KA-0012-0599 Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

State of Louisiana v. Wilcy Ernest Monceaux, Sr.

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit · Filed November 7, 2012

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Opinion text

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

12-599

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

WILCY ERNEST MONCEAUX, SR.

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON DAVIS, NO. 778-09
HONORABLE C. STEVE GUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JAMES T. GENOVESE
JUDGE

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Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, James T. Genovese, and Shannon J.
Gremillion, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Edward J. Marquet
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 53733
Lafayette, Louisiana 70505-3733
(337) 237-6841
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Wilcy Ernest Monceaux, Sr.

Michael C. Cassidy
District Attorney Thirty-First Judicial District
Stacey C. Naquin, Assistant District Attorney
Post Office Box 1388
Jennings, Louisiana 70546
(337) 824-1893
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

GENOVESE, Judge.

In this criminal case, Defendant, Wilcy Ernest Monceaux, Sr., pled guilty to

the offense of attempted manslaughter1 and was sentenced to twenty years at hard

labor. He appeals, alleging excessive sentence. For the following reasons, we

affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 12, 2009, officers with the Lake Arthur Police Department

responded to a call stating that Defendant was beating his ex-wife, Lucinda

Monceaux, and that he had a gun. Upon arriving at the scene, the officers

questioned witnesses, who advised that Defendant had beaten up his ex-wife and

fled the scene.

Officers found Lucinda bleeding from the nose, with a cut above her eye, a

busted lip, and a bruised and swollen face. She was sent to the hospital by

ambulance. Also at the scene was Edgar Lavergne, a next door neighbor, who had

intervened and fought with Defendant and had likewise been beaten up. He stated

that he was able to wrestle a .22 caliber pistol from Defendant and discard it.

After a search, the officers located Defendant at his home with both wrists

slit and bleeding profusely from both arms. He was also taken to the hospital.

Lucinda gave a statement that Defendant showed up at her rental property

where she was mowing the grass. He approached her and hit her in the face,

knocking her to the ground. He continued to hit and kick her. Then, he pulled out

a gun, put it between her eyes, and pulled the trigger twice. Luckily, the gun

malfunctioned and did not fire. She stated that her neighbor, Mr. Lavergne, came

over and interceded on her behalf, which allowed her to get away from Defendant.

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Defendant also pled guilty to a companion charge, false imprisonment with a weapon, which is
the subject of a separate appeal.

Two prospective renters of Lucinda’s property were there and also witnessed the

occurrence. Lucinda had previously procured a protective order which was in

effect at the time of this occurrence.

On September 4, 2009, the State filed a bill of information charging

Defendant with attempted first degree murder. Defendant entered a plea of not

guilty by reason of insanity. On October 17, 2011, Defendant entered a plea of

guilty to the amended charge of attempted manslaughter, a violation of

La.R.S. 14:27 and La.R.S. 14:31. On March 28, 2012, a sentencing hearing was

held wherein statements were read and the trial court heard testimony and

argument. On April 2, 2012, the trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty years at

hard labor, and Defendant lodged this appeal.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find no

errors patent.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

[The] [t]rial court erred in imposing the maximum
[twenty]-year sentence against a first-time felony offender with no
criminal history and a[n] uncontroverted medical condition at the time
of the offense of Alzheimer’s and paranoid psychosis who had been
discharged from a VA hospital a mere three days before the offense.

DISCUSSION

Defendant pled guilty to attempted manslaughter. According to the

manslaughter statute, “[w]hoever commits manslaughter shall be imprisoned at

hard labor for not more than forty years.” La.R.S. 14:31(B). According to the

attempt statute, “[w]hoever attempts to commit any crime shall be punished . . . in

the same manner as for the offense attempted . . . [except that] such . . .

imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of . . . the longest term of imprisonment

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prescribed for the offense . . . .” La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3). Therefore, the trial court

gave Defendant the maximum sentence provided by law for attempted

manslaughter.

Defendant, in brief, contends that his sentence is excessive, considering his

medical condition and the fact that he is a first felony offender.

In discussing maximum sentences, this court stated in State v.
Bailey, 07-130, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/3/07), 968 So.2d 247, 250:

A sentence which falls within the statutory limits
may be excessive under certain circumstances. To
constitute an excessive sentence, this Court must find that
the penalty is so grossly disproportionate to the severity
of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the
sentence makes no reasonable contribution to acceptable
penal goals and[,] therefore, is nothing more than the
needless imposition of pain and suffering. The trial
judge has broad discretion, and a reviewing court may
not set sentences aside absent a manifest abuse of
discretion.

State v. Guzman, 99-1753, 99-1528, p. 15 (La.5/16/00),
769 So.2d 1158, 1167 (citations omitted).

In State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846
So.2d 786
, 789, writ denied, 03-562 (La.5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061
(citations omitted), this court discussed the factors it would consider
in order to determine whether a sentence shocks the sense of justice or
makes no meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals:

In deciding whether a sentence is shocking or
makes no meaningful contribution to acceptable penal
goals, an appellate court may consider several factors
including the nature of the offense, the circumstances of
the offender, the legislative purpose behind the
punishment and a comparison of the sentences imposed
for similar crimes. While a comparison of sentences
imposed for similar crimes may provide some insight, “it
is well settled that sentences must be individualized to
the particular offender and to the particular offense
committed.” Additionally, it is within the purview of the
trial court to particularize the sentence because the trial
judge “remains in the best position to assess the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented by
each case.”

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“Generally, maximum sentences are reserved for those cases that
involve the most serious violations of the offense charged and the
worst type of offender.” State v. Jones, 05-735, p. 6 (La.App. 5 Cir.
2/27/06), 924 So.2d 1113, 1116.

State v. Maze, 09-1298, pp. 2-3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/10), 36 So.3d 1072, 1074-75.

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court gave sufficient, explicit, and

extensive reasons justifying the twenty-year maximum sentence given to

Defendant, stating (emphasis added):

You pled guilty of [sic] the crime of attempted manslaughter,
which normally carries with it a possible sentence of imprisonment, at
hard labor with the Department of Corrections, for not more than
twenty (20) years.

The Pre-Sentence Investigation indicates that you’re sixty-five
(65) years of age, born on March the 20th, 1947. You’re currently
divorced, having been married once to Lucinda Gaspard in 1971. You
have four (4) children from this marriage. You were divorced in 2011.
You attended school in Lake Arthur, Louisiana, and you graduated
from high school in 1966. After graduating, you joined the United
States Navy; however, you were later discharged due to health
problems. Prior to your arrest, you were employed in the
construction field, and you retired from the Jefferson Davis Parish
School Board for whom you worked as a maintenance supervisor for
twenty-two (22) years.

The Pre-Sentence Investigation states that you do not have a
juvenile criminal history. You have another arrest for false
imprisonment with a weapon to which you pled guilty on October
17th, 2011. The sentencing of false imprisonment is also set for today.

According to the Pre-Sentence Investigation, on August the
12th of 2009, Lake Arthur police officers were dispatched to a home
in Lake Arthur after a witness reported that you were beating your
wife and had a gun in your possession. When the police arrived,
witnesses advised them that you had left to get another gun because
your gun had misfired. The police called for an ambulance because
Ms. Marceaux -- Monceaux, excuse me, was bleeding from her nose
and other facial injuries. The police officers went -- then went to
your residence to question you, but you had attempted to harm
yourself by slitting -- slitting your wrists. At that point, the police
transported you to the hospital for treatment. During her interview,
Mrs. Monceaux told the officers that you had hit her several times in
the face and had pointed the gun between her eyes and threatened to
kill her. She stated that you had pulled the trigger twice, but both
times the gun misfired. A neighbor intervened, and Mrs. Monceaux
was able to get away. You were then arrested and charged with

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attempted first degree murder and other charges. On October 17th,
2011, after withdrawing your initial plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity, you pled guilty to the amended charge of attempted
manslaughter.

I am going to file the Pre-Sentence Investigation into the record
for further reference, if necessary.

In reviewing the Pre-Sentence Investigation, the Court takes
note of the fact that you are sixty-five (65) years of age. This has been
taken into consideration in mitigating against imposition of the
maximum sentence; however, the Court can find no other mitigating
factors.

The Court takes note of the fact that the district attorney’s
office initially charged you with attempted first degree murder, but
you were allowed to plead guilty to the reduced charge of attempted
manslaughter. There was testimony at the sentencing hearing as to
your voluntary intoxication and your use of ephedrine at the time you
-- at the time you committed the offense, and that these facts should
be taken into consideration when pronouncing your sentence.
However, the Court finds that these factors were already considered
when the district attorney’s office allowed the original charge to be
reduced in return for your plea of guilty. The prosecution has ample
evidence in this case that you demonstrated the offense was well-
planned before the incident occurred despite your claims of
incapacity. Furthermore, there was testimony from the victim that
you had a history of domestic abuse against both your wife and your
children going back several years which predated the incident at issue
herein.

In addition, the Court takes note of several aggravating factors
listed in Code of Criminal Procedure Article 894.1 that requires a
lengthy term of imprisonment -- excuse me, of incarceration. Your
conduct during the commission of the offense manifested deliberate
cruelty to the victim. You used actual violence in the commission of
the crime. The offense resulted in permanent injury or significant
economic loss to the victim or her family, and you used a dangerous
weapon in the commission of the offense.

Your involvement in this criminal activity demonstrates to this
Court that you -- that you cannot live in society and that this
community must be protected from you. You are certainly in need of
correctional treatment in a custodial environment for -- for a
significant period of time. Anything less would deprecate from the
seriousness of your offense, would not promote respect for the law,
and not -- and would not provide a just punishment for the crime of
which you stand convicted. This Court has an obligation to protect
the public from you and will do so by -- by removing you from
society.

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Therefore, the Court sentences you to the Department of
Corrections, State of Louisiana, to -- to be imprisoned at hard labor
for a period of time of twenty (20) years. The Court advises you that
you have two (2) years from the date this conviction and sentence
becomes final to apply for post- conviction relief, and you will be --
you will receive credit for time previously served, and the Court is
going to order the Pre-Sentence Investigation filed into the record and
sealed.

At the sentencing hearing, Defendant admitted the facts and occurrence of

the incident. Contrary to Defendant’s assertions, the transcript of the sentencing

hearing clearly indicates that the trial court did consider Defendant’s criminal

history and medical condition at the time of the offense. Although Defendant is a

first felony offender, his crime was vicious and very serious. Additionally, it is

undisputed that Defendant inflicted domestic physical and mental abuse upon his

ex-wife in excess of thirty years. In fact, there was a protective order in effect to

protect the ex-wife at the time of the offense. Additionally, the record clearly

indicates that this occurrence would have resulted in a completed homicide, as

opposed to an attempt, but for the misfiring of the gun and intervention by the

neighbor.

Defendant claims to have Alzheimer’s disease, but his expert, Dr. Lawrence

Dilks, a neuropsychiatrist, testified at the sentencing hearing and only gave a

diagnosis of “mild cognitive decline”―a precursor to Alzheimer’s disease. This

was noted by the trial court in its sentencing.

Considering the factors leading up to and through Defendant’s commission

of this offense and its companion charge, the benefit of allowing Defendant to

plead down to the lesser offense of attempted manslaughter as opposed to

attempted first degree murder and a potential fifty-year sentence therefor, and the

mitigating factors alleged by Defendant, we find no manifest abuse of discretion by

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the trial court in sentencing Defendant to the maximum twenty years at hard labor

for the lesser offense of attempted manslaughter.

DISPOSITION

Defendant’s sentence is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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