State of Louisiana v. Stanley Charles Young, III

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

12-780

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

STANLEY CHARLES YOUNG, III

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF GRANT, NO. 10-648
HONORABLE WARREN D. WILLETT, DISTRICT JUDGE

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PHYLLIS M. KEATY
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Phyllis M. Keaty, and John E. Conery,
Judges.

AFFIRMED. REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

James P. Lemoine
District Attorney
Renee W. Dugas
Assistant District Attorney
200 Main Street
Colfax, Louisiana 71417
(318) 627-2971
Counsel for Appellee:
State of Louisiana

Edward J. Marquet
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 53733
Lafayette, Louisiana 70505
(337) 237-6841
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Stanley Charles Young, III

KEATY, Judge.

Defendant, Stanley Charles Young, III, was charged by bill of information

with carnal knowledge of a juvenile, a violation of La.R.S. 14:80. Defendant

entered a plea of not guilty and later filed a motion to waive trial by jury. Prior to

trial, the State amended the bill of information to reflect a change in the date of the

offense. After a bench trial, Defendant was found guilty.

Defendant was sentenced to serve five years at hard labor, with all but one

year of the sentence suspended. Upon release from incarceration, Defendant was

ordered to be placed on five years supervised probation and to pay a fine of $2,500

plus court costs. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence which was

denied after a contradictory hearing.

Defendant now appeals, asserting that the State failed to prove that the

victim, J.S.,1 was under the age of seventeen at the time of the offense. For the

following reasons, we affirm.

DISCUSSION

Facts

At trial, J.S. testified that she was a runaway who told people she met that

her name was S.P. and that she was twenty-one years old. J.S. met Rodney

Holmes and entered into an arrangement to babysit his child. While living with

Holmes, J.S. met Defendant.

J.S. testified that she and Defendant had consensual sex several times at

Defendant‘s residence. J.S. also testified that she and Defendant never discussed

her age, and she did not tell him she was twenty-one. J.S. further indicated she

was not married to Defendant.

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We use the initials of the victim‘s given name and of the alias she used in order to keep
her identity confidential in accordance with La.R.S. 46:1844(W).

At trial, J.S. gave her date of birth as July 15, 1994, and stated she was

seventeen years old. She stated that she was fifteen years old in December 2009,

the month in which the offense occurred. Defendant‘s driver‘s license listed his

date of birth as July 5, 1978.

Errors Patent

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by

this court for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record,

we note one error patent.

As a condition of probation, the trial court ordered Defendant to pay a fine

of $2,500 and to pay a $750 fee to the Public Defender‘s Office; however, the

court failed to impose a payment plan for the fine and fee.

In State v. Wagner, 07-127, p. 7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/5/08), 996 So.2d 1203,

1208 (citations omitted), this court held in pertinent part:

When the fines and costs are imposed as a condition of
probation, but the trial court is silent as to the mode of payment or the
trial court attempts to establish a payment plan, this court has required
a specific payment plan be established.

We view this procedure as no different from payment plans for
restitution.

We, therefore, remand this case to the trial court for
establishment of a payment plan for the fine, noting that the plan may
either be determined by the trial court or by Probation and Parole,
with approval by the trial court.

Similarly, the trial court‘s ordering the payment to the crime lab
fund during the period of probation is an insufficient payment plan.
We also remand the case to the trial court for establishment of a
payment plan for these costs, noting that the plan may either be
determined by the trial court or by Probation and Parole, with
approval by the trial court.

Consequently, we remand this case to the trial court for the imposition of a

payment plan for the $2,500 fine and the $750 to be paid to the Public Defender‘s

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Office as a condition of probation. The plan may either be determined by the trial

court or by Probation and Parole, with approval by the trial court.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

In his only assignment of error, Defendant contends that the trier of fact

erred in determining J.S. was a person less than seventeen years of age, a required

element of the charged offense.

Defendant was convicted of carnal knowledge of a juvenile, which is

committed when:

A person who is seventeen years of age or older has sexual
intercourse, with consent, with a person who is thirteen years of age or
older but less than seventeen years of age, when the victim is not the
spouse of the offender and when the difference between the age of the
victim and the age of the offender is four years or greater . . . .

La.R.S. 14:80(A)(1).

The standard of review in a sufficiency of the evidence claim is
―whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of each of the essential elements of the crime
charged.‖ State v. Leger, 05-11, p. 91 (La.7/10/06), 936 So.2d 108,
170, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1221, 127 S.Ct. 1279, 167 L.Ed.2d 100
(2007) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61
L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 678
(La.1984)). The Jackson standard of review is now legislatively
embodied in La.Code Crim.P. art. 821. It does not allow the appellate
court ―to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the
fact-finder.‖ State v. Pigford, 05-477, p. 6 (La.2/22/06), 922 So.2d
517, 521 (citing State v. Robertson, 96-1048 (La.10/4/96), 680 So.2d
1165). The appellate court‘s function is not to assess the credibility of
witnesses or reweigh the evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116
(La.10/16/95), 661 So.2d 442.

The factfinder‘s role is to weigh the credibility of witnesses.
State v. Ryan, 07-504 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/7/07), 969 So.2d 1268.
Thus, other than insuring the sufficiency evaluation standard of
Jackson, ―the appellate court should not second-guess the credibility
determination of the trier of fact,‖ but rather, it should defer to the
rational credibility and evidentiary determinations of the jury. Id. at
1270 (quoting State v. Lambert, 97-64, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir.
9/30/98), 720 So.2d 724, 726-27).

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However, an appellate court may impinge on the
fact finder‘s discretion and its role in determining the
credibility of witnesses ―only to the extent necessary to
guarantee the fundamental due process of law.‖ State v.
Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1310 (La.1988). In
determining the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
conviction, an appellate court must preserve ― ‗the
factfinder‘s role as weigher of the evidence‘ by
reviewing ‗all of the evidence . . . in the light most
favorable to the prosecution.‘ ‖ McDaniel v. Brown, 558
U.S. ____, ____, 130 S.Ct. 665, 674, 175 L.Ed.2d 582
(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct.
2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). When so viewed by
an appellate court, the relevant question is whether, on
the evidence presented at trial, ―any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319,
99 S.Ct. at 2789. Applied in cases relying on
circumstantial evidence, . . . this fundamental principle of
review means that when a jury ―reasonably rejects the
hypothesis of innocence presented by the defendant[ ],
that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless
there is another hypothesis which raises a reasonable
doubt.‖ State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 680 (La.1984).

State v. Strother, 09-2357, pp. 10-11 (La.10/22/10), 49 So.3d 372,
378.

State v. McKithern, 11-1402, pp. 6-7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/2/12), 93 So.3d 684, 691.

Defendant argues that the State failed to present adequate evidence to

establish the age of the victim, J.S. In support of his argument, Defendant cites

State v. Marigny, 532 So.2d 420 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1988), wherein the defendant was

convicted of carnal knowledge of a juvenile. Defendant asserts the first circuit

reversed the conviction because the ―only evidence introduced at trial relating to

proof of sexual intercourse was that of the alleged victim.‖ He further asserts that

the first circuit ―noted that no medical evidence was introduced notwithstanding

that the victim had been taken to at least two doctors.‖

Defendant asserts that the only evidence introduced in the case at bar

relating to J.S.‘s age was the testimony of J.S., whom he characterized as a

persistent liar. Defendant notes that no member of law enforcement, child
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protection services, J.S.‘s family, or J.S.‘s friends presented any evidence that

established her date of birth.

Defendant contrasts this case with State v. Lee, 465 So.2d 806 (La.App. 2

Cir.), writ denied, 468 So.2d 572 (La.1985), wherein the age difference between

the defendant and the victim was established by the testimony of several witnesses,

including the defendant. Defendant also cites State v. Joseph, 425 So.2d 1261,

(La.1983), wherein the supreme court stated that the unrebutted testimony of a

witness as to her age was sufficient to prove the fact. In support of this statement,

the supreme court cited La.R.S. 15:430.1, which provided as follows:

The testimony of a witness (otherwise deemed competent to
testify) as to his or her own age, shall be admissible into evidence in
all criminal prosecutions where it is necessary to prove the age of such
person. However, such testimony shall be subject to rebuttal by
competent evidence to the contrary. If no such evidence is presented,
the court or the jury, as the case may be, may conclude that the
original testimony of the witness as to his or her own age is sufficient.
This section is declared to be an exception to the hearsay evidence
rule.

As noted by Defendant, La.R.S. 15:430.1 was repealed by 1988 La. Acts No. 515,

§ 8, effective January 1, 1989. However, that statute‘s substance can be found in

La.Code Evid. art. 803, which states:

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even
though the declarant is available as a witness:

....

(24) Testimony as to age. A witness‘ testimony as to his own
age.

Defendant asserts that J.S. was not trustworthy because she lied to Holmes

about her age, she lied about her sexual relationship with Holmes, and she told

everyone that she was twenty-one years old. He further asserts that the State could

have easily presented reliable evidence of J.S.‘s age by introducing a copy of her

birth certificate; a copy of her baptismal certification; or through the testimony of
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her mother, father, or sibling. Defendant contends that, in view of the lack of any

physical form of identification regarding ―who is [S.P.]/J.S., no rational trier of fact

could conclude that the unreliable evidence/testimony established the age of

[S.P.]/J.S.‖

The State counters that J.S.‘s testimony as to her age is sufficient to sustain

Defendant‘s conviction. The State notes that Marigny, 532 So.2d 420, involved a

reversal of a conviction based on insufficient evidence of penetration. The State

also notes there was no objection to J.S.‘s testimony regarding her age, and

Defendant failed to present conflicting evidence as to her age. Finally, the State

submits that because the trial court observed J.S. first hand and determined she was

believable, this court should not second guess that credibility determination.

In State v. Herrin, 562 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 565 So.2d 942

(La.1990), the defendant was convicted of three counts of aggravated oral sexual

battery and one count of sexual battery. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred

in allowing the admission of uncertified, unauthenticated photocopies of the

victims‘ birth certificates as proof of the victims‘ ages. Addressing this issue, the

first circuit found: ―Even assuming, however, that the documents should not have

been introduced, the victims‘ testimony sufficed to establish their ages.‖ Id. at 7.

In State v. Brown, 627 So.2d 192, 197 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1993), writ denied,

93-3101 (La. 3/18/94), 634 So.2d 850, this court stated: ―To establish . . . the age

of the victim, a judge is permitted to take notice of defendant‘s physical

appearance and that of the victim in determining whether he was more than three

years older than the victim.‖

In State v. Day, 98-964 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/10/99), 735 So.2d 56, the

defendant was convicted of two counts of indecent behavior with a juvenile. On

appeal, the defendant argued that the State failed to prove the victims were under
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the age of seventeen at the time of the incidents. The fifth circuit noted there were

no cases involving circumstantial proof of the victims‘ ages. It then set forth

several cases addressing observation and circumstantial evidence used to infer a

defendant‘s age when there was no direct evidence of such presented. The court

then stated:

In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State
. . ., we find that the state failed to meet its burden of proving the ages
of [S.S.] and [S.R.] at the time of the incident. In the cases analyzed
above, other facts corroborated the allegation that the defendants were
of age to be convicted. In this case, we do not have the benefit of
viewing the witnesses, but know that there is very little difference
between the way a child looks at 17 years of age and the way she
looks at 18. Further, the fact that a witness is in high school does not
prove that the student is 17 or younger, and that fact cannot be
presumed. Therefore, since the State did not prove that the victims in
Count 5 were under 17 years old, we reverse the conviction in Count
5.

However, we reach a different result as to [K.M.] and count
two. We can and do take judicial notice of the fact that the school
which she attends is Schneckenburger Elementary School in Kenner,
Louisiana. La.C.E. art. 201. See: State v. Miskel, 95–584 (La.App.
5th Cir. 1/30/96), 668 So.2d 1299, 1304. Elementary students are
very unlikely [to] be over the age of seventeen. This fact and the fact
that the jury viewed the victim, is proof sufficient for any rational trier
of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, to find the essential element that the victim is under the
age of 17 beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, we find that the jury did
not err in convicting defendant of Count 2 of the bill of information.

Id. at 59-60.

J.S. testified that her date of birth was July 15, 1994, and that she was fifteen

years old at the time of the offense. Additionally, the trial court had the

opportunity to observe J.S. when she testified. Based on Herrin, 562 So.2d 1,

Brown, 627 So.2d 192, and Day, 735 So.2d 56, the testimony of J.S. and the trial

court‘s opportunity to observe her were sufficient to prove J.S.‘s age, and the State

did not need to present any corroborating evidence of her age through testimony or

documentation.

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The verdict indicates that the trial court chose to believe J.S. when she

testified that she was fifteen years old, and this court will not second guess that

credibility determination. Thus, we conclude that the State proved, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that J.S. was less than seventeen years of age at the time of the

offense. Consequently, the trial court did not err in determining that the State

proved that J.S. was less than seventeen years old at the time of the offense. There

is no merit to Defendant‘s sole assignment of error.

DECREE

Defendant‘s conviction and sentence are affirmed. This matter is remanded

to the trial court to impose a payment plan for the fine and fee as conditions of

probation. The plan may either be determined by the trial court or by Probation

and Parole, with approval by the trial court.

AFFIRMED. REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2–16.3.

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