State of Louisiana v. Kristyn Paige Hoffpauir

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

KA 12-862

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

KRISTYN PAIGE HOFFPAUIR

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF VERNON, NO. 79,567
HONORABLE JAMES RICHARD MITCHELL, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JIMMIE C. PETERS
JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Jimmie C. Peters and
Marc T. Amy, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Edward John Marquet
Attorney at Law
P. O. Box 53733
Lafayette, LA 70505-3733
(337) 237-6841
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT /APPELLANT:
Kristyn Paige Hoffpauir

Asa Allen Skinner
District Attorney
Thirtieth Judicial District
P. O. Box 1188
Leesville, LA 71496-1188
(337) 239-2008
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Terry Wayne Lambright
Attorney at Law
118 South Third Street, Suite A
Leesville, LA 71446
(337) 239-6557
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

PETERS, J.

On July 21, 2010, a grand jury indicted the defendant, Kristyn Paige

Hoffpauir, with second degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1, and

conspiracy to commit second degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:26 and

La.R.S. 14:30.1. Pursuant to a plea agreement, on June 6, 2011, the State of

Louisiana (state) reduced the second degree murder charge to the responsive

charge of manslaughter, a violation of R.S. 14:31, and dismissed the conspiracy to

commit second degree murder charge. It also filed a bill of information under a

separate docket number charging the defendant with obstruction of justice, a

violation of La.R.S. 14:130.1, and conspiracy to commit manslaughter, a violation

of La.R.S. 14:26 and La.R.S. 14:31. In exchange for this action by the state, the

defendant entered a plea of guilty to the three remaining charges, and agreed to

assist in the prosecution of her codefendant, Justin Sizemore.

At the June 6, 2012 sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the

defendant to serve thirty years at hard labor on the manslaughter conviction,

twenty years at hard labor on the conspiracy to commit manslaughter charge, and

twenty-five years at hard labor on the obstruction of justice charge. The trial court

ordered that the thirty and twenty-year sentences run concurrently, and that the

twenty-five year sentence run consecutive to the other two sentences. In her

motion to reconsider the sentences imposed, the defendant asserted only that

sentences were excessive and improper. After the trial court rejected her

reconsideration motion, the defendant perfected this appeal asserting that the trial

court erred in imposing the twenty-five year sentence to run consecutive to the

thirty-year sentence imposed for the manslaughter conviction because the trial

court failed to provide ―the required ‗particular justification‘‖ for the consecutive

nature of the sentence.1 For the following reasons, we affirm the sentences at issue

in this appeal in all respects.

The factual basis giving rise to these criminal charges was set forth by the

state at the plea hearing and further established by other evidence in the record.

There is no dispute concerning these facts. On June 14, 2010, the defendant and

Justin Sizemore drove to Vernon Parish to pick up Christopher Hoffpauir, the

defendant‘s husband from whom she was separated. The defendant and Sizemore

lured Hoffpauir to a preplanned remote location in Vernon Parish, Louisiana, were

they killed him. They then hid and destroyed evidence that would have reasonably

proved relevant elements of the three offenses to which the defendant pled. The

apparent motivation for this planned action by the defendant and Sizemore was the

existence of a $400,000.00 insurance policy insuring the victim‘s life and naming

the defendant as beneficiary.

Errors Patent

Pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 920(2), we are required to consider any

―error that is discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings

and without inspection of the evidence.‖ We find no such error in this matter.

Assignment of Error

The defendant‘s motion to reconsider her sentences asserted only that her

sentences were ―excessive and improper.‖ On appeal, she asserts only that the

total fifty-five year sentence is excessive because the trial court failed to provide

justification for imposing consecutive sentences.

1
The defendant filed a separate appeal in the bill of information docket number and
caused the appeals to be consolidated on appeal for briefing purposes only. In that separate
appeal, State v. Hoffpauir, 12-865 (La.App. 3 Cir. ___/___/___), the defendant raised the same
excessiveness issue as is before the court in this appeal. That matter has been disposed of this
day by reference to the opinion in this appeal.
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With regard to the required scope of a trial motion to reconsider a sentence,

La.Code Crim.P. art. 881.1(E) provides that:

Failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence or to
include a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider sentence
may be based, including a claim of excessiveness, shall preclude the
state or the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence or
from urging any ground not raised in the motion on appeal or review.

Given the limited scope of the defendant‘s trial motion to reconsider the sentences,

on appeal, we need only consider a bare-bones claim of excessiveness and

determine whether the consecutive nature of the sentences leads to a constitutional

violation. See State v. Wood, 08-1511 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/3/09), 11 So.3d 701; State

v. Granger, 08-1480 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/3/09), 11 So.3d 658.

The standard to be used in reviewing an excessive sentence claim is well

settled.

La.Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, ―[n]o law shall subject
any person to cruel or unusual punishment.‖ To constitute an
excessive sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our
sense of justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution
to acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a
needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404
So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial court has wide discretion in the
imposition of sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence
shall not be set aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of
discretion. State v. Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746
So.2d 124, writ denied, 00-0165 (La.6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The
relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing
discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more
appropriate. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957,
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d
1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331.

In deciding whether a sentence shocks the sense of justice or makes no meaningful

contribution to acceptable penal goals, this court has held the following:

[A]n appellate court may consider several factors including the nature
of the offense, the circumstances of the offender, the legislative
purpose behind the punishment and a comparison of the sentences
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imposed for similar crimes. State v. Smith, 99-0606 (La.7/6/00), 766
So.2d 501. While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar
crimes may provide some insight, ―it is well settled that sentences
must be individualized to the particular offender and to the particular
offense committed.‖ State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1
Cir.1991). Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to
particularize the sentence because the trial judge ―remains in the best
position to assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
presented by each case.‖ State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674
So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ
denied, 03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061.

We find that, when considered individually, both sentences imposed are within the

statutory limits, are within the sound discretion of the trial court, do not shock our

sense of justice, and do make meaningful contributions to acceptable penal goals.

See La.R.S. 14:31(B) and 14:130.1(B).

The defendant does not contest the length of the individual sentences.

Rather, she asserts that when the sentences run consecutively, the resulting fifty-

five year term of imprisonment is excessive. Louisiana Code of Criminal

Procedure Article 883 provides the following:

If the defendant is convicted of two or more offenses based on
the same act or transaction, or constituting parts of a common scheme
or plan, the terms of imprisonment shall be served concurrently unless
the court expressly directs that some or all be served consecutively.
Other sentences of imprisonment shall be served consecutively unless
the court expressly directs that some or all of them be served
concurrently. In the case of the concurrent sentence the judge shall
specify, and the court minutes shall reflect, the date from which the
sentences are to run concurrently.

As pointed out in State v. Massey, 08-839, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/10/08), 999

So.2d 343, 348, consecutive sentences may be imposed at the trial court‘s

discretion if it can justify the imposition of consecutive sentences rather than

concurrent sentences:

Pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 883, concurrent sentences are
preferred when the offenses arise out of a common scheme or plan,
particularly if the offender is a first-time offender. State v.
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Thibodeaux, 05-1187 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/1/06), 924 So.2d 1205, writ
denied, 06-700 (La. 10/6/06), 938 So.2d 65. However, consecutive
sentences are not prohibited; rather, the trial court must justify its
imposition of consecutive sentences.

In State v. Coleman, 32,906, p. 42 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/5/00), 756
So.2d 1218, 1247-48, writ denied, 00-1572 (La.3/23/01), 787 So.2d
1010 (citations omitted), the court identified several factors a trial
court should consider when imposing a consecutive sentence:

[T]he defendant‘s criminal history; the gravity or
dangerousness of the offense; the viciousness of the
crimes; the harm done to the victims; whether the
defendant constitutes an unusual risk of danger to the
public; the defendant's apparent disregard for the
property of others; the potential for the defendant‘s
rehabilitation; and whether the defendant has received a
benefit from a plea bargain.

In sentencing the defendant, the trial court stated that its review of the record

established that the defendant and Sizemore ―came up with a plan to kill‖ the

victim, that the defendant ―was not just an innocent bystander,‖ that she ―had a lot

to do with initiating this plan,‖ and that the two of them carried it out. With regard

to motive, the trial court pointed to the life insurance policy, and described the

entire scenario as ―just pure evil on the part of these two people.‖ The trial court

further stated that it had considered the sentencing guidelines set forth in La.Code

Crim.P. art. 894.1, the content of a pre-sentence investigative report, and letters

from the defendant‘s and victim‘s families. Summarizing the sentences imposed

and particularly the reasons for imposing the consecutive sentences, the trial court

stated the following:

In this case there was certainly harm to the victim in that the victim
was killed and for apparently no reason that would in any way justify
this conduct. This defendant was – did not act under any kind of
provocation from the victim. The defendant, as was stated, does have
one child and that child apparently is now living with that child‘s
father, and apparently, Ms. Hoffpauir‘s rights to the child have been
terminated. Defendant is in good health. Her past employment record
consists of working for two months. She has about an eighth grade
education, does not have a G.E.D. I have no information about her
ever having any kind of drug or alcohol abuse or drug or alcohol
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treatment. And, as Ms. Nelson stated, she does not have any prior
criminal record. However, due to the seriousness of this case, and
what happened in this matter, and the conduct by Ms. Hoffpauir, the
sentence is as follows: On the charge of manslaughter, it will be the
sentence of this Court that you serve 30 years at hard labor with the
Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections. On the
offense of conspiracy to commit manslaughter, it will be the sentence
of the Court that you serve 20 years with the Louisiana Department of
Public Safety and Corrections. You will be given credit for time
served on all of these. Those two will run concurrent with each other.
On the charge of obstruction of justice, and I will make the comment
that this is a separate crime that basically occurred after the killing of
Mr. Hoffpauir. This defendant committed obstruction of justice by
lying to the police, changing her story several times, by destroying
written evidence that apparently was some kind of instructions from
Mr. Sizemore to help in covering up this crime. On that offense, it is
the sentence of the Court that the defendant serve 25 years at hard
labor with the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections
and that would be consecutive to the other two charges.

We need not reach the question of whether the trial court erred in

determining that the subsequent activity giving rise to the obstruction of justice

charge was not part of the original common scheme or plan to kill the victim. The

trial court articulated a sufficient basis for the imposition of consecutive sentences.

Furthermore, she received a significant benefit from her plea bargain. A

conviction on the second degree murder charge would have resulted in a

mandatory life sentence without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of

sentence. La.R.S. 14:30.1(B). We find no abuse of the trial court‘s discretion in

sentencing the defendant to consecutive sentences for the offenses of manslaughter

and obstruction of justice. We find no merit in the defendant‘s assignment of

error.

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DISPOSITION

We affirm the defendant‘s sentences for the manslaughter and obstruction of

justice convictions in all respects.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.3.

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