State of Louisiana v. Kenneth Earl Steelman

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

12-1008

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

KENNETH EARL STEELMAN

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF SABINE, NO. 68258
HONORABLE STEPHEN B. BEASLEY, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

PHYLLIS M. KEATY
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, J. David Painter, and Phyllis M. Keaty,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Don M. Burkett
District Attorney
Anna L. Garcie
Assistant District Attorney
Post Office Box 1557
Many, Louisiana 71449
(318) 256-6246
Counsel for Appellee:
State of Louisiana

Bryce J. Denny
Attorney At Law
209 Polk Street
Mansfield, Louisiana 71052
(318) 871-5007
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Kenneth Earl Steelman

KEATY, Judge.

On September 20, 2010, Defendant, Kenneth Earl Steelman, was indicted by

a grand jury with aggravated rape, in violation of La.R.S. 14:42. Following a

bench trial, Defendant was found guilty as charged on February 15, 2012. 1

Defendant filed a motion for post verdict judgment of acquittal which was denied

prior to sentencing. On June 7, 2012, Defendant was sentenced to serve life in

prison without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Defendant is now before this court on appeal, challenging his conviction.

For the following reasons, Defendant’s conviction is affirmed.

FACTS

Prior to and during the marriage of Defendant and the victim’s mother,

Bridget Steelman, Defendant inappropriately touched and sexually violated the

victim, his step-daughter A.D., on multiple occasions over the course of several

years.

DISCUSSION

Errors Patent

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by

this court for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record,

we find no errors patent.

Assignments of Error Numbers Two and Three

By these assignments of error, Defendant argues that the evidence was

insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated rape. Defendant also contends

that the trial court erred in denying his motion for post verdict judgment of

acquittal. We will address these assignments of error first in the event Defendant is

1
Defendant was also indicted with and found guilty of indecent behavior with a juvenile
involving the victim’s older sister, P.D. His appeal of that conviction is pending before this
court in Docket Number 12-1009.

entitled to an acquittal. See State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731 (La.1992). ―When the

entirety of the evidence, including inadmissible evidence which was erroneously

admitted, is insufficient to support the conviction, the accused must be discharged

as to that crime, and any discussion by the court of the trial error issues as to that

crime would be pure dicta since those issues are moot.‖ Id. at 734.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

The analysis for a claim of insufficient evidence is well settled:

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the
evidence claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789,
61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305 (La.1988).
A determination of the weight of evidence is a question of fact, resting
solely with the trier of fact who may accept or reject, in whole or in
part, the testimony of any witnesses. State v. Silman, 95-0154
(La.11/27/95), 663 So.2d 27, 35. A reviewing court may impinge on
the factfinding function of the jury only to the extent necessary to
assure the Jackson standard of review. State v. Bordenave, 95-2328
(La.4/26/96), 678 So.2d 19, 20. It is not the function of an appellate
court to assess credibility or re-weigh the evidence. Id.

State v. Macon, 06-481, pp. 7-8 (La. 6/1/07), 957 So.2d 1280, 1285-86.

A victim’s or witness’s testimony alone is usually sufficient to support
the verdict, as appellate courts will not second-guess the credibility
determinations of the fact finder beyond the constitutional standard of
sufficiency. State v. Davis, 02-1043, p. 3 (La.6/27/03); 848 So.2d
557, 559. In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable
conflict with physical evidence, one witness’s testimony, if believed
by the fact finder, is sufficient support for a requisite factual
conclusion. State v. Robinson, 02-1869, p. 16 (La.4/14/04); 874 So.2d
66, 79.

State v. Dorsey, 10-216, p. 43-44 (La. 9/7/11), 74 So.3d 603, 634, cert. denied, ___

U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1859 (2012); see also State v. Simon, 10-1111 (La.App. 3 Cir.

4/13/11), 62 So.3d 318, writ denied, 11-1008 (La. 11/4/11), 75 So.3d 922.

Aggravated rape is defined in La.R.S. 14:42, which reads in pertinent part:

A. Aggravated rape is a rape committed . . . where the anal,
oral, or vaginal sexual intercourse is deemed to be without lawful
2

consent of the victim because it is committed under any one or more
of the following circumstances:

....

(4) When the victim is under the age of thirteen years. Lack of
knowledge of the victim’s age shall not be a defense.

On appeal, Defendant contends that A.D. and her older sister, P.D., were

coached by relatives as to what to say during their videotaped interviews and at

trial. Defendant maintains that the coaching shed doubt upon the candor and

truthfulness of A.D. and P.D.’s testimonies. Defendant also complains that an

alternate theory of innocence was not investigated involving the alleged

molestation of A.D. and P.D. by their uncle. Defendant contends that the uncle’s

molestation of A.D. and P.D. would explain how they could testify in a sexually

descriptive manner. Additionally, Defendant asserts that the lack of medical or

psychiatric care for A.D. is highly inconsistent with an alleged rape and is

suggestive of a manipulated claim. Lastly, Defendant points to alleged

inconsistences in the testimonies of A.D. and P.D.

At trial, Detective Jason Rivers with the Sabine Parish Sheriff’s Office

testified that on August 2, 2010, A.D. and P.D.’s mother reported that her husband,

Defendant herein, had made inappropriate advances and possibly sexual advances

on A.D. and P.D. Defendant objected to the introduction of Mrs. Steelman’s

statement because she died prior to trial, thus, making her statement hearsay and

hearsay within hearsay with regard to what her daughters stated to her. Before the

trial court ruled on the objection, the State decided not to introduce

Mrs. Steelman’s statement into evidence.

Detective Rivers further testified that Defendant was interviewed on August

16, 2010. At the beginning of the interview, Defendant immediately reported that

he had information that A.D. and P.D. were molested by their uncle. Detective
3

Rivers stopped Defendant from speaking further and then explained his Miranda

rights. Defendant signed a waiver form and agreed to be interviewed. Detective

Rivers ended the interview soon after it began because Defendant asked for an

attorney.

Detective Rivers did not know if either A.D. or P.D. was referred for

medical treatment or evaluation. He did not send them because there was no report

of penetration and he did not want to put A.D. and P.D. through an examination if

not necessary. Detective Rivers stated that he investigated Defendant’s allegation

that A.D. and P.D. were molested by an uncle by interviewing the uncle by

telephone and by speaking with family members. At trial, neither party questioned

Detective Rivers about the outcome of his investigation regarding the uncle.

On August 6, 2010, A.D. and P.D. were interviewed by Christy Pennison, a

child forensic interviewer at the Rapides Children’s Advocacy Center (RCAC) in

Alexandria, Louisiana. A DVD recording and transcript of A.D.’s interview were

introduced into evidence, and the video recording was played for the court. In her

interview, A.D. reported that she was ten years old. Her biological father died

when she was a toddler; thus, she never knew him. A.D. stated that the abuse

started when she was about five years old when her mother married Defendant.

Her mother was unaware that Defendant molested ―kids‖ and that he had molested

both her and her sister.

According to A.D., the abuse came to light as follows:

A.D.: And he did a lot of things to me and he thought that I
wouldn’t tell nobody but he thought wrong because I did. I told my
mama and I told my-- like my sister’s best friend. She said she
wouldn’t tell nobody.

....

4

A.D.: And I told her and she wasn’t supposed to tell nobody
but it came around on the phone and it went to like my-- my mama’s
friend-- other friend, Jessica. She’s like big Jess.

....

A.D.: And it went from, uh, little Jess to big Jess to Ms. Pam to
my mom. And we had to tell her what happened and I didn’t want to
because I was scared to.

MS. PENNISON: Uh huh.

A.D.: And I figured that she would have been mad at me since
we didn’t tell her a long time ago.

When asked about the details of the molestation, A.D. told Ms. Pennison

that Defendant ―messed‖ with her in her ―social‖ areas and pointed to her breasts

and vagina, saying that Defendant licked her vagina and played with her breasts.

According to A.D., it happened often when her mother was not home. Defendant

would call her into his bedroom and begin touching her breasts and vagina with his

hands. Defendant would call her bad names when she refused his advances. On

two occasions, Defendant tried to insert his penis into A.D.’s vagina. The most

recent occasion was about a month and a half prior to her interview. When she

told Defendant that it hurt, he stated that he understood because it was too small.

She asserted that it hurt a lot. Defendant would touch A.D.’s breasts on top of her

clothes and then try to remove her clothes. Often times, she would resist when

Defendant tried to remove her clothes. A.D. saw ―white stuff‖ come out of

Defendant’s penis. Defendant instructed A.D. not to tell anyone. She agreed not

to tell her mother because her mother was too sick.

Ms. Pennison asked A.D. about her sister, and she related:

MS. PENNISON: Okay. What about your sister, do you think
he [the Defendant] did anything to your sister?

A.D.: I know that he tried – like she told me – like my mama
told her like to get her story straight before we got up here. But like

5

before we left the house, we was talking about what we were going to
say and she said that he touched her boobs-

MS. PENNISON: Uh huh.

A.D.: And she just didn’t (inaudible).

MS. PENNISON: Well, and tell me more about that. You said
that your mom like was telling y’all to make sure you had your story
straight before y’all came up here [advocacy center]?

A.D.: Yeah. Like to – like to tell the truth about what
happened.

MS. PENNISON: Uh huh, okay. So y’all were talking about
that before y’all came about making sure you tell the truth and stuff
like that, okay. Did you ever – did you ever see any of that happen
between your step dad and your sister?

A.D.: Like once.

....

A.D.: And like I was walking outside to go play basketball
with my brother because he was out there too.

MS. PENNISON: Uh huh.

A.D.: And like I went outside and what he – when he was out
there and I was going and he went back in and then like my sister was
on the trampoline because she was out there too. And he was in the
house and he came out and he got on the trampoline and then he
started doing stuff and I wasn’t even looking. I had the ball in my
hand and I was starting to shoot and then I looked over and he started
touching her boobs.

MS. PENNISON: Then he started touching her boobs so you
saw that happen?

A.D.: (nodding affirmatively).

At trial, A.D., then twelve years old, recalled telling her friend, Jessica Hurd

(Jess), that Defendant was ―doing things‖ to her. A.D. explained that she could not

keep the secret any longer and needed to ―get it out.‖ A.D. asked Jess not to tell

anyone.

6

A.D. testified that Defendant touched her breasts and vagina with his hands

both on top and beneath her clothing. He also touched her vagina with his penis

with her clothes on and off. Defendant would rub his penis on her vagina, and he

tried to put his penis into her vagina. After twice telling Defendant that he was

hurting her, he stopped. A.D. saw something come from his penis at that time.

A.D. stated that her mother was not home when the molestation occurred.

A.D. testified that she was hesitant to tell her mother about the abuse

because her mother was already sick and under a lot of stress, and A.D. did not

want to make it worse for her. Defendant told her not to tell anyone. A.D.

maintained that her mother never asked her to lie about Defendant.

On cross-examination, A.D. recalled the day she went to the RCAC with

P.D. and their aunt. Prior to leaving, she and P.D. talked with their mother about

what they were going to say during their interviews. According to A.D., their

mother told P.D. that she needed to get her story straight. A.D. also testified that

her uncle had also touched her inappropriately.

A DVD recording and transcript of P.D.’s interview with Ms. Pennison were

also introduced into evidence, and the video recording was played for the court.

P.D. stated she was fifteen years old. She could not exactly recall when Defendant

began to behave inappropriately with her. She was young, probably nine or ten

years old, when Defendant married her mother. Defendant started ―feeling‖ on

P.D. and A.D. and tried to ―mess‖ with them. Defendant touched P.D.

―everywhere.‖ P.D. stated that she did not want to be home alone with Defendant.

The abuse usually occurred when P.D.’s mother was not home. Defendant also

abused P.D. when her brother and A.D. were home. Her brother would be outside,

and A.D. would be in another room. Defendant would ask P.D. if he could touch

her. When she would say no, Defendant would get mad, call her a name, and walk
7

away. When Defendant did touch her inappropriately, she was wearing clothes,

and he touched her on top of her clothing. Defendant touched P.D.’s breasts and

vagina with his hands.

P.D. told Ms. Pennison that she was not sure where Defendant touched A.D.

as she was not around when the Defendant abused A.D., and she never saw

Defendant abuse A.D. P.D. told A.D. and her mother that Defendant was abusing

her. The last time Defendant touched P.D. was about two months prior to the

interview.

P.D. told Ms. Pennison that she had recently learned that Defendant had also

had inappropriate sexual contact with her cousin, Ethel. P.D. explained:

P.D.: Well, my cousin, Ethel, she told my grandma about it
because she had to tell somebody and she ended up telling her
grandma, her friends, her sister and she told one of her uncles.

MS. PENNISON: Uh huh.

P.D.: Which she told her grandma and her grandma told my
mom and my mom got us and started talking about it and she—she
told us she didn’t want anything but the truth right now and tell her if
he’d ever done anything to us. And then my sister just started saying
stuff of what he really did and I joined in on it to tell her.

When asked how often she was abused by Defendant, P.D. told

Ms. Pennison it was not often ―because he’ll do it like one time that day and then

wait maybe awhile . . . or something like that. Because I wouldn’t let him.‖

At trial, P.D., then seventeen years old, testified that she was eight years old

when her mother married Defendant and the molestation began before their

marriage. The abuse occurred when her mother was gone from the home or in a

different room in the home. Defendant would walk into P.D.’s room and ask her if

he could ―mess‖ with her breasts or her vagina. Defendant touched her breasts and

vagina with his hands, both on top of and beneath her clothing. On one occasion,

Defendant tried to touch her vagina with his penis.
8

P.D. testified that she was sixteen years old when she told her mother about

the abuse. She did not tell her mother sooner because she was scared that

Defendant would get mad and hit her mother and her mother was already under a

lot of stress at the time. Before P.D. told her mother of the abuse, A.D. told P.D.

that Defendant was molesting her. P.D. told A.D. to try and stay away from

Defendant because she did not want A.D. to be in the same position as herself.

P.D. finally told her mother about the abuse once Defendant was no longer living

with them. P.D. stated that she did speak to her mother about what happened to

her and A.D, but she maintained that her mother never told her what to say to the

police or to Ms. Pennison.

On cross-examination, P.D. testified that her aunt, Lisa Keese, drove her and

A.D. to the RCAC. Her mother did not go with them. P.D. was then asked:

Q All right. Before you went to Alexandria with your – with
this group, did you and your mother and your sister have a
conversation, right before you went to Alexandria, about what y’all
were going to talk about?

A No, sir.

Q There was never anything – your mother never said for y’all
to get your story straight or never told you to get your story straight?

A No, sir.

P.D. was questioned about her prior statement wherein she indicated she had her

clothing on when the abuse occurred. She maintained that her clothes were both

on and off when Defendant touched her. P.D. testified that Defendant touched her

approximately three times.

Pamela Hurd, a friend of A.D.’s mother, testified that her daughter, Jess,

knew A.D. and P.D. Pamela frequently saw Mrs. Steelman on a social basis.

Around the end of July 2010 and first part of August 2010, Pamela learned from

9

Jess that Defendant was molesting A.D. She then called Mrs. Steelman to

investigate the allegation.

Jess testified that she was acquainted with A.D. and P.D. She stated that

they were playing softball one day, and while in the dugout, A.D. told Jess that

Defendant had been molesting her. A.D. also told her that on one occasion, she

had to take a shower with Defendant before he allowed her to go to church with

her grandmother. When Jess told A.D. that she needed to tell someone about the

abuse, A.D. said she did not want to tell anyone. About a week later, Jess told her

sister-in-law, Jessica Hurd (Jessica), about the abuse.

Kristen Steelman, Defendant’s niece, testified that she was also friends with

A.D. and P.D. According to Kristen, A.D. stated that she was tired of the way

Defendant would discipline them when they misbehaved. Kristen testified that

A.D. told her that she knew of a way to get Defendant out of the house and her life,

and she was going to do it. When asked about A.D.’s plan, Kristen explained that

the victim knew if she kept misbehaving and aggravating Defendant enough, he

would discipline her, and in turn, her mother would kick him out of the house.

In State v. Rideaux, 05-446, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/05), 916 So.2d 488,

491 (citation omitted), this court observed the following ruling in State v. Roca,

03-1076 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/13/04), 866 So.2d 867, writ denied, 04-583 (La. 7/2/04),

877 So.2d 143:

In the absence of internal contradiction or
irreconcilable conflict with physical evidence, one
witness’s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is
sufficient support for a requisite factual finding. In the
case of sexual offenses, the testimony of the victim alone
can be sufficient to establish the elements of a sexual
offense, even where the State does not introduce medical,
scientific or physical evidence to prove the commission
of the offense.

10

We conclude that the testimony of A.D., alone, established that Defendant

committed aggravated rape as defined in La.R.S. 14:42. Although A.D. stated that

her mother told P.D. to get her story straight, A.D. subsequently clarified her

statement, explaining that their mother wanted P.D. to tell the truth. There was no

evidence adduced at trial to suggest that A.D. was coached or was not truthful in

her assertions.

A.D.’s testimony did reflect that her uncle had also touched her

inappropriately. However, aside from a single statement made by A.D., there was

no other evidence adduced at trial to suggest that she learned of sexual acts from

her uncle as opposed to Defendant or to show that her uncle touched her in the

same manner as Defendant allegedly touched her. Although there was no evidence

introduced at trial to show that either A.D. or P.D. received medical or psychiatric

care, the lack of same is not suggestive of a manipulated claim considering the

facts herein. Additionally, the health of A.D.’s mother was in jeopardy at the time

she was apprised of the A.D.’s sexual abuse, and she subsequently passed away

before trial. As such, the trial court’s conclusion that the family’s focus was on

the declining health of A.D.’s mother, rather than on the medical and/or psychiatric

care of A.D. and her sister, was reasonable.

Lastly, Defendant’s assertion that A.D.’s testimony was ―wildly inconsistent

and contradictory‖ to P.D.’s testimony is not supported by the record. While

minor inconsistencies are apparent, they fail to shed doubt on A.D.’s credibility.

After having reviewed the entire record in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s

conviction for the aggravated rape of his step-daughter, A.D. Thus, there is no

merit to Defendant’s second assignment of error.

11

Motion for Post Verdict Judgment of Acquittal

In assignment of error number three, Defendant contends that the trial court

erred in denying his motion for post verdict judgment of acquittal. Defendant’s

motion for post verdict judgment of acquittal was filed on June 5, 2012. The

claims asserted in the motion are the same claims raised by Defendant on appeal in

the sufficiency of the evidence assignment of error. A hearing on the motion was

held on June 7, 2012, without the introduction of any new evidence or argument

heard at trial.

In State v. Mead, 36,131, p. 2 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/14/02), 823 So.2d 1045,

1047, writ denied, 02-2384 (La. 3/14/03), 839 So.2d 34, the court stated:

La.C.Cr.P. art. 821 provides that a motion for post-verdict
judgment of acquittal shall be granted only if the court finds that the
evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the state, does not
reasonably permit a finding of guilt. This is a question of legal
sufficiency of the evidence

As mentioned previously, we have concluded that there was sufficient

evidence to support Defendant’s conviction for the aggravated rape of his step-

daughter, A.D. Without the introduction of any new evidence at the hearing on

Defendant’s motion for post verdict judgment of acquittal and given the claims

asserted in the motion are the same claims raised on appeal in the sufficiency

assignment of error, the trial court did not err in denying the motion. Accordingly,

Defendant’s third assignment of error lacks merit.

Assignment of Error Number One
By this assignment of error, Defendant argues that the trial court erred when

it admitted the videotaped interviews of P.D. and A.D. into evidence. Defendant

contends that a pre-interview ―collusion‖ occurred between P.D., A.D., and their

mother, who allegedly directed them to get their stories straight. Defendant

maintains that Mrs. Steelman evaded the requirement of La.R.S. 15:440(A)(2) by

12

coaching P.D. and A.D. immediately prior to the taped interviews. Defendant also

contends that the State made no effort to explain the alleged coaching. Lastly,

Defendant asserts that the pre-interview coaching should be grounds for excluding

the videotaped statements of P.D. and A.D.

Evidence in the form of video recording of a ―protected person‖ 2 is

admissible pursuant to La.R.S. 15:440.4, which reads in pertinent part:

A. A videotape of a protected person may be offered in
evidence either for or against a defendant. To render such a videotape
competent evidence, it must be satisfactorily proved:

(1) That such electronic recording was voluntarily made by the
protected person.

(2) That no relative of the protected person was present in the
room where the recording was made.

(3) That such recording was not made of answers to
interrogatories calculated to lead the protected person to make any
particular statement.

(4) That the recording is accurate, has not been altered, and
reflects what the protected person said.

(5) That the taking of the protected person’s statement was
supervised by a physician, a social worker, a law enforcement officer,
a licensed psychologist, a medical psychologist, a licensed
professional counselor, or an authorized representative of the
Department of Children and Family Services.

In the instant case, the State offered the testimony of Ms. Pennison, who

received training in child forensic interviewing from the National Children’s

Advocacy Center in Huntsville, Alabama. According to Ms. Pennison, she was not

trained to draw any conclusions or make opinions with regard to her interviews;

she was trained to be purely objective in her interviewing. She worked at the

RCAC for about two years in the role of child forensic interviewer. Ms. Pennison

identified the videotaped interviews of A.D. and P.D., taken on August 6, 2010,

2
According to La.R.S. 15:440.2(C), the term ―protected person,‖ as used in this statute,
means, in pertinent part, any person who is a victim of a crime and is under the age of seventeen.
13

and she testified that the recording accurately depicted her interviews of A.D. and

P.D.

Defendant objected to the introduction of the videotaped interviews pursuant

to La.R.S. 15:440.4 and asserted that the interviews had to be supervised by a

physician, social worker, law enforcement officer, licensed psychologist, medical

psychologist, licensed professional counselor, or an authorized representative of

the Department of Children and Family Services. Defendant stressed that

Ms. Pennison did not indicate she was qualified under La.R.S. 15:440.4. Lastly,

Defendant challenged the admissibility of the interview transcripts, arguing that

they had no ―indicia of reliability.‖ Defendant maintained that the statements of

A.D. and P.D. were tainted because they got together with their mother, discussed

what they were going to say, and then immediately went to Alexandria to the

RCAC. Defendant contended that the statements were unreliable because A.D.

and P.D. had been coached.

Ms. Pennison testified that Detective Derrell Cassell escorted the victims to

the center and was present for the interviews in a separate room where he

monitored the interviews. Ms. Pennison wore an ear piece during the interviews so

Detective Cassell could interject if he needed more information or for her to

address certain things. The State subsequently re-urged that the recordings be

shown to the court. Defendant continued to object on the basis of La.R.S. 15:440.4

and argued that the officer sitting outside the interview room, listening and

watching, was not supervision. The trial court disagreed and overruled the

objection on that basis. With regard to the reliability of the interview statements,

the trial court noted that Defendant would have an opportunity to cross-examine

P.D. and A.D.; thus, the objection was overruled. P.D.’s interview was viewed

14

first, followed by A.D.’s interview. Prior to A.D.’s interview being viewed,

Defendant reiterated the same objection which was subsequently overruled.

Considering the record herein, we conclude that the video-recorded

interviews of P.D. and A.D. met the admissibility requirements of La.R.S.

15:440.4. The record indicates that the video recordings of P.D. and A.D.,

protected persons under La.R.S. 15:440.4, were voluntarily given, and no relatives

were in the room at the time of the recording. Additionally, Defendant does not

suggest, nor does the record indicate, that the video recordings were made of

answers to interrogatories calculated to lead the victims to make any particular

statement. There was no evidence to show that the video recordings were

inaccurate or had been altered. Lastly, the recorded interviews of P.D. and A.D.

were supervised by a law enforcement officer.

The admissibility of a videotaped statement is addressed in La.R.S.

15:440.5, which reads in pertinent part:

A. The videotape of an oral statement of the protected person
made before the proceeding begins may be admissible into evidence
if:

(1) No attorney for either party was present when the statement
was made;

(2) The recording is both visual and oral and is recorded on film
or videotape or by other electronic means;

(3) The recording is accurate, has not been altered, and reflects
what the witness or victim said;

(4) The statement was not made in response to questioning
calculated to lead the protected person to make a particular statement;

(5) Every voice on the recording is identified;

(6) The person conducting or supervising the interview of the
protected person in the recording is present at the proceeding and
available to testify or be cross-examined by either party;

15

(7) The defendant or the attorney for the defendant is afforded
an opportunity to view the recording before it is offered into evidence;
and

(8) The protected person is available to testify.

B. The admission into evidence of the videotape of a protected
person as authorized herein shall not preclude the prosecution from
calling the protected person as a witness or from taking the protected
person’s testimony outside of the courtroom as authorized in R.S.
15:283. Nothing in this Section shall be construed to prohibit the
defendant’s right of confrontation.

In the instant case, A.D. and P.D. both testified at trial and were subject to cross-

examination by Defendant. Defendant does not allege, nor does the record reflect,

that he was not provided copies of the video recordings.

The fact that A.D. and/or P.D. spoke with their mother before leaving home

to go to the RCAC was considered by the trial court in determining the credibility

of their statements and testimonies. The record consistently reflects that

Mrs. Steelman instructed her daughters to tell the truth during their interviews.

Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

DECREE

Defendant’s conviction is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2–16.3.

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