State of Louisiana v. Randall C. Thompson

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

12-1097

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

RANDALL C. THOMPSON

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 18414-08
HONORABLE G. MICHAEL CANADAY, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

JOHN E. CONERY
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, James T. Genovese, and John E. Conery,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Andre Belanger
James P. Manasseh
Manasseh, Gill, Knipe & Belanger, P.L.C.
8075 Jefferson Highway
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70809
(225) 383-9703
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
Randall C. Thompson

John Foster DeRosier
14th Judicial District Court
District Attorney
Karen C. McLellan
14th Judicial District Court
Assistant District Attorney
Carla S. Sigler
14th Judicial District Court
Assistant District Attorney
901 Lakeshore Drive, Suite 800
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601
(337) 437-3400
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

CONERY, Judge.

On September 13, 2011, Defendant, Randall C. Thompson, was convicted of

aggravated incest, a violation of La.R.S. 14:78.1, for touching his daughter’s

vaginal area. He was sentenced on October 28, 2011, to serve thirty-five years at

hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. He filed

a motion to reconsider sentence on November 23, 2011, which was denied on

December 9, 2011. Defendant has timely appealed his conviction only, alleging

the following assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred when it instructed the jury that jurisdiction
was not an issue for consideration despite two requests from the
jury asking to consider the issue.

2. The trial court erred when it failed to grant the defendant’s
request for a mistrial after the State presented “other crimes”
evidence in violation of the court’s order.

3. The trial court erred in depriving the defendant of a unanimous
jury. In this case, [Randall C. Thompson] would not have been
convicted in 48 other states.

4. The case proceeded to trial in violation of the speedy trial act
which proscribed a time limitation of 2 years to commence with
trial once the prosecution is instituted.

For the following reasons, we affirm his conviction.1

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by

this court for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record,

we find no errors patent.

1
Defendant has not appealed his sentence for this conviction.

DISCUSSION

Jury Instruction on Jurisdiction

In his first assignment of error, Defendant contends “the trial court erred

when it instructed the jury that jurisdiction was not an issue for consideration

despite two requests from the jury asking to consider the issue.”

Defendant was convicted of touching his daughter’s vaginal area while she

was visiting with him between the dates May 22, 2006 – February 29, 2008.

Defendant claims that he was living in Texas on the dates alleged, hence any crime

would have occurred in Texas. Thus, he argues, Louisiana has no jurisdiction to try

the offense. Defendant failed to file a Motion to Quash to challenge jurisdiction

before the trial.

During deliberations, the jury sent two notes to the Judge, the first asking,

“Is location an issue?” And the second asking, “Texas/Louisiana?” To both, the

Judge responded, “Location is not an issue for the jury.” In response to this

question and discussion with counsel on the record, the trial court stated:

At this time the Court would reference Article 615 Code of
Criminal Procedure which states, “Improper venue shall be by Judge
alone. Venue shall not be considered an essential element to be
proven by the State at trial; rather it shall be a jurisdictional matter to
be proven by the State by a preponderance of the evidence and
decided by the Court in advance of trial.”
In conjunction with that, it’s the Court’s position to respond
accordingly that, “Location is not an issue for the jury.”
All defense objections were properly preserved for review. A motion

for mistrial and motion for judgment of acquittal were denied by the trial court.

We find that the trial court properly relied on La.Code Crim.P. art. 532,

which states, in pertinent part: “A motion to quash may be based on one of more of

2

the following grounds. . . . (8) The court has no jurisdiction of the offense

charged.”

In State v. Clark, 02-1463 (La. 6/27/03), 851 So.2d 1055, cert. denied, 540

U.S. 1190, 124 S. Ct. 1433 (2004), the defendant argued that all the elements of the

first degree murder of the victim occurred in Richland Parish, not West Carroll

Parish, where he was convicted. Thus, he argued West Carroll Parish was an

improper venue because the grand jury had no jurisdiction over him, and the

resulting conviction was invalid. The supreme court disagreed, noting that the

defendant did not file a pre-trial motion to quash the indictment based on

jurisdiction. See also State v. Westmoreland, 2010-1408 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/4/11),

63 So. 3d 373, writ denied, 2011-1660 (La. 1/20/12), 78 So.3d 140.

In State v. Pugh, 44,251, p. 6-7 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/27/09), 12 So.3d 1085,

1088-89 (footnote omitted), the second circuit discussed jurisdiction as follows:

Interstate territorial jurisdiction is arguably a more difficult
issue than intrastate venue . . . . A judge alone must decide the issue
of territorial jurisdiction, but only if that issue is brought before the
court before trial, as mandated by the Code.

....

A defendant who did not file a motion to quash raising venue as
an issue could not successfully assert on appeal that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction due to failure to prove venue. State v. Matthews,
93-0275 (La.App. 1st Cir.1993), 632 So.2d 294.

In State v. Rideout, 42,689 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/31/07), 968 So.2d 1210, writ

denied, 08-2745 (La. 9/25/09), 18 So.3d 87, the defendant was convicted of

aggravated rape and molestation of a juvenile. On appeal, he argued the evidence

was insufficient to prove the victim was under the age of thirteen when the sexual

acts occurred in Caddo Parish, and the trial court should have instructed the jury to

focus on the Caddo Parish incidents in determining not only when, but where the

3

offenses occurred. The second circuit observed that the defendant’s assertions

raised the issue of venue and found that neither of the offenses at issue, aggravated

rape and molestation of a juvenile, had an offense element concerning the place of

the crime. The second circuit then cited La.Code Crim.P. art. 615 and stated the

following:

Under this article, if the defendant feels that he is being charged
for an offense that occurred in another parish, or that the State cannot
prove the venue of the alleged crime, he must raise the issue before
trial by a motion to quash, and it must be decided by the court before
trial. State v. Clark, 02-1463 (La.6/27/03), 851 So.2d 1055; State v.
Gatch, 27,701 (La.App.2d Cir.2/28/96), 669 So.2d 676, writ denied,
96-0810 (La.9/20/96), 679 So.2d 429. The reduced burden of proof
listed in Article 615 demonstrates that the venue of the crime is not an
element of the crime. Accordingly, defendant’s failure to file a motion
to quash waives any issue of venue.

One other aspect of defendant’s argument, which also misses
the import of Article 615, is his claim that the state’s presentation of
evidence of defendant’s additional sexual misconduct in Bossier
Parish required a special venue instruction for the jury. The state
raised in its pre-trial motion the defendant’s Bossier Parish sexual
misconduct as allowable other crimes evidence. Again, if that same
evidence of defendant’s Bossier Parish actions with the victim
represented the only evidence of aggravated rape, making prosecution
in Caddo Parish improper, the defendant was obliged to raise venue
through the pre-trial motion to quash. No special jury instruction was
therefore required because the substance of defendant’s arguments
relate to venue.

Id. at 1212-13.

Neither venue nor jurisdiction are elements of the offense charged here. See

La.Code Crim.P. art 615; Pugh, 12 So.3d 1085. Thus, the trial court’s answers to

both of the jury’s questions as to jurisdiction and venue were correct, and, because

Defendant failed to file a motion to quash, he did not preserve the issue of

jurisdiction and venue for review on appeal. See Rideout, 968 So.2d 1210.

This assignment of error lacks merit.

4

Evidence of Other Crimes

In his second assignment of error, Defendant contends that the trial court

erred when it failed to grant his request for a mistrial after the State presented other

crimes evidence in violation of the trial court’s order. Louisiana Code of Evidence

Article 404 specifically provides, in pertinent part:

B. Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. (1) Except as provided in
Article 412, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he
acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident,
provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a
criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, of the
nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial for such
purposes, or when it relates to conduct that constitutes an integral part
of the act or transaction that is the subject of the present proceeding.

Defendant complains that the State improperly introduced evidence of the

violent relationship between Defendant and his ex-wife, Amanda, the child’s

mother. No pre-trial notice of intent to use evidence of violence in the marriage

was given by the State, nor was a pre-trial hearing on this issue conducted by the

trial court.

During direct examination, the State asked Amanda about the “nature” of

her divorce from Defendant. Amanda responded: “Physical abuse, violence.” The

State then asked her if she had filed for protective orders in the Fourteenth Judicial

District Court.2 Amanda testified that she had. Defense counsel then objected,

stating he had not received notice of the State’s intent to use other crimes evidence.

The State responded that the information was not other crimes evidence, but rather

was part of a civil proceeding. The State further argued that defense counsel

broached the subject when he asserted Amanda was “the instigator, that she is the

2
The protective orders were not entered into evidence in this case.

5

gatekeeper and she is causing the child to say all of this because of an ugly

divorce.” Defense counsel argued that his remarks, which he made during his

opening statement, did not open the door to other crimes evidence. The trial court

sustained Defendant’s objection at that time, stating:

[Y]ou’re not to go into the grounds or the basis of the divorce, but will
reserve your right to keep her on call for rebuttal purposes. . . . I don’t
think it’s appropriate at this stage of the game to bring that forward.

....

If ultimately they obtained a divorce on other grounds, and if
that was actually removed from consideration and they had
reconciled, then I don’t see that that has any relevance or any
probative value other than prejudicial value unless, of course, it
becomes apparent under rebuttal that it may have probative value.
But, we’ll defer until the Defense, if they wish to put on any evidence,
do so, and go from there. But, with regard to where we are at this
point as far as admonishing the jury that their personal matters of their
divorce is not something that needs to be considered at this time.

Later, during the State’s cross-examination of Defendant, the following

exchange occurred:

Q Mr. Thompson, you and Amanda Thompson had a rocky
relationship; did you not?

A Yes, ma’am.

Q Do you recall Protective Orders being issued against you from
harassing or bothering her or the minor children, and that was
most particularly in 2003 and 2004? Do you remember that?

A No, ma’am.

....

Q Do you remember pulling a gun and putting it to Amanda’s
head?

A No, ma’am.

Q Do you remember knocking her down when she was pregnant,
and then she filed for divorce against you?

6

Defense counsel again objected. The trial court found there was no violation

of La.Code Evid. art. 404(B), as the testimony sought was for the purpose of

impeachment on cross-examination. However, the trial court found the testimony

fell under La.Code Evid. art. 403, as it was more prejudicial than probative. 3

Defendant counsel stated he would not be satisfied with an admonition of the jury

and moved for a mistrial on the basis that improper La.Code Evid. art. 404(B)

other crimes evidence had been admitted. The trial court responded as follows:

It has been noted since the outset of the trial that Defense counsel has
indicated that this divorce was acrimonious, that this has gone
throughout the course of the cross-examination and direct examination
that’s been put forth by the Defense. In conjunction with that, and
also they are [sic] have put exhibits, both sides, with regard to the
domestic proceeding up to this point. I see that going into the
domestic proceedings is an absolute necessity on both the State –
actually on the Defense part, and then in cross or in response by the
State. And so, they would be entitled to do so.

But, I am going to admonish the jury that any references that
were made to specific instances are only within the confines of
allegations of a domestic proceeding, that they have nothing to do
with the charges that have been brought here, and they cannot be
considered by the jury to the defendant’s detriment. That may be a
better way to phrase that.

....

I don’t have a problem with you going into the divorce as that
it’s not being that they both alleged incidents against one another. I
mean it could be done in very generic terms rather than what I would
consider more prejudicial than probative, and that’s where I’m trying
to draw the line.
The trial court then denied the motion for mistrial and asked the State “to be much

more generic” in its attempts to address any issues regarding the divorce issue even

though the defense had opened the door on direct.

3
Louisiana Code of Evidence 403 provides, “Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or waste of
time.”

7

Defendant asserts on appeal that mistrial was mandatory pursuant to

La.Code Crim.P. art. 770, as the State referenced inadmissible other crimes

evidence. He argues that the State deliberately attempted to elicit testimony ruled

too prejudicial for admission into evidence, and the prejudice was so great as to

require a mistrial. In response, the State asserts the grounds for mistrial set forth in

La.Code Crim.P. art. 770 are inapplicable to the case at bar, and the trial court did

not abuse its discretion when denying the request for a mistrial.

Defendant does not challenge the trial court’s ruling that the testimony at

issue was used for impeachment purposes, but nonetheless claims a mistrial was

required. In support of his argument, Defendant cites State v. Green, 315 So.2d

763 (La.1975). In Green, 315 So.2d 763, the Louisiana Supreme Court found error

in the prosecution’s reference to other crimes evidence and specifically held that

the harmless error rule did not apply to a violation of La.Code Crim.P. art. 770.

However, we note that in the more recent case of State v. Johnson, 94-1379,

(La. 11/27/95), 664 So.2d 94, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that

notwithstanding the mandatory language of La.Code Crim.P. art. 770, an improper

reference to other crimes evidence was subject to the harmless error rule on

appellate review. In a more recent case, State v. Scott, 09-1658, p. 12 (La.

10/22/10), 48 So.3d 1080, 1087, the Louisiana Supreme Court held: “Even

assuming that the prosecutor placed inadmissible other crimes evidence before

jurors regarding the prior firearm possession, and that the court’s admonition was

not thus sufficient to cure the error, violations of La.C.Cr.P. art. 770(2) remain

subject to harmless-error analysis.”

8

In State v. Galliano, 05-962, pp. 31-32 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/29/06), 945 So.2d

701, 722, writ denied, 06-2367 (La. 4/27/07), 955 So.2d 682 (footnotes omitted),

the court found:

The State is allowed to introduce evidence of the defendant’s
bad character only for the purpose of rebutting evidence of good
character presented on the defendant’s behalf. State v. Bagley, 378
So.2d 1356, 1357–1358 (La.1979). Further, LSA–C.E. art. 607(C)
permits a party to attack the credibility of a witness by examining him
“concerning any matter having a reasonable tendency to disprove the
truthfulness or accuracy of his testimony.” This grant is subject to the
relevancy constraints set forth in LSA–C.E. art. 403, and is limited in
scope by LSA–C.E. art. 608(B). State v. Ellis, 94–599 (La.App. 5 Cir.
5/30/95), 657 So.2d 341, 353, writs denied, 95–2095 (La.12/8/95),
664 So.2d 421 and 95–1639 (La.1, 666 So.2d 300. A trial judge’s
determination regarding the relevancy and admissibility of evidence
will not be overturned on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.
State v. Sandoval, 02–230 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/25/03), 841 So.2d 977,
985, writ denied, 03–853 (La.10/3/03), 855 So.2d 308.

Even if the testimony about the domestic violence in the marriage was

evidence of other crimes, as Defendant contends, under the circumstances of this

case, it was harmless error and not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to admit

the testimony. We find that the limited questioning about domestic violence during

the marriage was used for impeachment and a sufficient admonition was given to

the jury. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Unanimous Jury

In his third assignment of error, Defendant contends the trial court erred in

depriving him of a unanimous jury.

Defendant claimed in a pre-trial motion that La.Code Crim.P. art. 782 was

unconstitutional in that it allowed for a conviction on a less than unanimous

verdict. Defendant likewise objected to the jury instruction providing that a

majority of ten of the twelve jury members was required to convict. Louisiana

Code of Criminal Procedure Article 782(A) provides:

9

A. Cases in which punishment may be capital shall be tried by a
jury of twelve jurors, all of whom must concur to render a verdict.
Cases in which punishment is necessarily confinement at hard labor
shall be tried by a jury composed of twelve jurors, ten of whom must
concur to render a verdict. Cases in which the punishment may be
confinement at hard labor shall be tried by a jury composed of six
jurors, all of whom must concur to render a verdict.

The jury in this case voted 11-1 to convict Defendant, who then moved post-

verdict for a Motion to Declare Unconstitutional Majority Verdict Law with

Incorporated Memorandum.

The Louisiana Supreme Court considered this exact issue in State v.

Bertrand, 08-2215, 08-2311 (La. 3/17/09), 6 So.3d 738, and upheld the

constitutionality of La.Code Crim.P. art. 782. The trial court followed Bertrand

and correctly ruled that in this twelve-person jury trial, a less than unanimous

verdict could be reached by the jury. 4

Defendant in brief before this court argues that we should consider remarks

made by the Supreme Court in McDonald v. City of Chicago, __ U.S. __, 130 S.Ct.

3020 (2010). He argues in the case at bar that at least one person voted for

acquittal, and, had Defendant been prosecuted in federal court or in forty-eight

other states, a unanimous verdict would have been required. Defendant further

argues that the lack of uniformity in the application of different statutes in different

states is an unconstitutional violation of due process and of his Sixth Amendment

right to a jury trial.

4
Amendments to La.R.S. 14:78.1 became effective in August of 2006. Prior to those
amendments, the offense at issue called for a sentence with or without hard labor. The 2006
amendments set forth subsection (D)(2), which provided for a hard labor sentence when the
victim was under the age of thirteen. The indictment did not indicate the Defendant was charged
under any subsection of the applicable statute. However, the Defendant was sentenced under
subsection (D)(2) to a hard labor sentence. He did not object to being sentenced pursuant to
La.R.S. 14:78.1(D)(2) and has not raised any issue regarding jury composition on appeal.

10

McDonald was a gun control case, and the court in that case did state that it

would be “incongruous” to apply different standards “depending on whether the

claim was asserted in a state or federal court.” Id. at 3035 (quoting Malloy v.

Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1495 (1964)). However, the court also

noted:

There is one exception to this general rule [(that Bill of Rights
protections are enforceable against the states)]. The Court has held
that although the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury requires a
unanimous jury verdict in federal criminal trials, it does not require a
unanimous jury verdict in state criminal trials. See Apodaca v.
Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 92 S.Ct. 1628, 32 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972); see also
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 92 S.Ct. 1620, 32 L.Ed.2d 152
(1972) (holding that the Due Process Clause does not require
unanimous jury verdicts in state criminal trials).

Id. at 3035, n.14.

This assignment of error has no merit.

Speedy Trial Act

In his fourth assignment of error, Defendant contends that the case

proceeded to trial in violation of the speedy trial act, which provided a time

limitation of two years to commence trial once the prosecution was instituted.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 578 provides, in pertinent

part: “A. Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter, no trial shall be

commenced nor any bail obligation be enforceable. . . . (2) In other felony cases

after two years from the date of institution of the prosecution.”

The State contends that the issue cannot be raised on appeal as it was not

raised pre-trial. This Court agrees. As noted in State v. Major, 03-249, p. 8

(La.App. 3 Cir. 3/2/05), 898 So.2d 548, 554:

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 581 states in part that:
“Upon the expiration of the limitations established by this Chapter,
the court shall, upon motion of the defendant, dismiss the indictment.

11

The right of dismissal is waived unless the motion to quash is made
prior to trial.” Because Major failed to raise the issue via a pre-trial
motion to quash, it was not preserved for review and we need not
consider it.

See also State v. Smith, 03-786 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/30/03), 864 So.2d 811, writs

denied, 04-380, 04-419 (La. 6/25/04), 876 So.2d 830, (La. 6/25/04), 876 So.2d

830.

Because Defendant failed to file a pre-trial Motion to Quash, Defendant

waived review of his claim of untimely prosecution. This assignment of error is

without merit.

DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the conviction of Defendant for

aggravated incest in violation of La.R.S. 14:78.1.

AFFIRMED.

12