State of Louisiana v. Aaron Orlando Richards

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

12-1354

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

AARON ORLANDO RICHARDS

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. CR133795
HONORABLE PATRICK LOUIS MICHOT, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JOHN D. SAUNDERS
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Marc T. Amy, and James T. Genovese,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Michael Harson
District Attorney, 15th Judicial District Court
Alan P. Haney, Assistant District Attorney
Post Office Box 3306
Lafayette, LA 70502-3306
(337) 232-5170
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Edward John Marquet
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 53733
Lafayette, LA 70505-3733
(337) 237-6841
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Aaron Orlando Richards

Aaron Orlando Richards, Pro se
Louisiana State Penitentiary
Camp J, Gar 3-L
Angola, LA 70712

SAUNDERS, Judge.

Defendant was charged as a habitual offender on December 7, 2011. A

habitual offender hearing was held on August 8, 2012, following which the trial

court found Defendant to be a third felony offender and, pursuant to La.R.S.

15:529.1(A)(3)(b), sentenced him to imprisonment for life without the benefit of

parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Defendant filed a “Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence” on August 23,

2012, asserting that the sentence was excessive. The trial court denied the motion

without a hearing.

Defendant now appeals the sentence. His argument is that the sentence was

excessive under the circumstances of his case.

FACTS:

Defendant was convicted of second degree robbery on July 20, 2011. He

was convicted, along with several other offenses, of second degree battery in

October 1997, and aggravated flight from an officer in November 2007.

Defendant also has an appeal pending in this court for his second degree robbery

conviction numbered 12-1382.

ERRORS PATENT:

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by

this court for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record,

we find no errors patent.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

Defendant argues that his life sentence is excessive under the circumstances

of his case. Defendant was sentenced as a third felony offender pursuant to

La.R.S.15:529.1(A)(3)(b), which provides:

A. Any person who, after having been convicted within this
state of a felony, or who, after having been convicted under the laws
of any other state or of the United States, or any foreign government
of a crime which, if committed in this state would be a felony,
thereafter commits any subsequent felony within this state, upon
conviction of said felony, shall be punished as follows:

....

(3) If the third felony is such that upon a first conviction, the
offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than
his natural life then:

....

(b) If the third felony and the two prior felonies are felonies
defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(B), a sex offense as
defined in R.S. 15:540 et seq. when the victim is under the age of
eighteen at the time of commission of the offense, or as a violations of
the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by
imprisonment for ten years or more, or any other crime punishable by
imprisonment for twelve or more, or any combination of such crimes,
the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life,
without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

In the current case, Defendant was convicted of the underlying offense of

second degree robbery, a violation of La.R.S. 14:64.4, which provides for a range

of punishment of not less than three years and not more than forty years at hard

labor and is a crime of violence as designated by La.R.S. 14:2(B)(35). He was also

convicted of second degree battery, a violation of La.R.S 14:34.1, which is

designated a crime of violence. La.R.S. 14:2(B)(6). Finally, Defendant was

convicted of aggravated flight from an officer, a violation of La.R.S. 14:108.1,

which is also designated as a crime of violence. La.R.S. 14:2(B)(39).

In State v. Boutte, 10-928, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/9/11), 58 So.3d 624,

629, writ denied, 11-689 (La. 10/07/11), 71 So.3d 314, this court discussed the

constitutionality of minimum sentences imposed upon habitual offenders:

Although the minimum sentences imposed upon multiple
offenders pursuant to the Habitual Offender Law are presumed
constitutional, a court has the power to declare such a sentence
excessive under Article I, Section 20 of the Louisiana Constitution.
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State v. Lindsey, 99-3302 (La.10/17/00), 770 So.2d 339. “A court
may only depart from the minimum sentence if it finds that there is
clear and convincing evidence in the particular case before it which
would rebut this presumption of constitutionality.” State v. Johnson,
97-1906, p. 7 (La.3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, 676. To rebut the
presumption of constitutionality, the defendant must show that he is
“exceptional, which in this context means that because of unusual
circumstances [he] is a victim of the legislature’s failure to assign
sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the
offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the
case.” Id. at 676.

In the current case, in his motion to reconsider the sentence, Defendant only

argued that the sentence was excessive. He gave no reasons why the sentence was

excessive in his particular case. In brief, Defendant argues only:

“In its ruling[,] the trial court provides no analysis or review of the
particular facts and circumstances of this particular defendant such as
his “family history, prior criminal conviction like if whether it was
violent or non violent and whether it was similar or dissimilar to the
conviction for which the defendant is being sentence, other
aggravating and mitigating circumstances such as those provided in
Code of Criminal Procedure Article 894.1, and the impact of the
crime on the victim.” State v. Morgan, [96-354 (La.App. 4 Cir.
4/17/96), 673 So.2d 256], writ denied, 97-2629 (La. 4/24/98), 717
So.2d 1161.

However, we find that “[w]here there is a constitutional mandatory sentence,

there is no need for the trial court to justify, under Article 894.1, a sentence it is

legally required to impose.” State v. Gill, 40,915, pp. 6-7 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/17/06),

931 So.2d 409, 413, writ denied, 06-1746 (La. 1/26/07), 948 So.2d 165. Defendant

makes no argument showing that he is exceptional because of unusual

circumstances and that he is a victim of the legislature’s failure to assign sentences

that are meaningfully tailored to his culpability, the gravity of the offense, and the

circumstances of his case.

Accordingly, we find no merit to this assignment of error.

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DECREE:

Defendant’s sentence is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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