State of Louisiana v. Brian Segura

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

13-398

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

BRIAN SEGURA

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APPEAL FROM THE
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF IBERIA, NO. 11-866
HONORABLE LORI ANN LANDRY, DISTRICT JUDGE

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SHANNON J. GREMILLION
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Shannon J. Gremillion, and Phyllis M.
Keaty, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Hon. J. Phillip Haney
District Attorney, Sixteenth Judicial District Court
Angela B. Odinet
Assistant District Attorney
415 Main St.
St. Martinville, LA 70582
(337) 394-2220
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Susan K. Jones
Attorney at Law
12320 Louisiana Highway 44, Bldg 4 Suite B
Gonzales, LA 70737
(225) 647-9673
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Brian Segura

Stephen J. Haedicke
The Law Offices of Stephen J. Haedicke, LLC
639 Loyola Ave. #1820
New Orleans, LA 70113
(504) 525-1328
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Brian Segura

Edward J. Marquet
Louisiana Appellate Project
P.O. Box 53733
Lafayette, LA 70505-3733
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Brian Segura

GREMILLION, Judge.

Defendant, Brian Segura, was charged by grand jury indictment with two

counts of aggravated kidnapping, violations of La.R.S. 14:44, and one count of

armed robbery, a violation of La.R.S. 14:64. At the sentencing hearing, the State

summarized its charges as follows:

[Defendant] victimized a young mother and her young child, kidnaped
them at knifepoint, tied the mother up, [and] robbed them of money
that she was supposed to withdraw from the ATM machine.

On October 6, 2011, four days before the trial, the local newspaper, The

Daily Iberian, ran a disparaging story about Defendant. On the same day, a local

television station, KATC, ran several segments derivative of the newspaper article.

On October 7, 2011, Defendant filed a “Motion for Change of Venue on Basis of

Pretrial Publicity.” Subsequently, on October 10, 2011, Defendant filed a “Motion

for Individual Sequestered Voir Dire on Publicity.” On that same date, the trial

court heard argument and testimony regarding the motion for change of venue.

The trial court, however, decided to rule on the motion for change of venue

after the jurors were questioned individually during voir dire. After jury selection,

the trial court denied the motion for change of venue, noting that a jury had been

selected.

Defendant was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to life

imprisonment at hard labor without benefits on each count of aggravated

kidnapping and fifty years at hard labor without benefits on the armed robbery

conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently with one

another, but consecutively to sentences imposed against Defendant in Iberia and

Lafayette Parishes as well as any other sentence Defendant was currently serving.

Defendant assigns two errors, both of which spring from the pretrial

publicity. Namely, he complains of the trial court’s denial of his motion to change

venue and the trial court’s denial of several juror challenges for cause.

CHANGE OF VENUE

Defendant argues that he was denied the right to a fair trial by the trial

court’s refusal to grant his motion for change of venue. The jury pool, Defendant

argues, was “irrevocably tainted through intensive media coverage of his alleged

crimes shortly before trial.” Defendant asserts that he introduced three media

items that appeared in the local press in the four days before his trial began on

October 10, 2011.

First, the defense introduced an article that appeared in the Daily Iberian on

Thursday, October 6, 2011 entitled “Murder Confession.” After recounting details

of the seven-year-old murder of Carrie Billeaud, the newspaper article quoted

Iberia Parish Sheriff, Louis Ackal, as stating that Defendant finally cooperated in

the murder investigation of Billeaud when he was threatened with the “needle.”

Before that time, Defendant had led the detectives to several “ghost locations” in

search of evidence, costing the parish about $136,000 in materials and labor. Once

Defendant finally cooperated, detectives located the baseball bat used in the

murder as well as the stolen money bags inside a shed belonging to Defendant’s

mother. The newspaper article also quoted Sheriff Ackal as stating that Defendant

admitted to killing Billeaud, and admitted to thinking of killing the woman that he

kidnapped (but did not because of the child in the car). The newspaper article also

quoted Sheriff Ackal’s statement that Defendant was the ringleader of an incident

in jail wherein a deputy was taken hostage and stabbed. According to Sheriff

Ackal, Defendant admitted to wanting to kill the deputy.

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Second, Defendant introduced clips from several KATC news segments that

aired on October 6, 2011. In the clips, KATC quoted Sheriff Ackal’s statement in

the Daily Iberian regarding Defendant’s confession to the Billeaud murder, posted

a picture of Defendant, quoted Sheriff Ackal as stating that Defendant was a

person of interest in the Billeaud murder, and stated that Sheriff Ackal denied the

interview with the Daily Iberian. In one of the segments, KATC also mentioned

that Defendant was involved in a hostage situation at the jail and that Defendant

would be going to trial the following Monday on aggravated kidnapping and armed

robbery charges. Finally, KATC stated that no arrests had been made in the

Billeaud murder and showed footage of one of Billeaud’s relatives crying because

of her death.

Lastly, Defendant introduced an article that was printed on Sunday, October

9, 2011, in the Daily Iberian newspaper. This article stated that Defendant’s

attorney had filed a motion for change of venue because of the inflammatory

remarks made by Sheriff Ackal and the District Attorney, which were printed in

the Daily Iberian and reported by KATC. The Sunday article mentioned Sheriff

Ackal’s statement, printed in the Thursday article, that Defendant confessed to the

Billeaud murder. The Sunday article also mentioned the facts surrounding the

present charges of aggravated kidnapping and armed robbery, as well as the

hostage and stabbing incident at the Iberia Parish Jail. Notably, while Defendant

introduced this article in support of the motion for change of venue, defense

counsel stated that “It is not our inclination that the article printed in the Sunday

paper tainted the jury.”

Thus, we are left to consider the possible effects of a single newspaper

article and several T.V. news segments, all of which derived from that newspaper

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article, and all of which were broadcast on a single day very shortly before the jury

was selected.

In a recent case, the Louisiana Supreme Court set forth the law regarding a

change of venue:

The right to an impartial jury and a fair trial is guaranteed to
every defendant. See La.Const. art. I, §16; State v. Sparks, 88-0017,
p. 15 (La. 5/11/11), 68 So.3d 435, 456, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
132 S.Ct. 1794, 182 L.Ed.2d 621 (2012); State v. Lee, 05-2098, p. 32
(La. 1/16/08), 976 So.2d 109, 132; State v. Bell, 315 So.2d 307, 309
(La.1975). To effect this guarantee, the law provides for a change of
venue when a defendant establishes that he or she will be unable to
obtain an impartial jury or a fair trial at the place of original venue.
Sparks, 88-0017 at 15, 68 So.3d at 456; Lee, 05-2098 at 32, 976 So.2d
at 132; Bell, 315 So.2d at 309.

Changes of venue are governed by La.C.Cr.P. art. 622, which
provides:

A change of venue shall be granted when the
applicant proves that by reason of prejudice existing in
the public mind or because of undue influence, or that for
any other reason, a fair and impartial trial cannot be
obtained in the parish where the prosecution is pending.

In deciding whether to grant a change of venue the
court shall consider whether the prejudice, the influence,
or the other reasons are such that they will affect the
answers of jurors on the voir dire examination or the
testimony of witnesses at the trial.

In exceptional circumstances, prejudice against a defendant
may be presumed. See State v. David, 425 So.2d 1241, 1246
(La.1983) (“[U]nfairness of a constitutional magnitude will be
presumed in the presence of a trial atmosphere which is utterly
corrupted by press coverage or which is entirely lacking in the
solemnity and sobriety to which a defendant is entitled in a system
that subscribes to any notion of fairness and rejects the verdict of the
mob.”) Otherwise, it is the defendant’s burden to demonstrate actual
prejudice. State v. Manning, 03-1982, p. 7 (La. 10/19/04), 885 So.2d
1044, 1061; State v. Vaccaro, 411 So.2d 415, 423-24 (La.1982).

State v. Magee, 11-574, pp. 10-11 (La. 9/28/12), 103 So.3d 285, 298, cert. denied,

__U.S. __, __ S.Ct. __ (2013).

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In State v. Connolly, 96-1680 (La. 7/1/97), 700 So.2d 810, the supreme court

found the trial atmosphere not utterly corrupted by press coverage when two

newspaper articles recounted the basic facts surrounding the crime, and one

newspaper article mentioned the fact that the defendant was involved in another

murder. Additionally, details concerning the murder for which the defendant stood

trial were aired on radio and television. Connolly differs from the present case in

that the articles in Connolly were printed several months to a couple of years prior

to trial. The articles in the present case were printed only a few days before trial.

Despite this distinction, we do not presume prejudice in the present case.

The supreme court in Magee did not presume prejudice despite the fact that the

media coverage in Magee resumed in the days immediately preceding Magee’s

trial. Furthermore, in State v. Lee, 05-2098 (La. 1/16/08), 976 So.2d 109, cert.

denied, 555 U.S. 824, 129 S.Ct. 143 (2008), the Louisiana Supreme Court did not

presume prejudice in a case where the defense introduced thousands of print and

media stories regarding the search for the South Louisiana Serial Killer, including

media stories that covered Lee’s conviction in another case. The media coverage

in the present case, like the media coverage in Connolly, Lee, and Magee, did not

utterly corrupt the trial atmosphere.

We did, however, compare Connolly, Lee, and Magee to Rideau v.

Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S.Ct. 1417 (1963), where prejudice was presumed

when Rideau’s twenty-minute “confession” was aired three times on television in

the community where the crime and trial took place, and Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.

532, 85 S.Ct. 1628 (1965), where trial was conducted in a circus atmosphere with

members of the press being allowed to sit within the bar of the court and overrun

the courtroom with television equipment. The distinctions we discerned from our

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comparison are obvious and manifest. They serve only to confirm our decision not

to presume prejudice.

Without the presumption of prejudice, Defendant has the burden to

demonstrate actual prejudice. See Magee, 103 So.3d 285. The Louisiana Supreme

Court set forth the following criteria that must be met for the defendant to meet his

burden of proving actual prejudice:

To meet this burden, a defendant must prove more than mere
public knowledge or familiarity with the facts of the case: he must
demonstrate the extent of prejudice in the minds of the community as
a result of such knowledge or exposure to the case. State v. Clark, 02-
1463, p. 18 (La. 6/27/03), 851 So.2d 1055, 1071; State v. Frank, 99-
0553, p. 14 (La. 1/17/01), 803 So.2d 1, 15. A defendant is not entitled
to a jury entirely ignorant of his case and cannot prevail on a motion
for change of venue simply by showing a general level of public
awareness about the crime; rather, he must show that there exists such
prejudice in the collective mind of the community that a fair trial is
impossible. Clark, 02-1463 at 17, 18, 851 So.2d at 1070, 1071.
Whether a defendant has made the requisite showing of actual
prejudice is a question addressed to the district court’s sound
discretion which will not be disturbed on appeal absent an affirmative
showing of error and abuse of discretion. Sparks, 88-0017 at 16-17,
68 So.3d at 457; Lee, 05-2098 at 33, 976 So.2d at 133; Clark, 02-1463
at 17, 851 So.2d at 1071.

In Bell, supra, this court enumerated several factors relevant to
the district court’s determination of whether to order a change of
venue. These factors include: (1) the nature of pretrial publicity and
the degree to which it has circulated in the community; (2) the
connection of government officials with the release of the publicity;
(3) the length of time between the dissemination of the publicity and
the trial; (4) the severity and notoriety of the offense; (5) the area
from which the jury is to be drawn; (6) other events occurring in the
community which either affect or reflect the attitude of the community
or individual jurors toward the defendant; and (7) any factors likely to
affect the candor and veracity of the prospective jurors on voir dire.
Bell, 315 So.2d at 311. In setting out these factors, this court
emphasized that in deciding whether to change venue, the district
court must extend its focus beyond the prejudices and attitudes of
individual venire persons. The defendant must be allowed to show
that, even if it would be possible to select a jury whose members were
not subject to a challenge for cause, prejudice or influences exist
within the community at large that would affect the juror’s answers
during voir dire or the witnesses’ testimony, or that for any other

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reason, a fair and impartial trial could not be obtained in that venue.
Clark, 02-1463 at 16-17, 851 So.2d at 1070; Bell, 315 So.2d at 313.
The district court’s ultimate determination must rest on the
community’s attitude toward the defendant. Clark, 02-1463 at 17,
851 So.2d at 1075.

In reviewing a denial of change in venue, the primary task of
the court is to inquire as to the nature and scope of publicity to which
prospective jurors in a community have been exposed and examine
the lengths to which a court must go to impanel a jury that appears to
be impartial in order to ascertain whether prejudice existed in the
minds of the public which prevented the defendant from receiving a
fair trial. Clark, 02-1463 at 18, 851 So.2d at 1071. In performing this
review, courts must distinguish largely factual publicity from that
which is invidious or inflammatory, as the two present real differences
in the potential for prejudice. Id. While, ultimately, there is no bright
line test for ascertaining the degree of prejudice existing in the
collective mind of the community, the seven Bell factors help
facilitate the inquiry. Sparks, 88-0017 at 18, 68 So.3d at 457; Frank,
99-0553 at 16, 803 So.2d at 16. In addition, courts have examined the
number of jurors excused for cause for having a fixed opinion as
another gauge of whether prejudice exists in the public mind. Clark,
02-1463 at 18, 851 So.2d at 1071; Frank, 99-0553 at 15, 803 So.2d at
15.

Id. at 298-99. After considering each of the Bell factors, the court in Magee found

no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of Magee’s motion for change of

venue. Following the supreme court’s example in Magee, we will address the

applicability of each of the Bell factors to the present case.

Nature and Degree of Publicity

As discussed above, Defendant introduced two newspaper articles and clips

of several news segments from KATC in support of his motion for change of

venue. In addition to claiming that the substance of both the newspaper article and

the news segments were “highly inflammatory and particularly invidious,”

Defendant argues that if such other crimes had been mentioned during the course

of his trial, the Code of Criminal Procedure would have mandated an automatic

mistrial. However, as the United States Supreme Court stated in Murphy v.

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Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 2036 (1975), “juror exposure to

information about a state defendant’s prior convictions or to news accounts of the

crime with which he is charged alone” do not presumptively deprive the defendant

of due process. Rather, the “totality of circumstances” must be examined to

determine whether the defendant received a fair trial. Id. See also Connolly, 700

So.2d 810, where the supreme court did not presume prejudice simply because a

newspaper article mentioned the fact that Connolly was involved in an unrelated

murder.

Some of the information printed in the newspaper and aired on KATC was

emotionally charged. However, even though the supreme court in Magee found

some of the information employed by the media in that case emotionally charged,

the inquiry did not end. The supreme court then looked to the record of the voir

dire examination: “[T]he record demonstrates that of the 63 prospective jurors

examined concerning their familiarity with the case, approximately 43% responded

they had some exposure to it.” Magee, 103 So.3d at 300. In the present case, of

the sixty prospective jurors examined, twenty-four jurors (40%) responded that

they had some exposure to the case prior to trial.1 Discussing the 43% of jurors

exposed to the case in Magee, the supreme court stated the following:

This percentage is comparable to, and in some instances considerably
smaller than, that present in other cases in which this court has found
no abuse of discretion in a district court ruling denying a motion for
change of venue based on the number of prospective jurors familiar
with the facts of the case. See, e.g., Lee, 05-2098 at 34, 976 So.2d at
133 (123 of 125 prospective jurors (98.4%) were “at least vaguely
familiar” with the case through media accounts or informal private
conversations); Clark, 02-1463 at 21, 851 So.2d at 1073 (78 of 124

1
Defendant asserts that there were sixty-eight prospective jurors in the jury pool. At trial,
the State asserted that there were sixty-two prospective jurors. According to the roll call of the
separate panels, four panels totaling sixty-nine jurors were called. However, we counted only
sixty prospective jurors as actually being called for examination.

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venire members (62.9%) responded that they had “some exposure” to
the case); Frank, 99-0553 at 16-17, 803 So.2d at 16-17 (110 of 113
venire members (97.3%) had been exposed to “some kind of publicity
surrounding the case” while 89% of the prospective jurors indicated
that they had been exposed to information about the case on more than
one occasion or from multiple sources); State v. Hoffman, 98-3118, p.
9 (La. 4/11/00), 768 So.2d 542, 555 (72 of 90 prospective jurors
(80%) “had awareness of the case before trial”); State v. Connolly, 96-
1680, p. 5 (La. 7/1/97), 700 So.2d 810, 815 (although 120 of 139
potential jurors (86.33%) possessed some knowledge of the crime,
most had only a vague recollection of the surrounding facts).

Magee, 103 So.3d at 300-01. Likewise, the 40% of jurors exposed to pre-trial

coverage in the present case is comparable to, and in most cases considerably

smaller than, the percentage present in other cases wherein the supreme court

found no abuse of discretion in the denial of a motion for change of venue.

In Magee, the supreme court further noted:

Moreover, of the 27 prospective jurors who expressed some
knowledge of the case, most had only a vague recollection of the
events, consisting largely of factual information, i.e., that the incident
arose out of a domestic dispute and involved the shooting of the
accused’s wife and children. And, those who actually served on the
jury assured the court they would be able to decide the case based
solely on the evidence presented at trial.

Id. at 301. Applying this same analysis to the present case, we note that of the

twenty-four prospective jurors who expressed some knowledge of the case, fifteen

expressed only a recollection of media coverage or Defendant’s involvement in the

kidnapping, Billeaud murder, and jail hostage situation. Five of those jurors heard

about the case through conversations with other people and not by reading the

newspaper or watching the news. Only nine of the sixty jurors admitted to

knowing details of the pertinent events or expressed concern with being able to put

their knowledge aside. None of these nine jurors served on the jury.

Each of the twenty-four prospective jurors who expressed some knowledge

of the case through pre-trial exposure was questioned individually by the trial

9

court, the State, and the defense. The trial court excused six of the sixty

prospective jurors (10%) because of their exposure to pre-trial publicity about the

case. This court has recognized that the number of jurors excused for cause due to

having a fixed opinion because of pre-trial publicity is a factor to be considered in

determining whether prejudice existed. State v. Hundley, 99-1156 (La.App. 3 Cir.

3/22/00), 760 So.2d 417. In Hundley, fifteen of sixty prospective jurors (25%)

were excused for cause based on pre-trial publicity. The court in Hundley found

that this percentage was “in line” with other cases wherein a change of venue was

unnecessary. Id. at 421. In one such case, Murphy, 421 U.S. at 803, the United

States Supreme Court found that a percentage of 26% (twenty of seventy-eight) of

prospective jurors excused for having an opinion about the defendant’s guilt “by

no means suggests a community with sentiment so poisoned against petitioner as to

impeach the indifference of jurors who displayed no animus of their own.”

Likewise, the 10% of jurors excused because of their exposure to pre-trial publicity

in the present case does not suggest a community with sentiment poisoned against

Defendant.

The trial court denied six of the challenges for cause made by Defendant

because of a juror’s exposure to pre-trial publicity. As discussed in the next

assignment of error, however, all of these jurors, including the two that ended up

serving on the jury, indicated that they could be fair and had not formed an opinion

about Defendant’s guilt or innocence.

Connection of Government Officials with Publicity

As to this factor, we must agree with Defendant. Upper-level Iberia Parish

officials were clearly connected with the newspaper article. It is beyond doubt that

two of the reporter’s sources were the Iberia Parish Sheriff and the Sixteenth

10

Judicial District Attorney. In addition, the reporter spoke with the public

information officer for the sheriff’s office more than once in connection with his

story. At the hearing, the reporter, Patrick Flanagan, stood by his story and the

quotes therein.

The State attempts to mitigate this by pointing out that the sheriff testified

that he had been misquoted and did not permit the publication; District Attorney

Bofill “Bo” Duhe testified as to his belief that he was speaking “off the record” and

the information officer, Captain Ryan Turner, testified that he had been left with

the impression that the story would not run in the newspaper. Furthermore,

Defendant candidly admits that the trial court did not make a “specific credibility

finding” regarding anything related to the subject news account.

The State’s attempt to blunt this potential pitfall, though, misses the point.

Regardless of who was on the record, who was accurately quoted, and whether the

reporter had the proper permission to run his story, the story did run. And it ran

with damaging assertions of fact and with damaging attributions of quotations.

Flanagan even testified that on several prior occasions, Duhe requested he not run

a story on the eve of a criminal trial for fear of potentially tainting the jury pool. It

does, then, weigh in favor of a change of venue, but only up to a point.

While the contents of this newspaper article (and the additional press

coverage it spawned) certainly left a negative impression of Defendant with

anyone who read it, it still was but one news item. It does not establish the

existence of such prejudice in the collective mind of the community that a fair trial

is impossible. Moreover, it does not equate to the “actual prejudice” that must be

proven by Defendant.

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Length of Time Between Publicity and the Trial

It is uncontested that the newspaper articles and the news broadcasts at issue

were printed and aired only a few days prior to trial. Defendant argues that this

factor weighs heavily in his favor since the publicity was fresh in the community’s

mind. In Magee, the defendant complained that the media coverage of the crime

resumed in the days immediately preceding the commencement of trial:

For example, the defendant cites to a news article appearing on
the front page of the newspaper on October 10, 2009, two days before
voir dire examinations commenced and to the district court’s own
admission that it had viewed television coverage of the case on the
morning of October 12, 2009.

Magee, 103 So.3d at 302, n.8. Despite the news coverage days before trial, the

supreme court focused on the fact that the trial court repeatedly cautioned jurors

against exposing themselves to television, internet, newspapers, radio, and

“anything of that nature.” Id. at 302. The supreme court also noted that the trial

court instructed the jurors that their decision must be based solely on what they

saw and heard in the courtroom and allowed defense counsel to question each juror

individually as to his or her exposure to media coverage. The supreme court

further stated:

All of the jurors who served on the defendant’s jury confirmed they
would be able to put aside any information they gleaned from outside
sources and decide the case only on the evidence presented. As a
result, the defendant has failed to demonstrate that the length of time
between any pre-trial publicity and the date of his trial affected his
right to an impartial jury.

Id.

In the present case, the trial court issued a gag order the day before jury

selection began. The trial court stressed the basic rule that the case must be

12

decided only on evidence presented in the courtroom. The trial court also

admonished the jury not to communicate with anyone about their jury service and

not to read the newspaper, not to watch the news about any cases, and not to seek

out information about any cases. Furthermore, each of the jurors who were

exposed to pre-trial media coverage and actually served on the jury stated that they

had not formed an opinion about Defendant’s guilt or innocence or would be able

to decide the case based only on the facts presented in the courtroom. Thus, as the

court in Magee determined, Defendant in the present case has failed to demonstrate

that the length of time between the pre-trial publicity and the date of his trial

affected his right to an impartial jury.

The Severity and Notoriety of the Offense

Defendant argues that this factor weighs in favor of a change of venue since

all of the crimes alleged against him were both severe and notorious in the

community. Defendant notes that “[s]ome potential jurors testified that hearing

about Mr. Segura’s crimes caused them to be concerned about their safety just

venturing out into the community, and others testified that they had heard about the

alleged crimes from discussions at work or with friends.” In analyzing this factor,

the supreme court in Magee pointed out that Magee’s case was not the first capital

case to be tried in St. Tammany Parish. Additionally, the court noted, Magee’s

case did not receive any more notoriety than other capital cases. Thus, the

supreme court held, “the publicity received by the present case does not appear

unprecedented.” Id. at 303.

Applying this same analysis to the present case, several murder and

aggravated kidnappings have been committed in Iberia Parish. In State v.

Authorlee, 12-1179 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/3/13), 111 So.3d 1170, the defendant was

13

convicted of killing an Iberia Parish woman by cutting her throat from ear-to-ear

with an incision deep enough to sever her throat and jugular vein and deep enough

to leave a tool mark on her back vertebra. In 2012, Defendant in this case was

convicted of the aggravated kidnapping and armed robbery of a deputy while

Defendant was housed at the Iberia Parish Jail. State v. Segura, 12-899 (La.App. 3

Cir. 3/6/13), ___ So.3d ___. In State v. Francisco, 12-455 (La.App. 3 Cir.

11/7/12), 101 So.3d 617, writ denied, 12-2654 (La. 5/31/13), 118 So.3d 388, the

defendant and a co-defendant entered a pawn shop in Iberia Parish, shot and killed

the owner of the pawn shop, and stole some guns. Further, in State v. Williams,

01-998 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/6/02), 815 So.2d 908, writ denied, 02-578 (La. 1/31/03),

836 So.2d 59, the defendant was convicted in Iberia Parish of aggravated burglary

and second degree kidnapping when he entered the victim’s home through a

window, covered the victim with a blanket, took the victim’s money and car keys,

forced the victim into the trunk of her car, and left her there until she was

discovered the following morning. Considering these cases, the severity and

notoriety of the present offenses is not unprecedented in Iberia Parish.

The Area from which the Jury is to be Drawn

In support of this factor, Defendant alleges that Iberia Parish is a relatively

small population, consisting of just 73,240 people as of the 2010 census. When

analyzing this factor in Magee, the supreme court considered the size of the jury

pool summoned for the case. Because the jury pool consisted of 500 people, with

only 43% of the jurors polled having heard something about the case and only 11%

being removed for having formed an opinion about Magee’s guilt, the supreme

court found that the large jury pool prevented a dearth of qualified prospective

jurors. The record is silent as to the size of the jury pool in the present case, and

14

there was no testimony at the hearing as to this issue. The record is, therefore,

insufficient to review this factor.

Other Community Events that Either Affect or Reflect the Attitude of the
Community or Individual Jurors toward Defendant

In support of this factor, Defendant states the following: “[a]lthough the

record does not contain references to other events in the community bearing on the

motion to change venue, the defense contends that the balance of other factors

supports changing venue.” We disagree with Defendant. Nothing in this record

relative to this factor advances his position or helps him with his burden of proof.

Any Factors Likely to Affect the Candor and Veracity of the Prospective Jurors on
Voir Dire

In support of this factor, Defendant simply states, “As noted above, the

nature and severity of Mr. Segura’s alleged crimes and the highly inflammatory

nature of the publicity were likely to influence the candor and veracity of the

prospective jurors on voir dire.” Again, Defendant’s burden is not to show “likely”

prejudice but to prove “actual” prejudice.

Final Analysis

After considering all of the Bell factors, the supreme court in Magee stated

the following:

In the final analysis, while the record reveals that some jurors
possessed a general knowledge of the case, the defendant fails to
demonstrate the existence of an overriding prejudice in the
community that prevented him from receiving a fair trial. The
defendant’s arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, the record
reveals that both counsel and the district court directly assessed each
juror’s ability to weigh the evidence and disregard any information or
knowledge they might have possessed about the facts of the case.

As noted above, this court has affirmed several rulings denying
a change of venue in cases in which a similar percentage of jurors
expressed a familiarity with the facts. See Clark, 02-1463 at 21, 851
So.2d at 1073; Hoffman, 98-3118 at 9, 768 So.2d at 555; Connolly,

15

96-1680 at 5, 700 So.2d at 815. More importantly, in this case, the
percentage of prospective jurors excused for cause on ground of bias
(13 of 123 prospective jurors examined or 11%) suggests that
widespread knowledge of the crime in the community had not so
tainted the venire that a fair trial in St. Tammany Parish was unlikely.
In fact, the percentage of exclusions does not even approach a
threshold showing of community-wide prejudice. See Murphy, 421
U.S. at 803, 95 S.Ct. at 2037-38 (that 20 of 78 venire persons
examined were excused because of their opinion about the
defendant’s guilt “may indeed be 20 more than would occur in the
trial of a totally obscure person, but it by no means suggests a
community with sentiment so poisoned against petitioner as to
impeach the indifference of jurors who displayed no animus of their
own.”); see also Lee, 05-2098 at 34, 976 So.2d at 133 (even assuming
that 16 cause challenges should have been granted by the district court
and that the percentage of jurors excluded because of fixed opinions
as to the defendant’s guilt rose from 32% to 44%, the court found
“these numbers consistent with other similarly situated cases in which
venue was not changed.”); State v. Wilson, 467 So.2d 503, 513
(La.1985) (although 24 of 39 prospective jurors examined had heard
about the crime, only four were excused on grounds of bias, a
percentage too low to support a finding of collective community
prejudice sufficient to warrant a change of venue); State v. Rodrigue,
409 So.2d 556, 559 (La.1982) (although 26 of 30 prospective jurors
examined in mock voir dire had heard about the case, only 9 had fixed
opinions of defendant’s guilt; change of venue not warranted).

In sum, based on the record below, the defendant has failed to
demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion when it denied
this motion for a change of venue.

Magee, 103 So.3d at 306 (footnote omitted).

Likewise, while the record in the present case reveals that some jurors

possessed a general knowledge of the case, Defendant fails to demonstrate the

existence of an overriding prejudice in the community that prevented him from

receiving a fair trial. Like the jurors in Magee, the jurors who expressed prior

knowledge of the present case were questioned on an individual basis in a

sequestered setting. After the individual questioning, only 10% of the jurors were

excused because of their exposure to pre-trial publicity, one percent less than in

Magee. As the court in Magee found, this percentage suggests that widespread

16

knowledge of the crime in the community had not so tainted the venire that a fair

trial in Iberia Parish was unlikely. Furthermore, the media’s discussion of

Defendant’s other crimes does not warrant a different result in this case. In both

State v. Comeaux, 514 So.2d 84 (La.1987) and Lee, 976 So.2d 109, the pre-trial

publicity included discussions of other crimes committed by the defendants.

Although the substance of the media coverage was discussed and considered by the

courts in those cases, neither court found that the coverage warranted a finding that

the trial court abused its discretion in denying the change of venue.

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant has failed to show that the trial court

abused its discretion in denying the motion to change venue in the present case.

CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying defense challenges for

cause against jurors who had heard about Defendant’s alleged participation in other

crimes. The trial court’s denial of these challenges for cause, Defendant claims,

forced Defendant to use peremptory strikes against the jurors, and, eventually

exhaust all of his peremptory challenges.

According to La.Code Crim.P. art. 797, a defendant may challenge a juror

for cause on the grounds that:

(2) The juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his
partiality. An opinion or impression as to the guilt or innocence of the
defendant shall not of itself be sufficient ground of challenge to a
juror, if he declares, and the court is satisfied, that he can render an
impartial verdict according the law and evidence[.]

In State v. Schmidt, 99-1412, pp. 30-31 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/26/00), 771 So.2d

131, 148, writ denied, 00-2950 (La. 9/28/01), 798 So.2d 105, cert. denied, 535

U.S. 905, 122 S.Ct. 1205 (2002), this court stated the following regarding the

purpose of voir dire:

17

The purpose of voir dire is to test the competency and
impartiality of prospective jurors to determine whether they are fit to
serve on the jury. Voir dire is designed to uncover information about
the prospective jurors, which may be used as a basis for challenges for
cause or exercise of peremptory challenges. State v. Berry, 95-1610
(La.App. 1 Cir. 11/8/96); 684 So.2d 439, writ denied, 97-0278 (La.
10/10/97); 703 So.2d 603. When a defendant exposes the partiality of
a juror, the juror may not be automatically excluded for cause. The
state or the trial court may rehabilitate the juror by asking questions
and obtaining answers demonstrating the juror’s ability to decide the
case impartially pursuant to law and evidence. Ultimately, the trial
court has the power to determine whether or not a juror may be
excused for cause. State v. Turner, 96-845 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/97);
692 So.2d 612, writ denied, 97-2761 (La. 2/20/98); 709 So.2d 773.

To succeed on appeal with the claim that the trial court
erroneously denied the challenge of a prospective juror for cause, a
defendant must exhaust his peremptory challenges and show that the
trial court’s denial of his challenge for cause was an abuse of
discretion. State v. Cross, 93-1189 (La. 6/30/95); 658 So.2d 683;
State v. Robertson, 92-2660 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 1278; appeal
after remand, 97-0177 (La. 3/4/98); 712 So.2d 8, cert. denied, 525
U.S. 882, 119 S.Ct. 190, 142 L.Ed.2d 155 (1998); Turner, 692 So.2d
612. Once these factors have been established, prejudice is presumed
and need not be shown by the defendant. Id.; Cross, 658 So.2d 683.
In Cross, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that a trial court’s
erroneous ruling on a challenge for cause, depriving the defendant of
one of his peremptory challenges, “constitutes a substantial violation
of [the defendant’s] constitutional and statutory rights, requiring
reversal of the conviction and sentence.”

In the present case, Defendant exhausted all of his peremptory challenges. Thus, if

the trial court erroneously denied one of his challenges for cause, prejudice should

be presumed.

In State v. Scott, 04-1312, pp. 16-17 (La. 1/19/06), 921 So.2d 904, 921, cert.

denied, 549 U.S. 858, 127 S.Ct. 137 (2006), overruled on other grounds by State v.

Dunn, 07-878 (La. 1/25/08), 974 So.2d 658, the supreme court discussed the

standard for reviewing the denial of challenges for cause:

A trial court is vested with broad discretion in ruling on
challenges for cause, and its rulings will be reversed only when a
review of the voir dire record as a whole reveals an abuse of
discretion. State v. Cross, 93-1189, p. 7 (La. 6/30/95), 658 So.2d 683,

18

686; State v. Robertson, 92-2660, p. 4 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 1278,
1281. . . . “A challenge for cause should be granted, even when a
prospective juror declares his ability to remain impartial, if the juror’s
responses as a whole reveal facts from which bias, prejudice or
inability to render judgment according to law may be reasonably
implied.” State v. Jones, 474 so.2d 919, 926 (La.1985). However, a
trial court does not abuse its discretion when it refuses to excuse a
prospective juror on the ground he is not impartial where, after further
inquiry or instruction, the potential juror has demonstrated a
willingness and ability to decide the case impartially according to the
law and evidence. Robertson, 92-2660 at p. 4, 630 So.2d at 1281.

Accordingly, we will review the challenges for cause denied by the trial court to

determine whether the trial court abused its discretion.

In his brief, Defendant asserts that the Louisiana Supreme Court has

cautioned against denying a cause challenge on a juror who has been exposed to

other crimes information and remembers it. In support of this assertion, Defendant

cites this excerpt from State v. Goodson, 412 So.2d 1077, 1081 (La.1982):

A prospective juror who has been exposed to and remembers reports
of highly significant information, such as the existence or contents of
a confession, or other incriminating matters that may be inadmissible
in evidence, or substantial amounts of inflammatory material, shall be
subject to challenge for cause without regard to the prospective juror’s
testimony as to state of mind.

In State v. Bolden, 95-749 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/17/96), 680 So.2d 6, writ

denied, 96-1272 (La. 11/22/96), 683 So.2d 286, this court addressed the

implication of the above statement by the supreme court. This court acknowledged

that since Goodson, there has been no real discussion in the case law about the

“damage that prior knowledge of a confession can do to a juror’s impartiality[.]”

Id. at 30. Nonetheless, the court in Bolden stated:

However, the Goodson court clearly considered prior knowledge of a
confession among the most tainting factors possible, and one that does
not allow for rehabilitation. The Goodson court clearly delineated
degrees of taint for potential jurors. Apparently, the Goodson court
decided advance knowledge of a confession was so prejudicial that
rehabilitation should not even by pursued.

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Id. However, the court in Bolden distinguished Goodson as applying only to venue

questions and as never intended to be applied as a standard for challenges for

cause. Id. at 30. Moreover, the Bolden court stated, “[u]sing Goodson as a

standard for causal challenges is in contradiction of La.Code Crim.P. art. 797(2),

which clearly provides for rehabilitation of biased jurors.” Id. at 30-31 (footnote

omitted). In support of this statement concerning Goodson, the court in Bolden

footnoted the following excerpt from State v. Lee, 559 So.2d 1310 (La.1990), cert.

denied, 499 U.S. 954, 111 S.Ct. 1431 (1991):

When a juror expresses a predisposition as to the outcome of a
trial, a challenge for cause should be granted. Yet, if after subsequent
questioning the juror exhibits the ability to disregard previous views
and make a decision based on the evidence presented at trial, the
challenge is properly denied. When assessing whether a challenge for
cause should be granted, the trial judge must look at the juror’s
responses during her entire testimony, not just “correct,” isolated
answers; or, for that matter, “incorrect,” isolated answers. (Citations
omitted.)

Bolden, 680 So.2d at 31, n.4.

Subsequently, in State v. Smith, 96-261 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/30/96), 687 So.2d

529, writ denied, 97-314 (La. 6/30/97), 696 So.2d 1004, this court again applied

the analysis in Lee, rather than relying on Goodson, to dismiss a juror for cause

because the juror was exposed to significant information. In Smith, the prospective

juror was told by a co-worker that the defendant had killed a former wife and his

present wife. The defendant challenged the juror for cause, but the challenge was

denied. On appeal, the defendant cited Goodson in support of his argument that

the juror should have been excused for cause. This court, however, cited Lee and

upheld the denial of the challenge for cause, stating the following:

Although the reference to the defendant’s killing of a second wife was
highly significant and incriminating, inadmissible information, the

20

record clearly reflects that juror Bertrand was sufficiently rehabilitated
by the trial court. In fact, Mr. Bertrand told the court he took the co-
worker’s statements with a grain of salt. Mr. Bertrand further added
that the comments would not enter into his determinations of guilt or
innocence of the defendant or affect any other decision he may be
required to make in this case. In addition, Mr. Bertrand stated that he
could decide the case strictly on the evidence presented to him in the
courtroom.

Id. at 560. Thus, we will address each of the alleged erroneous causal denials

using the standard set forth in Lee and applied by this court in Smith.

Juror Brittany Gachassin

During the trial court’s individual questioning, Juror Gachassin stated that

she heard about the case from her sister. When asked if her sister was reading the

newspaper, Juror Gachassin replied, “Right.” Juror Gachassin stated that she and

her sister talked about the kidnapping charge against Defendant. When asked by

the trial court what she and her sister talked about, Juror Gachassin replied, “She

had heard - - like I said, it’s hearsay. She had heard that - - something about

kidnapping charges, maybe even a little something about a murder from years ago

or something - - . . . - - of that sort. I really didn’t get details.” Juror Gachassin

stated that she did not watch the news or read the newspaper. When asked if she

had made a decision about whether or not Defendant is guilty or innocent of the

pending charges or anything else, Juror Gachassin answered, “No, I haven’t.”

Juror Gachassin agreed that she could keep an open mind, listen to the evidence,

and give a fair trial to both Defendant and the State.

Defense counsel challenged Juror Gachassin for cause because of her

exposure to publicity and her potential relationship to Defendant. The trial court

denied the challenge for cause, finding that the juror clearly had no knowledge of a

relationship with Defendant, that the information she received was very scant, and

21

that she could be fair and impartial. Defense counsel eventually used a peremptory

challenge to strike Juror Gachassin. On appeal, Defendant argues that Juror

Gachassin should have been dismissed because of her exposure to Defendant’s

kidnapping charges and Defendant’s alleged confession to the Billeaud murder.

Defendant alleges that Juror Gachassin’s claim that she could give Defendant a fair

trial should not be taken at face value given the nature of the information she

heard.

Considering Juror Gachassin’s statement that what her sister told her was

“hearsay,” along with Juror Gachassin’s assurances that she could be fair, that she

had not decided Defendant’s guilt or innocence, and that she would listen to the

evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to

dismiss Juror Gachassin for cause.

Juror Carol Fishburn

Defendant argues that Juror Fishburn should have been removed for cause

because she had read about the kidnapping charges, Defendant’s alleged

confession to the kidnapping charges, and the jail-hostage situation. Additionally,

Defendant alleges that Juror Fishburn seemed to have already made up her mind

that a kidnapping took place based solely on what she read in the newspaper.

Defense counsel challenged Juror Fishburn for cause, arguing that Juror

Fishburn remembered details about the Billeaud murder and the kidnapping. The

trial court denied the challenge for cause, reasoning that Juror Fishburn’s general

knowledge did not exclude her and reasoning that Juror Fishburn indicated that she

could be fair and impartial. Defense counsel used a peremptory challenge to strike

Juror Fishburn.

22

On appeal, Defendant argues that “[g]iven that the defense theory was that

there was no kidnapping, and instead this was a case of a drug deal gone bad . . .

juror Fishburn’s pre-conceived conclusion that a kidnapping had actually occurred,

as well as her knowledge of the Billeaud murder, should have resulted in her

removal for cause.” Defendant did not make this “defense theory” argument in the

trial court. Thus, that argument was not properly preserved. See Uniform

Rules―Courts of Appeal, Rule 1-3. As for Juror Fishburn’s knowledge of the

Billeaud murder, Juror Fishburn agreed that she could set aside what she learned

prior to trial and make a decision about the kidnapping case based on the evidence

presented at trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss

Juror Fishburn for cause.

Juror Alfred Phillips

Defendant alleges that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss Juror Phillips

for cause since Juror Phillips remembered the news report regarding Defendant’s

confession to the Billeaud murder. During his individual voir dire, Juror Phillips

testified that he saw a news report regarding the motion for change of venue.

When asked by defense counsel if he remembered why Defendant was asking for a

change of venue, Juror Phillips responded, “No. They said it’s because of a crime

that he supposedly confessed to, he said that he was involved in.” After more

questioning, Juror Phillips remembered that the confession was to murdering a

lady. Juror Phillips stated, however, that he could set his knowledge aside while

deliberating the instant case. Juror Phillips further stated, “I do try to go by

evidence more than anything. I don’t like to prejudge people.” Finally, Juror

Phillips stated that he really did not remember anything and that he could decide

the case solely on the evidence presented in the courtroom. The trial court denied

23

defense counsel’s challenge of Juror Phillips for cause, finding that Juror Phillips

had only general knowledge and indicated that he could be fair and impartial.

Defense counsel used a peremptory challenge to strike Juror Phillips.

Considering Juror Phillips’ assurance that he could be fair and impartial, that

he could decide the case solely on the facts presented in the courtroom, and that he

did not like to prejudge people, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

refusing to dismiss Juror Phillips for cause.

Juror Mandy Peltier

Defendant asserts that Juror Peltier heard about the kidnapping while at

work shortly after the kidnapping occurred. Because Juror Peltier works in the

medical profession and the kidnapping occurred in a hospital parking lot, it was

news in her community. Additionally, Defendant points out that Juror Peltier

testified that she heard there was a rape involved.

During her individual questioning, Juror Peltier stated that while checking

Facebook during her lunch break, she saw a post about a rape in the “IMC”

parking lot. Juror Peltier did not read any stories in the newspaper, nor had she

seen any posts on Facebook recent to the time of trial. Juror Peltier described the

details that she heard as follows, “there was a girl and supposedly a baby was in

the car with her. He took her to the ATM and then abandoned her in a field.”

Juror Peltier was not sure when the rape occurred. When asked if she had formed

an opinion about the person’s guilt or innocence, Juror Peltier shook her head

negatively. As for her ability to put aside what she saw on Facebook and decide

the case based on what she saw and heard in the courtroom only, Juror Peltier

testified that she “absolutely” could do that and that she could give both the State

24

and Defendant a fair trial. When defense counsel challenged Juror Peltier for

cause, the trial court denied the challenge as follows:

Ms. Peltier was clear, forward thinking, up front about
Facebook. It happened in March around the time it happened. Her
recall was that the day we got it. She talked about the rape, and then
she gave us the details of the facts. And I had to say, “Well, when did
the rape occur?” She said, “Oh.” She didn’t even figure. They didn’t
talk about anymore. She didn’t see any news. It was not posted again
on Facebook. She didn’t read the newspaper or anything. I think Ms.
Peltier was very honest that she could be clear. Her body language,
her certainty, and the totality of her testimony indicates to me that this
challenge needs to be denied. And I’ll deny the challenge and note
your objection for the record.

By the time Juror Peltier was called on, Defendant had exhausted all of his

peremptory challenges. Thus, Juror Peltier was accepted and served as a juror.

Considering Juror Peltier’s minimal pre-trial exposure to the case and Juror

Peltier’s assurance that she could decide the case based only on the facts presented

in the courtroom, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s

challenge of Juror Peltier for cause.

Juror Karen LeBlanc

Defendant argues that Juror LeBlanc should have been excused for cause

because she testified that she read all of the newspaper accounts of the Defendant’s

situation, discussed the information with her neighbor, and recalled extensive

details from the articles. Juror LeBlanc paid particular attention to the details,

because Mrs. Billeaud’s company dug the water well on her property. Juror

LeBlanc also testified that one of the most disturbing things she read was that

Defendant considered killing the victim in the kidnapping case.

Although Juror LeBlanc testified that she could disregard her knowledge and

rely solely on the evidence presented in court, Defendant argues that these claims

25

were “unworthy of belief given her extensive knowledge of the newspaper

articles.”

During her individual questioning, Juror LeBlanc testified that she read both

Thursday’s and Sunday’s paper and that she saw the headlines about the

confession. Juror LeBlanc stated that she paid particular attention since the

Billeauds “sunk” her water well. Juror LeBlanc also testified as to specifics

regarding Defendant’s confession – that he confessed to killing Ms. Billeaud, that

he told the authorities that the murder weapon and money bag were in a shed, that

it cost $136,000.00 to find the evidence, and that Defendant said he considered

killing the lady he kidnapped. When asked if she would be able to put everything

she learned aside and give Defendant a fair trial, Juror LeBlanc responded:

I would hope that I could. I’m usually a fair-minded person,
and I have a very big respect for the law. As a matter of fact, I don’t
even have a speeding ticket. It does a little bit concern me about the
part where it - - I guess I’m thinking if they have this in the paper that
he said, “I wanted to kill this person,” then he had to have kidnaped
her, and that kind of bothers me. I would hope that I could put that
out of my mind and listen only to the facts because I’m usually
definitely a fact person from doing charts at the hospital.

....

I think I could. I just - - I just hope I - - I’m just hoping
subconsciously that it wouldn’t stay there.

The trial court had the following colloquy with Juror LeBlanc:

Q: Assume this: Assume the facts come in and there is no evidence
that he kidnaped anybody. Could you say not guilty?

A: Yeah. If there’s no evidence, then yes.

Q: That he kidnaped anybody. If the State didn’t prove him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, could you say not guilty?

A: Yes.

26

Finally, Juror LeBlanc stated that she would base her decision solely on the

evidence presented in the courtroom, that she had not formed an opinion as to

Defendant’s guilt or innocence, that she strongly believed a person is innocent until

proven guilty, and that she tries not to judge people.

The trial court denied Defendant’s challenge of Juror LeBlanc for cause,

stating the following:

Ms. Leblanc came in, and her hesitancy really was an open-
ended question before they had all of the facts of the information. She
is a fact-oriented person. That is her skill set. She is a person who
understands the importance of details, so she recalls them. While she
doesn’t watch TV, she reads the newspaper. I think when we gave her
all of the information that was pertinent to her making that decision, it
was clear with her ready answers and her open responses that she can
put that aside and be fair. I deny the challenge for cause on Ms.
LeBlanc.

Defendant used his only remaining peremptory challenge to strike Juror LeBlanc

as an alternate juror.

Although Juror LeBlanc was initially hesitant on her ability to set aside what

she had learned, her later answers were definite that she would set aside what she

learned and decide the case only on the evidence presented at trial. Thus, the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s challenge of Juror

LeBlanc for cause.

Juror Vanessa Domingue

Defendant claims that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss Juror

Domingue for cause because Juror Domingue recalled that Defendant confessed to

the Billeaud murder and the “prison thing.” Juror Domingue had read the

newspaper and watched the television broadcasts about the case. Furthermore,

Defendant asserts, Juror Domingue knew the husband of the alleged victim in the

kidnapping case.

27

During her individual voir dire, Juror Domingue stated that she read the

newspaper article from the Daily Iberian that stated that Defendant confessed to

the Billeaud murder and the prison uprising. Juror Domingue discussed what she

read with co-workers and family. Juror Domingue thought she may have also seen

something on television. Additionally, Juror Domingue stated that she knew the

family of the husband of the kidnapping victim. According to Juror Domingue,

she grew up within a mile of the victim’s husband and went to school with him.

Juror Domingue does not, however, see the victim’s husband on a regular basis.

When asked if she could put the information she learned aside and decide the case

solely on the evidence presented in the courtroom, Juror Domingue stated that she

could. Juror Domingue stated that she had not formed an opinion as to

Defendant’s guilt or innocence and that she could be fair and impartial to both the

State and Defendant.

When defense counsel challenged Juror Domingue for cause, the trial court

denied the challenge. Since Defendant had exhausted all of his peremptory

challenges, he was not able to strike Juror Domingue, and she ended up serving as

a juror in the case. Considering Juror Domingue’s assurances that she could

decide the case based on the evidence presented in court and that she had not

formed an opinion as to Defendant’s guilt or innocence, the trial court did not err

in refusing to dismiss Juror Domingue for cause.

DECREE

Defendant’s conviction is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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