State of Louisiana v. William King, III

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

13-469

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

WILLIAM KING, III

**********
APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, DOCKET NO. 09-5228
HONORABLE JAMES P. DOHERTY, DISTRICT JUDGE
**********

SYLVIA R. COOKS
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Judges Sylvia R. Cooks, Marc T. Amy and Billy H. Ezell.

Affirmed.

Hon. Earl B. Taylor, District Attorney
St. Landry Parish
Jennifer M. Ardoin, Asst. District Attorney
P.O. Drawer 1968
Opelousas, LA 70571
(337) 948-0551
Attorney for Appellee
State of Louisiana

Daniel J. Stanford
812 Johnston Street
Lafayette, LA 70501
(337) 232-2272
Attorney for Appellant, William King, III

Cooks, Judge
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant, William King, III, (Defendant) was indicted on January 26,

2010, for the brutal second degree murder of Brian Armstrong (Armstrong), in

violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. The murder took place in the St. Landry Parish jail in

cell number eight known as “the drunk tank.” Defendant’s cousin, and co-

perpetrator, Chadwick O. King (Chadwick) was also indicted for the murder.1

The jury found Defendant guilty as charged on March 15, 2012.

Chadwick’s jury rendered a responsive verdict of guilty of negligent homicide in a

separate trial in late March of 2012, after Defendant’s trial.2 Defendant filed a

motion for new trial arguing the evidence did not support the essential elements of

his conviction and further asserted that newly discovered evidence would have

changed the verdict. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion on January 23,

2013.

Defendant appeals his conviction, arguing the evidence was insufficient to

convict him or to show his specific intent to cause death or great bodily harm to

Armstrong. He also asserts the testimony of a key witness, Reginald Cretain

(Cretain), was unreliable because of mental impairment.

Included as an attachment to Defendant’s brief is a transcript of Cretain’s

testimony from Chadwick’s trial, given on March 30, 2012, after Defendant’s trial.

It is not a part of the record of Defendant’s appeal. Nothing indicates it was ever

shown to or discussed with the trial court as part of this matter. Defendant’s

motion for new trial alleges he tried to obtain a transcript of the testimony, but the

1
Although in Defendant’s appellate brief he states he is not related to Chadwick King, the
trial court’s Reasons for Judgment (denying Defendant’s motion for new trial) indicate
Defendant and Chadwick are cousins.
2
William King is referred to throughout this opinion as “Defendant” and Chadwick King
is referred to as “Chadwick.”

cost was prohibitive. Nevertheless, Defendant obtained this testimony and now

seeks to offer it as part of this appeal. This court may not consider this transcript

which has not been first presented to the trial court. Uniform Rules—Courts of

Appeal, Rule 2-1.7. See also Denoux v. Vessel Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 07-2143

(La.5/21/08), 983 So.2d 84. For the reasons as stated herein we affirm Defendant’s

conviction.

FACTS

Brian Armstrong was kicked and stomped to death in the Opelousas City Jail

on September 28, 2009, by Defendant and Chadwick. Armstrong was booked into

the jail around 8:39 p.m. on September 27, 2009, for disturbing the peace due to

intoxication, resisting an officer, and entering/remaining on premises after being

forbidden. He was attempting to attend an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting in

Opelousas, Louisiana. The toxicology report and expert medical testimony

demonstrate Armstrong was severely intoxicated and had also consumed a large

quantity of the drug Prozac. The booking sheet indicates Armstrong “was very

combative and was not dressed out.” According to trial testimony, Armstrong was

“combative” in that he would not comply with the arresting officers’ requests and

became limp when the officers at the jail attempted to put him in the “drunk tank.”

The video recording system at the jail included a camera at the end of a

hallway that showed the exterior of cell eight. The camera was motion-activated.

Without movement the camera is operational but does not record. According to

the State’s witness, “the cameras were not working . . . [n]ot showing on the

monitor” at the patrol supervisor’s desk on September 27, 2009. Thus, the patrol

supervisor, Lieutenant Mark Semien (Lieutenant Semien) of the Opelousas Police

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Department, could not observe anything that took place in the hallway outside cell

eight.

The recorded video shows Armstrong was unable to stand when he was

carried out of the booking area at 8:18 p.m. on September 27. Lieutenant Semien

testified Armstrong “just went limp and he refused to get up” when “he learned

that he was going to the jail cell.” Law enforcement officers carried Armstrong

into the “drunk tank,” an eight-foot by eight-foot cinderblock room. The light in

the cell did not work; a light was in the hallway, but “you can only see, you know,

very – very little in the – in the drunk tank.” Nevertheless, Lieutenant Semien

testified he could clearly see Armstrong inside the cell because he “was lying right

there at the doorway when you open the doorway.” The cell’s solid metal door had

a small rectangular window around eye level and a pan-slot lower on the door. It

was through this pan-slot that a jail trustee saw Armstrong lying dead on the

bloodied floor of the cell the next morning. Apparently no officer checked on the

cell for at least six hours.

At 10:40 p.m., the video shows police escorting Cretain through the hallway

into the cell.3 A man wearing an orange jumpsuit is locked in the cell at 11:24 p.m.

Another man wearing orange is locked in the cell at 11:32 p.m. At 11:36, the

video shows clothing being thrown through the rectangular opening of the cell

door into the hallway. Police are in the hallway at 11:55 p.m. on September 27 and

again at 12:01 a.m. on September 28, but they do not approach the “drunk tank.”

An orange jumpsuit is thrown through the opening at 12:31 a.m. Nothing else

occurs on the video until 6:00 a.m., when an officer appears in the hallway. He

does not check the cell. At 6:05 a.m., a jail trustee, picking up trash in the hallway,

3
Cretain testified he was wearing plaid shorts and white and turquoise shoes, as shown on
the video.
3

puts something into the pan-slot of the door, and at 6:07 a.m., he puts the orange

jumpsuit through the opening. At 6:08 a.m., he looks through the opening in the

doorway and summons help. Medical personnel arrive at 6:23 a.m.

Lieutenant Semien identified Cretain and Chadwick at trial. He testified no

one was in the “drunk tank” cell when Armstrong was placed inside. Armstrong

was conscious when he was brought to the police station and when they placed

Cretain into the cell with him. When the victim was placed in the cell, he was

alive, fully clothed, and had no signs of any of the injuries he later suffered and

died from. He was left lying on the floor on his stomach. Every time Lieutenant

Semien opened the cell door, Armstrong looked up and moved, indicating to the

Lieutenant he was conscious and alive. Lieutenant Semien did not consider

Armstrong “that much impaired that he needed medical attention” upon arrival at

the station “because he was being combative with the officers.”

Armstrong made no sound at any time Lieutenant Semien went to the cell.

He discovered Armstrong was dead when other officers reported to him.

Lieutenant Semien could not say what time Armstrong died or how long he had

been dead when the body was discovered. He believed he would have heard any

“excessively loud” noises coming from the drunk tank “if they were banging on the

door, stuff like that,” while he was at his desk. A solid steel door separated the

desk from the hall that led to the “drunk tank.” Cretain testified he screamed for

help and banged on the cell door repeatedly while Armstrong was being brutally

stomped to death by Defendant and Chadwick but no one came to help.

Jeffery Fuselier, the trustee at the jail, testified one of the men inside the cell

asked Fuselier to hand him a shirt. Fuselier handed him the orange shirt thrown

from the cell earlier. Another man in the cell asked Fuselier to hand him the

orange jumpsuit thrown from the cell onto the floor in the hallway. Fuselier gave
4

them the clothing through the pan-slot in the door. He counted three people in the

cell, and then saw the body on the floor, lying on its back. A shirt found near the

body was torn into two pieces.

Cretain, who was living in Tacoma, Washington at the time of trial, was an

eyewitness to the murder. He thought he was placed in the Opelousas City Jail for

“disturbing the peace or something – something close to that.”4 He testified

Armstrong was on the ground when he went to the holding cell. Armstrong “was

sleeping, you know, drunk and stuff . . . He was laying like on his stomach . . .

arms to his side, you know, and kind of like sleeping there[.]” Cretain testified he

saw no injuries on Armstrong’s body when he first observed him. Armstrong was

“a little bit” conscious, and he lifted his head, looked at Cretain, and then “laid

back down.”

Cretain identified Defendant as the next person brought to the cell although

booking records indicate Defendant went to the cell after Chadwick. Defendant

“was a little upset and stuff,” and “he was talking and . . . voice was kind of . . .

like angry and stuff, you know, just cursing a little bit and stuff, you know.” He

was wearing an orange jumpsuit. Cretain was intoxicated and “kind of like upset”

himself. Cretain testified that after all four men were in the cell, Defendant kicked

Armstrong twice in the head while he was lying on the floor, then Chadwick joined

in the beating. Both Defendant and Chadwick “jumped on him.” Chadwick began

striking Armstrong after about “the first three blows” from Defendant. Both

kicked Armstrong in the face, and then, Chadwick kicked him in the side.

Defendant removed Armstrong’s clothing and then “stomped in the groin section”

causing severe injury to Armstrong’s genitals and inner thighs.

4
The jail’s booking log indicates Cretain’s charge was aggravated assault.
5

As Defendant stomped Armstrong in the groin, he said “‘[y]ou ain’t gonna

have no more kids,’ or something like that,” and referred to Armstrong as “You

Cracker.” Chadwick stood on the cell’s bench and jumped onto Armstrong again.

The body, according to Cretain, was “bloody, bruised, busted up on the face, uh,

just – groin area, man, was just, I mean – I mean, demolished. I mean, stuff just

like just, I mean just pushed – pushed in.” Forensic evidence showed that

Armstrong suffered severe internal injuries, including lacerations to his liver and a

torn mesentery, which holds a person’s intestines in place.

Cretain banged on the cell door and called to his brother, Devon Cretain

(Devon), who was in another area of the jail. He believed Devon and “other guys

up in there” heard him. Defendant and Chadwick stopped “for a minute and then

they went back and then after that, they just left him – just left him alone after that

. . . He wasn’t breathing or nothing no more and stuff.” Cretain could tell

Armstrong was not breathing by the way the body lay. Armstrong had turned onto

his back while they kicked him hard in the face, and “[h]is whole side was split.”

Cretain missed some of the beating because his back was turned when he was

banging on the door, but he could hear “like stomping . . . like the kicking and

stuff.” Although Cretain did nothing to try to intervene, he felt he tried to help

Armstrong by banging on the door in hopes of getting someone to help.

In the video of Defendant’s post-incident interview, he told law enforcement

officers he “didn’t kill that dude on purpose.” Defendant did not recall very much

of what happened because he was “f_ _ _ _d up.” He did recall that he kicked

Armstrong twice in the jaw while Armstrong lay on the floor and that Chadwick

had kicked Armstrong also. Defendant actually commented in his statement,

“nobody’s perfect.”

6

The trial court accepted Dr. Joel Carney (Dr. Carney) as an expert in

forensic pathology. Dr. Carney performed an autopsy on Armstrong on September

29, 2009. Pre-autopsy photographs showed Armstrong had “a number of blunt

injuries,” including contusions (bruises), abrasions (scrapes), and patterned

contusions. Dr. Carney explained “blunt injuries” are produced by blunt objects,

including fists and feet. He saw no defensive injuries to Armstrong’s hands. He

testified that all of the bruising on Armstrong’s face, genitals, and torso occurred

while he was still alive. When asked if there is a way to tell whether someone

received a laceration before or after death, Dr. Carney explained:

Injuries that occur prior to death result in bleeding and this is
due to the presence of blood pressure during life. In other words,
during life the heart is beating. The blood vessels are filled with
blood under pressure. When these blood vessels are injured, they
allow blood to leak into the surrounding tissues and this produces
visible discoloration of the injured site.

Injuries that take place after death, in contrast, are usually
lacking in color. That is, they’re usually yellow in color because these
injuries don’t have any bleeding involved with them so – so, yes, there
is a way we can distinguish them.

After the body was washed, Dr. Carney found abrasions on the back of

Armstrong’s head. He found a patterned contusion of seven roughly parallel lines

on the front of Armstrong’s right shoulder. Another patterned contusion of seven

parallel lines was located on Armstrong’s left flank, “the left thoraco-abdominal

skin,” and the right flank also had “a number of contusions and abrasions.” The

back of Armstrong’s right elbow also had contusions and abrasions. Armstrong’s

ear had a tear near the left ear canal, and his face had a “large contusion which was

red-purple in color and this contusion actually involved the entirety of the face,”

from the forehead to the neck. Armstrong had a tear at the corner of his eye, a

laceration on the upper portion of his chin, extensive bruising involving the

internal aspect of the upper lip, multiple lacerations that tore the inner lining of the
7

mouth and extended to the back of the mouth, and a laceration “within the

distribution of the mustache.” The bottom lip was cut and bruised, and Armstrong

had another cut just below the nostril.

Armstrong’s left eye showed bruising of the eyelids and “a laceration at the

angle of the eye.” A patterned contusion was on the skin of the forehead. Several

superimposed lacerations were on the nose. Armstrong’s neck contained a red

bruise with a superimposed darker red bruise. Bruises and contusions involving

the right lower portion of the abdomen “extended onto the genitalia, including the

dorsal aspect, the top of the penis.” Both of Armstrong’s testes were bruised. The

bruises “also involved the right side of the scrotum” and extended onto the inside

of Armstrong’s thighs. The right side of the abdomen contained another patterned

contusion of wavy lines. The right groin showed the patterned contusion of parallel

lines.

Dr. Carney’s internal examination during the autopsy showed fractures of

Armstrong’s face, including fractures of the right orbital rim, “a bone immediately

beneath the right eye,” and the right zygomatic bone, “the bone located

immediately beneath the skin at this location.” In the upper portion of the neck,

the hyoid bone was fractured, indicating “that blunt force or compression occurred

to the front of the neck.”

The thyroid cartilage (Adam’s Apple) was fractured. Dr. Carney explained

that cartilage is normally “rigid so as to maintain patency of the airway so that air

can pass through it.” Armstrong’s fracture “extended through the entire length of

the thyroid cartilage[,]” indicating “that a blunt force was applied to the front of the

neck in the form of a blow or compression.”

Armstrong had multiple rib fractures on both the right and left sides. Some

of “the edges of the fractured bones were separated from one another and they
8

were projecting into the right lung cavity.” Liquid blood was present within the

abdominal cavity. The capsulary surfaces of the liver and spleen were torn. The

mesentery, “a structure that anchors the intestine,” contained a large laceration,

“twelve by seven inches . . . capable of producing significant bleeding.”

Dr. Carney “ascribed the cause of death as blunt injuries[,] and an element of

neck compression [was] not entirely excluded.” Loss of blood was also a cause of

death. Dr. Carney could not exclude neck compression because of the fractured

hyoid bone and the fractured thyroid cartilage. Those fractures could have caused

lack of oxygen or “stimulation from a small organ in the neck known as the

cardioid body which is capable of actually stopping the heart.” Dr. Carney could

not determine “what mechanism of injury actually caused the death but – but the

cause of death [was] blunt injuries.” He did not find any of the blunt force trauma

to Armstrong’s head to be life-threatening. Armstrong’s blood alcohol level at the

time of the autopsy, around 3:00 p.m. on September 29, 2009, was .352 percent, a

level “capable of producing unconsciousness” but not death.

Armstrong also had “two thousand, seven hundred and eighty two

nanograms per mil” of the drug Prozac in his system, about five times the upper

limit of therapeutic level. The combination of Armstrong’s levels of alcohol and

Prozac could cause death but Dr. Carney did not believe these to be the cause of

Armstrong’s death.

While Dr. Carney did not issue the death certificate, he provided the opinion

as to the cause and manner of death. His opinion was “blunt force trauma caused

the death.” Armstrong’s death certificate, however, indicated causes of death as

“Blunt Injuries (multiple over body) due to inflicted trauma” and “Alcohol

Intoxication (0.352%).” Dr. Carney surmised the local coroner added alcohol

intoxication as an additional cause of death. Dr. Carney testified his analysis about
9

damage to Armstrong’s neck “came up after the fact,” but he did not issue a

supplemental autopsy report. He believed alcohol may have contributed to

Armstrong’s death, but “he had fatal injuries. Fatal injuries trump the toxicology.

The injuries were hemorrhagic and they were incurred during life[.]”

The trial court accepted Bethany Harris of the Acadiana Crime Lab “as an

expert in forensic science with a specialist as a DNA analyst.” Ms. Harris prepared

DNA profiles of Defendant, Chadwick, and Armstrong from reference DNA

samples. She performed DNA analysis on a blood stain from the orange prison

jumpsuit recovered from Defendant that showed the DNA of major and minor

contributors. Armstrong was the major contributor. Ms. Harris first testified

neither Defendant nor Chadwick could be excluded as potential contributors to the

minor DNA profile found on the jumpsuit. However, she later said Chadwick was

“excluded as the source of that minor profile,” but she could not exclude

Defendant.

Ms. Harris also analyzed a pair of Nike brand athletic shoes containing a

single source DNA profile; the profile matched Armstrong. The shoes were seized

from Defendant at 9:20 a.m. on September 28, 2009, at the Opelousas Police

Department. The DNA was extracted from a blood stain on the shoes.

The orange prison jumpsuit collected from Chadwick also contained a spot

of blood. The DNA profile showed Armstrong was the major DNA contributor. Of

the two minor contributors, Chadwick could not be excluded as part of the mixed

profile. Ms. Harris could not determine the identity of the second minor DNA

contributor to the mixed profile, but she excluded Defendant.

Chadwick’s Timberland shoes also contained blood. The major contributor

of the DNA in that blood was Armstrong; Chadwick was the minor contributor.

10

Mark Kurowski (Mr. Kurowski) qualified “as an expert in forensic science

and with the speciality [sic] or emphasis on shoe print analysis.” He enlarged

photographs provided by the St. Landry Sheriff’s Office to life size “and then

made test impressions using the shoes and then overlayed those impressions on the

photographs.” Mr. Kurowski explained Defendant’s Nike Air Force One shoes

had a unique sole pattern of two areas of concentric circles, “parallel lines around

the perimeter, and a small star pattern at the top.” Using impressions of those

shoes and scale photographs of Armstrong’s body, Mr. Kurowski determined the

shoes inflicted injuries shown to Armstrong’s right neck area and forehead. The

imprints on three other areas of injury were “more similar to the Timberland brand

shoes” belonging to Chadwick. Although Armstrong also wore Nike Air Force

One shoes, Mr. Kurowski excluded those shoes from causing any of the injuries

based on their size. The larger size thirteen shoes of Armstrong would have made

“parallel lines much fa[r]ther apart[.]”

ERRORS PATENT
In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find there

are no errors patent.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 1 and 2.
Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that he committed second degree murder and that he possessed

the specific intent to kill or do great bodily harm to Armstrong. The standard of

review in a sufficiency of the evidence claim is “whether, viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have

found proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the essential elements of the

crime charged.” State v. Leger, 05-11, p. 91 (La. 7/10/06), 936 So.2d 108, 170,

11

cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1221, 127 S.Ct. 1279 (2007) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979); State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676 (La.1984)). The

Jackson standard of review is now legislatively embodied in La.Code Crim.P. art.

821. It does not allow the appellate court “to substitute its own appreciation of the

evidence for that of the fact-finder.” State v. Pigford, 05-477, p. 6 (La. 2/22/06),

922 So.2d 517, 521 (citing State v. Robertson, 96-1048 (La. 10/4/96), 680 So.2d

1165). The appellate court’s function is not to assess the credibility of witnesses or

reweigh the evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So.2d 442.

The factfinder’s role is to weigh the credibility of witnesses. State v. Ryan,

07-504 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/7/07), 969 So.2d 1268. Thus, other than insuring the

sufficiency evaluation standard of Jackson, “the appellate court should not

second-guess the credibility determination of the trier of fact,” but rather, it should

defer to the rational credibility and evidentiary determinations of the jury. Id. at

1270 (quoting State v. Lambert, 97-64, (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/30/98), 720 So.2d 724.

Our supreme court has stated:

However, an appellate court may impinge on the fact finder=s
discretion and its role in determining the credibility of witnesses “only
to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental due process of
law.” State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1310 (La.1988). In
determining the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction,
an appellate court must preserve “‘the factfinder=s role as weigher of
the evidence’ by reviewing ‘all of the evidence . . . in the light most
favorable to the prosecution.’” McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. ___,
___, 130 S.Ct. 665, 674, 175 L.Ed.2d 582 (quoting Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560
(1979)). When so viewed by an appellate court, the relevant question
is whether, on the evidence presented at trial, “any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789.
Applied in cases relying on circumstantial evidence, . . . this
fundamental principle of review means that when a jury “reasonably
rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defendant[ ], that
hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another
hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt.” State v. Captville, 448
So.2d 676, 680 (La.1984).

12

State v. Strother, 09-2357, pp. 10-11 (La. 10/22/10), 49 So.3d 372, 378.
Second degree murder under these facts “is the killing of a human being . . .

[w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm[.]”

La.R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). “Specific criminal intent need not be proven as a fact, but

may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and the actions of the

defendant.” State v. Maxie, 93-2158, p. 11 (La. 4/10/95), 653 So.2d 526, 532

(citing State v. Graham, 420 So.2d 1126 (La.1982)). “The severity of a victim’s

injuries may be probative in proving the defendant’s intent to kill.” State v.

George, 09-143, p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/7/09), 19 So.3d 614, 620 (citing State v.

Green, 484 So.2d 698 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1985), aff’d, 493 So.2d 1178 (La.1986)).

In State v. Jones, 09-1453 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/11/10), 45 So.3d 1136, writs

denied, 10-504, 10-2132 (La. 2/18/11), 57 So.3d 328, 330, the defendant beat,

anally raped, and stabbed his girlfriend over a period of three days. On appeal, he

argued he did not intend to kill his victim, evidenced by the small size of the stab

wound and the fact he did not aim at or hit a vital organ. He claimed the opening

in the chest wall and collapsed lung were accidental. The defendant refused to let

his victim seek medical help because he feared being implicated, but he treated her

wound by securing a wash rag to her chest with duct tape. She finally escaped

with the help of a neighbor. He was convicted of attempted second degree murder

and a panel of this court upheld that conviction. The victim’s treating physician

testified the chest wound “was both significant and life-threatening.” Id. at 1139.

She had very low blood pressure, was going into shock, and required a blood

transfusion upon arrival at the hospital. She also had a collapsed lung and required

surgery to remove clotted blood in her chest cavity. Her physician testified she

would have died had she not received treatment when she did. This court rejected

13

the defendant’s argument that he had no specific intent to kill or cause great bodily

harm.

In State v. Scott, 09-748 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/9/09), 26 So.3d 313, writ denied,

10-94 (La. 6/25/10), 38 So.3d 336, the defendant was convicted of second degree

murder after he struck the victim multiple times with a baseball bat. As the victim

exited the side door of a lounge, the defendant struck him once in the head, then hit

him two more times. A witness testified she had seen the defendant “running with

a bat hitting people.” Id. at 315-16. The defendant argued the chaos in the area

precluded a finding of what truly transpired. He contended others also hit and

kicked the victim.

Dr. Carney performed the autopsy on the victim in Scott as he did here. He

testified at trial “the cause of death was injuries to the head and brain which were

the result of blunt force trauma consistent with being struck forcefully in the head

with a bat.” Id. at 316. This court held specific intent to cause great bodily harm

could be inferred from the defendant’s act and affirmed his conviction.

Here, Defendant admittedly kicked the helpless victim twice in the jaw,

apparently without any provocation. He stomped Armstrong’s neck area and

forehead so hard he left an imprint of his shoe in Armstrong’s skin. He fractured

Armstrong’s hyoid bone and thyroid cartilage. Dr. Carney testified those injuries

could have caused neck compression and led to Armstrong’s death. Defendant

also stomped Armstrong’s groin area and “demolished” Armstrong’s groin area

while declaring Armstrong would never have any kids. Armstrong’s blood and

DNA were on Defendant’s shoes. The jury could reasonably conclude that

Defendant at the very least intended to inflict great bodily harm on Armstrong.

Defendant suggests he should not be held responsible for this death because

Armstrong would have died anyway from excessive consumption of Prozac and
14

alcohol. This argument, disrespectful of a human life as it is, ignores the fact that

Armstrong was alive at the time Defendant and Chadwick attacked him. Dr.

Carney testified the body would not have bruised and bled as it did had Armstrong

already been dead at the time Defendant and Chadwick brutally kicked and

stomped him. As Dr. Carney testified, “[f]atal injuries trump the toxicology.”

One does not kick or stomp a victim with enough force to fracture his neck

area or demolish his groin area without the specific intent to at least inflict great

bodily harm, if not to actually kill. Both the nature and the extent of the injuries

infer the specific intent to kill or cause great bodily harm. Thus, the evidence was

sufficient to establish Defendant’s specific intent and his guilt. Defendant’s

arguments lack merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3.
Defendant contends Cretain’s testimony was unreliable because his ability to

perceive events was impaired by a head injury. He argues Cretain’s testimony

about this incident “changed and evolved” from the time of his law enforcement

interview on the day of the incident to when he testified at Chadwick’s trial on

March 30, 2012.

The jury assessed Cretain’s credibility and weighed the evidence and we will

not disturb its determinations of credibility. Ryan, 969 So.2d 1268. Further, the

evidence was sufficient to convict Defendant even without considering Cretain’s

testimony. Armstrong was alive when Defendant was placed in the cell, and he

was dead some six hours later. He was brutally injured. Defendant admitted to

kicking Armstrong. Defendant had Armstrong’s blood and DNA on his shoes.

Defendant’s shoe prints were on Armstrong’s neck and forehead.

Additionally, much of Defendant’s argument involves Cretain’s testimony

from his civil deposition and his testimony at Chadwick’s trial. Thus, his argument

15

depends on evidence that was not presented in the trial court and may not be

considered here. Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-1.7. We find

Defendant’s argument lacks merit.

For the reasons as stated above we affirm Defendant’s conviction.

AFFIRMED.

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