State of Louisiana v. Christopher Vincent

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

13-538
STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

CHRISTOPHER VINCENT

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 18125-10
HONORABLE DAVID KENT SAVOIE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, John D. Saunders, and
Phyllis M. Keaty, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

John Foster DeRosier
District Attorney – 14th Judicial District Court
Karen C. McLellan
Assistant District Attorney – 14th Judicial District Court
P. O. Box 3206
Lake Charles, LA 70602-3206
Telephone: (337) 437-3400
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellee - State of Louisiana

Paula Corley Marx
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 80006
Lafayette, LA 70598-0006
Telephone: (337) 991-9757
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellant - Christopher Vincent

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

Defendant, Christopher Vincent, entered a plea pursuant to North

Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160 (1970) to two counts of indecent

behavior with a juvenile, violations of La.R.S. 14:81(H)(2). He was initially

indicted by a grand jury with two counts of aggravated rape and two counts of

sexual battery.

He appeals his consecutive twenty years at hard labor sentences, with

ten years to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of

sentence, as excessive. We affirm.

ISSUE

We shall consider whether the sentences imposed on this twenty-two-

year-old first-time offender are excessive.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Excessiveness of Sentences

Defendant was originally charged with two counts of aggravated rape

of a juvenile, which carry mandatory sentences of life imprisonment at hard labor,

without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and two counts of

sexual battery on a minor, which carry sentences of twenty-five to ninety-nine

years, with at least twenty-five years served without benefit of probation, parole, or

suspension of sentence. See La.R.S. 14:42(D)(2)(b) and La.R.S. 14:43.1(C)(2).

However, Defendant pled guilty to two counts of indecent behavior with a

juvenile, which carry sentences of two to twenty-five years at hard labor, with at

least two years to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of

sentence. See La.R.S. 14:81(H)(2).

At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, which included testimony

by the father of the minor victims, the court sentenced Defendant to twenty years at

hard labor on each count, to be served consecutively, with ten years of each

sentence to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of

sentence. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, in which he claimed

that he was twenty-two years old and had no prior adult convictions at the time of

the offenses. He also alleged that he “has a substantial possibility of becoming a

responsible adult by the end of his twenties” and that the sentences imposed are

“cruel.” The trial court denied the motion without written reasons. Defendant

repeats these claims on appeal and also contends that, as noted by the trial court, he

“had limited educational understanding” and “had gotten through maybe the 8 th

grade.” Defendant argues the length and consecutive nature of the sentences make

them excessive and constitute a “defacto [sic] life sentence.”

In evaluating excessive sentence claims, this court has previously

stated, in State v. Whatley, 03-1275, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/3/04), 867 So.2d

955, 958-59:

The Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and La. Const. art. I, § 20 prohibit the
imposition of cruel or excessive punishment. “ „[T]he
excessiveness of a sentence becomes a question of law
reviewable under the appellate jurisdiction of this court.‟
” State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1280 (La.1993)
(quoting State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 764
(La.1979)). Still, the trial court is given wide discretion
in imposing a sentence, and, absent a manifest abuse of
that discretion, we will not deem as excessive a sentence
imposed within statutory limits. State v. Pyke, 95-919
(La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/96), 670 So.2d 713. However,
“[m]aximum sentences are reserved for the most serious

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violations and the worst offenders.” State v. Farhood,
02-490, p. 11 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/25/03), 844 So.2d 217,
225. The only relevant question for us to consider on
review is not whether another sentence would be more
appropriate, but whether the trial court abused its broad
discretion in sentencing a defendant. State v. Cook, 95-
2784 (La.5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

The fifth circuit, in State v. Lisotta, 98-648
(La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d 57, stated that the
reviewing court should consider three factors in
reviewing the trial court‟s sentencing discretion:

1. The nature of the crime,

2. The nature and background of the offender,
and

3. The sentence imposed for similar crimes by
the same court and other courts.

During sentencing, the trial judge stated that he considered the

presentence investigation report (PSI), as well as an abstract of Defendant‟s

juvenile record. The latter indicated that Defendant had previously been

adjudicated for sex offenses and that the “nature of the charges are sexual battery

and forcible rape.” The judge also noted that, in the instant case, the original

charges of aggravated rape “would have been entirely appropriate.” Defendant

does not contest the trial court‟s characterization of information contained in the

PSI. Finally, the trial judge noted Defendant‟s limited educational background and

the fact that the victims in this case were small children before sentencing

Defendant to twenty years on each count of indecent behavior with a juvenile, to

run consecutively, with ten years to be served without probation, parole, or

suspension of sentence. Specific details of the offenses committed against the

children in the current case are not listed in the record and were not described by

either the State or trial court.

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While Defendant cited his youth and lack of education as mitigating

factors warranting concurrent sentences, the State noted that the offenses involved

two separate, very young victims. Consecutive sentences are warranted when the

offenses committed do not arise out of the same course of conduct or were not part

of a common scheme. See La.Code Crim.P. art. 883 and State v. Pierre, 02-277

(La.App. 3 Cir. 6/11/03), 854 So.2d 945, writ denied, 03-2042 (La. 1/16/04), 864

So.2d 626. Further, the State noted that Defendant was facing possible sentences

of life imprisonment, plus lengthy additional terms, and benefitted substantially

from the plea.

Sentences of similar length for indecent behavior with a juvenile have

been routinely upheld on review. As found in Whatley, 867 So.2d at 958:

See State v. Delgado, 03-46 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/30/03), 845
So.2d 581 (upholding a near-maximum sentence where a
twenty-one-year-old second felony offender was found
naked in bed with a thirteen-year-old victim); State v.
Kirsch, 02-0993 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/20/02), 836 So.2d
390 (upholding a maximum sentence where a neighbor
and close family friend exposed the eight-year-old victim
to sexually explicit material and comments, removed her
clothes and viewed her “private parts,” and touched her
vaginal area through her clothing), writ denied, 03-0238
(La.9/5/03), 852 So.2d 1024; State v. Jordan, 98-101
(La.App. 3 Cir. 6/3/98), 716 So.2d 36 (upholding a
maximum sentence where a sixty-nine-year-old
wheelchair bound man originally charged with
aggravated oral sexual battery and aggravated crimes
against nature of a three-year-old neighbor benefitted
from a plea bargain); State v. Lisotta, 98-646 (La.App. 5
Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d 57 (upholding a near maximum
sentence where a teacher played pornographic movies for
his sixteen-year-old-victim and, on one occasion,
removed her clothing, inserted his fingers in her vagina,
and told her he was going to have sex with her), writ
denied, 99-0433 (La.6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183; State v.
Armstrong, 29,942 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/29/97), 701 So.2d
1350 (upholding a maximum sentence where a step-
grandfather fondled a nine-year-old victim on two
separate occasions as she visited in his home).

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Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing

Defendant as the sentences imposed are not excessive. This contention by

Defendant has no merit.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed

for errors patent on the face of the record. There are no errors patent, but the

minutes of sentencing are in need of correction.

The minutes of sentencing provide that the trial court ordered

Defendant to serve twenty years at hard labor on each count with “at least ten (10)

years of which is to be served without the benefit of probation, parole or

suspension of sentence.” The sentencing transcript clarified that ten years of each

sentence would be served without those benefits. Additionally, the Uniform

Commitment Order, which was signed by the trial judge, indicated that the trial

court ordered the first ten years of each sentence to be served without the benefit of

probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. “[I]t is well settled that when the

minutes and the transcript conflict, the transcript prevails.” State v. Wommack, 00-

137, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/00), 770 So.2d 365, 369, writ denied, 00-2051 (La.

9/21/01), 797 So.2d 62. Thus, we order the trial court to amend the minutes of the

sentencing proceedings to accurately reflect the sentencing transcript that the ten

years of each sentence are to be served without the benefit of probation, parole, or

suspension of sentence. See State v. Perry, 08-1304 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/6/09), 9

So.3d 342, writ denied, 09-1955 (La. 6/25/10), 38 So.3d 352.

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CONCLUSION

The trial court is instructed to amend the minutes of sentencing to

accurately reflect the sentencing transcript. Defendant‟s sentences are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
RULE 2-16.3, UNIFORM RULES—COURTS OF APPEAL.

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