State of Louisiana v. Larry Walker

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

13-738 c/w 13-739

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

LARRY J. WALKER, JR.

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APPEALS FROM THE
THIRTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF VERNON, DOCKET NOS. 82375 AND 83649
HONORABLE VERNON B. CLARK, DISTRICT JUDGE
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SYLVIA R. COOKS
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, J. David Painter and Shannon J. Gremillion,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Asa A. Skinner, District Attorney
Terry W. Lambright, Assistant District Attorney
P.O. Box 1188
Leesville, LA 71446
(337) 239-2008
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
State of Louisiana

Annette Roach
Louisiana Appellate Project
P.O. Box 1747
Lake Charles, LA 70602-1747
(337) 436-2900
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
Larry J. Walker, Jr.

COOKS, Judge.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 14, 2011, Defendant, Larry J. Walker, Jr., along with two other

co-defendants, jumped a fence and entered an immovable structure without the

consent of the owner. They then stole a two and one-half ton floor jack from the

property. The three men were apprehended shortly thereafter by police.

Defendant was arrested and released after posting a bail bond.

On November 29, 2011, Defendant was charged by bill of information with

one count of simple burglary, a violation of La.R.S. 14:62, and one count of

criminal conspiracy to commit simple burglary, a violation of La.R.S. 14:26 and

La.R.S. 14:62. On that same date, Defendant entered a plea of not guilty to the

charges. Subsequently, Defendant failed to appear in court as ordered on three

separate occasions.

On September 4, 2012, Defendant was charged in a separate docket number

with three counts of bail jumping, violations of La.R.S. 14:110.1, for failure to

appear at certain proceedings in a felony case. On that date, Defendant entered a

plea of not guilty to the bail jumping charges. On February 5, 2013, Defendant

moved to consolidate these charges for purposes of a guilty plea and entered pleas

of guilty to one count of simple burglary and one count of bail jumping. Pursuant

to the plea agreement, the State recommended that the sentences be imposed

concurrently and agreed not to habitualize Defendant. The State also agreed to

dismiss the remaining counts against Defendant in the consolidated bills of

information as well as a misdemeanor theft charge filed in a separate docket

number.

On April 9, 2013, Defendant was sentenced on the simple burglary charge to

six years at hard labor and to pay a fine of $1,000.00 plus court costs. On the bail

jumping charge, Defendant was sentenced to two years at hard labor. The trial

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court ordered the sentences to run concurrently and ordered Defendant to pay a

$100.00 fee to the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Division of

Probation and Parole for the preparation of the presentence investigation report

(PSI). On April 10, 2013, Defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider Sentence,

arguing that the sentence imposed for simple burglary was excessive. The trial

court denied the motion to reconsider without a hearing, stating the sentence was

supported by the reasons given. This appeal followed, wherein Defendant alleges

one assignment of error as to the excessiveness of the sentences imposed.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After such a review, we find there are no

errors patent.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In his sole assignment of error, Defendant contends the sentence he received

is excessive. Defendant argues the trial court’s failure to sufficiently consider and

weigh the factors set forth in La.Code Crim.P art. 894.1 resulted in the imposition

of an excessive sentence. Defendant notes that in his motion to reconsider

sentence, he asserted the six year sentence imposed for simple burglary served no

meaningful purpose considering his eligibility for probation, Defendant’s

employment status, and the inconsistency of the sentence in comparison to

sentences imposed on other defendants appearing in the same division of the court

with worse records than Defendant. Specifically, Defendant complains the

sentence imposed by the trial court for bail jumping (two years at hard labor) is the

maximum sentence for that offense. La.R.S. 14:110.1(C). He also notes the

sentence imposed for simple burglary (six years at hard labor and $1,000.00 fine)

is one-half of the maximum sentence that could have been imposed for simple

burglary (up to twelve years with or without hard labor and/or a fine of up to

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$2,000.00). La.R.S. 14:62. The State points out, although Defendant received the

maximum sentence for bail jumping, the sentence was ordered to run concurrently

with the simple burglary sentence.

The law is well settled concerning the standard to be used in reviewing

excessive sentence claims:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law
shall subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.”
To constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court
must find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or
that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more
than a needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v.
Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial court has
wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within the
statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as
excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d
124, writ denied, 00-0165 (La.6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067.
The relevant question is whether the trial court abused its
broad sentencing discretion, not whether another
sentence might have been more appropriate. State v.
Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied,
519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01),
779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La.2/1/02), 808 So.2d
331.

. . . [E]ven when a sentence falls within the statutory sentencing
range, it still may be unconstitutionally excessive, and in determining
whether a sentence shocks the sense of justice or makes no
meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals, this court has
suggested that several factors may be considered:

[An] appellate court may consider several factors
including the nature of the offense, the circumstances of
the offender, the legislative purpose behind the
punishment and a comparison of the sentences imposed
for similar crimes. State v. Smith, 99-0606 (La.7/6/00);
766 So.2d 501. While a comparison of sentences
imposed for similar crimes may provide some insight, “it
is well settled that sentences must be individualized to
the particular offender and to the particular offense
committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1
Cir.1991). Additionally, it is within the purview of the
trial court to particularize the sentence because the trial
judge “remains in the best position to assess the

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aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented by
each case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674
So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786,
789, writ denied, 03-562 (La.5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061.

State v. Decuir, 10-1112, pp. 11-14 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/6/11), 61 So.3d 782, 790-91.

Finally, it is well-settled that “maximum sentences are reserved for the most

serious violations and the worst offenders.” State v. Farhood, 02-490, p. 11

(La.App. 5 Cir. 3/25/03), 844 So.2d 217, 225 (citing State v. Sullivan, 02-35

(La.App. 5 Cir. 4/30/02), 817 So.2d 335).

Before imposing sentence, the trial court noted that Defendant entered an

immovable structure without the consent of the owner and committed a theft

therein. The trial court also noted that Defendant intentionally failed to appear for

court proceedings which involved the felony charges. Additionally, the trial court

noted that pursuant to the plea agreement, the sentences would be ordered to run

concurrently, the State would not charge Defendant as a habitual offender, and the

remaining charges would be dismissed. The trial court then stated the following in

support of the sentence imposed:

BY THE COURT:
All right, sir. I considered the Article 894.1 Code of Criminal
Procedure factors and found the following were pertinent: First, there
are no substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify his criminal
conduct nor did he act under strong provocation from anyone. He’s
thirty-one years of age. He’s single. He has two children. He’s in
good health. He is - - was at the time of the report unemployed and
did not give a history of any kind of employment. Are you working
now?

BY MR. WALKER:
Popeye’s where I do yard work.

BY THE COURT:
Okay.

BY MR. WALKER:
For Mr. (INAUDIBLE) - - do yard work with him.

BY THE COURT:

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All right, sir. He has an eleventh grade education and has not
received a GED. He has a history of some drug use, claims he is now
clean. He is classified as a second felony offender in that on January
the 19th, 2010, in the 10th Judicial District Court in Natchitoches
Parish, he pled guilty to distribution of cocaine, was given a five-year
Department of Corrections sentence which was suspended and that - -
he was placed on three years supervised probation. He was released
on good-time parole later and that case expired in 2011. The Court
will note in this case - - the simple burglary in, in this particular case
was committed on October the 14th, 2011, just a little over one year
after his release from the Natchitoches charges and this certainly
indicates that he does not and did not realize that he needed to obey
the law. You did some - - you did some time and you got out and a
year later you’re breaking the law again.

BY MR. WALKER:
Right. Yes, sir.

BY THE COURT:
He claims to be remorseful now. The sentence of the Court is
as follows: One 82,375, count one, the simple burglary, that you
serve six years at hard labor with the Louisiana Department of
Corrections and pay a fine of one thousand dollars plus court costs. In
number 83,649, count one, the bail jumping charge, the sentence is
that you serve two years at hard labor with Louisiana Department of
Corrections. These two sentences are made to run concurrent with
each other. You’re given credit for any time served on these offenses
since your arrest. You’re also ordered to pay a one hundred dollar fee
to the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections,
Division of Probation and Parole, for the preparation of this PSI
report.

In his brief, Defendant asserts that the trial judge “did not consider the facts

of the case, including whether the State would have been able to prove an actual

entry into an immovable.” Based upon the facts in the reports, appellate counsel

contends Defendant did not enter into the immovable property. Despite appellate

counsel’s argument, by entering a plea of guilty, Defendant admitted to committing

the offense charged by the State – “Count 1: committed the offense of simple

burglary, in that he did knowingly and intentionally enter into an immovable

structure without consent of owner. . . .” At the guilty plea hearing, defense

counsel did not dispute the factual basis submitted by the State, wherein the State

accused the Defendant of entering into “an immovable structure.”

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Appellate counsel further argues that the property stolen was returned a short

time after it was taken and that all of the charges filed against the Defendant stem

from the item stolen, which was valued at less than $500.00. Finally, appellate

counsel asserts that Defendant did not remain at large for a lengthy period of time,

he forfeited his bonds, he admitted to having a drug problem but is now clean, he

was employed at the time of his arrest and at the time of sentencing, no one was

present at the time of the theft, no severe damage was caused to the property, and

he was not the one who planned the burglary. Because the bail jumping charges

were all related, appellate counsel asserts that the dismissal of two of the bail

jumping charges did not justify the imposition of the maximum sentence on the

one bail jumping count to which Defendant pled guilty.

In further support of his excessive sentence claim, Defendant distinguishes

his case from other cases in which eight, nine, and twelve year sentences were

imposed for simple burglaries committed by defendants with allegedly more

aggravating factors than the present Defendant. Lastly, appellate counsel notes

that Defendant was eligible for a probated sentence under La.Code Crim.P. art.

893.

In its brief, the State argues the trial judge was well aware of the facts and

circumstances prior to sentencing this Defendant, considered the PSI, weighed the

factors set forth in La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1, and adequately stated those factors

for the record. Additionally, the State contends the trial court considered

Defendant’s status as a second felony offender, specifically noting that the

Defendant committed the simple burglary just a little over a year after his release

on his sentence for distribution of cocaine. The State also points out according to

the PSI, Defendant had several previous misdemeanor convictions along with his

prior felony distribution of cocaine conviction.

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Further, the State argues Defendant received a significant benefit from the

plea agreement – the dismissal of a felony conspiracy charge, the dismissal of two

felony bail jumping charges, and the dismissal of a misdemeanor theft charge.

Additionally, the State agreed to recommend concurrent sentences and agreed not

to charge the Defendant as a habitual offender.

Finally, the State notes this court recently upheld a five-year sentence in a

similar case out of Vernon Parish. State v. Stockton, 12-1398 (La.App. 3 Cir.

6/15/13) (unpublished opinion). Stockton was originally charged with aggravated

burglary, simple burglary and theft of firearms. Id. Pursuant to a plea agreement,

Stockton pled guilty to simple burglary and theft of property valued over $500. Id.

In upholding the sentence, this court noted Stockton’s prior record for felony

possession of a controlled dangerous substance as well as his prior record for three

misdemeanor convictions. Id. Finally, this court noted the substantial benefit

Stockton received by his plea agreement.

In reviewing the jurisprudence for comparable cases, we note in State v.

Brown, 12-626 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/10/13), 115 So.3d 564, the fourth circuit upheld a

six-year sentence for Brown’s simple burglary of a storage shed, during which

Brown stole $130.00 worth of soft drinks and bottled water. The fourth circuit

noted that the sentence was a mid-range sentence, that no fine was imposed, and

that Brown confessed to the offense. Id. at 578. Additionally, the fourth circuit

noted that other circuits have upheld six-year sentences, or greater, for convictions

of simple burglary.

In one of the cases cited by the fourth circuit, State v. Parker, 594 So.2d 3

(La.App. 5 Cir. 1992), the fifth circuit upheld a six-year sentence for the simple

burglary of a vehicle. In that case, as Defendant argues in the present case, the

items taken by Parker were recovered soon after the incident. The fifth circuit

noted in Parker, however, that the sentence was not excessive in light of Parker’s

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prior guilty plea to simple robbery (reduced from armed robbery) and Parker’s

other pending charges. Id. at 5.

In upholding Parker’s sentence, the fifth circuit cited State v. Guajardo, 428

So.2d 468 (La.1983), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by

State v. Richard, 99-1078 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/27/00), 779 So.2d 927. In Guajardo,

the supreme court upheld a six-year sentence imposed for the simple burglary of a

law office. Guajardo took $14.00 in currency from the office and did some minor

damage to the door of the building. Id. at 470. Finding the six-year sentence was

not excessive, the supreme court stated the following:

Our consideration of these factors leads us to conclude that a
sentence of six years at hard labor does not constitute excessive
punishment. In imposing the sentence, the trial judge acknowledged
that the unarmed daytime burglary of an office did not threaten
serious harm to others. However, the judge properly considered
defendant’s multiple juvenile convictions in setting the sentence. The
judge emphasized the fact that defendant’s prior two convictions
consisted of burglaries, and the present burglary occurred only nine
months after his release from the correctional institute. On the basis
of defendant’s recidivism, the trial judge properly found that he was
not a suitable candidate for probation. Furthermore, the duration of
the sentence is not excessive, in light of the fact that the offense of
simple burglary carries a maximum sentence of twelve years at hard
labor. La.R.S. 14:62.

Id. at 473 (citation omitted).

Finally, in State v. Doyle, 12-701 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/5/12) (unpublished

opinion), this court upheld a six-year sentence for a simple burglary committed

when Doyle and his two co-defendants “entered private property by ramming into

a locked gate with the truck [Doyle] was driving.” Id. at 1. Doyle and his co-

defendants “pried open a trailer from which they stole a generator, power tools,

and stackable Craftsman toolboxes.” Id. Doyle pled guilty to simple burglary

along with two unrelated charges of theft over $500 and aggravated flight from an

officer. Pursuant to the plea agreement, several companion charges were

dismissed. Doyle was sentenced to six years at hard labor for simple burglary, six

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years at hard labor for theft over $500, and two years at hard labor for aggravated

flight from an officer. Because the offenses were committed in separate acts or

transactions, the sentences were ordered to run consecutively. When it addressed

the appropriateness of the sentence imposed for Doyle’s simple burglary, this court

noted that the sentence was half of the maximum possible sentence, that Doyle was

spared a large fine, that Doyle’s sentencing exposure was significantly reduced by

the State’s dismissal of other charges, and that Doyle’s three prior felonies indicate

his propensity to commit crimes.

Likewise, we find the imposition of a six-year total sentence and $1,000.00

fine plus costs in the present case was not an abuse of discretion. Although the

trial court imposed the maximum sentence for bail jumping, the sentence was

ordered to run concurrently with the sentence imposed for simple burglary. Thus,

the trial court imposed one-half of the maximum sentence that could have been

imposed. Considering this fact, the comparable jurisprudence, Defendant’s prior

record, the dismissal of charges pursuant to the plea agreement, and the State’s

agreement not to habitualize Defendant, we find the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by the sentence it imposed.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s sentence is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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