State of Louisiana v. Alex Sigue

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

13-1072

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

ALEX SIGUE

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ALLEN, NO. CR-2011-5714
HONORABLE PATRICIA C. COLE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Marc T. Amy, and
James T. Genovese, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Annette Fuller Roach
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 1747
Lake Charles, LA 70602-1747
Telephone: (337) 436-2900
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellant - Alex Sigue

Herbert Todd Nesom
District Attorney - 33rd Judicial District
Joe Green
Assistant District Attorney - 33rd Judicial District
P. O. Box 839
Oberlin, LA 70655
Telephone: (337) 639-2641
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellee - State of Louisiana

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

After severely beating a prison guard, Defendant, an inmate at the

Allen Parish Correctional Center, was convicted by a jury of battery of a

correctional facility employee, a violation of La.R.S. 14:34.5. The State

subsequently filed a bill of information alleging that Defendant was a fourth

habitual offender pursuant to La.R.S. 15:529.1. After a habitual defender hearing,

the trial court determined that Defendant was a fourth habitual offender and

sentenced him to thirty years at hard labor, consecutive to any sentences already

being served. Defendant appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial

court’s judgment and Defendant’s sentence.

I.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal, the Defendant raises the following assignments of error for

our consideration:

(1) the trial court erred in finding Defendant to be a fourth felony
offender since the predicate offense used to establish his
incarceration as an offender was improperly used to enhance his
sentence;

(2) the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to elicit
testimony at trial regarding an alleged prior manslaughter
conviction;

(3) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s “Objection to
Multiple Offender Bill;” and

(4) Defendant was not sufficiently identified as the same person
who entered pleas of guilty to the predicate offenses alleged by
the State in the habitual offender bill of information.

II.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Assignment of Error Number One

In his first assignment of error, Defendant argues the habitual offender

adjudication subjected him to a double enhancement, as the adjudication was

based, in part, upon his earlier manslaughter conviction, the same offense that the

State used to prove an element of battery of a correctional center employee.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) states that “any challenge to a

previous conviction which is not made before sentence is imposed may not

thereafter be raised to attack the sentence.” As Defendant failed to raise this issue

in his written “Objection to Multiple Offender Bill” or in his oral argument at the

habitual offender hearing, the issue was not preserved for appellate review, and he

is precluded from raising it for the first time here. See State v. Elie, 10-1494

(La.App. 3 Cir. 10/5/11), 74 So.3d 1216, writ denied, 11-2786 (La. 4/13/12), 85

So.3d 1246; see also State v. Ayche, 07-753 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/11/08), 978 So.2d

1143, writ denied, 08-2291 (La. 1/30/09), 999 So.2d 752, and writ denied, 08-1115

(La. 2/13/09), 999 So.2d 1140.

Assignment of Error Number Two

In his second assignment of error, Defendant argues the trial court, in

his jury trial, erred by allowing the State to elicit testimony regarding his prior

manslaughter conviction, as it was an improper reference to evidence of other

crimes.

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The State cites State v. Rice, 31,871, pp. 11-12 (La.App. 2 Cir.

3/31/99), 736 So.2d 956, 964-65, writ denied, 99-1314 (La. 10/15/99), 748 So.2d

464, which addressed an analogous situation:

Evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible
in the guilt phase of the trial unless the probative value of
the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect and other
safeguards are met. State v. Hamilton, 478 So.2d 123,
129 (La.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022, 106 S.Ct.
3339, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986). Exceptions to the
prohibition of references to other crimes exist when the
state offers the evidence of other crimes to prove a
material issue which has independent relevance for
purposes other than to show the character of the
defendant. State v. Thompson, 532 So.2d 1160
(La.1988).

La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1) provides:

Except as provided in Article 412, evidence
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or
accident, provided that upon request by the
accused, the prosecution in a criminal case
shall provide reasonable notice in advance
of trial, of the nature of any such evidence it
intends to introduce at trial for such
purposes, or when it relates to conduct that
constitutes an integral part of the act or
transition that is the subject of the present
proceeding.

La.C.Cr.P. art. 720 provides that evidence “which
relates to conduct that constitutes an integral part of the
act or transaction that is the subject of the present
proceeding or other crimes for which the accused was
previously convicted” shall be admissible without prior
notice to the defendant.

The defendant’s prior conviction falls within an
exception to the inadmissibility of other crimes because
the state offered it to prove a material issue, the legal

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confinement of the defendant, which has independent
relevance other than to show the character of the
defendant. Furthermore, pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. 720,
the state was not required to give the defendant prior
notice because the prior conviction for armed robbery
was related to conduct that constituted an integral part of
the offense of aggravated escape.

....

Even if the “other crimes” evidence should have
been held inadmissible, the trial error would be subject to
a harmless error analysis on appeal. When the verdict is
“surely unattributable to the error,” the trial error is
harmless. State v. Ingram, 29,172 (La.App.2d
Cir.1/24/97), 688 So.2d 657, writ denied, 97-0566
(La.9/5/97), 700 So.2d 505. The defendant testified that
he had been incarcerated for armed robbery. Thus, the
evidence of defendant’s prior armed robbery conviction
was available to the jury, and the verdict is therefore
“surely unattributable” to the state’s reference to the
armed robbery conviction in its opening statement.

Here, the record indicates that the trial court limited the scope of

questioning regarding Defendant’s past conviction of manslaughter to “the reason

why he was initially incarcerated, and [to show] he would have still been

incarcerated legally for that crime.” To demonstrate the battery at issue was a

felony-grade offense, the State had to show that Defendant was in the custody of

the Department of Public Safety and Corrections or was being detained in a

correctional facility. As such, the trial court’s ruling here was valid. Even if the

court erred, said error would be harmless, pursuant to Rice, 736 So.2d 956. In light

of testimony from multiple witnesses that Defendant advanced on the sixty-two-

year-old guard and punched him several times, the verdict was surely not

dependent upon the jury’s knowledge that he had a prior manslaughter conviction.

Thus, if error occurred, the verdict was surely unattributable to the error.

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Defendant cites State v. Marsalis, 04-827 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/26/05),

902 So.2d 1081, in which the defendant argued that a State witness should not

have been allowed to refer to his incarceration in a maximum security area.

However, Marsalis did not address a scenario in which evidence of a prior offense

at issue was introduced. Thus, we find Marsalis distinguishable and conclude that

it should not be read as authority to prohibit such evidence in cases involving

La.R.S 14:34.5. Further, pursuant to Marsalis and Rice, even if an error occurred,

it was harmless. As such, this assignment lacks merit.

Assignment of Error Number Three

In his third assignment of error, Defendant argues the trial court erred

by denying his objection to the habitual offender bill. Specifically, he objected to

the use of the predicate offenses, alleging that his guilty pleas to those offenses

were not knowing and voluntary. He complained that he was not advised at any of

those plea proceedings that they could be used for future sentence enhancement.

Defendant is asking this court to reconsider established law stating that a defendant

need not be advised of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea. State v.

Guzman, 99-1753, 99-1528 (La. 5/16/00), 769 So.2d 1158; State v. Jackson, 362

So.2d 1082 (La.1978). While Defendant acknowledges this long-standing

jurisprudence, he suggests it has been modified or superseded by the Supreme

Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010). In

Padilla, the Court held that defense counsel must advise a non-citizen defendant of

the possible deportation-related consequences of a guilty plea. Further, Padilla is

rooted in the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United

States Constitution.

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While Defendant presents a germ of an argument, he fails to explain

why Padilla should be extended to collateral issues other than deportation or cases

relating to right to counsel. In the absence of an argument regarding why Padilla

should be extended, this assignment lacks merit.

Assignment of Error Number Four

In his final assignment of error, Defendant argues the State failed to

prove he was the same person who entered guilty pleas to the predicate offenses

alleged in the habitual offender bill. As discussed above, La.R.S.

15:529.1(D)(1)(b) states that “any challenge to a previous conviction which is not

made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the

sentence.” Here, Defendant did not raise his argument in his written “Objection To

Multiple Offender Bill” or at the habitual offender hearing. As such, Defendant

failed to preserve the issue for appeal. See Elie, 74 So.3d 1216, State v. Jones, 11-

649 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/19/11), 76 So.3d 608, writ denied, 11-2545 (La. 3/30/12),

85 So.3d 116.

III.

DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment and

Defendant’s sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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