State of Louisiana v. Christopher I. Shelton

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

14-237

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

CHRISTOPHER I. SHELTON

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APPEAL FROM THE
TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF NATCHITOCHES, NO. 19261
HONORABLE ERIC R. HARRINGTON, DISTRICT JUDGE

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PHYLLIS M. KEATY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, James T. Genovese, and Phyllis M. Keaty,
Judges.

AFFIRMED; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Van H. Kyzar
District Attorney
Post Office Box 838
Natchitoches, Louisiana 71458-0838
(318) 357-2214
Counsel for Appellee:
State of Louisiana

Brent A. Hawkins
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 3752
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70602-3752
(337) 502-5146
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Christopher I. Shelton

KEATY, Judge.

Defendant, Christopher Shelton, appeals his manslaughter conviction

pursuant to a plea agreement. For the following reasons, we affirm and remand

with instructions.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Bobby Arterberry was killed as a result of blunt force trauma to the head.

On October 4, 2012, Defendant was charged with second degree murder of

Arterberry, a violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. Defendant initially pled not guilty. As

part of a plea agreement, however, the State subsequently amended the charge to

manslaughter, a violation of La.R.S. 14:31. Defendant thereafter entered a guilty

plea. On November 5, 2013, Defendant was sentenced to serve twenty-five years

at hard labor and to pay $5,733.00 for the victim’s medical bills and funeral

expenses. Defendant subsequently appealed.

On appeal, Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to have the

State provide a factual basis for the offense to which he pled guilty. As such,

Defendant alleges that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily given.

DISCUSSION

Errors Patent

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find that

there are no errors patent. However, we find that the sentencing commitment order

requires correction.

The sentencing transcript indicates that the court, after imposing a twenty-

five year hard labor sentence, stated:

Manslaughter is listed as a crime of violence, as per the provisions of
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 14.2. As a result, your
parole eligibility is to be determined by the Department of Corrections
pursuant to RS 15:574.4B1 which requires that you serve at least 85%
of your sentence before being eligible for parole.

The sentencing minutes state:

THE COURT ADVISED DEFENDANT MANSLAUGHTER IS
LISTED AS A CRIME OF VIOLENCE AS PER THE PROVISIONS
OF LOUISIANA CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ARTICLE
14.2. THE COURT ADVISED DEFENDANT AS A RESULT, HIS
PAROLE ELIGIBILITY IS TO BE DETERMINED BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS PURSUANT TO R.S.
15:574.4B(1), WHICH REQUIRES THAT HE SERVE AT LEAST
85% OF HIS SENTENCE BEFORE BEING ELIGIBLE FOR
PAROLE.

The commitment order contains a section titled “Special Comments,

Program Participations or Instructions” under which appears the following:

Defendant is give [sic] years without benefit of probation,
parole or suspension of sentence

√ Defendant is given credit for time served from date of initial
arrest til [sic] today for each day defendant actually served

√ Other: [handwritten] Δ to serve 85% before eligible for
parole[.]

We find that the trial court minutes accurately reflect the sentencing

transcript regarding the trial court’s comments regarding parole eligibility.

Specifically, the trial court advised Defendant that his parole eligibility is to be

determined by the Department of Corrections pursuant to La.R.S. 15:574.4(B)(1),

which requires service of at least eighty-five percent of the sentence before being

eligible for parole. 1 We find that the commitment order, however, may be

1
Prior to its repeal in 1997, La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1(D) required the sentencing court,
immediately after imposing a felony sentence, to advise the offender in open court:

(4) Whether, pursuant to the provisions of R.S. 15:574.4(A)(1) and (3) and (B),
the offender is subject to parole eligibility.

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misconstrued by suggesting that the trial court restricted parole eligibility since it

only noted that Defendant was to serve “85% before eligible for parole.” Thus, we

order the trial court to correct the commitment order to accurately reflect the

sentencing transcript by stating that “parole eligibility is to be determined by the

Department of Corrections pursuant to La.R.S. 15:574.4(B)(1), which requires that

Defendant serve at least 85% of his sentence before being eligible for parole.”

Assignment of Error

Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to have the State provide

a factual basis for the offense to which he pled guilty. As a result, Defendant

alleges that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily given. In opposition,

the State contends that Defendant waived review of the alleged error through his

plea agreement.

The following exchange occurred during the plea colloquy:

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Sylvester, is there a sound factual basis
evidencing the commission of this crime?

MS. SYLVESTER: Yes Sir.

THE COURT: And Mr. Methvin, you’re the attorney for the
defendant?

MR. METHVIN: I am.

THE COURT: Have you heard the questions I have asked him?

MR. METHVIN: I have.

THE COURT: Is it your opinion from the facts stated to you by the
defendant that all elements that constitute the crime of manslaughter
are present?

(5) The prospective parole eligibility date of the offender should he be eligible for parole
pursuant to R.S. 15:574.4 et seq., to the extent that the court shall advise the offender that
he may be eligible for release upon serving the certain percentage of his sentence as
provided by law.

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MR. METHVIN: It is.

Based upon the above, we find no factual basis for the offense was provided at the

time Defendant entered his plea. Thus, we must determine whether Defendant

waived review of this alleged error.

During the exchange between the trial court and Defendant, the trial court

discussed the form entitled “Plea Agreement.” The Plea Agreement stated, in

pertinent part:

(3) By accepting this plea agreement, the defendant waives,
releases and relinquishes any and all rights to appeal the
conviction resulting from this plea agreement, whether on direct
appeal or by application for post-conviction relief motion to
modify sentence, motion to correct sentence, application for
habeas corpus relief, or otherwise. The defendant reserves the
right to appeal the actual sentence imposed herein.

(4) By accepting this plea agreement, defendant asserts that he/she
is fully satisfied with the services and assistance rendered by
his/her counsel and has had sufficient time to confer with
counsel concerning his/her case and this plea agreement. By
accepting this plea agreement, defendant acknowledges that
his/her counsel has performed adequately and competently,
securing a satisfactory plea agreement and resolution of
defendant’s criminal case(s). By accepting this plea agreement,
defendant waives, releases and relinquishes any claim or right
to appeal this matter, whether on direct appeal or by application
for post-conviction relief, application for habeas corpus relief,
or otherwise on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Defendant reserves his right to appeal the sentence imposed
herein.

Defendant indicated that he reviewed the form with his attorney before he

signed it. The trial court then stated the following:

You waive the right to appeal your conviction. You reserve the
right to appeal your sentence resulting from this plea agreement
whether by direct appeal, post conviction relief, or by any other
available motion. So, you will absolutely have the right to appeal
your sentence, but not your conviction.

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Defendant stated he understood this. The trial court then signed and dated the Plea

Agreement and entered it into the record. The form was also signed by Defendant

and defense counsel.

At the sentencing hearing, Defendant was again informed by the trial court

that he waived his right to appeal his conviction.

A defendant may waive his right to appeal, either expressly or
impliedly, but that waiver must be knowing and voluntary. An
implied waiver occurs when a defendant is told of his right to appeal
by a trial court, but he chooses not to take the appeal within the time
limits prescribed by law. It is express if a defendant is told that he has
the right to appeal and he says in court, “I waive my right to appeal.”

In addition, when a defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a plea
bargain, jurisprudence traditionally holds that he is waiving only the
right to appeal his conviction.

State v. Pickens, 98-1443, pp. 7-8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/28/99), 741 So.2d 696, 701,

writ denied, 99-1577 (La. 11/5/99), 751 So.2d 232, and writ denied, 01-2178 (La.

4/19/02), 813 So.2d 1081 (citations omitted).

Both the signed plea form and colloquy are void of any suggestion that

Defendant’s guilty plea was made subject to the reservation of appellate review of

his conviction. Notably, Defendant expressly waived his right to appeal his

conviction. Thus, Defendant may not seek review of his guilty plea on the basis

that there was no factual basis to support the plea. Furthermore, a defendant

generally “waives the right to question the merits of the State’s case or the

underlying factual basis by entering a plea of guilt.” State v. Johnson, 04-1266, p.

6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/2/05), 893 So.2d 945, 950.

Accordingly, Defendant’s conviction is affirmed.

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DECREE

Defendant’s conviction is affirmed. The trial court is ordered to correct the

commitment order to accurately reflect the sentencing transcript by stating that

“parole eligibility is to be determined by the Department of Corrections pursuant to

La.R.S. 15:574.4(B)(1), which requires that Defendant serve at least 85% of his

sentence before being eligible for parole.”

AFFIRMED; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2–16.3.

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