State of Louisiana v. Isaac Thomas

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

14-820

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

ISAAC THOMAS
**********

APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF EVANGELINE, NO. 95656FB
HONORABLE THOMAS F. FUSELIER, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and Shannon J.
Gremillion, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Edward Kelly Bauman
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 1641
Lake Charles, LA 70602-1641
(337) 491-0570
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:
Isaac Thomas

Hon. Trent Brignac
District Attorney, Thirteenth Judicial District Court
J. Gregory Vidrine
Assistant District Attorney
P. O. Box 780
Ville Platte, LA 70586
(337) 363-3438
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

PICKETT, Judge.

FACTS

Carl Jack was the manager of Anger No. 2, a convenience store in

Evangeline Parish. He and his wife, Karriel Alfred, were working in the store on

February 13, 2013, when, at approximately 8:30 p.m., three men came into the

store demanding money from the cash register. One of the men wore a white

hockey-type mask and had a handgun. He said that the man with the gun took him

into the back room and threatened to shoot him in the leg if he did not get on the

floor. However, Ms. Alfred could not get the cash register drawer open, so Mr.

Jack was returned to the store area to open the register. Mr. Jack testified that Ms.

Alfred had panicked and crawled underneath the counter on which the cash register

sat. The man with the gun stood behind him and demanded he open the register.

When Mr. Jack could not get the register opened either, one of the other two men

grabbed the register and fled the store. The armed man fired the gun, missing Ms.

Alfred by approximately eighteen inches and Mr. Jack by about six to eight inches.

On May 6, 2013, the defendant, Isaac Thomas, was charged by a bill of

information with two counts of attempted first degree murder, violations of La.R.S.

14:27 and 14:30, and one count of armed robbery, a violation of La.R.S. 14:64. On

September 9, 2013, the bill of information was amended to add a charge of

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a violation of La.R.S. 14:95.1. A jury

trial commenced on September 30, 2013. On October 3, 2013, the jury returned a

verdict of guilty of armed robbery, attempted manslaughter, violations of La.R.S.

14:27 and 14:31, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.1 The defendant

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One count of attempted first degree murder of Mrs. Alfred was dismissed during trial.

filed a “Motion to Arrest Judgment.” A hearing was held on April 3, 2014,

following which the trial court denied the motion.

The defendant was sentenced on May 1, 2014, to forty years on the

conviction for armed robbery, to be served without the benefit of parole, probation,

or suspension of sentence; ten years on the conviction for possession of a firearm

by a convicted felon, to be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or

suspension of sentence; and consecutively with the forty-year sentence, and to ten

years on the conviction for attempted manslaughter, to be served concurrently with

the above sentences, for a total of fifty years imprisonment.

The defendant has perfected a timely appeal, wherein he alleges that the

convictions for armed robbery and attempted manslaughter constitute double

jeopardy and that there was insufficient evidence to find defendant guilty of

attempted manslaughter.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by

this court for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record,

we find no errors patent.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

The defendant asserts two assignments of error:

1. Isaac Thomas’ convictions for armed robbery and attempted
manslaughter constitute double jeopardy.

2. The trial court erred in finding Isaac Thomas guilty of attempted
manslaughter.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO

Assignment of error number two alleges that the evidence was insufficient to

sustain the conviction for attempted manslaughter. We will address this assignment

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first for the reason that should there be merit to his assertion, assignment of error

number one would be moot. Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 101 S.Ct. 970

(1981); State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731 (La.1992). The constitutional standard for

testing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979).

The defendant was originally charged with attempted first degree murder.

First degree murder, in pertinent part, is defined as “the killing of a human being:”

(3) When the offender has specific intent to kill or inflict great
bodily harm upon more than one person.

La.R.S. 14:30(A)(3).

However, the defendant was convicted of attempted manslaughter.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:31, in pertinent part, defines manslaughter as:

(1) A homicide which would be murder under either Article 30
(first degree murder) or Article 30.1 (second degree murder), but the
offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately
caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his
self-control and cool reflection.

Attempt, in pertinent part, is defined as:

A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime,
does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the
accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the
offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the
circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

La.R.S. 14:27.

“To support a conviction for attempted manslaughter, the state must prove

that the defendant specifically intended to kill the victim and committed an overt

act in furtherance of that goal.” State v. Cortez, 48,319, p. 5 (La.App. 2 Cir.

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8/7/13), 122 So.3d 588, 592. In brief, the defendant argues that “[t]he jury

incorrectly concluded that the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that

Mr. Thomas had the specific intent to kill Karrell Jack.”2 “Specific criminal intent

is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender

actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to

act.” La.R.S. 14:10(1). “[S]pecific criminal intent need not be proven as fact but

may be inferred from the circumstances of the case and actions of the defendant.”

State v. Robertson, 98-883, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/9/98), 723 So.2d 500, 504, writ

denied, 99-658 (La. 6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1187.

Both Mr. Jack and Ms. Alfred testified that the defendant stood behind the

cash register, where they were virtually together, pointed the gun at them, and fired

a shot. The surveillance video, while without sound, showed the defendant

standing behind the two, holding a gun pointed in their direction. The act of aiming

a lethal weapon and discharging it in the direction of a victim supports a finding of

specific intent to inflict great bodily harm or to kill. State v. Seals, 95-0305 (La.

11/25/96), 684 So.2d 368, cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1199, 117 S.Ct. 1558 (1997).

Jonathan Antoine, who was one of the robbers, testified at the defendant’s trial. He

testified that the defendant was the man who wore the white mask. He further

stated that he saw the defendant fire the gun.

We find there is no merit to this assignment of error. The evidence was

sufficient to establish the defendant’s specific intent to kill and an act in

furtherance. Accordingly, there was no error when the jury found the defendant

guilty of attempted manslaughter.

2
The defendant incorrectly spelled Mr. Jack’s first name. The correct spelling is “Carl.”

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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

The defendant argues that the convictions for armed robbery and attempted

manslaughter constitute double jeopardy in that the charge of attempted first

degree murder of Mrs. Alfred was dismissed by the state during trial. He argues

this means there was no intent to kill more than one person, and the state could

only rely on armed robbery as the underlying offense to support a conviction for

attempted first degree murder, the original charge.

Armed robbery is defined as “the taking of anything of value belonging to

another from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another,

by use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon.” La.R.S.

14:64.

First degree murder, in pertinent parts, is defined as “the killing of a human

being:”

(1) When the offender has specific intent to kill or to inflict
great bodily harm and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of aggravated kidnapping, second degree kidnapping,
aggravated escape, aggravated arson, aggravated rape, forcible rape,
aggravated burglary, armed robbery, assault by drive-by shooting,
first degree robbery, second degree robbery, simple robbery,
terrorism, cruelty to juveniles, or second degree cruelty to juveniles.

....

(3) When the offender has specific intent to kill or inflict great
bodily harm upon more than one person.

La.R.S. 14:30.

Double jeopardy stands for the proposition that no person shall twice be put

in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. U.S. Const. amend. V. The clause

protects against three distinct double jeopardy situations: a second prosecution for

the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after

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conviction, and multiple punishments for the same offense. North Carolina v.

Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072 (1969), overruled on other grounds by

Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S.Ct. 2201 (1989).

In State v. Bowles, 13-80, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/9/13), 123 So.3d 350,

354-55, writ denied, 13-2655 (La. 4/25/14), 138 So.3d 643, this court noted:

This court examined double jeopardy in State v. Cogswell, 05-
510, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/30/05), 918 So.2d 590, 593-94, writ
denied, 06-314 (La.9/1/06), 936 So.2d 196 (quoting State v. Vaughn,
431 So.2d 763 (La.1983)), as follows:

In State v. Knowles, 392 So.2d 651, 654 (La.1980),
the Court citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S.
299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), outlined the
following criteria for examining violations of double
jeopardy:

“. . . The applicable rule is that where the
same act or transaction constitutes a
violation of two distinct statutory provisions,
the test to be applied to determine whether
there are two offenses or only one, is
whether each provision requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not . . .”

This rule is constitutionally required by the States.
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d
187 (1977), and is embodied in La.C.Cr.P. 596:

“Double jeopardy exists in a second trial
only when the charge in that trial is: (1)
Identical with or a different grade of the
same offense for which the defendant was in
jeopardy in the first trial, whether or not a
responsive verdict could have been rendered
in the first trial as to the charge in the second
trial; or (2) Based on a part of a continuous
offense for which offense the defendant was
in jeopardy in the first trial.”

Louisiana uses both the “Blockburger test” and the
“same evidence test”. State v. Steele, 387 So.2d 1175
(La.1980); State v. Doughty, 379 So.2d 1088 (La.1980);
State v. Didier, 262 La. 364, 263 So.2d 322 (1972) and
State v. Hayes, 412 So.2d 1323 (La.1982). When a

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defendant is charged with separate statutory crimes they
need not be identical in elements or in actual proof to be
the same within the meaning of the constitutional
prohibition. State v. Hayes, 412 So.2d at 1325.

The Louisiana Supreme Court explains the “same
evidence” test in State v. Steele, 387 So.2d 1175
(La.1980) as follows:

“If the evidence required to support a
finding of guilt of one crime would also
have supported conviction of the other, the
two are the same offense under a plea of
double jeopardy, and a defendant can be
placed in jeopardy for only one. The test
depends on the evidence necessary for
conviction, not all the evidence introduced
at trial . . . The ‘same evidence’ test is
somewhat broader in concept than
Blockburger the central idea being that one
should not be punished (or put in jeopardy)
twice for the same course of conduct.” Id. at
1177.

The defendant points to this court’s opinion in State v. Bradford, 514 So.2d

534 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1987), writ denied, 523 So.2d 226 (La.1988), cert. denied,

488 U.S. 835, 109 S.Ct. 97 (1988), to support his contention that he was subjected

to double jeopardy. Bradford, with several companions, severely beat the victim in

an attempt to rob him and threatened to shoot him if he did not come up with the

money. The robbers were eventually unsuccessful in the attempt. Bradford was

charged with attempted first degree murder and attempted armed robbery but

convicted of attempted manslaughter and attempted armed robbery. In an

application for post-conviction relief, Bradford alleged he was subjected to double

jeopardy. The court stated:

In the present case the defendant was convicted of the
responsive crime of attempted manslaughter on a charge of attempted
first degree murder. At the same time he was convicted of attempted
armed robbery, the underlying felony. Since defendant was in

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jeopardy of the offense of attempted first degree murder, this
constitutes double jeopardy.

In the current case, as noted above, first degree murder is also defined as a

murder that is committed during several enumerated offenses, including armed

robbery. La.R.S. 14:64(A)(1). Although the defendant clearly states in brief that

the state’s position and argument at trial was that the taking of the victims’ cash

register at the point of a gun constituted the armed robbery offense, and the intent

to kill two people constituted the attempted first degree murder, he argues that

“[a]s the charge against the attempted murder of Mrs. Alfred was dismissed, the

state could have only proceeded under the La.R.S. 14:30(A)(1), the armed

robbery.” The defendant argues that the defendant “shot at Mr. Jack and missed,

but not at Mrs. Alfred. There could be no attempted murder of more than one

person.” However, as noted in State v. Tyler, 342 So.2d 574, 582 (La.1977), cert.

denied, 431 U.S. 917, 97 S.Ct. 2180 (1977), “[T]here is authority in law for the

proposition that shooting into a crowd indiscriminately with intent to kill someone

is an assault with intent to kill each of them.”

Testimony and review of the surveillance video shows that Mrs. Alfred

ducked under the counter on which the register sat. She can be seen through the

glass front of the counter. Standing directly above her was her husband, attempting

to open the cash register. After one of the men grabbed the register off the counter,

the defendant, who was standing close behind the couple, fired his gun. It cannot

be seen in the video exactly who the gun was pointed at, but the victims were

positioned right by each other, and the gun was pointed in their direction.

The defendant further argues that the trial court initially instructed the jury

that murder required a specific enumerated offense, listing the offenses, including

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armed robbery, to be classified as a first degree murder, but never instructed the

jury that first degree murder can occur when the offender has the specific intent to

kill or inflict great bodily harm on more than one person. However, the trial court

did include the latter instruction in its jury instructions given prior to the jury

retiring to deliberate.

There is no requirement that the defendant be charged with more than one

count of attempted first degree murder as a prerequisite for the state to argue that

the defendant attempted to commit the offense of attempted first degree murder

because there was an intent to kill more than one person. See State v. Pete, 13-

1107 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/14), 134 So.3d 196, writ denied, 14-705 (La. 11/7/14),

152 So.3d 173, and State v. Bridgewater, 98-658 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726

So.2d 987. The armed robbery was not the underlying offense to the attempted first

degree murder in this case, the intent to kill more than one person was the

underlying factor.

Even though the jury reduced the offense of attempted first degree murder to

attempted manslaughter, the attempted first degree murder or attempted

manslaughter offenses occurred when the defendant fired purposefully in the

direction of the two victims crowded closely together. His actions exhibited the

intent to kill one or more than one person. Armed robbery required the taking of

something of value from another by the use of force while armed with a dangerous

weapon, and the cash register was taken at gun point. The actions of the defendant

constituted a violation of two distinct statutory provisions.

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CONCLUSION

The defendant’s convictions are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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