State of Louisiana v. Johnny Ray Hamilton

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

14-998

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

JOHNNY RAY HAMILTON

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APPEAL FROM THE
TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF NATCHITOCHES, NO. 16,844
HONORABLE DEE A. HAWTHORNE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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PHYLLIS M. KEATY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, John D. Saunders, and
Phyllis M. Keaty, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Van H. Kyzar
District Attorney
Post Office Box 838
Natchitoches, Louisiana 71458-0838
(318) 357-2214
Counsel for Appellee:
State of Louisiana

Edward J. Marquet
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 53733
Lafayette, Louisiana 70505-3733
(337) 237-6841
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Johnny Ray Hamilton

KEATY, Judge.

Defendant, Johnny Ray Hamilton, appeals his sentence as excessive. For the

following reasons, we affirm.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 30, 2010, Carolyn Roy and her granddaughter were in a parking lot

in Natchitoches, Louisiana, when they were approached by Defendant who pulled

out a knife while demanding Roy’s purse. After Defendant took her purse, he ran

away. Two bystanders who witnessed the incident chased Defendant and called

the police. Defendant was subsequently arrested at his grandmother’s house. As a

result, Defendant was charged with armed robbery in violation of La.R.S. 14:64.

A sanity commission was appointed on April 12, 2011, resulting in Defendant’s

being committed to the Eastern Louisiana Mental Health System on September 12,

2012. The trial court subsequently found Defendant competent to proceed at trial.

Following a jury trial on February 3, 2014, Defendant was unanimously found

guilty of armed robbery. Defendant was thereafter sentenced to ninety-nine years

at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, the

maximum penalty under La.R.S. 14:64(B).

Defendant appeals, assigning only one assignment of error. Specifically,

Defendant contends that the trial court’s sentence was excessive considering that

he is a paranoid schizophrenic, suffering from psychosis.

DISCUSSION

Errors Patent

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find that

there are no errors patent.

Excessive Sentence

In his only assignment of error, Defendant claims that the trial court erred in

imposing an excessive sentence given his mental history of paranoid schizophrenia

and psychosis. In opposition, the State contends that Defendant can be charged as

a habitual offender under La.R.S. 15:529.1, and if adjudicated, he would be

automatically ordered to serve a life sentence without the benefit of parole,

probation, or suspension of sentence.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 881.1 provides the

mechanism for preserving the review of a sentence on appeal:

A. (1) In felony cases, within thirty days following the
imposition of sentence or within such longer period as the trial court
may set at sentence, the state or the defendant may make or file a
motion to reconsider sentence.

....

E. Failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence or to
include a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider sentence
may be based, including a claim of excessiveness, shall preclude the
state or the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence or
from urging any ground not raised in the motion on appeal or review.

At the outset, we note that no motion to reconsider sentence was filed

although Defendant’s counsel contemporaneously objected to the sentence as being

excessive. This court has reviewed claims of excessiveness where no objection

was made and no motion to reconsider sentence was filed. See State v. Davis, 06-

922 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/29/06), 947 So.2d 201. Accordingly, we will review

Defendant’s claim as a bare claim of excessiveness.

The standard of review utilized in excessive sentence claims is as follows:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall subject
any person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an
excessive sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock

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our sense of justice or that the sentence makes no measurable
contribution to acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing
more than a needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v.
Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial court has wide
discretion in the imposition of sentence within the statutory
limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as excessive
absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Etienne, 99-192
(La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124, writ denied, 00-0165
(La.6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The relevant question is whether
the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not
whether another sentence might have been more appropriate.
State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01),
779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La.2/1/02), 808 So.2d
331.

. . . [E]ven when a sentence falls within the statutory sentencing
range, it still may be unconstitutionally excessive, and in determining
whether a sentence shocks the sense of justice or makes no
meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals, this court has
suggested that several factors may be considered:

[An] appellate court may consider several factors including the
nature of the offense, the circumstances of the offender, the
legislative purpose behind the punishment and a comparison of
the sentences imposed for similar crimes. State v. Smith, 99-
0606 (La.7/6/00); 766 So.2d 501. While a comparison of
sentences imposed for similar crimes may provide some insight,
“it is well settled that sentences must be individualized to the
particular offender and to the particular offense committed.”
State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991).
Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to
particularize the sentence because the trial judge “remains in
the best position to assess the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances presented by each case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784
(La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786,
789, writ denied, 03-562 (La.5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061.

State v. Decuir, 10-1112, pp. 11-14 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/6/11), 61 So.3d 782, 790-91.

Looking at the Smith factors, the crime in the instant case involved the threat

of use of a deadly weapon against a woman and her eight-year-old grandchild.

Although Defendant has some mental problems, he has multiple prior violent

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felony convictions. The legislature intended to punish those who put society at

risk. Smith, 846 So.2d 786.

Additionally, the maximum sentence for this armed robbery is not unusual

for situations where an offender has multiple prior felonies. Specifically, in State v.

Douglas, 389 So.2d 1263 (La.1980), the supreme court affirmed the defendant’s

ninety-nine-year sentence for armed robbery, noting that he had three prior felony

convictions. Similarly, in State v. Lagarde, 07-123 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/29/07), 960

So.2d 1105, writ denied, 07-1650 (La. 5/9/08), 980 So.2d 684, the fifth circuit

affirmed the defendant’s ninety-nine-year sentence for armed robbery, noting that

he was a career criminal with two prior felony convictions.

During the sentencing hearing in the instant case and after noting that it had

received documentation regarding Defendant’s mental illness, the trial court made

the following finding regarding his criminal history:

Hamilton has been convicted of eight adult felony offenses; all violent
and against the person. Hamilton committed three counts of Simple
Robbery, with offense dates of November 8, 19[9]3 and November 10,
1993. He was convicted on March 2, 1994 classifying him as a first
offender, felony offender. Hamilton committed two counts of first
degree robbery, with an offense date of January 11, 2002 and a
conviction date of June 12, 2002 classifying him as a second felony
offender. Hamilton committed aggravated second degree battery with
an offense date of August 5, 2002 and a conviction date of June 3,
2004 classifying him as a third felony offender. He committed
attempted battery of a correctional employee with an offense date of
March 8, 2007 and a conviction date of September 4, 2007 classifying
him as a fourth felony offender. Hamilton committed armed robbery,
which is in the present case, with an offense date of June 30, 2010 and
a conviction date of February 5, 2014 classifying him as a fifth felony
offender.

The trial court then gave a detailed explanation of its findings with regard to

the sentencing guidelines under La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1, discussing factors

such as knowingly creating a risk of death or great bodily harm to multiple people,

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threatening to kill the victim, and the ongoing mental effect of the crime on both

Roy and her granddaughter.

Although the trial court noted that Defendant would be a “fifth felony

offender” if he were adjudicated a habitual offender, La.R.S. 15:529.1 only

recognizes up to fourth felony offenders. That distinction, however, is somewhat

irrelevant as Defendant would be subject to a life sentence without benefit of

parole, probation, or suspension of sentence if adjudicated as either a third or

fourth felony offender given his prior convictions. See La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(b)

and La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(b).

Considering the seriousness of an armed robbery offense in general, the

seriousness of the armed robbery offense committed in the instant case, and

Defendant’s prior criminal history, we find that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by the sentence it imposed. The trial court acknowledged Defendant’s

history of mental illness but found that his multiple prior felonies, which are all

categorized as violent crimes under La.R.S. 14:2, coupled with his eligibility for a

mandatory life sentence without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of

sentence if adjudicated under La.R.S. 15:529.1, warranted the imposition of a

maximum sentence.

DECREE

Defendant’s sentence is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2–16.3.

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