State of Louisiana v. Glyndale Arceneaux

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

14-1181

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

GLYNDALE ARCENEAUX

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. CR 136485
HONORABLE GLENNON P. EVERETT, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

JOHN E. CONERY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Marc T. Amy, James T. Genovese, and John E. Conery, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Roger P. Hamilton, Jr.
Assistant District Attorney
15th Judicial District
Post Office Box 3306
Lafayette, Louisiana 70511
(337) 232-5170
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Edward K. Bauman
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 1641
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70602-1641
(337) 491-0570
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Glyndale Arceneaux

Glyndale Arceneaux
Post Office Box 26
St. Gabriel, Louisiana 70776
APPELLANT:
Glyndale Arceneaux

CONERY, Judge.

On April 12, 2012, Defendant, Glyndale Arceneaux, was charged by bill of

information with one count of armed robbery, in violation of La.R.S. 14:64 and

one count of attempted armed robbery, in violation of La.R.S. 14:27 and La.R.S.

14:64. On May 9, 2012, Defendant entered a written plea of not guilty.

On March 18, 2014, the morning of trial, the State filed an amended bill of

information, changing the second charge from attempted armed robbery to armed

robbery, in violation of La.R.S. 14:64. The State also severed the two charges,

proceeding to trial only on armed robbery, the second count of the bill. Defendant

entered a verbal plea of not guilty.

On March 19, 2014, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged. On

June 26, 2014, Defendant was sentenced to fifteen years at hard labor without

benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. On July 7, 2014,

Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence alleging that the sentence was

excessive, which was denied. Defendant has timely appealed, alleging errors in

jury selection, insufficiency of the evidence, and excessive sentence. We find no

errors in jury selection. The evidence was sufficient to prove Defendant’s identity

as the perpetrator of the robbery, and the sentence imposed was not excessive. We

affirm Defendant’s conviction and sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On the first day of trial, Defendant plead not guilty to the amended bill of

information. During voir dire, Defendant’s attorney asked if anyone believed that

an innocent defendant should be required to take the stand to declare their

innocence. Potential jurors Marcus Richard, Mary Miley, and Deborah Gooch all

stated that they felt someone who was innocent should testify.

The trial court subsequently attempted to rehabilitate the potential jurors by

making it clear that a defendant has the right not to take the stand, asking whether

or not anyone would hold a decision not to testify against Defendant, and

instructing the potential jurors that they would not be allowed to take Defendant’s

decision not to testify into consideration. Defense counsel subsequently

challenged Mr. Richard, Ms. Miley, and Mrs. Gooch for cause, claiming that

neither Mr. Richard nor Ms. Miley answered the trial court’s questions.

The trial court denied the challenges for cause, stating that “[n]o one

indicated that they would not follow the law as presented to them.” Defense

counsel subsequently used peremptory challenges to remove Mrs. Gooch and Mr.

Richard. 1 After a second panel of jurors was questioned, the State chose to

backstrike Ms. Miley.

Thereafter, the State called its first witness, Ms. Danielle Foreman, who

testified that she was the teller manager of the Capital One bank on September 17,

2009. She testified that she was approached by a woman wearing a mask,

sunglasses, and a baseball cap. Ms. Foreman testified as to what dye-packs2 and

bait lists3 are, and how they are part of the bank’s protocol during a robbery. She

also testified that the bank most commonly uses red and blue dye packs.

Ms. Foreman stated that while there was a gun in her face, she loaded all of

the money that was in her top drawer into a bag for the robber, along with her dye-

1
Although the minutes reflect that Mr. Richard and Mrs. Gooch were excused by the
defense, the transcript contains no mention of those two jurors being removed by peremptory
challenge, although they are not amongst the jurors asked to remain.
2
A dye pack is a radio-controlled incendiary device used by banks to permanently mark
stolen cash.
3
A bait list is essentially a list of the serial numbers on certain bills, which are kept in
each drawer, so that they can easily be traced in the event of a robbery.

2

pack. She also testified that once she gave the bag back to the robber, the

individual moved to the next teller, Ms. Patty Allemond, and stuck the gun in Ms.

Allemond’s face. Ms. Foreman noted that the gun was a small black handgun. On

cross-examination, Ms. Foreman stated that she could not determine the caliber of

the gun, nor could she identify Defendant as the individual who robbed her.

Next, the State called Ms. Patty Allemond, who testified that at 3:00 p.m.,

while waiting on a customer, she noticed that Ms. Foreman had a customer, and

upon noticing that the customer had her face hidden, Ms. Allemond hit the panic

button. She further testified that the robber pushed her customer, Mr. Joe Daphine,

out of the way and pointed a black gun at her, and that she placed bait money and

her dye-pack in the bag before giving it back to the robber.

On cross-examination, Ms. Allemond testified that she could not identify the

caliber of the weapon used. When asked if she could identify Defendant as the

person who robbed her, or whether Defendant was the person who held the gun on

her, she responded “I’m pretty sure it is.” Ms. Allemond testified that the robber’s

mask dropped some, and she remembered waiting on Defendant from a prior

encounter. Ms. Allemond testified that she was unable to identify Defendant by

name to the police on the day of the robbery. Likewise, she was unable to identify

any features which might have led law enforcement to the Defendant, as Defendant

was just a regular customer at the bank. She was clear, however, that when

Defendant’s mask dropped, she recognized Defendant as a prior customer, and she

was able to identify Defendant at trial as the robber.

The State then called Ms. Cheryl Anthony, another Capital One employee,

who testified that while returning to her station shortly before the robbery, she saw

a customer approaching Ms. Foreman’s station, while Mr. Joe Daphine was at Ms.

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Allemond’s station. Thereafter, the customer that had been at Ms. Foreman’s

station went over to Ms. Allemond’s station. That customer left, and Mr. Daphine

was still standing near Ms. Allemond’s station. Soon thereafter, Ms. Anthony was

informed that the bank had been robbed by the customer she had observed.

The State then called Mr. Joseph Daphine, who testified that while he was at

Ms. Allemond’s station, the robber pushed him out of the way. He saw a weapon

that “[he] just kind of knew it was a gun.”

The State’s final witness on the first day of trial was Mr. Kevin Hudson, the

branch manager at the time of the robbery. Although he was not at the bank during

the robbery, Mr. Hudson testified that he returned to the bank immediately after the

robbery, was in charge of securing the bank during the investigation, and oversaw

the preparation of Capital One’s post-robbery security report.

Mr. Hudson then testified that Capital One had video surveillance and that

he obtained from their corporate office the video from the time of the robbery and

subsequently gave a copy of the video to Detective Landry. The video surveillance

footage was shown to the jury, and then court was recessed for the day.

Trial resumed on March 19, 2014. The State called Corporal Jeff Suire with

the Lafayette Police Department. Corporal Suire testified that he responded to an

armed robbery in progress call, that he took pictures inside the bank, and that he

processed the note that had been left behind by Defendant. Corporal Suire stated

that he was not able to obtain any finger prints off of the note.

The State next called Sergeant Terrance Olivier of the Lafayette Police

Department. Sergeant Olivier testified that at the time of the robbery, he was a

crime scene technician and that upon his arrival, he met with the detective in

charge, viewed the security footage and processed the crime scene. He identified

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State’s Exhibit Number Three as the note he recovered from the crime scene that

was given to one of the tellers by the robber, which read “All money in bag or die.”

Sergeant Olivier also testified that he was unable to obtain any prints from the

note.

On cross-examination, Sergeant Olivier confirmed there were no identifying

forensics which connected the note to Defendant. On re-direct however, Sergeant

Olivier noted that you would not expect to find any fingerprints when someone is

wearing gloves.

The State next called Chris Cogburn of the Lafayette Sheriff’s Office, who

was a metro crime scene detective at the time of the robbery. Mr. Cogburn

testified that he obtained a search warrant for and processed a vehicle as part of the

investigation and that he copied the original surveillance DVD for Detective

Landry.

Mr. Cogburn further testified that pursuant to said search warrant, he

recovered a paper towel and a $100 bill which appeared to have dye stains on them

from Defendant’s car. The items were found between the driver’s seat and the

car’s center console. He also identified State’s Exhibit Number Five, a pair of

sunglasses recovered from the glove compartment of Defendant’s vehicle. He

noted that Detective Landry had requested they collect the glasses as possibly

being worn during the robbery. On cross-examination, Mr. Cogburn testified that

he turned over the sunglasses to the Lafayette Police Department Evidence

Custodian and had no knowledge of any tests being performed on the sunglasses.

The State then called Deputy Troy Romero of the Lafayette Sheriff’s Office.

Deputy Romero testified that he came into possession of a $10 bill that had red dye

on it similar to the dye packs from the bank. The $10 bill had been recovered from

5

a bingo hall. The evidence showed that Defendant had attempted to use the bill at

the bingo hall and that Deputy Romero took immediate possession of the $10 bill

when Defendant tried to use it to pay for bingo games. Deputy Romero also

testified that Defendant willingly provided him with her ID upon request. He

further testified that Defendant claimed that she found the $10 bill she paid to the

bingo hall at a gas station.

On cross-examination, Deputy Romero testified that at the time he came into

contact with Defendant, he did not consider her a suspect, that she cooperated

willingly, and that he felt she was being truthful.

The State next called Detective Brad Robin of the Lafayette Police

Department, who testified that he executed a search warrant at Defendant’s

residence. Detective Robin testified that during the search, deputies recovered a

Nike hat, a BB gun, and three pairs of slippers.

The State’s next witness was Detective Glenn Landry of the Lafayette Police

Department, who testified he was the lead detective on the case. Detective Landry

identified a number of still photos taken from the Capital One video surveillance,

depicting the robber’s attire, which was similar to some of the items recovered in

the search warrant.

Detective Landry testified that he received information that led to his

viewing the surveillance video of a nearby business, which in turn led him to the

determination that a silver four-door car with a sun roof may have been involved in

a robbery as a “get away” vehicle. Detective Landry then testified that he used a

database to determine that Defendant owned a four-door silver Hyundai. He then

drove by Defendant’s home and observed that the car had a sun roof. Detective

6

Landry then testified that he obtained search warrants for Defendant’s home and

vehicle.

On cross-examination, Detective Landry stated that while the sunglasses had

distinctive markings, there was nothing distinctive about any of the slippers

recovered from Defendant’s home, nor could he identify the footwear worn by the

robber from surveillance footage. He also agreed with defense counsel that the cap

recovered was non-distinct and common.

The State next called Mr. Kevin Ardoin, the lab director for the Acadiana

Crime Lab. Mr. Ardoin testified regarding the chain of custody of the paper towel

and $100 bill that were recovered from Defendant’s car. He then discussed the

procedure used to test them and the crime lab’s finding that both items had dye-

pack dye on them. On cross-examination, he confirmed that none of the other

items recovered from Defendant’s home or vehicle were tested by the crime lab.

The State then called Ms. Trina Cross, Capital One’s Assistant Branch

Manager at the time of the robbery. Ms. Cross testified as to the previously-

referenced State’s Exhibit Number Nineteen, verifying the exhibit as the bait list

from the day of the robbery. The State then brought back Detective Landry to

verify that the $100 bill recovered from Defendant’s car was part of the bait money

stolen during the robbery. At that time, the State rested its case.

Defendant then called her only witness, Mr. Gene Edwards, a retired

member of the Lafayette Sheriff’s Office, who was Defendant’s neighbor. Mr.

Edwards testified that on the day of and at the time of the robbery, he was mowing

his grass and spoke to Defendant as she was going to meet her son’s school bus.

He further testified that he saw her return to the house with her son. While Mr.

Edwards testified that his memory is in good condition, his testimony regarding the

7

child’s age at the time of the incident and the child’s age as of the date of testifying

was similar. Mr. Edwards testified that he simply did not keep up with the child’s

age. Mr. Edwards’ testimony that he saw Defendant on the date and time of the

robbery was given on March 19, 2014, almost five years after the robbery in

question.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find there

are no errors patent.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal, Defendant asserts the following three assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s challenges
for cause regarding prospective jurors Gooch, Richard, and
Miley.

2. The trial court erred in finding Ms. Arceneaux guilty of
armed robbery.

3. The trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

Defendant’s first assignment of error contends that during voir dire, three

potential jurors provided answers which indicated that, should Defendant exercise

her Constitutional right not to testify, they would hold it against her. Those jurors

were Mr. Marcus Richard, Ms. Mary Miley, and Mrs. Deborah Gooch.

Prejudice is presumed when a challenge for cause is denied
erroneously by the trial judge and the defendant has exhausted all of
his peremptory challenges. In order for a defendant to prove reversible
error warranting reversal of both [her] conviction and sentence, [s]he
need only show the following: (1) erroneous denial of a challenge for
cause; and (2) use of all [her] peremptory challenges.

State v. Hart, 96-697, p. 7 (La. 3/7/97), 691 So.2d 651, 656 (citations omitted).

8

Defendant contends that her challenges for cause were erroneously denied,

that she was forced to use peremptory challenges to remove all three potential

jurors, and that she used all of her peremptory challenges. The voir dire transcript

directly conflicts with Defendant’s claim with regards to Ms. Miley and does not

support Defendant’s claims with regards to Mr. Richard or Mrs. Gooch.

The transcript clearly shows that Ms. Miley was initially accepted by both

Defendant and the State. Ultimately, Ms. Miley did not serve on the jury, as the

State chose to backstrike her after examining the second panel of prospective

jurors. Thus, Ms. Miley was removed from the jury without Defendant’s having to

use a peremptory challenge. Therefore, Defendant suffered no prejudice from the

denial of the challenge for cause, and her assignment of error with respect to Ms.

Miley is without merit.

As stated in Hart, Defendant must prove that she has used all of her

peremptory challenges before she can claim prejudice based on a failure to grant

her peremptory challenges. In this case, the Defendant has failed to prove that she

used all of her peremptory challenges. While the court minutes reflect that

Defendant used all twelve of her peremptory challenges, careful review of the

transcript only proves the use of seven of Defendant’s peremptory challenges.

When the court minutes conflict with the transcript, the transcript prevails. See

State v. Wommack, 00-137 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/00), 770 So.2d 365, writ denied, 00-

2051 (La. 9/21/01), 797 So.2d 62. Thus, Defendant has failed to meet her burden

under Hart, and thus, has failed to prove prejudice. This assignment of error is

without merit.

9

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO

In her second assignment of error, Defendant contends the evidence was

insufficient to support her conviction. The analysis for such claims is well settled:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the
critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100
S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979), State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King,
436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982);
State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact
finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and
therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the credibility
determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations
under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino,
436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228
(La.1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the
record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

To convict a defendant of armed robbery, the state
is required to prove: (1) a taking (2) of anything of value
(3) from a person or in the immediate control of another
(4) by the use of force or intimidation (5) while armed
with a dangerous weapon. La. R.S. 14:64; State v.
Jeselink, 35, 189[, pp. 7-8] (La.App. 2d Cir. 11/2/01),
799 So.2d 684[, 690].

State v. McGinnis, 07-1419, p. 11 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/30/08), 981 So.2d 881, 890

(quoting State v. Ellis, 42,520 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/26/07), 966 So.2d 139, writ

denied, 07-2190 (La. 4/4/08) 978 So.2d 325).

Although Defendant has alleged that the evidence was insufficient to support

her conviction, her argument is based solely on issues of identification. Because

Defendant has failed to allege insufficiency with regard to any of the elements of

armed robbery, we found no additional sufficiency issues and will only address

Defendant’s issues with identification.

10

Our law requires the State “to negate any reasonable probability of

misidentification” when a key issue in a case is the defendant’s identity. State v.

Hughes, 05-992, p. 5 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1047, 1051. However, “[p]ositive

identification by only one witness is sufficient to support a conviction. It is the

factfinder who weighs the respective credibilities of the witnesses, and this court

will generally not second-guess those determinations.” Id. (Citations omitted).

In the case sub judice, there were multiple witnesses to the robbery.

However, most could not identify the perpetrator. The first victim, Ms. Danielle

Foreman, testified that she could not identify Defendant as the perpetrator because

the robber was wearing a hat, sunglasses, and mask. Likewise, Mr. Joseph

Daphine, who was pushed out of the way by the robber, could not identify the

individual.

The second victim, Ms. Patty Allemond, was the only witness to place

Defendant at the bank during the robbery, stating that she was “pretty sure” that

Defendant was the person who held a gun on her. Although she admitted to being

unable to identify Defendant by name at the time of the robbery, Ms. Allemond

stated that “whatever she had on her face dropped.” As a result, she testified at

trial that she recognized Defendant as someone on whom she had previously

waited.

In contrast, Mr. Gene Edwards, Defendant’s neighbor, testified that at the

time of the robbery, he was having a conversation with Defendant, saw her walk to

meet her son’s school bus, and then saw the two of them walk back. Mr. Edwards’

testimony that he saw Defendant on the date of the robbery came almost five years

after the robbery at trial. There were no contemporaneous notes of Mr. Edwards’

recollections on the date of the robbery, nor was there a previous statement to that

11

effect given at or in close proximity to the time of the robbery introduced to

corroborate Mr. Edwards’ testimony.

The factfinder’s role is to weigh the credibility of witnesses. See Kennerson,

695 So.2d 1367. Thus, other than insuring the sufficiency evaluation standard of

Jackson, “the appellate court should not second guess the credibility

determinations of the triers of fact,” but rather, it should defer to the rational

credibility and evidentiary determinations of the jury. Id. at 1371. Our supreme

court has stated:

However, an appellate court may impinge on the fact finder’s
discretion and its role in determining the credibility of witnesses “only
to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental due process of
law.” State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1310 (La.1988). In
determining the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction,
an appellate court must preserve “‘the factfinder’s role as weigher of
the evidence’ by reviewing ‘all of the evidence . . . in the light most
favorable to the prosecution.’” McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. [120],
[134], 130 S.Ct. 665, 674, 175 L.Ed.2d 582 (quoting Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560
(1979)). When so viewed by an appellate court, the relevant question
is whether, on the evidence presented at trial, “any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789.
Applied in cases relying on circumstantial evidence, . . . this
fundamental principle of review means that when a jury “reasonably
rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defendant[ ], that
hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another
hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt.” State v. Captville, 448
So.2d 676, 680 (La.1984).

State v. Strother, 09-2357, pp. 10-11 (La. 10/22/10), 49 So.3d 372, 378.

Given the jury’s verdict, it appears the trier of fact found Ms. Allemond a

more credible witness than Mr. Edwards. The repetitive and mundane act of

retrieving a child from the bus is not something that would stick out in a person’s

memory, while the events of bank robbery would not be an event that a person

would likely forget.

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The remaining evidence presented to identify Defendant was circumstantial.

The State recovered a single $100 bill from Defendant’s car which was part of the

bank’s bait money, and was confirmed by the crime lab to have dye on it from the

bank’s dye packs. The State also presented a pair of sunglasses from Defendant’s

car, a $10 bill with dye on it used by Defendant at a bingo hall, a BB gun, a generic

black and white Nike baseball cap, plus multiple pairs of slippers, which could not

be directly tied to the robbery, all recovered from Defendant’s residence. A similar

cap, sunglasses, and slippers were depicted on the video of the robbery, as was the

description of Defendant’s car on video surveillance as a silver sedan with a

sunroof.

Following the Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, standard of viewing “all of the

evidence . . . in the light most favorable to the prosecution,” the finder of fact was

presented with a victim identifying Defendant as the person who robbed her;

possession, by Defendant, of bait money with dye stains on it; Defendant’s

possession of multiple items of clothing that resemble the items worn by the

perpetrator during the robbery; and Defendant’s ownership of a silver sedan with a

sunroof, a vehicle identified as being driven by the robber on video surveillance.

As stated by the supreme court in Hughes, this state’s appellate courts have

frequently found that identification by a single witness is sufficient to establish

identity. See State v. Francis, 99-208 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/6/99), 748 So.2d 484,

writ denied, 00-544 (La. 11/13/00), 773 So.2d 156; State v. Cambrice, 10-26

(La.App. 5 Cir. 4/26/11), 64 So.3d 363, writ denied, 11-1181 (La. 3/23/12), 84

So.3d 568.

We affirm Defendant’s conviction, finding that a rational trier of fact,

viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could

13

come to the belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant was the individual

who committed the armed robbery of the Capital One bank in question on

September 17, 2009. Defendant’s assignment of error lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE

In her final assignment of error, Defendant claims that she received an

excessive sentence. Defendant was sentenced on June 26, 2014. She filed a

motion to reconsider sentence on July 7, 2014, which was denied without a hearing

on July 11, 2014.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 881.1 provides the

mechanism for preserving the review of a sentence on appeal:

A. (1) In felony cases, within thirty days following the
imposition of sentence or within such longer period as the trial court
may set at sentence, the state or the defendant may make or file a
motion to reconsider sentence.

....

E. Failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence or to
include a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider sentence
may be based, including a claim of excessiveness, shall preclude the
state or the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence or
from urging any ground not raised in the motion on appeal or review.

Louisiana courts have laid out the following guidelines with regard to

excessive sentence review:

Sentences within the statutory sentencing range can be
reviewed for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Sepulvado, 367
So.2d 762 (La.1979). In State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12
(La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-
838 (La.2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331, a panel of this court discussed the
review of excessive sentence claims, stating:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law
shall subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.”
To constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court
must find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or

14

that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more
than a needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v.
Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial court has
wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within the
statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as
excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d
124, writ denied, 00-0165 (La.6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067.
The relevant question is whether the trial court abused its
broad sentencing discretion, not whether another
sentence might have been more appropriate. State v.
Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied,
519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

Further, in reviewing the defendant’s sentences, the appellate
court should consider the nature of the crime, the nature and
background of the offender, and the sentences imposed for similar
crimes. State v. Lisotta, 98-648 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d
57 (citing State v. Telsee, 425 So.2d 1251 (La.1983)), writ denied, 99-
433 (La.6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183. In State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4
(La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied, 03-562
(La.5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061, a panel of this court observed that:

While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar
crimes may provide some insight, “it is well settled that
sentences must be individualized to the particular
offender and to the particular offense committed.” State
v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991).
Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to
particularize the sentence because the trial judge
“remains in the best position to assess the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances presented by each case.”
State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Soileau, 13-770, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1002, 1006, writ

denied, 14-452 (La. 9/26/14), 149 So.3d 261.

Defendant was convicted of armed robbery, which is punishable by

imprisonment at hard labor for not less than ten years and for not more than ninety-

nine years, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La.R.S.

14:64(B). Defendant was sentenced to fifteen years at hard labor, without benefit

15

of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. This represents a low-end

sentence.

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court gave its reasoning as follows:

All right, Ms. Arceneaux, as you know, I presided over this
armed robbery trial and I’m very familiar with the facts. I have
considered those facts. I have also considered the information
provided me in the pre-sentence investigation report and the fact that
you have no prior record. I have considered the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances listed in the applicable provisions of [the]
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. And after considering all of
those facts, I hereby sentence you to serve fifteen years at hard labor.
That sentence is to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or
suspension of sentence. You will be given credit for time served.

Although Defendant is a forty-nine year old with no prior record, and the

mother of a nine-year old son, the fact remains that this was a crime of violence

involving the use of a dangerous weapon, which created the possibility of serious

injury to not just the victims listed on the bill of information, but also everyone

else present in the bank during the robbery.

Louisiana jurisprudence has clearly established that a fifteen-year sentence

for armed robbery is not excessive, even for a first offender. In State v. Lewis, 08-

1308 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/1/09), 16 So.3d 1, this court found a sentence of thirty years

not excessive for a first offender convicted of armed robbery. And in State v.

Augustine, 555 So.2d 1331 (La.1990), statutorily superseded on other grounds, the

supreme court held that a forty-year sentence was not excessive for an eighteen-

year old first offender convicted of armed robbery.

In light of jurisprudence holding that sentences between thirty and forty

years are not excessive for first offenders convicted of armed robbery, we find the

trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving Defendant a low-end, fifteen-year

sentence for armed robbery without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of

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sentence as mandated by the statute. Defendant’s third assignment of error lacks

merit.

DISPOSITION

Defendant has failed to meet her burden of proving the use of all of her

peremptory strikes as is required under State v. Hart, 96-697 (La. 3/7/97), 691

So.2d 651, and therefore, has failed to show any prejudice from the trial court’s

denial of challenges for cause. The evidence presented at trial sufficiently proved

Defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the robbery and the circumstantial

evidence corroborated Defendant’s guilt. Finally, Defendant’s sentence is well

below the established allowable range for a first offender convicted of armed

robbery. Therefore, both Defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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