State of Louisiana v. Christopher H. Joseph

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

14-1188

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

CHRISTOPHER H. JOSEPH

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 22090-08
HONORABLE CLAYTON DAVIS, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Sylvia R. Cooks, and
Elizabeth A. Pickett, Judges.

SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED
FOR RESENTENCING.

John Foster DeRosier
District Attorney – 14th Judicial District
Karen C. McLellan
Assistant District Attorney – 14th Judicial District
P. O. Box 3206
Lake Charles, LA 70602-3206
Telephone: (337) 437-3400
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellee - State of Louisiana

Carey J. Ellis, Jr.
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 719
Rayville, LA 71269
Telephone: (318) 728-2043
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellant - Christopher H. Joseph

Christopher H. Joseph
Louisiana State Prison
MPWY/Oak - 3
Angola, LA 70712
Defendant/Appellant

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

Defendant Christopher H. Joseph appeals his sentence of life

imprisonment without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension for a second

degree murder conviction. The trial court sentenced Defendant at a resentencing

hearing at which he had no counsel. On appeal, Defendant contends that he was

entitled to counsel at the hearing and that his sentence is excessive. The State

agrees that Defendant was entitled to counsel but contends that Defendant’s

sentence is appropriate. Because we find that the trial court erred in resentencing

Defendant in the absence of counsel or waiver by Defendant of his right to counsel,

we vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing.

I.

ISSUES

We must determine:

(1) whether the trial court erred in resentencing Defendant without
counsel present; and

(2) whether the trial court imposed an unconstitutionally excessive
sentence on Defendant.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant Christopher H. Joseph was previously charged and

convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the

benefit of parole, probation, or suspension. Defendant appealed, pro se. He also

requested counsel, and the Louisiana Appellate Project was appointed to represent

him. On appeal, this court vacated Defendant’s conviction of first degree murder

and entered a conviction of second degree murder in its place. This court further

vacated the life sentence and remanded the matter to the trial court for

resentencing. State v. Joseph, 11-1583 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/13/12), 94 So.3d 922,

writ denied, 12-1652 (La. 3/1/13), 108 So.3d 783.

More than a year passed and the trial court had not yet scheduled the

hearing for resentencing. Defendant wrote a letter to the clerk of court asking that

the resentencing hearing be scheduled. This letter was treated as a motion in the

trial court’s order scheduling the hearing.

At the hearing, Defendant appeared without counsel. At the outset,

the trial court asked if the public defender who represented Defendant at trial was

supposed to be there. The State responded in the negative and stated that the

public defender had not represented Defendant on appeal. The court then asked,

“And it was pro se?” The State responded in the affirmative, to which the court

responded, “Okay.” The court then sentenced Defendant, again, to life

imprisonment without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension. Thereafter,

Defendant appealed.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“[T]he right to counsel is such a fundamental right that it is not

subject to the harmless error analysis” and a violation of this right will constitute

reversible error. State v. Haider, 00-231, p. 7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/11/00), 772 So.2d

189, 193. In reviewing a claim of excessive sentence, we recognize that the “trial

court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within the statutory limits,”

and on appeal, “such sentence shall not be set aside as excessive absent a manifest

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abuse of discretion.” State v. Barling, 00-1241, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779

So.2d 1035, 1042, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331.

IV.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Defendant and the State both contend that Defendant was entitled to

counsel at resentencing. We agree. The constitutional mandates of the right to

counsel were not complied with at resentencing, and the imposed sentence must be

set aside. As such, we need not reach the issue of whether the sentence is

excessive.

Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a

defendant has a right to counsel at every critical stage of criminal proceedings,

including a resentencing hearing. State v. Dupas, 94-1264 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/96),

670 So.2d 667. “Unless a defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of

his right to counsel, any sentence imposed in the absence of counsel is invalid and

must be set aside.” Id. at 669 (quoting State v. Flowers, 598 So.2d 1144, 1146

(La.App. 1 Cir. 1992)). In determining whether a defendant has knowingly and

intelligently waived the right to counsel, a trial court must conduct “a meaningful

inquiry” with the defendant regarding the waiver and must advise the defendant

“of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.” State v. Hayes, 95-1170,

pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/96), 670 So.2d 683, 685-86. Alternatively, this court

has found that a defendant’s conduct can constitute an implied waiver of the right

to counsel. State v. Batiste, 96-526 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/11/96), 687 So.2d 499, writ

denied, 97-174 (La. 6/30/97), 696 So.2d 1003; State v. Mitchell, 580 So.2d 1006

(La.App. 3 Cir. 1991), writ denied, 613 So.2d 969 (La.1993). Such conduct

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includes dilatory tactics by a defendant, for example, obtaining multiple

continuances by refusing to accept court-appointed counsel and failing to secure

other counsel. Id. Additionally, a criminal defendant is entitled to court-appointed

counsel at each stage of the proceedings if indigent and facing charges punishable

by imprisonment. La.Const. art. 1, § 13.

Here, the constitutional mandates of the right to counsel were not

followed. At resentencing, the trial court learned that Defendant did not have

counsel and sentenced him without conducting any inquiry regarding whether

Defendant was waiving his right to counsel. Moreover, the trial court did not warn

Defendant of the risks involved in self-representation. Additionally, the hearing

transcript shows that Defendant did not engage in any conduct, dilatory or

otherwise, that could be interpreted as impliedly waiving his right to counsel. The

record indicates that the trial court might not have believed Defendant to be

entitled to counsel, given the pro se nature of the “motion” he made requesting the

hearing. However, Defendant’s request was prompted by the court’s delay in

fulfilling its existing obligation to schedule the hearing and had no bearing on his

right to counsel at the proceeding.

Since the trial court sentenced Defendant without counsel present and

without his knowing and intelligent or implied waiver of the right to counsel, the

sentence is invalid and must be set aside. Accordingly, we vacate the sentence

imposed by the trial court and remand this matter for a resentencing compliant with

the constitutional mandates of the right to counsel. As Defendant’s sentence has

been vacated, the issue of its alleged excessiveness is rendered moot.

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V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the sentence imposed by the trial

court and remand the matter for resentencing in accordance with the considerations

set forth herein.

SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED FOR

RESENTENCING.

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