State of Louisiana v. Morris James

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

15-414

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

MORRIS JAMES

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APPEAL FROM THE
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF IBERIA, NO. 12-597
HONORABLE VINCENT JOSEPH BORNE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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SHANNON J. GREMILLION
JUDGE

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Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, Billy Howard Ezell, and Shannon J.
Gremillion, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Hon. J. Phillip Haney
Sixteenth Judicial District Attorney
300 Iberia Street, Suite 200
New Iberia, LA 70560
(337) 369-4420
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Harry Daniels, III
Daniels & Washington
830 Main Street
Baton Rouge, LA 70802
(225) 346-6280
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Morris James

GREMILLION, Judge.

The Defendant, James Morris, appeals his sentence for possession of cocaine

as constitutionally excessive. For the reasons that follow, we affirm Defendant’s

sentence.

FACTS

On December 27, 2011, Defendant was observed by officers holding a

conversation with a person known by them to be involved in illegal narcotics.

Officers stopped the vehicle Defendant was driving for a traffic violation. During

the stop, Defendant said he was coming from a different location than where he

had just been seen, and he was nervous. Defendant granted the officers consent to

search, and a pat-down revealed two bags of a substance that appeared to be

cocaine in Defendant’s pocket. Testing verified the substance was 55.8 grams of

cocaine.

On April 16, 2012, Defendant was charged by bill of information with

possession of cocaine between twenty-eight and two hundred grams, a violation of

La.R.S. 40:967(F)(1)(a), and improper display of license plate, a violation of

La.R.S. 47:507(B). On July 16, 2014, Defendant entered an open-ended plea to the

possession charge, and the State agreed to not charge Defendant as a habitual

offender pursuant to La.R.S. 15:529.1, et seq. The record reveals no disposition of

the charge of improper display of license plate.

The trial court ordered a pre-sentence investigation (PSI). On December 3,

2014, the trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-five years at hard labor and the

minimum $50,000 fine. This sentence was designated to run concurrently with any

other sentence Defendant may be serving.

On December 17, 2014, Defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence.

He argued the sentence was excessive, because it was close to the maximum

sentence he could have received, and he is not the worst kind of offender for whom

maximum sentences are appropriate. The trial court denied the motion without a

hearing. Defendant now appeals his sentence and argues that the sentence imposed

by the trial court violates the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution of the United

States and La. Const. art. I, § 20, as it is nothing more than cruel and unusual

punishment and, thus, excessive, and that the trial court erred in denying his

motion to reconsider his sentence.

ANALYSIS

We review all appeals for errors patent on the face of the record, pursuant to

La.Code Crim.P. art. 920. Our review reveals no such errors.

At the sentencing hearing, Defendant’s counsel acknowledged that

Defendant had “a problem with drugs” and argued, “Jail won’t correct that.” He

requested a minimal sentence and noted that family members were present and

prepared to pay the fine.

This court has previously discussed the standard for reviewing excessive

sentence claims:

[Louisiana Constitution Article] I, ' 20 guarantees that, “[n]o
law shall subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To
constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court must find the
penalty so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to
shock our sense of justice or that the sentence makes no measurable
contribution to acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more
than a needless imposition of pain and suffering. The trial court has
wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within the statutory
limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as excessive absent a
manifest abuse of discretion. The relevant question is whether the
trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another
sentence might have been more appropriate.

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State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d

1035, 1042, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331 (citations omitted).

Defendant was exposed to a sentence of five to thirty years at hard labor and

a fine of $50,000 to $150,000. La.R.S. 40:967(F)(1)(a). Thus, he received a term

in the upper range of the possible sentence for the offense. However, he received

the minimum possible fine.

Even though a penalty falls within the statutory sentencing range, it may still

be unconstitutionally excessive:

In deciding whether a sentence is shocking or makes no
meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals, an appellate court
may consider several factors including the nature of the offense, the
circumstances of the offender, the legislative purpose behind the
punishment and a comparison of the sentences imposed for similar
crimes. While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes
may provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must be
individualized to the particular offender and to the particular offense
committed.” Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to
particularize the sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best
position to assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
presented by each case.”

State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ

denied, 03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061 (citations omitted). “[T]he trial

judge need not articulate every aggravating and mitigating circumstance outlined

in art. 894.1[;] the record must reflect that he adequately considered these

guidelines in particularizing the sentence to the defendant.” State v. Smith, 433

So.2d 688, 698 (La.1983) (citing State v. Ray, 423 So.2d 1116 (La.1982); State v.

Keeney, 422 So.2d 1144 (La.1982); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982)).

“[M]aximum sentences are reserved for cases involving the most serious violations

of the charged offense and for the worst kind of offender.” State v. Quebedeaux,

424 So.2d 1009, 1014 (La.1982) (citing State v. Jones, 398 So.2d 1049 (La.

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1981)). “The appellate court shall not set aside a sentence for excessiveness if the

record supports the sentence imposed.” La.Code Crim.P. art. 881.4(D).

The trial court noted that the PSI report indicated Defendant was a fourth

felony offender. However, the present conviction was actually Defendant’s fifth

felony offense. Exhibits in the record show Defendant pled guilty to possession of

cocaine on June 20, 1997, and was sentenced to serve five years at hard labor. The

State agreed not to charge Defendant as a habitual offender and to nolle prosequi

another unidentified charge.

On November 7, 2002, Defendant pled guilty to two counts of possession of

cocaine. The State again agreed not to charge Defendant as a habitual offender.

The trial court explained that Defendant was charged with one count of possession

of cocaine and also charged with possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute;

the distribution charge was amended to a second count of possession of cocaine.

Defendant was sentenced to serve ten years at hard labor on each count, with the

sentences to run concurrently.

The record also shows that Defendant was convicted of simple robbery in

1991, a crime of violence. The trial court noted that Defendant, at the arrest for the

present offense, was in possession of “a substantial amount of cocaine, consistent

with someone that might be using, but also consistent with someone that might

have [been] involved in something other than using it, and possibly selling it.”

Defendant received a very substantial benefit from his plea. The trial court

noted that the State agreed not to bill Defendant as a habitual felony offender. Had

the State obtained a habitual-offender adjudication, Defendant would have been

exposed to a possible life sentence as a fifth felony offender. La.R.S.

15:529.1(A)(4)(a). The trial court indicated that it considered “specifically the

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criminal history that has been detailed in the pre-sentence investigation” and

mitigating and aggravating circumstances.

The defendant in State v. Lewis, 48,373 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/25/13), 125 So.3d

482, was convicted of violating La.R.S. 40:967(F)(1)(a) and sentenced to twenty-

five years of imprisonment, with the first five years without benefit of parole,

probation, or suspension of sentence, and a fine of $50,000. He was also convicted

of distribution of crack cocaine and sentenced to another twenty-five-year term,

with the first two years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of

sentence and an additional $50,000 fine. The sentences were to run concurrently.

On appeal, the defendant argued the sentences were excessive because the

trial court imposed a near-maximum term on each count without benefit of a PSI.

Although the second circuit “caution[ed] the trial court not to sentence a defendant

in the absence of a PSI and a sentencing hearing[,]” it found the “imposed sentence

was not harsh” where the maximum sentences would have resulted in a sixty-year

imprisonment and $200,000 fine. Id. at 492.

In State v. Montgomery, 42,835 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/9/08), 974 So.2d 110, the

defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine in excess of twenty-eight grams

and conspiracy to distribute cocaine. He had six prior felony convictions including

assault and drug crimes. The second circuit noted that the defendant failed to

benefit from the court’s prior leniency and previous attempts at rehabilitation

during incarceration. The appellate court also noted his continued involvement

with drug activity justified the near-maximum sentence of twenty-eight years at

hard labor for possession of cocaine and was not excessive.

Here, Defendant has a long history of drug abuse and offenses. He was in

possession of a large amount of cocaine. He has continued to be involved with

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drugs for almost twenty years. The courts have previously granted him leniency,

and he has not benefited from it. He received another substantial benefit from this

plea agreement because, as a fifth felony offender, he would have been exposed to

a potential sentence of life imprisonment. La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a). The trial

court considered Defendant’s PSI report, his age, and his criminal history before

imposing sentence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing

Defendant to twenty-five years at hard labor and fining him $50,000.

As his second assignment of error, Defendant alleged that the trial court

erred in denying his Motion to Reconsider Sentence. However, Defendant failed

to brief that assignment, and it is deemed abandoned. Uniform Rules—Courts of

Appeal, Rule 2-12.4; State v. Marinello, 09-1260 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/6/10), 49

So.3d 488, writ denied, 10-2494 (La. 3/25/11), 61 So.3d 660, and writ denied, 10-

2534 (La. 3/25/11), 61 So.3d 661.

DECREE

The sentence of twenty-five years at hard labor and fine of $50,000 is

affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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