State of Louisiana v. Asa Bentley AKA - Asa N. Bentley

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

15-597

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

ASA BENTLEY
AKA - ASA N. BENTLEY

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWELFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF AVOYELLES, NO. 176957
HONORABLE WILLIAM BENNETT, DISTRICT JUDGE

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DAVID KENT SAVOIE
JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, James T. Genovese,
and David Kent Savoie, Judges.

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge, dissents and assigns written reasons.

AFFIRMED.

Honorable Charles A. Riddle, III
District Attorney, Twelfth Judicial District Court
Michael F. Kelly
First Assistant District Attorney
Post Office Box 528
Marksville, LA 71351
(318) 253-5815
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Chad Ikerd
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 2125
Lafayette, LA 70502
(225) 806-2930
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Asa Bentley

SAVOIE, Judge.

On November 14, 2013, the State charged Defendant, Asa N. Bentley, by

bill of indictment with one count of second degree kidnapping of Jessica Guillot on

or about September 9, 2013, in violation of La.R.S. 14:44.1. The State’s

indictment relied on the theory that the victim was “forcibly seized and carr[ied] . .

. from one place to another wherein [the victim] was physically injured.”

Defendant was arraigned and pled not guilty on December 10, 2013. Trial by jury

commenced on January 13, 2015. A unanimous jury found Defendant guilty on

January 14, 2015. Relator was sentenced as a second felony offender pursuant to

La.R.S. 15:529.1 to seventy years at hard labor without the benefit of parole,

probation, or suspension of sentence on March 24, 2015, and his motion to

reconsider sentence was denied on March 31, 2015. This appeal of his conviction

follows.1

FACTS

Defendant was indicted with Donnie Dontreal Edwards, Chadwick McGhee,

Willie Price, Jr., and Tamika Williams in Avoyelles Parish for the second degree

kidnapping of Jessica Guillot. During opening statements, the State explained its

theory that Defendant was looking for the twenty-one-year-old victim because she

had stolen cocaine from him. With the help of his male co-defendants, Defendant

located the victim and forced her into the back of his Dodge Durango. Tamika

Williams was sitting in the front passenger seat of the vehicle, and testified that she

heard slapping and choking sounds coming from the back of the vehicle where

Defendant and the victim were located. Soon thereafter, she heard glass breaking

1
Defendant is also appealing the denial of his motion to reconsider his habitual offender
sentence under docket number 15-598.

and smelled something “terrible.” Tamika Williams was then dropped off in

Simmesport, Louisiana, for roughly fifteen to twenty minutes as the men left with

the victim. When her co-defendants returned, the victim was no longer in the

vehicle. The State acknowledged that it had struck a plea deal with Tamika

Williams to testify. The deal called for her to plead guilty to obstruction of justice

with an agreed upon sentence of ten years in prison. She further agreed to testify

against all of her co-defendants, after which her sentence would be reduced to time

served.

Tamika Williams did indeed testify at Defendant’s trial. She explained that

on September 7, 2013, Defendant told her he was looking for the victim and that he

intended to kill her because she stole drugs and money from him. Defendant asked

Ms. Williams to take a ride with him that evening in his Dodge Durango, which

they drove to the Y-Not Stop in Mansura, Louisiana. There, they met Chadwick

McGhee, Willie Price, and Donnie Edwards, who arrived in another car with

Jessica Guillot. Ms. Williams testified that Defendant and Donnie Edwards

dragged the victim from the car and put her in the back of Defendant’s vehicle.

Tamika Williams described that she sat in the front seat, while Donnie Edwards

drove, and Defendant put his knees over the screaming victim as she pleaded with

him not to kill her. She explained that “[she] could hear noises like somebody

getting hit and like somebody getting chocked [sic].” Eventually, she heard glass

break, after which everything went quiet, and she noticed a smell “like somebody

had went to the bathroom on them self [sic].” She also explained that she was

texting her sister on the phone while all of this happened. Tamika Williams’ co-

defendants dropped her off at her apartment in Simmesport soon thereafter, and she

made her way to her mother’s house a few miles away on her own. Her co-

2

defendants later returned to pick her up at her mother’s home. They were arguing,

and it appeared to her that Chad McGhee was crying.

Tamika Williams called 911 several weeks later to report these events. The

State played a recording of the 911 call, in which Ms. Williams purportedly

identified herself as another woman who had overheard Defendant and “Tamika

Williams” “bragging about how they killed some girl name[d] Jessica. I don’t

know if it’s true or not, but she’s bragging about it.” Ms. Williams explained that

she “felt guilty” and misidentified herself to the 911 operator because she was

scared to go to the police, so she made the phone call to bring the police to her.

She admitted that she did not tell the police “the whole truth” the first time she

spoke to them, but she did tell them the truth during a second interview. On cross-

examination, Ms. Williams also admitted she called the police after a night of

drinking and taking pills. It was further revealed that Ms. Williams called 911 and

made a false report in 2009. She confirmed that she spoke to the police on several

occasions but was not sure of the exact number of times.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find there

are no errors patent.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The State committed reversible error by making comments which
violated Defendant’s constitutional rights to a fair trial and a
presumption of innocence.

2. The State’s closing rebuttal argument violated Defendant’s rights
by making arguments that exceeded the scope of Defendant’s
arguments.

3

3. Alternatively, if the court finds that trial counsel did not properly
preserve the issues in the previous assignments of error because he
did not lodge an objection at trial, Defendant contends he was
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.

DISCUSSION

I. Closing Arguments

All of the assignments of error are based on comments made by the State in

closing argument. Defense counsel’s closing argument almost exclusively targeted

Tamika William’s credibility by attacking her for her prior convictions and

inconsistent statements to the police. Defense counsel also highlighted what he

described as a “sweet heart plea bargain deal” as a reason to question her

credibility. He stated that there was “no evidence” his client or any of the other co-

defendants received any plea offer like hers. He also reminded the jury of Ms.

Williams’ previous conviction for giving a false report to 911 operators in 2009.

When she called 911 in this case, she used another person’s name and was

admittedly intoxicated on alcohol and “pills.” Afterwards, she provided varying

accounts of what happened to the victim, with defense counsel submitting that the

State had simply relied on the most recent account to prove its case. Counsel

concluded by reminding the jury that Defendant’s failure to testify could not be

held against him.

The State’s rebuttal began with a reference to the testimony of Tomika

Mason, Defendant’s girlfriend at the time of the offense. The prosecutor recounted

the portion of her testimony in which she described Defendant as having

“dreadlocks and tatts” and being “in the business of selling drugs” when the

incident occurred. He argued that such information provided context, or

“motivation,” for the kidnapping. The prosecutor then steered his rebuttal towards

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mourning the loss of the victim, a mother of two, and an admitted drug addict, who

enraged Defendant by stealing some cocaine. Once that comment was made,

defense counsel requested a bench conference, however, the substance of the

discussion is transcribed as “(UNINTELLIGIBLE).” After the bench conference,

the prosecutor continued and turned his attention to Tamika Williams. He

minimized her criminal history and described her, too, as an addict that Defendant

brought along to witness the consequences of stealing from him. The prosecutor

resisted the idea that Ms. Williams received a “sweet heart plea deal” as well,

highlighting the fact that she pled guilty to a felony and served some time in prison

and would continue to be in prison until all of her co-defendants’ cases were

resolved. He explained how Ms. Williams went to the police on her own and

submitted that “the one thing she [Tamika Williams] had that Asa Bentley doesn’t

have” is a conscience.2 He continued:

She knew she had done wrong being in that car with those men when
they took Jessica Guillot into the night. She knew she had
figuratively, blood on her hands. She was responsible as a participant.
She lead the police to her front door . . . [and] gave the statement
October 10 when she laid out what happened.

He emphasized that, over the course of seven interviews with law enforcement, she

was found to be “consistent on all the major points.”

II. The Assignments of Error

We will address the third assignment of error as it presents the threshold

issue of whether counsel preserved the first two issues for review. It anticipates

the possibility that this court will decline review of the substance of Defendant’s

claims based on trial counsel’s failure to timely object during rebuttal. In such

2
The transcript incorrectly states that Ms. Williams had a “conscious.” Based on the
context it is clear that the transcriber simply misspelled the word “conscience.”

5

event, Defendant alternatively requests that the court review the claim as one of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel based upon his attorney’s failure to

sufficiently preserve the issues by appropriate objection. The State responds that

the claim is without merit because no prejudice can be shown.

The facts presented above demonstrate that trial counsel failed to lodge an

oral objection on the record to either the scope of defense counsel’s closing or his

allegedly improper comment regarding Defendant’s lack of a conscience.

Defendant’s brief asserts that an objection was made regarding his “scope” claim

and that the court “improperly” overruled the objection. This claim apparently

finds its basis in Defendant’s motion for a new trial, filed February 11, 2015, in

which Defendant asserted that he timely objected to the State’s rebuttal. However,

a review of the transcript shows only that Defendant’s trial counsel asked to

approach the bench during rebuttal, without any indication as to the content of the

conversation at the bench. The motion relied on La.Code Crim.P. art. 774, which

states “[t]he state’s rebuttal shall be confined to answering the argument of the

defendant.” The motion for new trial did not, however, assert any impropriety as

to the prosecutor’s comment on Defendant’s lack of a conscience. Instead, in

conjunction with his argument regarding the scope of rebuttal, the motion accused

the prosecutor of insinuating that defense counsel was hiding certain facts and that

the “State’s argument in this respect should be likened to indirectly commenting

about defendant’s failure to testify.”

The relevant portion of the criminal procedure law states that:

An irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless
it was objected to at the time of occurrence. A bill of exceptions to
rulings or orders is unnecessary. It is sufficient that a party, at the
time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known

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to the court the action which he desires the court to take, or of his
objections to the action of the court, and the grounds therefor.

La.Code Crim.P. art. 841(A). In State v. Lee, 346 So.2d 682, 684-85 (La.1977),

the supreme court addressed La.Code Crim.P. art. 841 in detail:

[Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure] Article 841 is not an
inflexible rule imposed on criminal litigants without rationale or
justification. It is necessary adjunct to our role as an appellate court
which is intended to promote judicial efficiency and to insure fair
play. See State v. Smith, 339 So.2d 1379 (La.1977); State v. Ervin,
340 So.2d 1379 (La.1977); State v. Marcell, 320 So.2d 195 (La.1975).
For example, its operation prevents a defendant from gambling for a
favorable verdict and then, upon conviction, resorting on appeal to
errors that could have been corrected at trial, had he but [sic] brought
the errors to the judge’s attention. State v. Smith, supra; State v.
Knight, 323 So.2d 765 (La.1975); State v. Marcell, supra.

....

What our rules require is that counsel bring an error to the
attention of the trial judge within a reasonable time after the error
occurs so that he can cure the error or declare a mistrial. C.Cr.P. arts.
770, 771, 841. Generally, a contemporaneous objection must be made
immediately. In certain instances, however, objections which come
shortly thereafter will be considered timely, see State v. Foss, 310
So.2d 573 (La.1975), and there are even instances in which no
objections are required because they would be a vain and useless act,
see State v. Ervin, supra. Particularly may there be such exceptions to
the general rule during closing argument for reasons expressed in the
following law review comment:

“one must recognize that the closing argument of the
prosecutor may be so permeated with improprieties that
constant objections may alienate the jurors or underscore
the remark rather than erase it from their minds.
Therefore, an objection at the end of the summation
should be considered timely, and in some cases should be
allowed outside the presence of the jury.” (citations
omitted) 34 L.L.Rev. 746, 759 (1974).

Moreover, we recognize that a prosecutor’s prejudicial
comments in closing argument may be considered by a federal court
to violate federal due process guarantees even in the absence of a
defense challenge or objection at trial. United States v. Briggs, supra;
United States v. Grunberger, 431 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1970); United
States v. Sawyer, 347 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1965).

7

An objection in this case would not have been a “vain and useless act” such

as in State v. Ervin, 340 So.2d 1379, 1381 (La.1976), in which objectionable

testimony was allowed despite “defense counsel [having] made every reasonable

effort to prevent the introduction of the statement complained of in advance of its

utterance.” Nor can it be said that defense counsel sought to avoid repeated

objection before the jury, as not even a single objection was raised on the record

during closing. It is arguable that defense counsel declined to object to avoid

highlighting what he perceived to be a comment on Defendant’s failure to testify.

However, per Lee, defense counsel could have lodged the objection on the record

after rebuttal and outside the presence of the jury so as to “cure the error” at the

appropriate time.

We find that raising these claims for the first time—and in an incomplete

fashion—in a motion for new trial does not constitute “contemporaneous

objection.” State v. Hamilton, 03-1385, p. 21 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/3/04), 867 So.2d

151, 165, writ denied, 04-1227 (La. 4/22/05), 899 So.2d 567; see also State v.

Sykes, 03-397, p. 23 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/8/03), 857 So.2d 638, 653, writ denied, 03-

3429 (La. 4/2/04), 869 So.2d 875. Nevertheless, “Louisiana courts have

recognized certain rights are so basic and ‘due process’ requirements mandate that

they may be asserted for the first time on appeal or noticed as an error patent by

mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings.” State v. Pyke, 93-1506, p. 3

(La.App. 3 Cir. 5/4/94), 640 So.2d 460, 462.

In State v. Day, 14-708, p. 11 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/23/14), 158 So.3d 120,

129, this court reiterated its adherence to the general rule requiring

contemporaneous objection:

8

However, “[a] new basis for objection cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal.” State v. Fowlkes, 352 So.2d 208, 211 (La.1977)
(citing La.Code Crim.P. art. 841); See also State v. Johnson, 438
So.2d 1221, 1225 (La.App. 3 Cir.1983). Thus, Defendant cannot now
attempt to avail herself of the alleged error. See also State v. Klein,
351 So.2d 1158 (La.1977). The alleged error does not affect the
“entire framework of the trial from beginning to end, without
reference to any other trial consideration.” Langley, 958 So.2d at
1168. As previously mentioned, Defendant did not move for a new
trial. For the same reasons articulated in our analysis of her first
assignment of error, she cannot now request one.

In light of this jurisprudence, the court must determine if any of the

aforementioned exceptions to the requirement of contemporaneous objection

apply, and, if not, whether there exists sufficient evidence in the record to evaluate

and decide the merits of Defendant’s alternative claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel.

We find that none of the exceptions set forth in Lee are applicable here.

Thus, this court must decide whether the State’s comment amounted to one

affecting the “entire framework of the trial,” as mentioned in Day, or infringed on

a right “so basic” that due process requirements mandate recognition even though

the claim is raised for the first time on appeal. As these questions turn on the more

substantive issues raised in Defendant’s other assignments of error, we must now

discuss them.

In his first assignment of error, Defendant specifically takes issue with the

prosecutor’s comments contrasting him with Tamika Williams, suggesting that she

had a conscience, and he did not. He submits that the “unmistakable inference the

State tried to make to the jury with this comment is that Ms. Williams is

trustworthy because she admitted her culpability and that [Defendant] does not

accept responsibility because he did not plead guilty, forcing the state to prove [its]

case at trial.” Such a comment, in turn, “violated the defendant’s constitutional

9

right to a fair trial because, in rebutting the defense’s argument about the

trustworthiness of a testifying co-defendant, the State went too far and inferred that

the defendant did not take responsibility for his actions unlike his co-defendant

who pled guilty.”

Defendant relies on State v. Jones, 98-1165 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/3/99), 734

So.2d 670, in which this court addressed a similar situation. In Jones, a co-

defendant pled guilty to theft and testified at the defendant’s trial that defendant

was with him during the theft. Id. at 671. In the decision’s quoted portion of the

prosecutor’s rebuttal, the prosecutor alluded to defense counsel’s characterization

of the cooperating co-defendant as a “self-confessed liar.” Id. In response, the

prosecutor contrasted the two men, arguing that the co-defendant “took

responsibility for what he did and pled guilty,” whereas, the defendant “[did] not

want to take responsibility for his actions.” Id. at 671-72. The court overruled

defendant’s objection to the comment and denied his motion for a mistrial. Id. at

672.

On appeal, the Jones defendant submitted that the comment violated

La.Code Crim.P. art. 770(3), which prohibits both direct and indirect comment on

a defendant’s failure to testify at trial. Id. at 672. This court differentiated one’s

election not to testify from one’s election not to enter a plea but, nonetheless,

characterized comment on the latter as “impermissible.” Id. at 672. This court

reasoned that the remark “focused on the failure of the Defendant to act similarly

to the co-defendant and plead guilty[]” which led the jury “to infer that because . . .

defendant[] did not want to take responsibility for his actions, as did . . . co-

defendant[,]” he did not plead guilty. Id. at 672. Since this court found that the

prosecutor’s comment infringed on the defendant’s right to the presumption of

10

innocence, a right “so basic to a fair trial that [its] infraction can never be treated as

harmless error,[],” a mistrial was ordered. Id. at 673.

The State argues in its brief that it was simply responding to defense

counsel’s closing challenging the credibility of Tamika Williams. The State takes

the position that the comparison to Jones is “misplaced and incorrect.” Jones, it

submits, involved a prosecutor who “zeroed in on a co-defendant’s plea of guilty,”

whereas the case at bar involved “explaining the motive or reason Tamika

Williams made a 911 call.” The State suggests that the word “conscience” was

simply used “to differentiate the two persons” and that it was “NOT a statement

which inferred there should be no trial and did not suggest that by pleading guilty

Tamika Williams proved she had a conscience and conversely that ASA

BENTLEY should have pled guilty.”

We agree with the State. We do not believe that the prosecutor’s comments

rise to the level of a structural error and did not infringe on Defendant’s right to the

presumption of innocence. As such, we find that the claim is precluded from

review for failure to properly preserve the issue and because no other exception

applies. We must now decide if the failure of counsel to object and preserve the

issue for appeal constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.

The framework for evaluating this portion of Defendant’s claim can be

found by reference, again, to this court’s reasoning in Day, 158 So.3d at 129:

Finally, we find that Defendant has failed to meet her burden of
proof on her claim that failure to object to Dr. McCanless’ testimony
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel because she has not
alleged that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.
Further, she has not alleged any prejudice. Both prongs of the test set
out in Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, must be satisfied in
order to find ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Truehill, 09–
1546 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/2/10), 38 So.3d 1246. Her “[g]eneral

11

statements and conclusory allegations will not suffice to prove a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel.” State v. Celestine, 11–1403, p. 5
(La.App. 3 Cir. 5/30/12), 91 So.3d 573, 577 (citing State v. Camp,
46,052 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/16/11), 59 So.3d 548, writ denied, 11–954
(La.12/16/11), 76 So.3d 1199.)

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are generally relegated to

applications for post-conviction relief because of the trial court’s superior ability to

conduct comprehensive evidentiary hearings. State v. Prudholm, 446 So.2d 729

(La.1984). However, when the record on appeal provides sufficient information

for an appellate court to rule on the merits, such a claim may be reviewed by the

appellate court in the interest of judicial economy. State v. Ratcliff, 416 So.2d 528,

530 (La.1982). We find, based on the arguments made by Defendant in this

regard, there is sufficient information in the record to proceed on the issue of

ineffective assistance of counsel.

As stated in Day, we must look to Defendant’s showing for each prong set

forth in Strickland. Defendant relies upon counsel’s failure to preserve the claim

for review to prove deficient performance. 3 Defendant argues that he was

prejudiced by reverting back to Jones, insisting that “the statements by the State in

rebuttal violated the basic, core principle fundamental to the criminal justice

system: the right to a fair trial.” This showing of prejudice is not sufficient for the

reasons set forth in the discussion of assignment of error one. We do not find that

the statement amounts to a structural error or that it infringes upon a basic right.

3
We note that Defendant’s brief conflates the issue of preservation as to each of the other
assignments of error. Regarding his first assignment of error, he asserts that “[t]he record does
indicate the defense counsel was aware of this right and made some effort to protect it by making
the objection during rebuttal and specifically citing the statutory provisions in the Motion for a
New Trial.” However, as we already noted, defense counsel did not object when the State
referred to Defendant’s lack of conscience. Counsel only asked to approach the bench prior to
this comment, at which time an “unintelligible” conference occurred. Thus, there is no merit to
the claim that “the objection showed proof of knowledge of the issue,” as the objection related to
Defendant’s second assignment of error that the State went beyond the proper scope of rebuttal.

12

Without establishing both prongs of ineffective assistance, Defendant’s claim is

without merit.

Finally, Defendant further attacks the State’s rebuttal for violating La.Code

Crim.P. art. 774, which limits rebuttal to addressing a defendant’s closing

argument. Defendant argues that the State instead “used its right to rebuttal

argument to rehash its whole case and present arguments on issues never before

discussed that were outside the scope of the defense’s closing arguments.”

Specifically, Defendant asserts there was no need to refer to his “dreadlocks and

tatts” because his appearance was never an issue. He further argues that there was

no need to mention that the victim was a mother of two who was “swallowed up in

the dark of the night.” Most significantly, Defendant asserts that the State offered

a “whole new theory” during its rebuttal regarding Defendant’s reason for

involving Tamika Williams in his crime, that is, to send a message to other addicts

that there would be consequences for stealing from him. Defendant concludes that

“to present this theory for the first time and not allow the defense an opportunity to

offer a [counterargument]” violated the code of criminal procedure.

In response to Defendant’s complaint that he did not have an opportunity to

respond to the State’s new theory on rebuttal, the State argues that it was “a fair

response” to Defendant’s attack on Ms. Williams’ credibility. The State appears to

suggest that dreadlocks and tattoos are an indication of something more probative

than the simple fact that Defendant had dreadlocks and tattoos at the time of the

offense. Finally, the State argues that the rebuttal could not fairly be said to have

contributed to the verdict as the evidence of Defendant’s guilt was “simply

overwhelming.”

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The scope of proper closing argument is confined to “evidence
admitted, to the lack of evidence, to conclusions of fact that the state
or defendant may draw therefrom and to the law applicable to the
case.” La.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 774 (West 1998). However, a
prosecutor is afforded considerable latitude in making closing
arguments. State v. Byrne, 483 So.2d 564 (La.1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 871, 107 S.Ct. 243, 93 L.Ed.2d 168 (1986); State v. Morris, 404
So.2d 1186 (La.1981). As a general rule, the prosecutor may not use
closing argument as a vehicle to express his personal opinions about
the defendant when his opinion is expressed in a manner that the jury
may understand has been formed from evidence outside of the record.
State v. Procell, 365 So.2d 484, 489 (La.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
944, 99 S.Ct. 2164, 60 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1979). Such an opinion is
permissible if the prosecutor refers to, or it is apparent that his opinion
is based on, the evidence of record. Id. See also State v. Hicks, 395
So.2d 790, 797–98 (La.1981); State v. Bretz, 394 So.2d 245, 248
(La.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 820, 102 S.Ct. 102, 70 L.Ed.2d 91
(1981).

This Court has recognized as a matter of well-settled law that the
prosecutor has the right to “press upon the jury any view of the case
arising out of the evidence—the Supreme Court is bound to credit
jurors with common intelligence, conscientiousness, and sense of
duty.” State v. Alexander, 215 La. 245, 40 So.2d 232, 234 (La.1949).
Even when we have found the prosecutor to have exceeded the proper
bounds of argument, this Court has often criticized the improper
arguments without finding that they constituted reversible error. See,
e.g. Byrne, supra; State v. Jarman, 445 So.2d 1184 (La.1984); State v.
Messer, 408 So.2d 1354 (La.1982). The standard by which this Court
determines whether improper closing argument constitutes reversible
error is whether it is “firmly convinced that the jury was influenced by
the remarks and that they contributed to the verdict.” State v. Sanders,
93–0001 p. 16–17 (La.11/30/94), 648 So.2d 1272, 1285–86, cert.
denied, 517 U.S. 1246, 116 S.Ct. 2504, 135 L.Ed.2d 194 (1996);
Byrne, 483 So.2d at 572; Messer, 408 So.2d at 1357.

State v. Frost, 97-1771, pp. 18-19 (La. 12/1/98), 727 So.2d 417, 432-33, cert.

denied, 528 U.S. 831, 120 S.Ct. 87 (1999), superceded by statute on other grounds

as stated in State v. Gomez, 00-566 (La. 1/17/01), 778 So.2d 549.

We find that the comment regarding Defendant’s “dreadlocks and tatts” and

the victim being “swallowed up in the night,” is irrelevant and cannot be said to

have “contributed to the verdict.” The jury heard the testimony of Ms. Mason

regarding Defendant’s appearance. Defense counsel could have moved to strike

14

that portion of her testimony if he felt the need. Therefore, we find no merit to this

claim. Additionally, it was a matter of record that the victim has not been seen

since the crime occurred, and the prosecutor’s latter comment merely reflected this

fact.

As for the prosecutor’s introduction of his theory that Ms. Williams was

brought along as a witness for purposes of Defendant’s show of force as a drug

dealer, we find that the comment served to “press upon the jury” the prosecutor’s

view of the facts and that the theory was indeed based solely on evidence

contained in the record. The comment was a fair response to defense counsel’s

attack on Ms. Williams’ credibility, as it goes to show why she was there when the

crime occurred.

Defense counsel’s failure to object did not amount to “ineffective assistance

of counsel” since no prejudice has been shown. Defendant’s claim is denied.

DECREE

For the reasons stated above, we find the claims set forth in Defendant’s

assignments of error one and two are precluded for defense counsel’s failure to

timely and properly object. We further find no merit to Defendant’s claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel based on Defendant’s failure to demonstrate

prejudice.

AFFIRMED.

15

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

15-597

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

ASA BENTLEY

AKA - ASA N. BENTLEY

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge, dissenting.

I adhere to my views expressed in State v. Jones, 98-1165 (La.App. 3

Cir. 2/3/99), 734 So.2d 670.

The prosecutor’s comments here similarly drew attention to

Defendant’s failure to “act similarly” to his co-defendant, Ms. Williams, and “take

responsibility.” This court determined the comment in Jones—a comment on

defendant’s failure to plead guilty—to be a structural error, or one which “affects

the framework within which the trial proceeds[]” and which “defies harmless error

standards[.]” Id. at 673. We went on to elaborate:

Those comments injected in to the process the
imprimatur of the state’s representative on the jury. The
comments had the high probability of allowing the jury to
impose a lesser standard than guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt during the deliberative process. The impermissible
comments also had the highly prejudicial potential of
permitting the jury to abdicate its standard of review in a
criminal proceeding. They were unrelated to any truth-
seeking function and aborted the presumption of
innocence and right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 1,
Section 16 of the Louisiana Constitution and the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.

Id. (footnote omitted). This court concluded: “[S]ome rights are so basic to a fair

trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error. The presumption

of innocence is one of those rights.” Id. In this case, Mr. Bentley’s presumption of

innocence was compromised, and his right to a fair trial impaired.

For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse Defendant’s conviction and

remand for a new trial.