State of Louisiana v. Tavares Charles

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

15-1082

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

TAVARES CHARLES

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ALLEN, NO. CR-2015-0458
HONORABLE JOEL G. DAVIS, DISTRICT JUDGE

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BILLY HOWARD EZELL
JUDGE

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Court composed of Billy Howard Ezell, Shannon J. Gremillion, and David Kent
Savoie, Judges.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED; MOTION TO WITHDRAW
GRANTED; AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Paula Corley Marx
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 80006
Lafayette, LA 70598-0006
(337) 991-9757
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Tavares Charles

Herbert Todd Nesom
District Attorney
Thirty Third Judicial District Court
P. O. Box 839
Oberlin, LA 70655
(337) 639-2641
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

EZELL, Judge.

The defendant, Tavares Charles, was charged by bill of information with

multiple drug offenses, one count of obstruction of justice, and one count of

resisting an officer. After initially entering a plea of not guilty, the defendant later

entered a plea of no contest to possession with intent to distribute marijuana, Count

1 of the bill of information. The remaining charges were dismissed. The court

ordered a presentence investigation report, and on August 27, 2015, the defendant

was sentenced to serve ten years at hard labor with five years suspended. Upon his

release from incarceration, the defendant is to be placed on supervised probation

for three years subject to the conditions outlined in La.Code Crim.P. art. 895 and

other special conditions.

The defendant is before this court appealing his conviction and sentence.

Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,

87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967) alleging the record contains no non-frivolous issues for

appeal; thus, she requests this court grant her accompanying motion to withdraw.

This court granted the defendant until January 21, 2016, to file a pro se brief if he

so desired. To date, no brief has been filed. For the following reasons, this court

affirms the defendant’s conviction and sentence and grants appellate counsel’s

motion to withdraw.

FACTS

On or about September 23, 2014, the defendant knowingly and intentionally

possessed with the intent to distribute marijuana.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find there

are two errors patent.

The trial court imposed fees as conditions of probation, including a

$1,000.00 fine; $250.00 cost of prosecution assessment to the District Attorney’s

Office; $250.00 assessment to the Public Defender’s Office; and court costs, which

the judge stated included a $100.00 assessment for the DARE program, $50.00 for

drug education, and a $250.00 Southwest Crime Lab fee.

A payment plan was not established for the aforementioned fees imposed as

conditions of probation. In State v. Arisme, 13-269, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir.

10/9/13), 123 So.3d 1259, 1262, this issue was addressed by this court:

First, as a condition of probation, the trial court ordered a
$250.00 fee to the Louisiana Crime Lab, for which a payment plan
was not established. In State v. Wagner, 07-127, pp. 7-8 (La.App. 3
Cir. 11/5/08), 996 So.2d 1203, 1208, this court held in pertinent part:

When the fines and costs are imposed as a
condition of probation, but the trial court is silent as to
the mode of payment or the trial court attempts to
establish a payment plan, this court has required a
specific payment plan be established. See State v.
Theriot, 04-897 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/9/05), 893 So.2d 1016
(fine, court costs, and cost of prosecution); State v.
Fuslier, 07-572 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/31/07), 970 So.2d 83
(fine and costs); State v. Console, 07-1422 (La.App. 3
Cir. 4/30/08), 981 So.2d 875 (fine and court costs).

We view this procedure as no different from
payment plans for restitution. See State v. Dean, 99-475
(La.App. 3 Cir. 11/3/99), 748 So.2d 57, writ denied, 99-
3413 (La.5/26/00), 762 So.2d 1101 (restitution only),
State v. Reynolds, 99-1847 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/00), 772
So.2d 128 (restitution, fine, and costs), State v. Stevens,
06-818 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/07), 949 So.2d 597
(restitution, fine, court costs, and reimbursement to
Indigent Defender Board), and State v. Fontenot, 01-540
(La.App. 3 Cir. 11/7/01), 799 So.2d 1255 (restitution,
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court costs and payments to victim’s fund, Indigent
Defender Board, and District Attorney).

We, therefore, remand this case to the trial court
for establishment of a payment plan for the fine, noting
that the plan may either be determined by the trial court
or by Probation and Parole, with approval by the trial
court. See Stevens, 949 So.2d 597.

Similarly, the trial court’s ordering the payment to
the crime lab fund during the period of probation is an
insufficient payment plan. We also remand the case to
the trial court for establishment of a payment plan for
these costs, noting that the plan may either be determined
by the trial court or by Probation and Parole, with
approval by the trial court. See Stevens, 949 So.2d 597.

This issue has been similarly resolved in other cases. See State
v. LaCombe, 09-544 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/9/09), 25 So.3d 1002, and
State v. Snelling, 09-1313 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/10), 36 So.3d 1060, writ
denied, 10-1301 (La.12/17/10), 51 So.3d 16. Accordingly, we remand
this case to the trial court for the establishment of a payment plan for
the fee, noting that the plan may either be determined by the trial court
or by the Department of Probation and Parole with approval by the
trial court. See Stevens, 949 So.2d 597.

Likewise, this case is remanded to the trial court for the establishment of a

payment plan for the fees and costs imposed as conditions of probation. The plan

may either be determined by the trial court or by the Department of Probation and

Parole with approval by the trial court.

Next, the trial court failed to set the amount of the probation supervision fee.

At sentencing, the judge informed the defendant, ―You are required to pay the

monthly supervision fee to the State.‖ Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure

Article 895.1 requires the imposition of a supervision fee of not less than $60.00

nor more than $100.00 to defray the cost of supervision. A similar issue was before

this court in State v. Desoto, 06-1115, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/14/07), 968 So.2d

146, 147-48, rev.d on other grounds, 07-1804 (La. 3/17/09), 6 So.3d 141:

[T]he trial court failed to impose a supervision fee as a condition of
the defendant’s probation. The trial court ordered the defendant to
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―pay the probation and other fees as required by law and regulation,‖
but failed to specify a monthly probation supervision fee. Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure Article 895(A) provides in pertinent part:
―When the court places a defendant on probation, it shall require the
defendant to refrain from criminal conduct and to pay a supervision
fee to defray the costs of probation supervision . . .‖ Article 895.1(C)
further provides that the supervision fee must be paid monthly and
must not be less than $50.00 nor more than $100.00.

This court has stated the following regarding a trial court’s
failure to set a probation supervision fee:

When remanding a case for imposition of a supervision
fee as a condition of probation, this court has stated:

The defendant’s sentence does not
necessarily have to be vacated if the trial
court decides to set the minimum monthly
supervision fee. See State v. Harris, 93-
1098 (La.1/5/96); 665 So.2d 1164. In
Harris, the Louisiana Supreme Court
remanded the case and gave the trial court
the option of amending the court minutes to
reflect the change in sentence without
bringing the inmate to court. The court
stated that the district judge retains the
discretion to vacate the sentence originally
imposed and to resentence the inmate in
open court. Harris allowed ministerial
corrections of the record in instances where
the trial court failed to impose special
restrictions required by law. However, the
trial court has some discretion in setting the
probation supervision fee, as it can impose a
fee between twenty and one hundred dollars
per month. Therefore, if the trial court opts
to assess the minimum fee required by law,
it can correct the sentence in accordance
with the procedures set forth in Harris.
However, if the trial court wishes to set a
higher fee, the trial court should vacate
defendant’s sentence and resentence him in
open court. Therefore, although we affirm
the defendant’s conviction, we must remand
the case to the trial court with instructions
to set a monthly probation supervision fee to
be paid in accordance with article 895.1(C).

State v. Iles, 96-256 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/6/96); 684 So.2d
38 at 40-41.
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Likewise, we remand for the trial court to impose
and set the amount of a supervision fee. If the trial court
sets the amount at the minimum fee, the trial court can
correct the sentence by following the procedures set forth
in Harris. If, however, the trial court wishes to set a
higher fee, the sentence must be vacated and the
Defendant resentenced in open court.

State v. Bey, 03-277, pp. 12-13 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/15/03), 857 So.2d
1268, 1276-77. See also State v. Johnson, 04-1266 (La.App. 3 Cir.
2/2/05), 893 So.2d 945.

In accordance with the jurisprudence set forth above, the
present case is remanded for the trial court to impose a supervision fee
as a condition of the defendant’s probation. The trial court should
follow the procedure set forth in Harris if it imposes the minimum
supervision fee. If, however, it chooses to impose a higher fee, the
trial court must vacate the sentence imposed and resentence the
defendant in open court.

Accordingly, we also remand for the imposition of a supervision fee.

ANDERS ANALYSIS

Pursuant to Anders, the defendant’s appellate counsel filed a brief stating

that she made a conscientious and thorough review of the trial court record and

could find no non-frivolous errors on appeal. Thus, counsel seeks to withdraw.

In State v. Benjamin, 573 So.2d 528 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1990), the fourth circuit

explained the Anders analysis:

When appointed counsel has filed a brief indicating that no
non-frivolous issues and no ruling arguably supporting an appeal were
found after a conscientious review of the record, Anders requires that
counsel move to withdraw. This motion will not be acted on until this
court performs a thorough independent review of the record after
providing the appellant an opportunity to file a brief in his or her own
behalf. This court’s review of the record will consist of (1) a review
of the bill of information or indictment to insure the defendant was
properly charged; (2) a review of all minute entries to insure the
defendant was present at all crucial stages of the proceedings, the jury
composition and verdict were correct and the sentence is legal; (3) a
review of all pleadings in the record; (4) a review of the jury sheets;
and (5) a review of all transcripts to determine if any ruling provides
an arguable basis for appeal. Under C.Cr.P. art. 914.1(D) this Court
will order that the appeal record be supplemented with pleadings,
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minute entries and transcripts when the record filed in this Court is not
sufficient to perform this review.

Id. at 531.

Appellate counsel’s Anders brief must indicate a review of the record and

provide ―a detailed and reviewable assessment for both the defendant and the

appellate court of whether the appeal is worth pursuing in the first place.‖ State v.

Mouton, 95-981, p. 2 (La. 4/28/95), 653 So.2d 1176, 1177.

In her Anders brief, appellate counsel points out that the trial court fully

informed the defendant of his rights at the guilty plea proceeding and that the

defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea of no contest. Additionally,

appellate counsel notes that the defendant properly waived his right to an initial

entry of a plea of not guilty. Even if he did not waive his initial right to plead

guilty, the error is harmless. Finally, appellate counsel notes that the argument

made at sentencing concerning consideration of a new sentencing scheme has no

merit and that the sentence imposed is not excessive.

Pursuant to Anders, 386 U.S. 738, and Benjamin, 573 So.2d 528, we have

performed a thorough review of the record, including pleadings, minute entries, the

charging instrument, and the transcripts. Our review revealed the defendant was

properly charged in the bill of information, and he was present and represented by

counsel at all crucial stages of the proceedings. The defendant waived counsel for

the purpose of entering a plea of not guilty at arraignment, which was not a critical

stage of the proceedings in this case. See State v. Tarver, 02-973, 02-974, 02-975

(La.App. 3 Cir. 3/12/03), 846 So.2d 851, writ denied, 03-1157 (La. 11/14/03), 858

So.2d 416. Additionally, the defendant entered a free and voluntary plea after he

was advised of his rights in accordance with Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89

S.Ct. 1709 (1969). These rights were also set forth in a written plea form signed
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by the defendant. According to the guilty plea transcript, the defendant had an

eleventh-grade education and indicated he could read, write, and understand the

English language. The trial court advised the defendant of the penalty range he

was facing for possession with the intent to distribute marijuana. Additionally, the

defendant indicated he had not been forced, threatened, or coerced in any way to

enter a plea. He affirmed he was entering the plea freely and voluntarily.

Considering the colloquy between the trial court and the defendant, we find that

the trial court properly Boykinized the defendant and that the defendant voluntarily

and knowingly entered his plea of no contest to possession with the intent to

distribute marijuana. Finally, the defendant’s sentence is legal with the exception

of the errors patent discussed above.

Appellate counsel correctly notes that the recent amendment to La.R.S.

40:966 makes significant changes to the penalties for possession of marijuana but

that the punishment for possession with the intent to distribute marijuana remains

unchanged since the commission of the offense in this case. The sentencing range

for possession with the intent to distribute marijuana is five to thirty years at hard

labor and a fine of not more than $50,000.00. Counsel is correct in her assertion

that the defendant’s sentence of ten years, with five years suspended, is not

excessive considering the defendant is a second felony offender, the state

dismissed five charges, and the state also agreed to not file a habitual offender bill

against him. Finding no non-frivolous issues, this court grants counsel’s motion to

withdraw.

DECREE

The defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed. However, the case is

remanded to the trial court for the establishment of a payment plan for the fees and

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costs imposed as conditions of probation noting that the plan may either be

determined by the trial court or by the Department of Probation and Parole with

approval by the trial court. Additionally, the trial court must set the amount of the

supervision fee it imposed as a condition of the Defendant’s probation. It should

follow the procedure set forth in State v. Harris, 93-1098, 94-2243 (La. 1/5/96),

665 So.2d 1164, if it imposes the minimum supervision fee. If, however, it

chooses to impose a higher fee, the trial court must vacate the sentence imposed

and resentence the defendant in open court. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is

granted.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED; MOTION TO
WITHDRAW GRANTED; AND REMANDED WITH
INSTRUCTIONS.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Uniform
Rules—Courts of Appeal. Rule 2–16.

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