State of Louisiana v. Dontrez T. Banks AKA - Dontrez Banks

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

16-34

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

DONTREZ T. BANKS a/k/a
DONTREZ BANKS

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF VERNON, DOCKET NO. 81421, DIVISION B
HONORABLE C. ANTHONY EAVES, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JAMES T. GENOVESE
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Billy H. Ezell, and James T. Genovese,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Edward J. Marquet
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 53733
Lafayette, Louisiana 70505-3733
(337) 237-6841
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Dontrez T. Banks

Asa A. Skinner, District Attorney
Thirtieth Judicial District
Terry W. Lambright, Assistant District Attorney
Post Office Box 1188
Leesville, Louisiana 71446
(337) 239-2008
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

GENOVESE, Judge.

In this criminal case, Defendant, Dontrez T. Banks, pled guilty to the

reduced charge of manslaughter and to conspiracy to commit simple robbery,

pursuant to a plea agreement, with a dismissal of an armed robbery charge.

Defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years at hard labor on the conviction for

manslaughter and three years at hard labor on the conviction for conspiracy to

commit simple robbery, with the sentences to be served consecutively.

Defendant appeals, alleging that his twenty-five year manslaughter sentence

is excessive. For the following reasons, we affirm Defendant’s manslaughter

sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant and two co-defendants, Andre Porter and Joshua Griffin, went to

the home of Jason Perry with the intent to rob him of drugs. A confrontation

ensued, which resulted in Mr. Perry being stabbed several times. Mr. Perry died as

a result of the stab wounds.

Defendant was indicted on one count of first degree murder of Jason Perry, a

violation of La.R.S. 14:30, one count of criminal conspiracy to commit armed

robbery, a violation of La.R.S. 14:26 and 14:64, or in the alternative, conspiracy to

commit simple robbery, a violation of La.R.S. 14:26 and 14:65, and one count of

armed robbery, a violation of La.R.S. 14:64. On October 3, 2011, the State

informed Defendant in open court that it would not seek the death penalty in this

case.

On September 5, 2012, pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty

to the offense of manslaughter, a violation of La.R.S. 14:31, and conspiracy to

commit simple robbery. The armed robbery charge was dismissed.

Defendant was sentenced on October 2, 2015, to twenty-five years at hard

labor on the conviction for manslaughter and three years at hard labor on the

conviction for conspiracy to commit simple robbery. The sentences were ordered

to be served consecutively, for a total of twenty-eight years imprisonment, and

with credit for time served. Defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider Sentence,

which was denied without a hearing on October 8, 2015.

Defendant has perfected a timely appeal, wherein he asserts that the sentence

of twenty-five years imposed on the conviction for manslaughter was excessive,

considering the circumstances of his case.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find no

errors patent.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In his sole assignment of error, Defendant contends: “The trial judge

imposed an excessive sentence of [twenty-five] years at [h]ard [l]abor against a

[seventeen-]year[-]old juvenile with no criminal history and who testified against

the most culpable co-defendant, Joshua Griffin, that resulted in a life sentence.”

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that the sentence of twenty-five years imposed on his

conviction for manslaughter was excessive, considering that he was only seventeen

years old at the time of the incident, that he fully cooperated with the police, and

that he testified at the trial of the co-defendant, who was the person who actually

stabbed the victim.

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This court has articulated the following standard regarding the review of

excessive sentence claims:

[Louisiana Constitution Article 1], § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o
law shall subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To
constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court must find the
penalty so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to
shock our sense of justice or that the sentence makes no measurable
contribution to acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more
than a needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell,
404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial court has wide discretion in the
imposition of sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence
shall not be set aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of
discretion. State v. Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746
So.2d 124, writ denied, 00-0165 (La.6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The
relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing
discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more
appropriate. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957,
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d

1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331.

Defendant was originally charged with first degree murder. First degree

murder is defined as “the killing of a human being:”

When the offender has specific intent to kill or to inflict great
bodily harm and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of aggravated kidnapping, second degree kidnapping,
aggravated escape, aggravated arson, aggravated rape, forcible rape,
aggravated burglary, armed robbery, assault by drive-by shooting first
degree robbery, second degree robbery, simple robbery, terrorism,
cruelty to juveniles, or second degree cruelty to juveniles.

La.R.S. 14:30(A)(1).

Whereas the State declined to pursue the death penalty in this case, the

punishment for first degree murder was “life imprisonment at hard labor without

benefit of parole, probation[,] or suspension of sentence.” La.R.S. 14:30(C)(2).

Defendant was also charged with armed robbery, with the pertinent punishment

provision providing for imprisonment “for not less than ten years and for not more

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than ninety-nine years, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of

sentence.” La.R.S. 14:64(B).

Defendant, however, pled guilty to the reduced charge of manslaughter,

which provides for a range of imprisonment of not more than forty years at hard

labor. La.R.S. 14:31(B). Defendant received twenty-five years at hard labor

without any restriction on parole eligibility.

A sentencing hearing was held on October 2, 2015. Several people testified

on Defendant’s behalf. Lisa Johnson testified that she had just recently met

Defendant and that he was helping coach her stepson’s football team. She

described Defendant as a kind, goodhearted, and compassionate man. Allen

Chandler, whose oldest son and Defendant’s brother were best friends, stated that

Defendant had matured in the past few years. Clair Suske, the mother of

Defendant’s seven-month-old daughter, testified that she and Defendant had been

living together for the past year. She stated that it would be an enormous

economic hardship on her and the baby should Defendant go to prison. She further

stated that Defendant is devoted to his daughter and has worked hard to help

provide for them. Defendant’s sister, Jasmine Harris, described how she and

Defendant grew up together as children of a single mother who was in the army.

She stated that Defendant helped her out at a homeless shelter she ran.

The administrator of BeauVer Christian Academy, Cheryl Zeno, testified as

to how well Defendant did in his last year in high school. She spoke of how he

helped with other troubled boys at the school. She believed that Defendant had

accepted responsibility for what he had done regarding the victim’s death. Latasha

Berry, Defendant’s mother, described how Defendant had matured and changed for

the better as a result of the terrible mistake he made. Defendant testified and

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expressed remorse for the victim’s death, and he apologized to the family of the

victim. He described himself as a typical teenager, who had a mischievous bent,

and that he had made a bad decision when he was seventeen and followed the

wrong people.

Finally, the victim’s mother and brother testified. They spoke about how

the loss of their son and brother has affected their lives.

Following the testimony, at the sentence hearing, the trial court ruled as

follows:

The facts are that on or about April the 12 th, 2011, here in Vernon
Parish, Louisiana, that Dontrez Banks, along with Joshua Griffin and
Andre Porter, met and discussed going to the residence north of
Rosepine here in Vernon Parish, Louisiana, where the victim, Jason
Perry, lived for the purpose[] of committing a robbery. The robbery
did occur wherein several items were taken from the victim[,] and an
altercation ensued in the process of that [sic] whereby Mr. Banks,
Mr. Griffin, and Mr. Porter and against Mr. Perry [sic]. Brass
knuckles with a blade was used against the victim in the robbery and
the altercation[,] which resulted in the death of Mr. Perry. Mr. Banks
was actively involved in this altercation and robbery and the
conspiracy to commit the robbery so much so to the extent that he
received a cut on his body from a co-perpetrator, Mr. Griffin, who
was the testimony [sic] of the only one who actually had a blade.
There was testimony that Mr. Banks had brass knuckles. There’s
testimony at the trial of Mr. Griffin that Mr. Banks was also involved
in the physical altercation as far as blows go. Up to this point and if
you see the statements that have been given by Mr. Banks as well as
Mr. Porter, both have given statements that have been self-serving up
to this point and not taking responsibility for what they have done.
They have sought to cover their tracks and to cover their rear-end,
even on the testimony during the trial of Mr. Joshua Griffin. They
basically both testified it wasn’t them involved, it was the other two
involved during that trial here in August of this year of Mr. Joshua
Griffin. The recommendation was that he was to be sentenced after
the trial of Mr. Joshua Griffin. There [were] no sentencing
recommendations other than to run concurrent with one another and to
ask for an 893 and that there be a bond set. Okay. There was harm
caused to the victim and his family, both economically, emotionally[,]
and everything else that’s been caused. The family did expend quite a
bit of money from the presentence investigation in relation to the
funeral[,] and there is significant economic impact when someone
is - - when somebody has been murdered. They went down there to

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rob him of some drugs. There was a text message that was sent to him
to get him out of his house. The defendant did - - was not under any
strong provocation by the victim in this case. There [were] no
substantial grounds that exist to tend to justify or excuse his conduct.
He is single, he has a daughter, a seven month old, as testified here on
the stand. He’s in good health, he has a - - on the PSI there’s
one - - there was an undated PSI that was ordered. There is on
2/19/2014 . . . a careless operation and driving under suspension while
he was on bond from this matter[,] and on 5/30/2014[,] there was a
plea of guilty to careless operation and the other charge was
dismissed. He has completed his highschool education as testified
and as the documents provided by his counsel to the [c]ourt so show.
The PSI indicates that there is no juvenile record. Juvenile, it says
none indicated. Adult, it says none indicated under Probation and
Parole record[,] and then the updated showed the careless operation
and, also, none for detainers. But[,] the defendant is not likely to
respond favorably to probationary treatment. There is an undue risk
that during the period of any potential suspended sentence or
probation that he would potentially commit a crime. The crime here
is just too serious to think otherwise. He is in need of correctional
treatment and custodial environment that can provide the most
effective commitment to an institution. A lesser sentence would
deprecate the seriousness of his offense[,] and, of course, the
defendant pled guilty under Louisiana law, manslaughter is a crime of
violence.

Defendant argues that he was only seventeen when the robbery and killing

of the victim occurred. He notes that he willingly and truthfully testified at

co-defendant Joshua Griffin’s trial, which resulted in a life sentence for

Mr. Griffin. He points out that he had no prior criminal history and that, in the

three years between his guilty plea and his sentencing, he became a law abiding,

family man. He states that “[t]here is little doubt that this [seventeen-]year[-]old

juvenile was heavily influenced and corrupted by the older Joshua Griffin.”

Defendant’s appellate counsel argues that:

Our society and our courts have recognized that juveniles have
lessened culpability and they are less deserving of the most severe
penalties. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___; 132 S.Ct.
2455 (2012). The courts have noted that as compared to adults,
juveniles lack maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility

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and are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and
outside pressures. Roper, 543 U.S. 569-570.

In State v. Lisotta, 98-648 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d 57, writ

denied, 99-433 (La. 6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183, the fifth circuit noted three factors

the appellate court should consider in reviewing a trial court’s sentencing

discretion, which are: the nature of the crime; the nature and background of the

offender; and the sentence imposed for similar crimes by the same court and other

courts.

The record before this court shows that the interviews of Defendant and

Mr. Porter with the police indicated that the three men had been harassing the

victim for several days prior to the incident. Defendant told the police that

Mr. Griffin was upset because the victim was dating the mother of Mr. Griffin’s

two minor children. According to Defendant’s version of the event, Mr. Porter and

Mr. Griffin had gone to Mr. Perry’s home the night before and broke out several of

his windows with a baseball bat. Defendant claimed that because Mr. Porter’s

phone was out of minutes, he allowed Mr. Porter to use his phone to text the victim

and lure him out of the house the evening of the killing. Mr. Griffin told the police

that he, Mr. Porter, and Defendant attacked the victim. Defendant denied that he

was aware of Mr. Griffin’s intent and that he did not take an active role in the

beating; however, Defendant, himself, was stabbed twice during the fray by

Mr. Griffin. Defendant testified that he was regretful for what had occurred and

wished that he could have done something at the time. However, when Defendant

was confronted two days after the killing, he denied that he was even at the scene.

Furthermore, his mother and her boyfriend vouched for him, stating that he was

home the entire evening of the incident. Defendant did not admit he was with

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Mr. Griffin and Mr. Porter until they gave him up. Still, Defendant continued to

deny that he had any knowledge of what was to occur or that he participated in the

occurrence.

In State v. Wright, 10-577 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/15/11), 61 So.3d 88, writ

denied, 11-560 (La. 9/30/11), 71 So.3d 283, the defendant, who was fifteen years

old at the time and charged with second degree murder and armed robbery, was

found guilty of manslaughter by a jury. The defendant received twenty-five years

at hard labor on the conviction for manslaughter. He appealed the sentence as

excessive because of his youth, asserting that there was no evidence that he shot

the victim. While noting that the defendant did have an extensive juvenile criminal

history, the fifth circuit did not find the sentence excessive under the

circumstances. The fifth circuit looked at other similarly situated defendants, as

follows:

In a case similar to the instant one, State v. Williams, 34,359
(La.App. 2 Cir. 5/9/01), 786 So.2d 203, writ denied, 01-2275
(La.5/10/02), 815 So.2d 835, defendant was originally charged as a
principal to a second degree murder which occurred during the course
of an armed robbery. However, he was found guilty of the responsive
verdict of manslaughter after a jury trial. The trial court sentenced
defendant to 30 years at hard labor. On appeal, defendant argued that
his 30-year sentence was excessive, noting that the trial court failed to
give adequate weight to various factors, including his youth at the
time of the offense, his lack of a felony record, the fact that his
co-defendant was the leader/organizer of the robbery and the shooter,
and the minimal evidence linking him to this crime. Id., 34,359 at 20,
786 So.2d at 216.

The appellate court found that the 30-year sentence was not
excessive. The court found that although defendant was only 16 at
time of the offense and was the least culpable of the offenders,
defendant had a significant juvenile criminal history, and he did not
receive the maximum 40-year sentence. Further, the appellate court
noted that although defendant denied any participation in the crimes,
that claim was refuted by the evidence. The court stated that
defendant was present at the planning of the robbery and during the
commission of the robbery-homicide, and that he received part of the

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robbery proceeds. The appellate court also stated that defendant
received great lenience from the jury in light of the overwhelming
evidence showing his guilt on the charged offenses of second degree
murder and armed robbery. It concluded that the 30-year sentence did
not shock the sense of justice when considered in light of the violent
crimes committed. State v. Williams, 34,359 at 22-23, 786 So.2d at
217-18.

Likewise, in State v. Bowman, 95-667 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/10/96),
677 So.2d 1094, writ denied, 96-2070 (La.1/31/97), 687 So.2d 400,
defendant was indicted for second degree murder, but a jury convicted
him of manslaughter. He was sentenced to 33 years at hard labor. On
appeal, defendant contended his sentence was excessive, arguing that
he was only 16 years old at the time of the crime and that he was a
first offender but received a sentence of only seven years less than the
maximum. Id., 95-667 at 14, 677 So.2d at 1101. Defendant further
asserted that he was not the individual who did the shooting and that
there was no evidence that he knew his co-defendant was going to
shoot or kill the victim. Id. The appellate court found that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing, noting that the
defendant was a principal to a drive-by shooting that resulted in the
death of one person, and that the shooting occurred without any
provocation. Id., 95-667 at 16, 677 So.2d at 1102.

In the instant case, we find that the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion in imposing a 25-year sentence. We find that the trial judge
gave a sufficient basis for the sentence, and the sentence is supported
by the record. The evidence showed that defendant was present
during the planning of the armed robbery, and that he provided the
gun that was used to kill the victim, pretended to knock on the next-
door neighbor’s door as a set-up to the armed robbery, was present at
the scene in the event the co-defendants needed his assistance, and ran
back to the house with his co-defendants after the shooting, the same
place where the robbery was planned. Further, the evidence showed
that the victim did nothing to warrant being killed.

Id. at 107-08.

In the current case, Defendant received a significant benefit from pleading

guilty to manslaughter. The evidence in the record of this case was such that it was

highly probable that Defendant was facing life imprisonment for his participation

as a principal in this offense. La.R.S. 14:24. As in the cases cited above,

Defendant conspired to rob the victim, whose only misdeed was dating the mother

of Mr. Griffin’s two children. Defendant denied that he shared a portion of the

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money taken from the pockets of the victim, but he admitted that he took a share of

the marijuana which was also taken from the victim. At the sentencing hearing,

Defendant stated he wished that he could have helped the victim; yet, he told the

police that as he and his co-defendants were leaving, he saw the victim on the

ground, crawling back towards his house, and he did nothing. The record indicated

that at least an hour later, when the victim was found by his brother, he was still

alive.

A sentence violates La.Const. art. 1, § 20 if it is grossly out of proportion to

the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a purposeless and needless

infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Smith, 01-2574 (La. 1/14/03), 839 So.2d 1.

“A sentence is grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are

considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice.”

State v. Weaver, 01-467, p. 11 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So.2d 166, 174. We do not find

that the punishment in this case shocks this court’s sense of justice. Accordingly,

we find that the trial court did not abuse its vast discretion when it sentenced

Defendant to twenty-five years imprisonment at hard labor for his participation in

this heinous offense.

DISPOSITION

We affirm the trial court’s twenty-five year sentence imposed upon

Defendant as a result of his manslaughter conviction in this case.

AFFIRMED.

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