State of Louisiana v. John W. Hatfield, III

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

16-457

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

JOHN W. HATFIELD, III

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF BEAUREGARD, NO. CR-2012-873
HONORABLE C. KERRY ANDERSON, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JOHN D. SAUNDERS
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Billy Howard Ezell, and D. Kent Savoie,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

James R. Lestage
District Attorney 36th Judicial District Court
Richard F. Blankenship
Assistant District Attorney
P. O. Box 99
DeRidder, LA 70634
(337) 463-5578
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Chad Ikerd
Louisiana Appellate Project
P.O. Box 2125
Lafayette, LA 70502
(225) 806-2930
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
John W. Hatfield, III

SAUNDERS, Judge.

On February 14, 2013, a grand jury indicted Defendant, John W. Hatfield,

III, for the second degree murder of four-year-old Tanner Bailey. A sanity

commission was appointed on February 26, 2013, to determine whether Defendant

was able to proceed and whether he was sane at the time he committed the murder.

The trial court appointed Dr. Flynn Taylor and Dr. James Anderson to evaluate

Defendant and determine whether he was competent to stand trial.

Dr. Anderson determined Defendant was incompetent to proceed to trial. He

recommended treatment in an inpatient hospital setting and believed Defendant

could be returned to competency with the appropriate treatment. Dr. Flynn could

not give “a real answer as to weather [sic] [Defendant was] fully competent.”

On June 26, 2013, the trial court found Defendant lacked the appropriate

mental capacity to stand trial and ordered him committed to the Feliciana Forensic

Facility. On August 26, 2014, the trial court found Defendant’s competency to

stand trial had been restored. Defendant entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty

by reason of insanity.

A jury found Defendant guilty of second degree murder on March 3, 2016.

The trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor without

benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, to run consecutively to any

other sentence. The trial court also recommended Defendant be placed in a mental

health unit during his prison term.

Defendant now alleges he proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he

was legally insane at the time of the murder, and no rational jury could have found

otherwise.

FACTS:

On December 18, 2012, Defendant, a diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic,

stabbed and killed his four-year-old nephew, Tanner Bailey.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

Defendant contends he proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he

was legally insane at the time of this crime, and no rational juror could have found

otherwise. We disagree.

Under La.Rev.Stat. 14:14:

If the circumstances indicate that because of a
mental disease or mental defect the offender was
incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong with
reference to the conduct in question, the offender shall be
exempt from criminal responsibility.

However, in Louisiana there is a legal presumption that the defendant
is sane and responsible for his actions. La.Rev.Stat. 15:432; State v.
Poree, 386 So.2d 1331 (La.1979). Therefore, to overcome this
presumption of sanity, the defendant has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that he suffered a mental disease or a
mental defect which prevented him from distinguishing between right
and wrong with reference to the conduct in question. La.Code Crim.
Pro. art. 652; State v. Armstrong, 94-2950, pp. 4-5 (La.4/8/96), 671
So.2d 307, 309; State v. Silman, 95-0154, p. 7 (La.11/27/95), 663
So.2d 27, 32; State v. Peters, 94-0283, pp. 8-9 (La.10/17/94), 643
So.2d 1222, 1225-26. Sanity is a factual matter for the jury, to be
determined from all of the evidence, both lay and expert, along with
circumstances surrounding the events and testimony relating to the
defendant’s behavior before, during, and after the crime. State v.
Price, 403 So.2d 660, 663-64 (La.1981); State v. Claibon, 395 So.2d
770, 772 (La.1981); State v. Roy, 395 So.2d 664, 668-69 (La.1981).
A determination of the weight of the evidence is a question of fact that
rests solely with the trier of fact, who may accept or reject, in whole
or in part, the testimony of any witness, and if rational triers of fact
could disagree as to the interpretation of the evidence, the rational
trier’s view of all of the evidence most favorable to the prosecution
must be adopted. State v. Silman, 95-0154, p. 12, 663 So.2d at 35.

In reviewing a claim for insufficiency of evidence in an action
where the affirmative defense of insanity is raised, the appellate court,
applying the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), must determine whether under
the facts and circumstances of the case, any rational fact finder,
viewing the evidence most favorably to the prosecution, could
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conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant failed to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane at the
time of the offense. State v. Peters, 94-0283, p. 8, 643 So.2d at 1225;
State v. Armstrong, p. 4, 671 So.2d at 309; State v. Nealy, 450 So.2d
634, 639 (La.1984).

State v. Williams, 07-1407, pp. 7-8 (La. 10/20/09), 22 So.3d 867, 875-76, cert.

denied, 560 U.S. 905, 130 S.Ct. 3278 (2010).

Defendant contends his circumstances show he could not tell right from

wrong. He had a long history of mental health problems. Doctors at Greenbriar

took him off his regular medication and placed him on a new one. Defendant

stopped taking that medication when he returned home days before the murder. He

made no attempt to harm anyone other than Tanner, who was the object of a

delusion. Defendant’s admission of what he did and his failure to flee or hide

evidence add to the circumstances that show he could not tell right from wrong at

the time of the murder and should have been found not guilty by reason of insanity.

However, the defense presented no expert testimony to opine Defendant was

insane at the time of the offense. Dr. Cantu, Defendant’s treating psychiatrist for

some time prior to the time of the offense, was not qualified to give an opinion

about Defendant’s sanity at the time of the murder. The defense criticized Dr.

Vosburg’s testimony because he saw Defendant only once, more than two years

after the murder. Dr. Vosburg admitted his opinion was only as reliable as the

records and the record-takers, and he wished he “had more exacting” records.

In his appeallate brief, Defendant incorrectly argues Dr. Vosburg “saw

[Defendant] as merely depressed, sleep deprived, suffering with severe mood

swings, and had poor impulse control at the time [he] killed his four-year-old

nephew[,]” rather than as a paranoid schizophrenic. In fact, Dr. Vosburg testified

Defendant’s prescribed mood-stabilizing medication indicated to him “there’s an

affect or a mood component . . . beyond just paranoid schizophrenia . . . . a
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combination of schizophrenic symptoms and affective or mood symptoms.” Dr.

Vosburg’s expert opinion was that Defendant knew right from wrong when he

murdered Tanner.

The State noted Defendant was able to accurately recall events surrounding

the murder shortly after it occurred and offered “an excuse” for it to his mother

about an hour after it occurred. Defendant admitted he told Kristina he stabbed

Tanner in the chest. He knew all the details of Tanner sleeping on the couch while

John and Kristina were out of the room. He told detectives he did not think about

the consequences, although he also told them he was afraid of Tanner, the knife

was made available for him to stab Tanner, and Tanner was already dead but

Defendant still had to kill him. The day after the murder, he asked deputies to tell

Kourtney he was sorry for what he had done.

Without question, Defendant was seriously mentally ill and had been on

medication for a long time. However, these facts do not automatically lead to the

conclusion that Defendant did not know right from wrong at the time of the

murder. Some of the bizarre reasons Defendant gave for killing Tanner – the

squirrels, the light shining on the knife, etc. – did not arise until a significant time

after the murder, when Defendant could have known what he would gain from a

finding of insanity. However, testimony showed Defendant said he did hear voices

prior to the murder, but he apparently never acted on them. Although Defendant

told Kourtney she was the antichrist and her children were the spawn of Satan

before the murder, he never indicated or exhibited any violent tendencies in

relation to that purported belief.

In State v. Sharp, 418 So.2d 1344, 1348 (La.1982), the supreme court stated:

In the present case, the evidence (particularly the medical
evidence) was in substantial conflict, and there was ample evidence to
support either verdict the jury decided to render. When there is
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conflicting evidence on the issue of insanity at the time of the offense,
the reviewing court should accord great weight to the jury’s resolution
of the conflicting evidence (as long as the jury was properly instructed
and no evidence was prejudicially admitted or excluded), and the
jury’s verdict should not be overturned unless no rational juror could
have found, on the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, that defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence his insanity at the time of the offense.

Here the evidence is not conflicting. It is the interpretation of the evidence

by Defendant and by the State that conflicts. We find that the evidence was not

sufficient for the jury to reject Dr. Vosburg’s opinion that Defendant was not

insane when he stabbed Tanner. Defendant bore the burden of rebutting the

presumption of sanity at trial. The jury’s finding of guilty, implying Defendant

failed to carry the burden of rebutting the presumption, was not without support in

the record.

The jury could have accepted all of the evidence of Defendant’s behavior

before, during, and after the murder; the factual evidence of his medical history

before and after; and the medical testimony, and it still could have rationally

determined by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant was not insane at

the time of the murder. Defendant did not actually refute any of the evidence; he

just reached a different conclusion. Thus, we affirm Defendant’s conviction.

DECREE:

Defendant’s conviction is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules– Courts of Appeal, Rule 2–16.3.

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