State of Louisiana v. Christopher Goodly -Aka- Christopher Bryant Goodly

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

16-512

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

CHRISTOPHER GOODLEY,
A/K/A CHRISTOPHER BRYANT GOODLEY

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF EVANGELINE, NO. 102417-FB
HONORABLE CHUCK R. WEST, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

JIMMIE C. PETERS
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, Shannon J. Gremillion, and Phyllis M. Keaty,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Trent Brignac
District Attorney
Thirteenth Judicial District
Julhelene E. Jackson
Assistant District Attorney
P.O. Drawer 780
Ville Platte, LA 70586
(337) 363-3438
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Chad Ikerd
Louisiana Appellate Project
P.O. Box 2125
Lafayette, LA 70502
(225) 806-2930
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Christopher Goodley

PETERS, J.

The defendant, Christopher Bryant Goodley,1 appeals his conviction of first

degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:30. For the following reasons, we affirm

his conviction in all respects.

DISCUSSION OF THE RECORD

On January 28, 2015, the State of Louisiana (state) charged the defendant by

grand jury indictment with the November 2, 2014 first degree murder of Delsie

Williams, his eighty-year-old grandmother. After a four-day trial beginning on

February 1, 2016, a jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty as charged.

Immediately after the jury returned its verdict, the defendant orally moved for both

a post-verdict judgment of acquittal and a motion for new trial, and the trial court

rejected both motions. The defendant then orally moved for an appeal of his

conviction, and the trial court granted that motion. The defendant subsequently

filed a written motion for appeal, and the trial court executed a written order to that

effect on February 16, 2016. Nine days later, on February 25, 2016, the trial court

sentenced the defendant to life in prison at hard labor without the benefit of

probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

In the appeal now before us, the defendant raises the following assignments

of error:

1. Christopher Goodley‟s appeal is premature because the trial
court granted an order appealing his conviction prior to the trial court
imposing a sentence.

2. The trial court erred by denying Christopher Goodley‟s post-
trial motion for judgment of acquittal because the state failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Christopher had the requisite specific
intent to be found guilty of first or second degree murder because his
intoxication vitiated any specific intent.

1
The defendant‟s last name is spelled “Goodly” in the grand jury indictment. However,
throughout most of the transcript and briefs his name is spelled “Goodley.” We will use the
latter spelling in this opinion.

3. The trial court erred by denying Christopher Goodley‟s
motion [to] suppress his statements to police because they were not
freely and voluntarily given due to being highly intoxicated at the
time.

OPINION

Assignment of Error Number One

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 916 provides the following

with regard to when a trial court is divested of jurisdiction to act in a criminal

proceeding:

The jurisdiction of the trial court is divested and that of the
appellate court attaches upon the entering of the order of appeal.
Thereafter, the trial court has no jurisdiction to take any action except
as otherwise provided by law and to:

(1) Extend the return day of the appeal, the time for filing
assignments of error, or the time for filing per curiam comments in
accordance with Articles 844 and 919.

(2) Correct an error or deficiency in the record.

(3) Correct an illegal sentence or take other appropriate action
pursuant to a properly made or filed motion to reconsider sentence.

(4) Take all action concerning bail permitted by Title VIII.

(5) Furnish per curiam comments.

(6) Render an interlocutory order or a definitive judgment
concerning a ministerial matter not in controversy on appeal.

(7) Impose the penalty provided by Article 844.

(8) Sentence the defendant pursuant to a conviction under the
Habitual Offender Law as set forth in R.S. 15:529.1.

Thus, it is clear that the trial court sentenced the defendant after entering an order

of appeal and, therefore, after it had been divested of jurisdiction to act on such

matters. However, that factual finding does not necessarily require a dismissal of

the appeal and remand for resentencing.

2

The fifth circuit faced a similar factual scenario in State v. Lampkin, 12-391

(La.App. 5 Cir. 5/16/13), 119 So.3d 158, writ denied, 13-2303 (La. 5/23/14), 140

So.3d 717, wherein the trial court granted an appeal prior to sentencing. That court

recognized the provisions of La.Code Crim.P. art. 916, but concluded that the

defendant‟s appeal should not be dismissed with the following analysis:

Ordinarily, a premature appeal need not be dismissed when a
sentence is imposed after the defendant‟s motion for appeal is filed.
State v. Washington, 98-69 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/26/99), 727 So.2d 673,
675 (citation omitted). Here, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
impose sentence pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. 916. A defendant can
appeal from a final conviction only where sentence has been imposed.
State v. Chapman, 471 So.2d 716 (La.1985); State v. London, 316
So.2d 743 (La.1975).

Although this appeal is premature because the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to impose sentence, we find State v. Brooks, 633 So.2d
816, 818 (La.App. 4 Cir.1994), writ denied, 94-1939 (La.9/3/96), 678
So.2d 548, to be applicable in the present case. In Brooks, as in this
case, the defendant‟s motion for appeal was granted prior to the
imposition of sentence. Id. The Fourth Circuit did not dismiss that
appeal, quoting State v. Martin, 483 So.2d 1223, 1225 (La.App. 4
Cir.1986):

The Louisiana Supreme Court and this court, in
handling similar situations in civil actions where an
appeal was granted prior to the signing of the judgment,
have refused to dismiss the appeal. Matter of Parker,
399 So.2d 607 (La.1981). Palmer v. Wren, 361 So.2d
1206 (La.1978); City of New Orleans v. Kirzner, 447
So.2d 66 (La.App. 4 Cir.1984), writ denied, 466 So.2d
1303 (La.1985). We choose to follow a similar line of
thinking in criminal cases on point with the one at bar.
Dismissing the appeal would simply result in a delay of
the appellate process, and hinder defendant‟s right to
appeal. Accordingly, we conclude that where a sentence
is imposed after defendant‟s motion for appeal is filed
and granted, the appeal will not be dismissed.

Under the circumstances of this appeal, defendant‟s motion for appeal
should not be dismissed as this would only result in a delay of
defendant‟s right to appellate review.

Lampkin, 119 So.3d at 162.

3

We do note that in two more recent cases, State v. Johnson, 13-75 (La.App.

5 Cir. 10/9/13), 128 So.3d 325 and State v. Griffin, 13-701 (La.App. 5 Cir.

3/12/14), 138 So.3d 90, the fifth circuit reached a different conclusion from its

holding in Lampkin. In both of these cases, the trial court ruled on a motion for

new trial after granting the defendants‟ motion for appeal, and in each case, the

fifth circuit concluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sentence the

defendant, dismissed the appeal, and remanded the matter to the trial court for a

ruling on the new trial motion before acting on the motion for appeal. However, as

was specifically recognized by the fifth circuit in Johnson, we find the two rulings

to be distinguishable from the holding in Lampkin.

In Johnson, 128 So.3d 325, the fifth circuit reiterated the holding in Lampkin

that the divesting of jurisdiction in the trial court does not always require the

dismissal of an appeal where the dismissal would delay a defendant‟s right to an

appellate review of his conviction, but held Johnson was distinguishable from

Lampkin because Johnson involved the trial court‟s ruling on a motion for new

trial after it had been divested of jurisdiction. This distinction was particularly

important in Johnson because one of the issues on appeal was the trial court‟s

denial of the defendant‟s motion for new trial.

Under the particular circumstances of the present case, where
the trial court, after having been divested of jurisdiction, denied
defendant‟s motion for a new trial, the substance of which he then
raised on appeal, we find a remand is proper. Before this Court, a
court of review, addresses the merits of an issue that the trial court
improperly considered, in light of due process considerations,
defendant is entitled to have those merits considered by a trial court
properly vested with jurisdiction. Although equitable considerations
of judicial economy are as pertinent here as in other cases, this case is
distinguishable because it presents a definite issue of due process
concern. Under such circumstances, we find that defendant‟s due
process rights should not yield to equitable considerations of judicial
economy. Consequently, we are constrained to vacate the sentences
imposed on defendant . . . and remand this matter to the trial court to

4

rule on defendant‟s motion for a new trial, and, if denied, to
resentence defendant.

Id. at 329.

Although we agree with the defendant‟s argument that the order of appeal

was issued prematurely, we find the ruling in Lampkin to be persuasive given the

facts before us. Because the dismissal of the present appeal would only result in a

delay of the defendant‟s right to appeal, we decline the request to dismiss his

appeal.

Assignment of Error Number Two

The defendant does not deny that he killed his grandmother. Instead, he

asserts in this assignment of error that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that he had the requisite specific intent to commit the offense of first degree

murder; and therefore, the trial court erred in denying his motion for post-verdict

judgment of acquittal. Specifically, he asserts that his intoxicated state at the time

of the offense vitiated any specific intent and that he should have been convicted of

a lesser and included responsive offense.

When a defendant asserts an insufficiency of the evidence defense, the

standard of appellate review is well settled:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the
critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100
S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King,
436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982);
State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact
finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and
therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the credibility
determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations
under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino,
436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)).
In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record

5

must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

As it applies to this matter, La.R.S. 14:30(A)(5) provides that “[f]irst degree

murder is the killing of a human being . . . [w]hen the offender has the specific

intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon a victim who is under the age of

twelve or sixty-five years of age or older.” Thus, the offense does require a

specific intent.

The evidence establishes that on November 2, 2014, the defendant resided

with his grandmother in her Ville Platte, Louisiana home and that sometime that

day he beat her to death with an aluminum baseball bat; removed her blood-stained

capri pants and stuffed them into a trash can; loaded her partially clothed body into

the trunk of her automobile; and disposed of the body in a field where it was

discovered later that day by Mark Tremie, the owner of the field, who immediately

reported his finding to law enforcement personnel.

Evangeline Parish Sheriff‟s Detective Elliot Thomas was called to Ms.

Williams‟ home on the evening of November 2, 2014, and led the investigation of

the homicide. When Detective Thomas arrived on the scene, he observed blood on

the trunk of an automobile parked in the carport of the house, and traced a blood

trail from the house to the back of the automobile. Once inside the house, he

observed a pair of white blood-stained capri pants and a calendar in a garbage can,

as well as what appeared to be blood stains on the floor and kitchen counter. Soon

after arriving at the scene, he received a telephone call that Ms. Williams‟ body

had been discovered in Mr. Tremie‟s field; and further investigation at that location

resulted in the recovery of, among other items, a blood-stained white sheet, a white

towel with red and blue stripes, and a plastic bag. Further investigation established

6

that Ms. Williams had been pulled from the trunk of the automobile and dragged

through the grass into the field.

Using information derived from the investigation at the crime scene as well

as the field where the body was found,2 Detective Thomas quickly determined the

defendant to be his prime suspect in the homicide. Law enforcement personnel

apprehended the defendant the next day in an abandoned trailer across town from

his grandmother‟s home.

Once Detective Thomas had the defendant in custody, he began an initial

interview of the defendant at 1:30 p.m. on November 3, 2014. However, this

interview lasted only moments because Detective Thomas very quickly concluded

that the defendant appeared to be confused and under the influence of narcotics or

alcohol. Given the communication barrier, Detective Thomas decided to maintain

the defendant in custody in order to allow him a period of time to overcome the

effects of whatever was in his system.

Two days later, Detective Thomas began a second interview with the

defendant and found the defendant‟s demeanor to be “much different” from the

first interview. Still, although the defendant was able to respond to the questions

asked of him and appeared to understand what was going on, Detective Thomas

obtained little helpful information. Later that same afternoon, Detective Thomas

received a call that the defendant wanted to speak with him. In this third interview,

Detective Thomas found that although he was “a little emotional,” the defendant

appeared to understand what was going on around him and that “he had decided

2
This information included statements from Mr. Tremie, from Mary Joseph (Ms.
Williams‟ neighbor), from Laura Stevens (Ms. Williams‟ sister), and from Kimble Tezeno (Ms.
Williams‟ niece). When the three women were unable to contact Ms. Williams by telephone,
they went to her home after the homicide (with Ms. Joseph arriving first and the other two
women joining her for a second observation), saw the bloody aftereffects of the offense, and
contacted law enforcement officials.
7

that he wanted to talk.” In the interview that followed, the defendant provided the

detective a full statement concerning his involvement in the homicide.3

The defendant told Detective Thomas that he had gone to a neighbor‟s house

that morning to “smoke a blunt” and the fact that he was still under the influence of

the drugs when he returned home made his grandmother upset. When she

continued to criticize him, he stated that he retrieved an aluminum baseball bat and

hit her on the head as she sat in her recliner. He stated that he continued to hit her

until she stopped moving,4 and he then began to try to clean up the crime scene

using a dishtowel. The defendant explained that the white capri pants came off his

grandmother‟s body as he began dragging her to the door to deposit her in the

trunk of the automobile. He simply dumped them in the garbage can and deposited

a calendar over them to cover them up. Additionally, he placed a plastic bag over

his grandmother‟s head to prevent more blood from flowing onto the floor. After

dragging her body into the field, the defendant returned to the house to clean the

scene. The defendant told Detective Thomas that the aluminum baseball bat he

used to kill his grandmother could be found in the closet in her room. The bat was

found at that location, and all of the other physical evidence recovered at the field

and Ms. Williams‟ home was consistent with the defendant‟s version of the

offense.

With regard to the actual attack, the defendant told Detective Thomas that he

blindsided his grandmother with the initial blow and that after he completed the

act, he went outside and smoked a cigarette. In fact, he recalled his grandmother

3
In all three interview attempts, Detective Thomas provided the defendant with notice of
his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966), and the defendant
executed a written waiver of those rights.
4
The defendant estimated that he struck her for approximately forty minutes.
8

say “Chris who‟s hitting me?” after he first hit her. He told the detective he did not

answer his grandmother, and simply continued to hit her.

The defendant testified in his own defense and suggested that he has a severe

narcotics addiction with no limit to the type of illegal narcotics he would use.5 He

suggested that he often hallucinated and blacked out when he mixed drugs, which

he did on a regular basis. His defense to his grandmother‟s murder was that prior

to the offense he had consumed all sorts of drugs, including PCP, cocaine, and

marijuana.

According to the defendant, he only wanted to sleep when he returned to his

grandmother‟s house but she wanted him to go to church with her. He became

irritated and ingested some cocaine to calm himself as she prepared to go to

church. As he tried to sleep, she kept waking him and when he left his bed at

about 10:00 a.m., he found that she had decided not to go to church. He then

returned to his bed and slept until his grandmother woke him again at

approximately 1:00 p.m. According to the defendant, he became angry, grabbed

the baseball bat, walked down the hallway into the room where his grandmother

was sitting, and began striking her with the bat.

The defendant testified that when he was first taken into police custody, he

lied about what happened because he did not want to go back to prison. 6 At first,

he thought everything that happened was a dream, but after spending two days in

custody, he realized it had actually occurred. He then contacted Detective Thomas

and confessed to killing his grandmother and dumping her body in the field.

Although he claimed that he would not have killed her if he had not been so high

5
He suggested that his habit included marijuana, cocaine, crystal meth, PCP, and
“possibly anything under the moon.” His problem with illegal drugs was confirmed by the
testimony of Chantel Estes, his probation and parole officer.
6
The defendant had previously been convicted of simple burglary and sentenced to
prison.
9

on illegal drugs, he acknowledged that he had sufficient control to know that he

needed to clean the crime scene after disposing of her body.

On cross-examination, the defendant could not remember how many times

he struck his grandmother, but he remembered that “she held in there a long

time[.]” He also recalled placing a sheet over his grandmother after he placed her

body behind the sofa; and he remembered Ms. Joseph coming to the door and

pointing out the blood on the fender of the automobile. He waited until dark to

dispose of his grandmother‟s body because he was trying to determine what he was

going to do. He acknowledged that he had the presence of mind to put a plastic

bag over his grandmother‟s head to keep her from bleeding all over the house, to

throw her pants in the trash, to take a calendar off the wall and throw it in the trash

can to soak up and cover up the blood, and to put towels in the trunk of the

automobile to keep blood from staining the trunk. After dumping the body in the

field, he even telephoned a girlfriend7 and discussed with her how to get away with

what he had done. Finally, he acknowledged that the only evidence of his drug use

on November 2, 2014, was his own self-serving testimony.

Assuming for purposes of argument that the defendant was under the

influence of narcotics at the time he beat his grandmother to death, we note that the

supreme court has stated the following concerning the intoxication defense in a

murder prosecution:

Voluntary intoxication will not excuse a crime, but it is a
defense to a specific intent offense if the circumstances demonstrate
that intoxication precluded formation of the requisite intent. See La.
R.S. 14:15(2); State v. Legrand, 02-1462, p. 7 (La. 12[/3/03),] 864
So.2d 89, 95-96. The defendant has the burden of proving his
intoxication defense; thereafter, it falls to the state to negate that
defense by showing beyond a reasonable doubt that specific intent
was present despite the defendant‟s alleged intoxication. See State v.
Smith, 94-2588, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/27/96), 672 So.2d 1034, 1038,

7
The girlfriend was not identified by the defendant in his testimony.
10

citing State v. Davis, 92-1623, p. 10 (La. 5/23/94), 637 So.2d 1012,
1020. Whether voluntary intoxication in a particular case is sufficient
to preclude specific intent is a question to be resolved by the trier of
fact. See Davis, 92-1623 at 10, 637 So.2d at 1020.

State v. Mickelson, 12-2539, pp. 6-7 (La. 9/3/14), 149 So.3d 178, 183 (footnote
omitted).

A decision from this circuit addressing similar facts is State v. Carroll, 95-

859 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/96), 670 So.2d 286. In that case, the defendant and two

others were intoxicated at a beach when the victim, who was extremely

intoxicated, asked them for a ride. They consented to give him a ride, but became

increasingly angry toward him as the trip progressed. The driver pulled to the side

of the road and all three men exited the truck in which they were riding, beat the

victim severely, and put him back into the truck. When the victim regained

consciousness and began hollering, the three men stopped the truck again and, this

time only Carroll beat the victim back into unconsciousness. When the driver

stopped the next time, the three men brutally beat the victim, put rocks in his shirt,

and threw him off a bridge into the water below. Carroll and a co-defendant were

found guilty of second degree murder. On appeal, Carroll claimed the jury erred in

failing to find that his intoxication precluded him from forming specific criminal

intent.

Finding that the jury did not err in rejecting the defendant‟s intoxication

defense, this court stated the following:

Little evidence was presented in this case on the issue of
intoxication as it relates to the preclusion of specific criminal intent of
this particular defendant. Much of the evidence adduced to convict
Carroll was by way of the confessions of him and his co-defendant
Norman Jean. Except for minor differences, mostly self-serving to the
person confessing, the two confessions corroborate and substantiate
each other. While both Carroll and [the co-defendant] stated in their
confessions that all four men had been drinking, the amount of alcohol
consumed was not clearly established, nor was the “preclusive” effect
of whatever amount that was consumed by Carroll particularized as to
him individually.
11

In addition, that Carroll was able to recall accurately and clearly
the details of a crime scenario that extended over a considerable time
period does not go toward proving his point. He was mentally clear
enough, and had the motor skills, to savagely beat the victim at three
different places and times. Carroll also had the presence of mind to
then participate, in concert with the others, in a series of actions to
coverup the crime and to deflect suspicion from himself and the
others: after finally beating Arceneaux to death, Carroll helped in
stuffing the victim‟s shirt with rocks and in throwing him off the
bridge and into the water below; he also disposed of the log that had
been used to batter Arceneaux, and he helped in washing Jean‟s truck
to remove evidence of the victim‟s blood.

This crime was deliberately committed over a long period of
time in a particularly brutish manner by Carroll and his confederates.
Specific criminal intent is a state of mind and need not be proven as
fact, but may be inferred from the circumstances present in the case
and from the action of the defendant. Carroll confessed that he
remembered becoming angry at the victim, continuing to be angry at
the victim, and venting that anger in a series of merciless beatings.
He also confessed that during that time he had the urge to kill the
victim. Essentially, Carroll now asks this court to presume his intent
had been negated due to intoxication simply from the fact that he had
been drinking, that the victim had a high blood alcohol content at
death (thus his must have been similarly elevated), and because his
crime was (allegedly) out of character. He, however, cites no legal
authority on point in support of such a presumption based on those
reasons, nor does he make a compelling legal argument for this court
creating one.

It was the role of the jury in this case to weigh the credibility of
the witnesses. This it did, to the defendant‟s detriment. We refuse to
second-guess the credibility determinations of the jury beyond the
sufficiency of the evidence evaluations under the Jackson standard of
review. Scant testimony was presented regarding the defendant‟s
intoxicated state as it related to the negation of his specific criminal
intent. The confessions of Carroll and Jean, taken together and in
tandem, leave no doubt that Carroll actively desired the prescribed
criminal consequences, death or great bodily harm, to follow his
actions of violence against the victim. The jury believed that Carroll
had the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and this
court will not disturb that finding.

Id. at 289 (citation omitted).

Similarly, in the present case, little evidence was presented on the issue of

intoxication as it relates to the preclusion of the defendant‟s specific criminal

intent. As in Carroll, the defendant in the present case was able to recall details of
12

a crime scenario that lasted several hours; and these details were corroborated by

physical evidence. Additionally, the defendant was mentally clear enough and had

the motor skills to savagely beat the victim, dispose of the victim‟s body, and

attempt to clean the murder scene. He asked the jury to presume his intent had

been negated due to his drug use, and the jury chose to reject this presumption.

See also, State v. Baumberger, 15-1056, p. 9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/16), ___ So.3d

___, ___8 (holding that “specific intent can be formed in an instant”).

Although there was testimony that the defendant had a drug problem and

appeared to be under the influence of something when the detectives initially

attempted to interview him, the record contains no evidence that the defendant was

under the influence to the extent that he could not form specific intent at the time

of the offense. Additionally, there was no testimony that the defendant did not

consume drugs after the offense and before he spoke to detectives. The jury heard

evidence of the defendant‟s drug use and rejected his intoxication defense. This

court will not disturb that finding. Therefore, we find no merit in this assignment

of error.

Assignment of Error Number Three

In this assignment of error, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred in

denying his motion to suppress his three statements to Detective Thomas. He

argues that his statements should have been suppressed because they were not

freely and voluntarily given due to his highly intoxicated condition. Specifically,

he asserts in brief that when he came into the custody of the state, he was under the

influence of mind altering drugs “which rendered him unconscious of the

consequences of his statements[,]” and that his condition did not change between

the first and other two interviews because he ingested more illegal drugs while in

8
This case is cited at 2016 WL 3077491.
13

custody. Specifically, he asserts that he would not have given any of these

statements had he been sober. Furthermore, he asserts that the third interview was

deeply prejudicial to him because he was forced to testify in order to explain his

prior statements. He summarizes his argument in brief as follows:

For these reasons, all three statements during interrogation,
made under the influence of heavy drugs, should have been
suppressed by the trial court, and the court‟s failure to suppress these
statements was not harmless error. Without the interrogation
statements and Christopher‟s testimony at trial, the jury would have
only been left with circumstantial evidence that Christopher‟s DNA
was on a bat stored inside the home in which he resided, and to which
he had access, as well as Ms. Williams‟ blood in her own car. This
Court should now correct the trial court‟s error and rule that the three
statements should have been suppressed and that Christopher should
be given a new trial.

On the other hand, the state argues that the defendant‟s statements were

given after a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights and were not the result of

any coercion. Additionally, the state notes that the defendant did not confess to

killing his grandmother in either of the first two statements, and that the third

statement was precipitated by the defendant‟s request to speak with the detective,

not by the state‟s attempt to obtain a third statement. The state further asserts that

there exists no evidence to establish that the defendant obtained and consumed

illegal drugs while incarcerated between the first and third statements. The state

summarizes its argument as follows (alteration in original):

On three separate occasions, appellant is read his Miranda
rights and signs a Miranda Rights form, indicating that he was read
his rights, that he understood his rights, and that he was not made any
promises to get him to answer any questions or under any pressure to
give up those rights. The third interview with detectives was as a
result of appellant requesting to speak to them, and he voluntarily
gave a recorded statement that amounted to a confession. According
to the transcription of all three statements, appellant clearly indicated
that he understood his rights and he was willing to answer questions
posed to him. Therefore, appellant knowingly and intelligently
waived his rights three separate times. It was not until the third
statement, which occurred two days after appellant was arrested, that
he confessed to murdering his grandmother; and only after he
14

requested to speak to detectives. It is clear from the records of the
suppression hearing and the trial that appellant knowingly and
intelligently waived his rights [emphasis added].

The trial court heard and rejected the motion to suppress before the

beginning of the jury trial resulting in the defendant‟s conviction. In addressing

the merits of this assignment of error, we first note that the statements themselves

were not introduced at the suppression hearing or at trial—although a transcript of

each statement is included in the appellate record.9 Still, even without referring to

the transcripts, the record is sufficient to review the assigned error as the substance

of the statements was discussed in testimony presented at the suppression hearing;

and the substance of the third statement in particular was discussed in detail at trial

by both Detective Thomas and the defendant.

Detective Thomas testified at the suppression hearing concerning the

defendant‟s signing of his warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,

86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966), as well as the defendant‟s understanding of those warnings

and the consequences of any statement. He testified that he explained the Miranda

rights to the defendant and caused him to execute a waiver of rights in each of the

three interviews.10

The record establishes that the first interview was quickly terminated

because of the defendant‟s apparent intoxicated condition and nothing was gained

by the state in that interview. In fact, during that interview, the defendant informed

Detective Thomas that he had consumed drugs and alcohol approximately two

hours before the interview was attempted.

9
It is clear from a reading of the ruling on this issue that the trial court reviewed the
actual transcripts in rejecting the motion.
10
The state introduced all three waiver of rights forms executed by the defendant in the
suppression hearing.
15

The second interview was initiated two days later and terminated because of

the defendant‟s evasive answers. Between the first and second interview, the

defendant remained in custody at the Evangeline Parish jail. The second interview

resulted in no information helpful to the state, and the defendant was returned to

jail. Later that same day, he initiated the third interview.

In the third interview, the defendant confessed to killing his grandmother

and provided the details of the offense which have been previously set forth in this

opinion. Although the defendant described his drug addiction in detail during this

interview, Detective Thomas did not subject the defendant to drug testing prior to

his second and third statements. He chose not to do so because of the defendant‟s

change in demeanor and his lack of access to illegal drugs while in jail.11 He did

not believe that the defendant‟s condition at the time of the second and third

interviews had any effect on his ability to understand the questions asked of him or

to respond appropriately to those questions.

The defendant‟s testimony at the suppression hearing was basically that he

had a lack of understanding of the proceedings or of the consequence of his

participation. He testified that immediately before being apprehended he had

ingested a significant amount of cocaine and smoked a few “wet cigarettes,”12 and

the first statement was taken within two hours of that activity. He suggested that in

the first statement he “just went on ahead and agreed with whatever was going on.”

Although the defendant stated that he voluntarily gave the statement, he also

suggested that he ignored the information concerning his right to a lawyer because

11
Detective Thomas acknowledged that, on occasion, contraband in the form of illegal
narcotics was brought into the local jail, but he asserted that the defendant did not have access to
such contraband because he had been isolated from the general jail population.
12
“Wet cigarettes” are described in the record as marijuana cigarettes dipped into
formaldehyde or laced with PCP. According to Detective Thomas, smoking such cigarettes
could result in severe side effects, depending on the individual‟s tolerance.
16

he did not know how to contact a lawyer and that he thought he had no choice but

to give the statement because he “was so scared.”

On cross-examination, the defendant admitted that he contacted Detective

Thomas to “tell them the story,” and that when he signed the three separate waiver

of rights documents he understood his Miranda rights and knew what Detective

Thomas was asking of him. He also acknowledged that he was not forced to give

the statements, and that he was not promised anything for cooperating.13

With regard to the general standard for reviewing a trial court‟s ruling on a

motion to suppress, the supreme court, in State v. Blank, 04-204, p. 10 (La.

4/11/07), 955 So.2d 90, 103, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 994, 128 S.Ct. 494 (2007),

stated that:

A trial court‟s finding as to the free and voluntary nature of a
statement carries great weight and will not be disturbed unless not
supported by the evidence. State v. Benoit, 440 So.2d 129, 131
(La.1983); State v. English, 582 So.2d 1358, 1364 (La.App. 2nd Cir.
1991), writ denied, 584 So.2d 1172 (La.1991). Credibility
determinations lie within the sound discretion of the trial court and its
rulings will not be disturbed unless clearly contrary to the evidence.

More particularly, the supreme court stated the following in State v. Thornton, 12-

95, pp. 1-4 (La. 3/30/12), 83 So.3d 1024, 1025-26 (alteration in original), with

regard to the ever changing requirements of review:

Although in the past this Court rejected the view in other jurisdictions
that “a confession may be involuntary in the due process sense only
where the declarant has been subjected to police custody, external
pressure or coercion,” State v. Glover, 343 So.2d 118, 128 (La.1976)
(on reh‟g) (statements made by defendant to his former common-law
wife wired for sound by the police rendered involuntary as a result of
defendant‟s florid undifferentiated schizophrenia), our current
jurisprudence subscribes as a matter of state law to the rule of
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 522, 93
L.Ed.2d 473 (1986), that “coercive police activity is a necessary
predicate to the finding that a confession is not „voluntary‟ within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
13
On redirect, the defendant testified that before the third statement, he asked Detective
Thomas if he would contact his family to get him some clothes; and that after the statement was
completed, Detective Thomas followed through with that promise.
17

Amendment.” . . . (“[A]n essential prerequisite for suppressing a
statement on voluntariness grounds is misconduct or overreaching by
the police.”) . . . .

Connelly has therefore also modified our former jurisprudential
rule that intoxication may negate the voluntariness of a statement if it
is of such a degree that it renders the defendant “unconscious of the
consequences of what he is saying.” State v. Simmons, 443 So.2d
512, 516 (La.1983). After Connelly, diminished mental capacity,
which may result from intoxication, remains relevant to the
voluntariness of a statement only to the extent that it “made mental or
physical coercion by the police more effective.” United States v.
Chrismon, 965 F.2d 1465, 1469 (7th Cir.1992), see also United States
v. Gaddy, 532 F.3d 783, 788 (8th Cir.2008) (test is “whether these
mental impairments caused the defendant‟s will to be
overborne”) . . . .

Thus, for due process purposes, defendant‟s statements were
not involuntary, i.e., they were not the products of a will overborne by
police coercion. Nor, in purely statutory terms, were they the product
of “fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or
promises.” La. R.S. 15:451. While intoxication remains relevant to
the question of whether a Miranda waiver is not only voluntary but
also knowing and intelligent, . . . in the present case, we need not
resolve the question of whether defendant, who appeared to the
officers to understand the explanation of her Miranda rights, made a
valid waiver when she continued to respond to questioning in a
coherent and rational manner although she also appeared heavily
“narcotized.”

At the suppression hearing, the trial court reached the conclusion that the

defendant‟s statements were freely and voluntarily given based primarily on

Detective Thomas‟ testimony, and it is well-settled that “[t]he testimony of the

interviewing police officer alone may be sufficient to prove the defendant‟s

statement was given freely and voluntarily.” State v. Harrington, 12-886, p. 4

(La.App. 3 Cir. 2/13/13), 129 So.3d 38, 40-41 (quoting State v. Roshell, 40,374

(La.App. 2 Cir. 12/14/05), 916 So.2d 1268, writ denied, 06-771 (La. 10/6/06), 938

So.2d 69).

Considering the evidence submitted at the hearing on the motion to suppress

the defendant‟s three statements, we find no error in the trial court‟s determination

18

that the statements were voluntary and should not be suppressed. That being the

case, we find no merit in this assignment of error.

DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the conviction of Christopher Goodley,

a/k/a Christopher Bryant Goodley, in all respects.

AFFIRMED.

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