State of Louisiana v. Perry Wayne Williams -Aka- Perry Williams

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

16-966

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

PERRY WAYNE WILLIAMS
A/K/A PERRY WILLIAMS

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APPEAL FROM THE
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CONCORDIA, NO. 11-0275
HONORABLE GLYNN ROBERTS, DISTRICT JUDGE, AD HOC

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MARC T. AMY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, John D. Saunders, and
Marc T. Amy, Judges.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED. SENTENCE AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Joseph L. Waitz, Jr.
District Attorney
Thirty-Second Judicial District
Ellen Daigle Doskey
Assistant District Attorney
Thirty-Second Judicial District
James Christopher Erny
Assistant District Attorney
Thirty-Second Judicial District
7856 Main Street
Courthouse Annex, Suite 220
Houma, LA 70360
(985) 873-6500
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Peggy J. Sullivan
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 2806
Monroe, LA 71207-2806
(318) 855-6038
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Perry Wayne Williams

AMY, Judge.

The State charged the defendant with possession with intent to distribute a

Schedule II controlled dangerous substance. In pre-trial proceedings, the trial court

rejected the defendant’s contention that his arrest was not supported by probable

cause, denying the defendant’s motion to suppress in this regard. Following a

multi-day trial, a jury convicted the defendant of attempted possession of cocaine

with intent to distribute. The trial court imposed a four-year sentence to be served

at hard labor and imposed payment of costs of a pre-sentence report as a condition

of parole. The defendant appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm the

defendant’s conviction, amend the defendant’s sentence to remove the condition of

parole, and affirm that sentence as amended. We further remand this matter, with

instructions to the trial court to correct the minutes to reflect that amendment.

Factual and Procedural Background

Deputy John Cowan, then an officer with the Ferriday Police Department,1

explained that, in February 2011, he “received information from a Vidalia officer

that there was a subject that wanted to turn over his dealer in Ferriday.” He

testified that, “[a] couple of days after this phone call [he] met up with the guy that

wanted to turn over his dealers; his name was [Ricky] Davenport.” Deputy Cowan

confirmed that this was the first time he had met Mr. Davenport.

Deputy Cowan testified that, he thereafter met with Mr. Davenport, who

telephoned the defendant, Perry Williams, among others, and that he “[u]ltimately

arranged to - - to buy or purchase a hundred dollars worth of crack-cocaine.”

Deputy Cowan explained that he listened to the telephone call with the defendant

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At trial, Deputy Cowan stated that he is now employed by the Concordia Parish
Sheriff’s Department as a “Sergeant with Investigations.”

as it was broadcast on the “speaker phone[.]” Thereafter, Deputy Cowan

accompanied Mr. Davenport as a passenger in Mr. Davenport’s vehicle as the two

drove to the location identified on the call. The record indicates that the defendant

was walking alongside the roadway at the time and that Deputy Cowan exited the

vehicle after he identified the defendant.2

Deputy Cowan explained that, upon leaving the vehicle, he drew a

“Stinger”3 and ordered the defendant to the ground. He testified that the defendant

then “fumbled with his pockets” and then threw a plastic bag to the ground.

Deputy Cowan explained that he recovered the bag, suspecting that the substance

contained therein was “crack cocaine[4] in the very early stages of production[.]”

He stated that he then placed the defendant “on the ground; place[d] him in

handcuffs and he was Mirandized and taken to jail.”

The State initially charged the defendant with possession of a Schedule II

controlled dangerous substance. However, by an amended bill of information in

October 2015, the State charged the defendant with possession with intent to

distribute a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, a violation of La.R.S.

40:967(A)(1). Subsequently, the trial court considered the defendant’s motion to

suppress wherein he alleged that the evidence relied upon by the State resulted

2
Deputy Cowan testified that he “identified him” and that he felt that Mr. Davenport
“said that that’s him there or either he asked if that was him. But he said; That’s him there. I
want to say that’s what he said, but I know for a fact that was him.” Mr. Davenport also
explained that, although he didn’t initially recognize the defendant as he had his back to them, he
recognized him as they drew near.
3
At trial, Deputy Cowan testified at trial that he exited the vehicle “with the - - not a taser,
it’s a stinger. It’s basically the same thing.”
4
While lab testing introduced into evidence revealed the substance to be “COCAINE,
SCHEDULE II[,]” the report did not include the weight of the substance tested. Instead, Derrick
Collins, the State’s expert in the field of “identification, the use, the packaging and distribution
and investigations of illegal narcotics[,]” estimated the substance to be “a gram or a little bit
more[,]” an amount he opined “is about a hundred dollars worth.”

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from an illegal search. The trial court denied the motion. Following trial, a jury

convicted the defendant of attempted possession of cocaine with intent to

distribute. The trial court subsequently denied the defendant’s motion for new trial

and motion for acquittal. The trial court thereafter imposed a sentence of four

years at hard labor, with credit for time served.

The defendant appeals assigning the following as error:

I. The evidence seized in this case was the result of an unlawful
arrest. Thus, any evidence seized as a result of that arrest
should have been suppressed. The Trial Court erred in denying
the Motion to Suppress.

Discussion

Error Patent

Having reviewed this matter for errors patent on the face of the record in

accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, we find one such error. In imposing

sentence, the trial court explained that: “A special condition of parole will be that

you pay a hundred and fifty dollars ($150.00) for cost of the pre-sentence

investigation and report payable to the Louisiana Department of Probation and

Parole.” However, a trial court lacks authority to impose such a condition on

parole. See State v. R.K., 10-982 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/11/11), 64 So.3d 426.

Accordingly, we amend the defendant’s sentence to strike the condition of parole

and instruct the trial court to note the amendment to the sentence in the court’s

minutes. See id.

Probable Cause

In support of his appeal, the defendant continues to argue that his arrest was

without probable cause as it stemmed from information received by an unproven,

confidential informant with whom Deputy Cowan was not previously acquainted.

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Other than the information obtained from Mr. Davenport, the defendant argues, the

police conducted no independent investigation, surveillance, or otherwise verified

that he was the individual on the call with Mr. Davenport.

Unreasonable searches and seizures are prohibited by both U.S. Const.

amend. IV and La.Const. art. 1, § 5. “If evidence is derived from an unreasonable

search or seizure, the proper remedy is exclusion of the evidence from trial.” State

v. Coleman, 14-0402, p. 17 (La. 2/26/16), 188 So.3d 174, 192, cert. denied __ U.S.

__, 137 S.Ct. 153 (2016). A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress addressing

the reasonableness of the search and seizure is entitled to great weight and will not

be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Id. Although the question of probable

cause was placed before the trial court within the context of a pre-trial motion to

suppress, an appellate court considers the correctness of a trial court’s ruling on a

pre-trial motion to suppress by taking into account “the totality of the evidence

presented at the motion to suppress hearing and the trial.” State v. Burkhalter, 428

So.2d 449, 455 (La.1983).

Having reviewed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress under that

standard, we find no abuse of discretion in its ruling. As noted above, the

defendant suggests that Mr. Davenport’s information to Deputy Cowan was

unreliable. In this regard, the record offered conflicting evidence as to Mr.

Davenport’s introduction to Deputy Cowan. The latter explained that he was

contacted by Officer Jamie Lipscomb with the Vidalia Police Department, who

suggested that Mr. Davenport wanted to assist in turning over his drug dealers, that

Officer Lipscomb had worked with Mr. Davenport before, and that he “was good

to go.” Deputy Cowan testified that a meeting was thereafter arranged between he

and Mr. Davenport.

4

Yet, at trial, Mr. Davenport explained that he had not worked as an

informant, but that he had known Officer Lipscomb from having worked with him

in the flooring business. Mr. Davenport also recalled that he was introduced to

Deputy Cowan by another officer.

Obviously, the two differed in their account of their initial introduction. 5

And, in the least, Deputy Cowan and Mr. Davenport did not have an established

history of working together. However, Deputy Cowan did not proceed based on

Mr. Davenport’s history alone. Rather, both Deputy Cowan and Mr. Davenport

testified that they were together while Mr. Davenport made telephone calls to his

various contacts in order to arrange a drug transaction. Mr. Davenport testified

that the defendant’s telephone number was saved in his telephone as he had

previously purchased drugs from him, albeit only one or two times.

Both Mr. Davenport and Deputy Cowan explained that, when the defendant

returned Mr. Davenport’s call, Deputy Cowan listened to the conversation by the

speaker. They consistently reported the substance of the conversation with the

defendant. Mr. Davenport explained that: “I was going to get a hundred dollars

worth of crack-cocaine.” When asked what the defendant said, Mr. Davenport

testified that: “He’d be walking down the street. Call when I got close or

something like that.” Mr. Davenport explained that, when he turned down the

street, he almost passed the defendant because it was dark, but that he ultimately

recognized him, as explained above. Deputy Cowan then got out of the truck and

approached the defendant.

5
The underlying arrest in this case occurred in 2011, whereas both the hearing on the
motion to suppress and the trial occurred in October 2015.

5

Deputy Cowan also explained that he was with Mr. Davenport while he was

speaking with the defendant. He confirmed that he heard the conversation. In

reporting the substance of the call, Deputy Cowan explained that “we had arranged

to get a hundred dollars worth of crack-cocaine and were supposed to call him

back when we were close to his house; to his area.” Deputy Cowan also reported

the series of telephone calls, and attempted telephone calls that occurred between

Mr. Davenport and the defendant, as well as his brother afterwards. He explained

that one such call was to the defendant, who said “to meet him on the roadway past

the house.” Upon locating a man walking along the roadway, both Mr. Davenport

and Deputy Cowan identified him as the defendant. Again, as reported above,

Deputy Cowan exited the vehicle with the Stinger drawn and ordered the defendant

to the ground. Thereafter, the defendant removed the plastic bag with the alleged

crack cocaine from his pocket and threw it onto the ground.

Thus, in the present case, Deputy Cowan’s stop and ultimate detention of the

defendant resulted, not only from initial information provided by Mr. Davenport,

but by his own observations in listening to the proposed drug transaction and in

confirming the defendant’s location at the arranged meeting location.

In State v. Holmes, 08-719, p. 7 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/10/09), 10 So.3d 274, 279,

writ denied, 09-0816 (La. 1/8/10), 24 So.3d 857, the fifth circuit discussed the

sufficiency of a confidential informant’s tip within the context of an officer’s

subsequent actions as follows:

Tips provided to police by confidential informants can
supply sufficient reasonable suspicion to conduct an
investigative stop under certain circumstances. The tip must
accurately predict the offender’s conduct in sufficient detail to
support a finding that the informant had reliable information
regarding the illegal activity. See, e.g., [State v. Melancon, 03-
514 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/28/03), 860 So.2d 225, writ denied, 03-

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3505 (La. 4/23/04), 870 So.2d 297]. The tip must also be
corroborated by the police. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325,
110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). If an informer’s tip
accurately predicts the offender’s future behavior it gains an
additional modicum of reliability. Id. Predictive ability is not
always necessary; a non-predictive tip coupled with police
corroboration or independent police observation of suspicious
activity can provide the police with the requisite reasonable
suspicion to detain a suspect. See, e.g., State v. Francois, 04-
1147, p. 7 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/29/05), 900 So.2d 1005, 1010. An
informant’s past record for accuracy and reliability is another
factor taken into account when determining the reliability of the
tip in question. State v. Austin, 04-993 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/1/05),
900 So.2d 867, 879, writ denied, 05-0830 (La.11/28/05), 916
So.2d 143.

In the present case, Mr. Davenport provided initial information to Deputy

Cowan by virtue of contacting the defendant as a person from whom he had

purchased crack cocaine. From that point, Deputy Cowan independently heard the

plans for the transaction, located the defendant in the arranged location, and

identified the defendant. Accordingly, in the least, Deputy Cowan had reasonable

suspicion to stop the defendant. As a result, the defendant, himself, removed the

bag from his pocket, throwing it to the ground. Deputy Cowan explained that he

believed the substance in the bag to be crack cocaine. In light of that series of

events, which commenced with a stop for which there was reasonable suspicion,

we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination in finding probable

cause for the ultimate arrest.

For these reasons, the defendant’s assignment lacks merit.

DECREE

The conviction of the defendant, Perry Williams, is affirmed. The

defendant’s sentence is amended to delete the condition of parole. The defendant’s

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sentence is affirmed as amended. The trial court is instructed to note the

amendment in the court’s minutes.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED. SENTENCE AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

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