State of Louisiana v. Renee Tyler

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

KA 17-410

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

RENEE TYLER

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 13646-10
HONORABLE ROBERT LANE WYATT, DISTRICT JUDGE

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CANDYCE G. PERRET
JUDGE

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Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, John E. Conery, and Candyce G. Perret,
Judges.

AFFIRMED AND
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

John Foster DeRosier
14th JDC, District Attorney
Karen C. McLellan
14th JDC, Assistant District Attorney
P. O. Box 3206
Lake Charles, LA 70602-3206
(337) 437-3400
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Edward Kelly Bauman
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 1641
Lake Charles, LA 70602-1641
(337) 491-0570
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:
Renee Tyler

PERRET, Judge.

Defendant-Appellant, Renee Tyler, was convicted of second degree murder,

in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison at hard

labor, without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

Defendant seeks review of her conviction by this court based on whether or not she

was sane at the time of the offense. For the reasons that follow, we affirm

Defendant’s conviction.

ISSUE FOR REVIEW

This court must decide whether the trial court erred in finding Defendant

sane at the time of the offense.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 20, 2010, Defendant called the Lake Charles Police

Department and reported that she shot someone. The reporting officers later found

Elliot Thomas shot at the scene, lying on the bedroom floor. Defendant admitted

to the officers on the scene that she shot Mr. Thomas. Defendant further admitted

to hiding the gun in an undisclosed location where it would never be found.

Defendant refused to disclose the location of the gun. Thomas was transported to a

local hospital but later died from a gunshot wound.

Defendant was charged by Bill of Indictment with one count of second

degree murder, in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1, and one count of obstruction of

justice, in violation of La.R.S. 14:130.1(A)(1). A motion to appoint a sanity

commission was filed, but withdrawn before Defendant’s competency was

determined. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty as charged and

received a mandatory life sentence without benefits for the murder conviction and

two years at hard labor to run concurrently with the life sentence for the

obstruction of justice conviction. However, this court found that it was improper

for the trial court to allow a motion for sanity commission to be withdrawn without

determining Defendant’s competency, vacated her convictions, and remanded to

the trial court for a sanity commission prior to trial. See State v. Tyler, 11-1123

(La.App 3 Cir. 5/9/12), 89 So.3d 510, writ denied, 12-1314 (La. 11/30/12), 103

So.3d 364.

Doctors Garret Ryder and James Anderson were appointed by the court to

determine Defendant’s capacity to stand trial. Doctor Patrick Hayes was also later

appointed. Following testimony from Drs. Ryder, Anderson, and Hayes, the trial

court found that Defendant was competent to stand trial and set a trial date of May

2, 2016. Dr. Hayes was also asked to review Defendant’s sanity at the time of the

offense, and he concluded that she was sane.

After finding Defendant competent to stand trial, the trial court also noted

that, ―I’m convinced of the determination of sanity at the time of the offense.‖ At

that time, Defendant pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.

Defendant also waived her right to a jury trial in court.

The State then dismissed the obstruction of justice charge and a bench trial

was held on the second degree murder charge. At trial, the State admitted

recordings during which Defendant stated she shot the gun once, but it didn’t go

off. Defendant then shot the gun a second time, hitting the victim. Defendant

continued to say the victim messed up her life and so she messed up his and that

now they were even. The State also presented several witnesses who testified that

Defendant was upset with the victim over money, specifically an income tax

check. Defendant told her co-worker, who was also the victim’s sister-in-law, that

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she wanted to kill the victim. Defendant even told her co-worker to warn the

victim’s family.

Defendant’s sister also testified that Defendant came over to her house at

1:00 a.m. on February 20, 2010, asking for a gun. Additionally, the detective at the

scene, Mr. Rupp,1 testified that Defendant said, immediately upon him opening the

patrol car door, ―Look, I did it. I shot Elliott. You’re not gonna find the gun, and

I’ll cooperate any way I can.‖ Defendant later agreed to a search and seizure of her

apartment. Mr. Rupp recalls Defendant explained there were no arguments, no

fights, she planned it and she did it.

Defendant’s opening statement included no reference to her claim that she

was insane at the time of the murder. Defendant did not call any witnesses or put

on any case-in-chief regarding her insanity claim. The short cross-examination

that took place of a handful of the State’s witnesses had nothing to do with

Defendant’s sanity at the time of the offense.

The trial judge found Defendant guilty as charged.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find that

there is one error patent and one harmless error patent.

First, the Defendant was entitled to a jury trial in this case. See La.R.S.

14:30.1 and La.Code Crim.P. art. 782. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure

Article 780 states:

1
The spelling of Mr. Rupp’s name differs throughout the record, on August 25, 2010
being spelled ―Rupf,‖ but during trial as ―Rupp." We refer to him as Rupp.

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A. A defendant charged with an offense other than
one punishable by death may knowingly and intelligently
waive a trial by jury and elect to be tried by the judge.

B. The defendant shall exercise his right to waive
trial by jury in accordance with Article I, Section 17 of
the Constitution of Louisiana. The waiver shall be by
written motion filed in the district court not later than
forty-five days prior to the date the case is set for trial.
The motion shall be signed by the defendant and shall
also be signed by defendant’s counsel unless the
defendant has waived his right to counsel.

C. With the consent of the district attorney the
defendant may waive trial by jury within forty-five days
prior to the commencement of trial.

D. A waiver of trial by jury is irrevocable and
cannot be withdrawn by the defendant.

There is no written waiver of jury trial as required in the record. However,

the court minutes reflect that Defendant was present when defense counsel advised

the court of the waiver. The court advised Defendant of her right to a trial by jury,

Defendant indicated she understood, that she had discussed the matter with her

attorney, and that she wanted to waive her right to a jury trial.

In State v. Bell, 13-1443 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/4/14), 140 So.3d 830, this court

held this same scenario was harmless error. Accordingly, this court holds the error

in failing to obtain a written waiver in violation of La.Code Crim.P. art. 780 in this

case was harmless under the facts of the present case.

Second, Defendant was advised at sentencing that she has ―two years from

today’s date and the date of the final - - this conviction becoming final to file for

post-conviction relief.‖ The prescriptive period for filing post-conviction relief is

two years, beginning when a conviction and sentence become final under the

provisions of La.Code Crim.P. arts. 914 or 922. La.Code Crim. Art. 930.8.

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In State v. M.S.L., 10-738 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/2/11) (unpublished opinion),

writ denied, 11-453 (La. 9/23/11), 69 So.3d 1155, this court noted it was not clear

whether the trial court advised the defendant that he had two years from sentencing

to seek post-conviction relief, or whether it corrected itself to indicate the two

years begins with the finality of the conviction. In M.S.L., the trial court stated the

defendant had ―two (2) years from this date, the date your conviction becomes

final, to file any Post Conviction Relief Petition.‖ This court therefore ordered the

trial court to correctly advise the defendant of La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8 by

sending written notice and to file written proof in the record that the defendant

received notice.

We find that the trial court failed to correctly advise Defendant of her time

to seek post-conviction relief. Consequently, to ensure Defendant in this case is

properly informed of the provisions of La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8, we remand to

the trial court with instructions that the trial court send written notice, properly

advising Defendant of her time to seek post-conviction relief within thirty days of

the rendition of this opinion, and to file written proof in the record that defendant

received the notice. M.S.L., 10-783; State v. Baylor, 08-141 (La.App. 3 Cir.

11/26/08), 998 So.2d 800, writ denied, 09-275 (La. 11/20/09), 25 So.3d 795.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Williams, 07-1407, p. 8 (La.

10/20/99), 22 So.3d 867, 876, cert. denied, 560 U.S. 905, 130 S.Ct. 3278 (2010),

recited the standard of review applicable in this case as the following:

In reviewing a claim for insufficiency of evidence
in an action where the affirmative defense of insanity is
raised, the appellate court, applying the standard set forth
in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61
L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), must determine whether under the

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facts and circumstances of the case, any rational fact
finder, viewing the evidence most favorably to the
prosecution, could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that he was insane at the time of the offense.
State v. Peters, 94–0283, p. 8, 643 So.2d at 1225; State v.
Armstrong, p. 4, 671 So.2d at 309; State v. Nealy, 450
So.2d 634, 639 (La.1984).

LAW AND DISCUSSION

In Louisiana, a legal presumption exists that a ―defendant is sane and

responsible for his actions.‖ La.R.S. 15:432. The burden of proving otherwise is

on the defendant. La.Code Crim.P. art. 652. The defendant must rebut the

presumption of sanity ―at the time of the offense by a preponderance of the

evidence.‖ Id.; see also State v. Roy, 395 So.2d 664 (La.1981). It is then the

responsibility of the fact-finder to determine whether the defendant met that

burden. Williams, 22 So.3d 867. Specifically, the Louisiana Supreme Court

stated:

[T]o overcome this presumption of sanity, the defendant
has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that he suffered a mental disease or a mental
defect which prevented him from distinguishing between
right and wrong with reference to the conduct in question.
Sanity is a factual matter for the jury, to be determined
from all of the evidence, both lay and expert, along with
circumstances surrounding the events and testimony
relating to the defendant's behavior before, during, and
after the crime. A determination of the weight of the
evidence is a question of fact that rests solely with the
trier of fact, who may accept or reject, in whole or in part,
the testimony of any witness, and if rational triers of fact
could disagree as to the interpretation of the evidence, the
rational trier's view of all of the evidence most favorable
to the prosecution must be adopted.

Id. at 875-76 (citations omitted).

In Roy, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed a finding of sanity based on

insufficient evidence. The court reviewed the denial of a motion for new trial. The

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court held the jury’s verdict of sanity was contrary to the preponderance of

evidence. Specifically, the court recognized that the defense presented three

doctors at trial who testified the defendant suffered from chronic paranoid

schizophrenia on the day of the crime. One doctor stated the defendant could not

tell right from wrong; though he knew he was shooting someone, he saw them as

an enemy to be destroyed like a soldier overseas. A second doctor diagnosed the

defendant with the same condition, but opined it was of at least ten years duration,

and that the defendant was under the influence of ―dangerous delusions.‖ Roy, 395

So.2d at 668. The third doctor opined the defendant knew the nature and

consequences of his actions, but could not distinguish right from wrong. The State

did not present any testimony to contradict the doctors. Instead, the State relied on

the fact that the defendant admitted to the crime and submitted to the police.

Therefore, the supreme court held the defendant established insanity by a

preponderance of the evidence, the motion for new trial should have been granted,

and the defendant’s conviction and sentence were reversed, with the case

remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

On the other hand, this court in State v. Collatt, 477 So.2d 177 (La.App. 3

Cir. 1985), determined that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding of

guilt, and denied the defendant’s insanity assertion. Although the defendant was a

mental patient since 1970, the murder occurring in 1984, a psychiatrist and

member of the defendant’s Sanity Commission testified the defendant was able to

distinguish right from wrong. His opinion was based on the defendant’s

remorsefulness, the act of disposing of the weapon, and going to a church and

minister’s home after the crime.

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In the present case, Defendant asserts on appeal that only Dr. Hayes gave an

opinion as to whether or not Defendant was competent at the time of the offense.

Defendant therefore seeks to have her conviction and sentence vacated, and her

case remanded for a new determination of her sanity at the time of the offense.

Three doctors interviewed Defendant to determine her competency to stand

trial. Dr. Hayes was the only doctor asked to additionally provide an opinion on

Defendant’s sanity at the time of the offense. Dr. Hayes opined she was sane at the

time of the offense. This evidence was admitted at the sanity hearing and

Defendant failed to present evidence that contradicted Dr. Hayes’s findings. The

trial court declared Defendant was sane at the time of the offense. Thereafter, no

evidence of Defendant’s insanity was admitted at trial.

At trial, the State presented evidence that Defendant thought about killing

the victim prior to doing it, admitted to shooting the victim, and evidence that she

was unremorseful, stating in a later phone call that now she and the victim were

even. Defendant also hid the weapon, telling Mr. Rupp, ―You’re not gonna find

the gun[.]‖ The record shows Defendant did not present any evidence at trial of

her insanity at the time of the offense. Although she was previously evaluated to

determine her competency to stand trial, her sanity was not further presented for

the fact-finder during her actual trial. At no time at trial did Defendant even raise

the assertion she was insane at the time of the offense; not in opening statements or

through any evidence or testimony presented. The last time Defendant alleged she

was insane was at the sanity hearing when she pled ―not guilty and not guilty by

reason of insanity.‖ Defendant did not make any case for insanity at the time of

the offense, let alone overcome the presumption of sanity. Based on the evidence

introduced, a rational fact finder could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that

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Defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was insane

at the time of the offense.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we find Defendant failed to overcome the

presumption that she was sane during the commission of the offense. Therefore,

we affirm Defendant’s conviction and sentence. We further remand this case to

the trial court with instructions to send written notice within thirty days of the

rendition of this opinion, properly advising Defendant of her time to seek post-

conviction relief, and to file written proof in the record that Defendant received the

notice.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. THIS
OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. RULE 2-16.3,
UNIFORM RULES—COURTS OF APPEAL.

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