State of Louisiana v. Ruffin Stokes

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

17-970

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

RUFFIN STOKES

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF IBERIA, NO. 07-000681
HONORABLE EDWARD LEONARD, JR., DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

PHYLLIS M. KEATY
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Phyllis M. Keaty, and
Candyce G. Perret, Judges.

SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED.

M. Bofill Duhe
District Attorney
W. Claire Howington
Assistant District Attorney
300 Iberia Street, Suite 200
New Iberia, Louisiana 70560
(337) 369-4420
Counsel for Appellee:
State of Louisiana

Richard A. Spears
Attorney At Law
101 Taylor Street
New Iberia, Louisiana 70560
(337) 367-1960
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Ruffin Stokes

KEATY, Judge.

On April 5, 2007, Defendant, Ruffin Stokes, was charged with armed robbery,

a violation of La.R.S. 14:64. A jury trial commenced on February 8, 2010, following

which Defendant was found guilty as charged. Defendant was sentenced on April

19, 2010, to seventy-five years at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation,

or suspension of sentence. Defendant, pro se, timely filed a Motion to Reconsider

Sentence. Several weeks later, on May 21, 2010, defense counsel filed a Motion to

Reconsider Sentence or, Alternatively, Notice of Appeal. Following a July 30, 2010

hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s motions to reconsider sentence.1 On June

1, 2016, Defendant filed a “Motion to Set Status Conference” to determine the status

of the “unperfected appeal which was filed in this matter on May 21, 2010.” At the

conclusion of an August 10, 2016 hearing, the trial court granted Defendant an out-

of-time appeal without objection by the State.

Defendant is now before this court asserting in his sole assignment of error

that the trial court’s imposition of seventy-five years imprisonment was

constitutionally excessive. He argues that the trial court “did not sufficiently take

into account mitigating factors nor did it appropriately tailor the sentence to the

defendant for the crime committed.” For the following reasons, we vacate

Defendant’s sentence and remand this matter to the trial court for resentencing.

DISCUSSION

The facts of this matter, which are uncontested for purposes of this appeal,

were recited in the State’s appellee brief:

On December 21, 2006, Charles and Angela Fus[i]lier were
working at their hair salon. Three men with their faces covered rushed
into the salon, waiving guns and demanding money. Although his face

1
Defendant and his counsel were present at the July 30, 2010 hearing. The transcript
reflects that no evidence was offered at the hearing and defense counsel did not orally pursue the
request made in his motion that, should the motion for reconsideration be denied, Defendant “files
a Notice of Appeal and seeks to have a return date set.”

was covered, Charles and Angela recognized the defendant, Ruffin
Stokes. The defendant pointed his gun at Angela and demanded money.
Angela tried to give him what she had, but the defendant pointed the
gun at Charles, who threw whatever cash he had in his pocket at the
defendant. When Charles could not comply with the defendant’s
demand for more money, the defendant pointed his gun at Charles’ and
Angela’s three-year-old son. Charles testified that he would rather have
died than let the defendant kill his son. Charles tackled the defendant,
and, during the struggle, the gun went off, firing a shot into the ceiling.

In State v. James, 15-414, pp. 2-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/7/15), 175 So.3d 1176,

1178, writs denied, 15-2059 (La. 1/9/17), 208 So.3d 876, and 15-2044 (La. 1/9/17),

214 So.3d 858, this court discussed the standard for reviewing excessive sentence

claims, as follows:

[Louisiana Constitution Article] I, § 20 guarantees
that, “[n]o law shall subject any person to cruel or unusual
punishment.” To constitute an excessive sentence, the
reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock
our sense of justice or that the sentence makes no
measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals and is,
therefore, nothing more than a needless imposition of pain
and suffering. The trial court has wide discretion in the
imposition of sentence within the statutory limits and such
sentence shall not be set aside as excessive absent a
manifest abuse of discretion. The relevant question is
whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing
discretion, not whether another sentence might have been
more appropriate.

State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779
So.2d 1035, 1042, writ denied, 01-838 (La.2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331
(citations omitted).

....

Even though a penalty falls within the statutory sentencing range,
it may still be unconstitutionally excessive:

In deciding whether a sentence is shocking or makes
no meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals, an
appellate court may consider several factors including the
nature of the offense, the circumstances of the offender,
the legislative purpose behind the punishment and a
comparison of the sentences imposed for similar crimes.
While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar
crimes may provide some insight, “it is well settled that
2

sentences must be individualized to the particular offender
and to the particular offense committed.” Additionally, it
is within the purview of the trial court to particularize the
sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best
position to assess the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances presented by each case.”

State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786,
789, writ denied, 03-562 (La.5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061 (citations
omitted). “[T]he trial judge need not articulate every aggravating and
mitigating circumstance outlined in art. 894.1[;] the record must reflect
that he adequately considered these guidelines in particularizing the
sentence to the defendant.” State v. Smith, 433 So.2d 688, 698
(La.1983) (citing State v. Ray, 423 So.2d 1116 (La.1982); 175 so.3d
1176; State v. Keeney, 422 So.2d 1144 (La.1982); State v. Duncan, 420
So.2d 1105 (La.1982)). “[M]aximum sentences are reserved for cases
involving the most serious violations of the charged offense and for the
worst kind of offender.” State v. Quebedeaux, 424 So.2d 1009, 1014
(La.1982) (citing State v. Jones, 398 So.2d 1049 (La.1981)). “The
appellate court shall not set aside a sentence for excessiveness if the
record supports the sentence imposed.” La.Code Crim.P. art. 881.4(D).

In the current case, Defendant was convicted of armed robbery. Louisiana

Revised Statutes 14:64 provides:

A. Armed robbery is the taking of anything of value belonging
to another from the person of another or that is in the immediate control
of another, by use of force or intimidation, while armed with a
dangerous weapon.

B. Whoever commits the crime of armed robbery shall be
imprisoned at hard labor for not less than ten years and for not more
than ninety-nine years, without benefit of parole, probation, or
suspension of sentence.

Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when determining

the appropriate length of his sentence because it did not take into consideration as

mitigating circumstances that he was only twenty years old and a first-time felony

offender when the armed robbery occurred. In brief, Defendant points out that

although “[t]he trial court begins its analysis by noting the defendant’s youth; he

took it into consideration as an aggravating factor, stating that because of his

youthfulness[, Defendant] would likely ‘commit additional crimes.’” Defendant

further notes that there is no indication in the record that the trial court considered
3

his lack of criminal history as a mitigating factor. Citing the supreme courts’

pronouncement in Quebedeaux, 424 So.2d 1009, that maximum sentences are

generally imposed upon the worst of offenders and the worst of offenses, Defendant

argues that his seventy-five-year sentence is unconstitutionally excessive. Thus, he

asks this court to vacate his sentence and remand this matter to the trial court for

resentencing.

At the sentencing hearing, the State disclosed that Defendant had no adult

criminal record before offering into evidence several Victim Impact Statements.

Thereafter, defense counsel asked the trial court for mercy on Defendant because of

his youth. The trial court then noted for the record:

The Court, of course, heard all the testimony. And the testimony
was that Mr. Stokes entered this place of business armed with a
dangerous weapon, that at first the people who were in there who owned
the business didn’t think that it was serious because they apparently
knew who he was. He had been there before. They knew him. They
knew him from the neighborhood. He demanded money. He pointed
the weapon. He threatened not only the adults, but also a very young
child. He did so in a particularly cruel and heinous manner. He did it
deliberately. He did it, the Court found, the jury found deliberately and
with some planning.

The Legislature has deemed armed robbery to be . . . one of the
most serious crimes that is defined in our code, our Criminal Code and
the penalty provision reads as follows: Whoever commits the crime of
armed robbery shall be imprisoned at hard labor not less than ten years,
nor more than ninety-nine (99) years without benefit of parole,
probation or suspension of sentence.

The Victim Impact Statements that I have received show how
serious this was and how it has affected the victims of this crime.

Mr. Stokes deserves a severe penalty. Having committed this
crime at a young age with such deliberate and violent intent indicates
to the Court that he is a serious offender who would likely commit
additional crimes. For that reason[,] the Court is going to impose a
sentence of seventy-five (75) years at hard labor without benefit of
probation, parole or suspension of sentence. And in imposing this
sentence the Court takes into consideration the provisions of Article
894, 895, 894.1, and finds that there is an undue risk that during any
period of suspension of sentence or probation the defendant would
commit another crime. He is in need of correctional treatment and a
4

custodial environment is suitable. A less[e]r sentence would deprecate
the seriousness of the offense. The Court does find that this was a
particularly heinous crime, that one or more persons could easily been
killed as a result of this and that no other or no lesser sentence is
appropriate in this case.

According to the trial transcript, Defendant threatened to shoot a three-year-

old child because the parents did not come up with enough money. When the father

attempted to wrestle the gun from Defendant, the gun discharged. Defendant does

not dispute these facts. Fortunately, no one was injured, but Defendant’s actions put

the Fusiliers and several customers at their salon at serious risk. Defendant

essentially terrorized the parents when he aimed the gun at their child and threatened

to shoot him if they did not come up with more money.

In State v. Jackson, 04-1388 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/31/05), 904 So.2d 907, writ

denied, 05-1740 (La. 2/10/06), 924 So.2d 162, the defendant was sentenced to sixty

years on each of two counts of armed robbery to be served concurrently. The

defendant complained that the sentences were excessive considering that he was

nineteen at the time of the offenses and a first-time felony offender. Discussing

whether the sentences were excessive under the circumstances, the fifth circuit

stated:

Sentences in excess of the minimum for armed robbery have
been upheld despite the youth of the defendant and/or the lack of a prior
criminal history. However, most of these cases involve more egregious
circumstances than the present case.

In State v. Williams, 04-697, p. 9-10 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/30/04),
889 So.2d 1135, 1144-1145, a 22-year-old defendant received a 70 year
sentence for armed robbery. The defendant robbed a bank while armed
with a gun. In finding, the defendant’s sentence was not
constitutionally excessive, this Court noted the defendant had an
extensive record of violent criminal activity, which was evidenced by
the presentence investigative report.

In State v. Sanborn, 02-257, p. 10-12 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/16/02),
831 So.2d 320, 330-332, writ denied, 02-3130 (La.9/26/03), 854 So.2d
346, this Court upheld the defendant’s 75 year sentence for armed
robbery despite his youthful age of 25 and the fact he was a first time
5

offender. However, the defendant’s crime was exceptionally brutal.
The defendant shot, pistol whipped, and broke one of the victim’s
ankles during the commission of the crime.

In State v. Palmer, 00-0216 (La.App. 1 Cir.12/22/00), 775 So.2d
1231, writs denied, 01-0211 (La.1/11/02), 807 So.2d 224 and 01-1043
(La.1/11/02), 807 So.2d 229, the court upheld a 65 year sentence for
armed robbery, although the defendant was a first felony offender. In
that case, the defendant and a companion robbed a small grocery store
while armed with guns. The defendant pointed his gun at a female
customer’s face and shot a male customer. He also threatened the store
clerk with the gun.

In State v. Lofton, 96-1429 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/27/97), 691 So.2d
1365, writ denied, 97-1124 (La.10/17/97), 701 So.2d 1331, the First
Circuit upheld a 50 year sentence imposed for a first felony offender
convicted of armed robbery. In that case, the defendant put a gun to the
victim’s head as a threat, and discharged the gun at least twice while
the victim fled, but did not shoot the victim.

In State v. Mitchell, 26,718 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/7/94), 647 So.2d
423, the Second Circuit upheld a 50 year sentence for a young offender,
who robbed a pizza restaurant at gunpoint, shot the manager five times,
and then repeatedly stabbed her.

In State v. Smith, 433 So.2d 688 (La.1983), the Louisiana
Supreme Court affirmed a 60 year sentence for an armed robbery of a
bank. The Supreme Court noted the defendant was the planner and
organizing force of the robbery, in which victims were threatened and
shots were fired. The court also noted the defendant had a substantial
criminal past.

In the present case, the State introduced evidence at the
sentencing hearing suggesting the defendant had been involved in
several armed robberies for which he was not arrested. However, the
trial court sentenced the defendant without consideration of this
evidence, because it found the evidence was not clear and convincing.
The trial court noted that the defendant engaged in a three day crime
spree where, luckily, no one was killed.

In cases similar to the present one, where the defendant does not
have a criminal history and the armed robbery did not involve the
discharge of a weapon or any physical injury to the victims, the
sentencing range is between 20-40 years.

In State v. Price, 04-812 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/1/05), [909] So.2d
[612], 2005 WL 474339, this Court found a 23-year-old defendant[’]s
40 year sentence for armed robbery not to be excessive. In Price, the
defendant robbed a Taco Bell while armed with a firearm. No shots
were fired, but the defendant made one of the employees lie on the floor
while he pointed a gun at them.
6

In State v. Lewis, 39,263 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/26/05), 892 So.2d
702, the defendant, a first felony offender, received three concurrent 20
year sentences for the armed robbery of three employees at a bank. The
defendant was armed with a BB gun.

In State v. Roddy, 33,112 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/7/00), 756 So.2d
1272, writ denied, 00-1427 (La.5/11/01), 791 So.2d 1288, a 22-year-
old first felony offender defendant received a 20 year sentence for
armed robbery of a bank. The defendant was a passenger in the
getaway car, but was aware of the plan to rob the bank. The presentence
report noted the defendant had spent eight months in a juvenile
detention center for a prior adjudication for armed robbery.

In State v. Square, 433 So.2d 104 (La.1983), the Louisiana
Supreme Court upheld the defendant[’]s 25 year sentence for a bank
robbery. The defendant was 22 years old, was gainfully employed,
lacked a prior criminal record, and there was an absence of personal
injury to the victims of the robbery.

However, in this case, the defendant was charged with nine
counts of armed robbery, and one count of conspiracy to commit armed
robbery. He was tried on two counts of armed robbery and conspiracy
to commit armed robbery, and found guilty. The sentencing range for
armed robbery was 5 to 99 years, at the time the instant offenses were
committed. The trial court considered the defendant[’]s age and
reviewed the sentencing guidelines before imposing a 60 year sentence
for each count of armed robbery. The defendant’s sentences of 60 years
on each count of armed robbery, to be served concurrently, fall in that
range.

The issue before us on appeal is whether the trial court abused its
discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more
appropriate. We apply three factors in reviewing a trial court[’]s
sentencing discretion: the nature of the crime, the nature and
background of the offender, and the sentence imposed for similar
crimes. We find in this case that the defendant[’]s sentence is not
constitutionally excessive. Although, the defendant was nineteen years
old and a first time offender, he went on a three-day violent crime spree.
While in cases with facts similar to the present one the sentencing range
is between 20-40 years, the defendant’s sentence of 60 years is within
the statutory sentencing range (10-99 years) and does not shock our
conscience. The defendant participated in an armed robbery in which
victim, Adriene Bazile, testified that she had a gun pointed at her face,
which placed her in fear of her life. Bazile testified that she was
terrified during the robbery and fell on the floor crying when the
robbers, including the defendant, left the bank. Victim, Laura
Waguespack, testified that a gun was pointed at her during the robbery,
which made her nervous and she feared for herself. Given these factors,
we do not find the sentence imposed to be excessive.

7

Id. at 915-17 (footnote omitted). See also State v. Curry, 593 So.2d 860 (La.App. 2

Cir. 1992), wherein a sentence of sixty years at hard labor without benefit of parole,

probation, or suspension of sentence for armed robbery was unconstitutionally

excessive, even though the defendant had a lengthy juvenile record and bludgeoned

the victim unnecessarily during the robbery. The defendant was a first-time felony

offender, nineteen years old at time of the offense, and did not fire a gun during the

robbery. The defendant’s juvenile record was primarily a chronicle of escapes, and

the offense was the first incident of a crime of violence against a person. The second

circuit noted that “[s]ixty years without benefit for this defendant is tantamount to a

life sentence and totally voids the possibility of rehabilitating the first felony

offender.” Id. at 863. After reviewing “comparable cases,” the second circuit

determined that “the maximum sentence [it] could affirm for this offender and

offense [was] 35 years at hard labor without benefit[s].” Id. at 864

Considering the facts of this case and the above jurisprudence, we conclude

that the seventy-five-year sentence on this twenty-year-old, first-time felony

offender is constitutionally excessive and amounts to an abuse of the trial court’s

broad discretion. Accordingly, this matter will be remanded to the trial court for

resentencing.

DECREE

The sentence imposed on Defendant, Ruffin Stokes, for his conviction of

armed robbery is constitutionally excessive. We vacate his sentence and remand this

matter to the trial court for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.

SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED.

8