State of Louisiana v. Chakha Danny James

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

17-1062

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

CHAKHA DANNY JAMES

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APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 240,893
HONORABLE MONIQUE FREEMAN RAULS, DISTRICT JUDGE

************

ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE

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Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Billy H. Ezell, and Candyce G. Perret,
Judges.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GRANTED.

Phillip Terrell, Jr.
District Attorney – Ninth Judicial District Court
P. O. Box 1472
Alexandria, LA 71309
(318) 473-6650
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Christopher Albert Aberle
Louisiana Appellate Project
P.O. Box 8583
Mandeville, LA 70470
(985) 871-4084
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Chakha Danny James

Chakha Danny James, Pro Se
Louisiana State Penitentary
Oak - 1
Angola, LA 70712

PICKETT, Judge.

In 1999, the defendant Chakha Danny James pled guilty to second degree

murder; the district court sentenced him to life in prison without parole eligibility.

After the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct.

2455 (2012), the defendant sought to be resentenced; on March 27, 2017, the

district court granted him parole eligibility. On June 14, 2017, the state filed a

“Motion to Correct Sentence Without Hearing.” In response, the district court

signed an order affirming the defendant’s parole eligibility.

Counsel has filed a brief seeking to withdraw pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967). He alleges there are no non-

frivolous issues to raise on appeal, as the defendant has received the relief to which

he was entitled under Miller. Our analysis indicates the motion to withdraw should

be granted.

FACTS

As counsel observes, the underlying facts of the case are not relevant to the

current discussion, which is based upon a resentencing proceeding.

ANDERS ANALYSIS

Pursuant to Anders, the defendant’s appellate counsel filed a brief stating

that he made a conscientious and thorough review of the trial court record and

could find no errors on appeal that would support reversal of the defendant’s

conviction or sentence. Thus, counsel seeks to withdraw. The state has filed a

brief in agreement with appellate counsel’s request to withdraw. Also, the

defendant has filed a pro se brief.

In State v. Benjamin, 573 So.2d 528, 531 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1990), the fourth

circuit explained the Anders analysis:

When appointed counsel has filed a brief indicating that no
non-frivolous issues and no ruling arguably supporting an appeal were
found after a conscientious review of the record, Anders requires that
counsel move to withdraw. This motion will not be acted on until this
court performs a thorough independent review of the record after
providing the appellant an opportunity to file a brief in his or her own
behalf. This court’s review of the record will consist of (1) a review
of the bill of information or indictment to insure the defendant was
properly charged; (2) a review of all minute entries to insure the
defendant was present at all crucial stages of the proceedings, the jury
composition and verdict were correct and the sentence is legal; (3) a
review of all pleadings in the record; (4) a review of the jury sheets;
and (5) a review of all transcripts to determine if any ruling provides
an arguable basis for appeal. Under C.Cr.P. art. 914.1(D) this Court
will order that the appeal record be supplemented with pleadings,
minute entries and transcripts when the record filed in this Court is not
sufficient to perform this review.

Appellate counsel’s Anders brief must review the record and provide “a

detailed and reviewable assessment for both the defendant and the appellate court

of whether the appeal is worth pursuing in the first place.” State v. Mouton, 95-

981, p. 2 (La. 4/28/95), 653 So.2d 1176, 1177. Counsel states that the defendant

received the sole relief to which he is entitled, pursuant to the jurisprudence. Our

research indicates counsel is correct. State v. Doise, 15-713 (La.App. 3 Cir.

2/24/16), 185 So.3d 335, writ denied, 16-546 (La. 3/13/17), 216 So.3d 808; State v.

Sumler, 51,324 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/2/17), 219 So.3d 503.1

Pursuant to Anders, 386 U.S. 738, and Benjamin, 573 So.2d 528, this court

has performed a thorough review of the record, which consists in relevant part of

the minutes and transcript of the resentencing hearing conducted on March 27,

2017, along with the various motions that led to that hearing. The defendant was

represented by counsel. As already noted, the court granted him the sole relief to

which he was entitled.

1
This court recently came to the same conclusion, although the case has not yet been
released for publication. State v. Thomas, 17-620 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/17), ___ So.3d ___ (2017
WL 6029608).
2

The defendant has filed a pro se brief arguing that he is entitled to different

relief. He raises the following arguments:

THE TRIAL COURT DENIED APPELLANT LIBERTY WITHOUT
DUE PROCESS WHEN IT FAILED TO SENTENCE HIM TO A
PENALTY LEGISLATIVELY PRESCRIBED AFTER THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT EXCISED SENTENCES OF LIFE WITHOUT
PAROLE ON JUVENILE OFFENDERS UNDER 18 YEARS OLD
“WHOSE CRIME REFLECTS UNFORTUNATE YET TRANSIENT
IMMATURITY.”

THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT’S FIFTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO FAIR WARNING AND
PROTECTION AGAINST “UNFORESEEABLE AND
RETROACTIVE JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF NARROW AND
PRECISE STATUTORY LANGUAGE” WHEN IT AMENDED
APPELLANT’S SENTENCE AND RETROSPECTIVELY APPLIED
PAROLE GUIDELINES PROMULGATED AFTER HE
COMMITTED HIS OFFENSE.

THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED EX POST FACTO CLAUSE
WHEN IT RETROACTIVELY APPLIED PAROLE GUIDELINES
PROMULGATED AFTER APPELLANT COMMITTED HIS
OFFENSE AND THOSE GUIDELINES RESULTED IN AN
INCREASED MEASURE OF PUNISHMENT ATTACHED TO THE
COVERED CRIME.

THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE SUBSTANTIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL RULE CHANGE ANNOUNCED IN MILLER
V. ALABAMA AND MONTGOMERY V. LOUISIANA THAT THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT GUARANTEES A JUVENILE
OFFENDER UNDER THE AGE OF 18 YEARS OLD “WHOSE
CRIME REFLECTS UNFORTUNATE YET TRANSIENT
IMMATURITY” “AN INDIVIDUALIZE[D] SENTENCE.”

THE TRIAL COURT DENIED APPELLANT DUE PROCESS
WHEN IT REFUSED TO CONSIDER HIS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF HIS EXCESSIVENESS SENTENCE.

His first argument is an attempt to obtain a sentence for the next most severe

offense, rather than the relief he received. Such arguments have been turned away

by Louisiana courts, as the second circuit has explained:

Keith maintains he should be resentenced under [State v.]
Craig, [340 So.2d 191 (La. 1976)], to the next lesser included offense
of manslaughter - a maximum sentence of 40 years at hard labor. In
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1976, the Louisiana Supreme Court held in Craig that Louisiana’s
mandatory death penalty for aggravated rape is unconstitutional. The
Craig court concluded the appropriate remedy to correct this now
illegal sentence was to remand the case for resentencing of the
defendant to the most serious penalty for the next lesser included
offense. Id., at 193-94. Craig followed a prohibition of mandatory
death sentences by the United States Supreme Court, which applied to
all offenders currently sentenced to death without a hearing in which
to present mitigating factors, and not exclusively to juveniles like
Miller, supra. Thus, Craig eliminated the possibility of a mandatory
death sentence entirely, necessitating vacating those now illegal
sentences and resentencing to the most severe sentence for the next
lesser included offense. Conversely, Miller did not eliminate the
possibility of a life sentence for juvenile homicide offenders; it simply
held sentencing to life imprisonment at hard labor, without parole
eligibility, is unconstitutional if the defendant is denied a meaningful
opportunity to present mitigating factors - such as, the attendant
qualities of youth.

The application of the Miller and Montgomery [v. Louisiana,
136 S.Ct. 718 (216)] decisions is far more analogous to the Louisiana
Supreme Court’s response to Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130
S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed. 2d 825 (2010), in which the United States
Supreme Court held that the United States Constitution’s Eighth
Amendment precludes sentencing a juvenile to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole for a non-homicide offense. In State
v. Shaffer, 2011-1756 (La. 11/23/11), 77 So.3d 939, three defendants
sought relief from their life sentences following Graham, and claimed
their convictions for aggravated rape committed while juveniles were
now illegal. The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the defendants’
argument that they should be sentenced under the lesser included
offense of attempted aggravated rape as was done in Craig, supra.
Further, instead of remanding the cases for resentencing, the
Louisiana Supreme Court amended the defendants’ life sentences to
delete the restriction on parole eligibility. Accordingly, Craig relief is
inapplicable to Keith’s circumstances, and the trial court did not err in
following Montgomery.

State v. Keith, 51,389, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/21/17), 223 So.3d 767, 770-71

(footnotes omitted).

We find that the second and third assignments are essentially arguments that

the application of current parole guidelines and recent jurisprudence to his sentence

is an improper ex post facto application of law. However, this is not the case, as

the Miller-related jurisprudence has not increased the defendant’s punishment.
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Instead, it has provided him with possible relief on his sentence, albeit not as much

relief as he now seeks.

In his fourth assignment, the defendant complains the sentence was not

individualized to him, and in his fifth and final pro se assignment of error, he

argues the district court failed to consider any mitigating factors at the resentencing

hearing. As noted earlier, the defendant pled guilty to second degree murder and

received the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. Due to recent jurisprudence

arising from Miller, he has received the benefit of eligibility for parole. As his

appellate counsel observes, this is the only relief to which he is entitled.

We find that the defendant received the sole relief required by law; no non-

frivolous issue remains for review. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence are

affirmed, and counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GRANTED.

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