State of Louisiana v. George E. Byrd AKA George Byrd

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

17-1136

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

GEORGE E. BYRD

AKA GEORGE BYRD

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CONCORDIA, NO. 15-1981
HONORABLE KATHY A. JOHNSON, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

BILLY HOWARD EZELL
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Billy Howard Ezell, Shannon J. Gremillion, and D. Kent Savoie,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Holli A. Herrle-Castillo
Louisiana Appellate Project
P.O. Box 2333
Marrero, LA 70073
(504) 345-2801
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
George E. Byrd

Bradley R. Burget
District Attorney, Seventh Judicial Distrct Court
4001 Carter St., Suite 9
Vidalia, LA 71373
(318) 336-5526
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

George E. Byrd
MPWY/Hic-1
Louisiana State Prison
Angola, La 70712

2

EZELL, Judge.

Defendant, George E. Byrd, was indicted on July 30, 2015, for the second

degree murder of John Perritt, a violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. On March 25, 2016,

a jury found Defendant guilty as charged. On the same date scheduled for the

sentencing hearing, May 18, 2016, Defendant filed a “Motion for Post Verdict

Judgment of Acquittal.” The trial court denied the motion and, after waiving all

delays, Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the benefit of parole,

probation, or suspension of sentence.

Defendant appeals the conviction, asserting that the evidence was insufficient

to support a guilty verdict of murder. Defendant argues that the verdict was premised

entirely on circumstantial evidence and that the State failed to negate all reasonable

hypotheses of innocence. For the following reasons, we find the evidence was

sufficient to support the verdict of second degree murder, and the evidence presented

by the State negated all reasonable hypotheses of innocence.

FACTS

On September 22, 2014, the decomposing body of John Perritt was found

outside his back door. Between the evening of September 18 and early morning of

September 19, 2014, Defendant stabbed the victim in the victim’s home. The victim

died as a result of the stab wounds.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find no errors

patent.

3

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

For his sole assignment of error, Defendant argues the State failed to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that it was he who stabbed the victim. Defendant points

out that the verdict was premised solely on circumstantial evidence. Therefore, the

State was required to negate any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Defendant’s

hypothesis is that someone else killed the victim.

In State v. Cole, 15-358, pp. 8-9 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/23/15), 182 So.3d 1192,

1198-99, writ denied, 16-179 (La. 2/10/17), 215 So.3d 700, the court held:

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court
must determine that the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, or a
mixture of both, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements
of the crime have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v.
Neal, 00-674 (La.6/29/01), 796 So.2d 649, 657, cert. denied, 535 U.S.
940, 122 S.Ct. 1323, 152 L.Ed.2d 231 (2002). Evidence may be direct
or circumstantial. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of
collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main
fact can be inferred according to reason and common experience. State
v. Williams, 05-59 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/31/05), 904 So.2d 830, 833. All
evidence, both direct and circumstantial, must be sufficient to support
the conclusion that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Wooten, 99-181 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/1/99), 738 So.2d 672, 675,
writ denied, 99-2057 (La.1/14/00), 753 So.2d 208.

An appellate court’s primary function is not to re-determine the
defendant’s guilt or innocence in accordance with its appreciation of
the facts and credibility of the witnesses. Rather, our function is to
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s
conclusion. State v. Banford, 94-883 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/15/95), 653
So.2d 671, 677. The credibility of witnesses is within the sound
discretion of the trier of fact, who may accept or reject, in whole or in
part, the testimony of any witness; the credibility of the witnesses will
not be reweighed on appeal. State v. Workman, 14-559 (La.App. 5 Cir.
4/15/15), 170 So.3d 279, 289. When there is conflicting testimony
about factual matters, the resolution of which depends on a
determination of credibility of the witnesses, this is a matter of the
weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Brown, 01-41
(La.App. 5 Cir. 5/30/01), 788 So.2d 694, 701. “The Jackson standard
does not serve as a vehicle for a reviewing court to second guess the

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rational credibility determinations of the fact finder at trial.” State v.
Hotoph, 99-243 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/10/99), 750 So.2d 1036, 1045.

Furthermore, as noted by the supreme court in State v. Brown, 03-897, p. 22

(La. 4/12/05), 907 So.2d 1, 18, cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1022, 126 S.Ct. 1569 (2006):

When circumstantial evidence is used to prove the commission
of the offense, La.R.S. 15:438 requires that “assuming every fact to be
proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must
exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” [State v.] Neal,
[00-674 (La. 6/29/01)], 796 So.2d [649] at 657. Ultimately, all
evidence, both direct and circumstantial must be sufficient under
Jackson to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to a rational jury. Id.
(citing State v. Rosiere, 488 So.2d 965, 968 (La.1986)).

However, in State v. Bridgewater, 00-1529, pp. 8-9 (La. 1/15/02), 823 So.2d 877,

889, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1227, 123 S.Ct. 1266 (2003) (alteration in original), the

supreme court stated:

“[h]ypotheses of innocence are merely methods for the trier of fact to
determine the existence of a reasonable doubt arising from the evidence
or lack of evidence.” State v. Shapiro, 431 So.2d 372, 389 (La.1982)
(on reh’g )(Lemmon, J., concurring). This circumstantial evidence rule
is not a separate test from the Jackson standard; rather, La. R.S. 15:438
merely “provides an evidentiary guideline for the jury when
considering circumstantial evidence and facilitates appellate review of
whether a rational juror could have found defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Wright, 445 So.2d 1198, 1201
(La.1984). “Although the circumstantial evidence rule may not
establish a stricter standard of review than the more general reasonable
juror’s reasonable doubt formula, it emphasizes the need for careful
observance of the usual standard, and provides a helpful methodology
for its implementation in cases which hinge on the evaluation of
circumstantial evidence” State v. Chism, 436 So.2d 464, 470 (La.
1983).

In the current case, Defendant was charged with second degree murder, which

is the killing of a human being with the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily

harm. La.R.S. 14:30.1.

5

Testimonies and exhibits introduced at trial

Jack Fletcher, a captain with the Concordia Parish Sheriff’s Office, testified

that at approximately noon on September 22, 2014, he received a call about a body

found at a residence in Monterey, Louisiana. Upon arrival at the location, he met

with Albert Crouch, who had found the victim’s naked body wrapped in blankets

next to the back door steps. Inside the house, the captain and two other deputies

found a great deal of blood on the floor next to the bed in the master bedroom. All

the sheets were removed from the bed. There were bloody footprints tracked

throughout the house. The captain speculated that the victim was killed in the

bedroom, then wrapped in blankets, and dumped out the back door. Because there

appeared to be two different sets of footprints, the captain speculated there were two

persons involved. The captain took eighty-two pictures inside and outside the crime

scene. Each picture was shown to the jury and clarified by the captain.

Captain Fletcher testified he learned from the victim’s son, Jason Perritt, that

the victim was diabetic. A search of the house located a blood glucose tracker.

Apparently, the victim was very organized and kept meticulous track of his blood

sugar levels. The tracker listed the blood sugar levels each morning before breakfast

and again after dinner. The last notation was entered on the early evening of

September 18, 2014.

Captain Fletcher stated that when he was advised by a deputy who had

attended the autopsy that the victim was stabbed to death, the captain went back to

the victim’s house and collected knives for DNA and fingerprint analysis.

Captain Phillip Webber, at the time a detective with the Concordia Parish

Sheriff’s Office, took over the case as lead investigator. He had swabs taken of the

blood left around the bedroom and had the house dusted for fingerprints. He noted

6

no prints were found for analysis, not even the victim’s prints. He noted that there

were two different sized, bloody shoe prints and that there were no drag marks

through the kitchen to the back door, indicating that the body was carried out. The

captain was advised that a fifty-inch flat screen television, an iPad, and a pistol were

missing from the victim’s house. The victim’s wallet, cell phone, and vehicle were

also missing. The captain put out a BOLO (be on the lookout) for the victim’s

vehicle.

Captain Webber obtained a warrant for the victim’s bank records. The bank

records showed that in the early morning of September 18, at 12:30 a.m., the victim

used his debit card at Walmart. A few hours later, he used the debit card at a Circle

K in Ferriday, and on the evening of the September 18, he used his debit card at

Walmart in Natchez around 8:00 p.m. Walmart’s surveillance video showed that no

one was with Mr. Perritt in Walmart or when he left and got into his vehicle.

When Captain Webber called the victim’s cell phone number, “it went straight

to like it was a disconnect.” He applied for a warrant for the cell phone records.

According to the phone records, the last outgoing call on the victim’s phone was at

9:54 p.m. and the last outgoing text was at 9:59 p.m. on September 18, both to the

same phone number. The phone number called was listed to Kimmie Isaac, who

lived in Vidalia. The captain could see in the victim’s phone records that there were

several calls and texts sent to the victim from Ms. Isaac’s number the evening of the

September 18 through September 23. The captain learned that Ms. Isaac’s son,

Kenzell Isaac, used her cell phone frequently. The victim’s phone number was listed

in Ms. Isaac’s phone contacts under “lick.” The captain interviewed both Ms. Isaac

and her son. It was after the interviews that the captain began looking for Defendant.

7

Ms. Isaac did not know the victim. She gave the captain permission to search the

cell phone and to obtain its call records.

The victim’s vehicle was located in Natchez, Mississippi, on September 23,

2014. The owner of a lumber yard in Natchez, Bruce Reynolds, noticed that a

strange vehicle was parked in the lumber yard’s parking lot from the morning of

September 19, 2014, to September 23. When he saw that the vehicle had temporary

license plates with the dealership listed, he called the dealership. The dealership had

already been contacted by Captain Webber. The dealership called Captain Webber.

It was noted that when the car’s engine was started, the windshield wipers came on,

and the radio blasted loud music.

Because the victim’s car was located in Mississippi, Delane Bush, an officer

with the Adams County Sheriff’s Office, processed the vehicle before turning it over

to Captain Webber. A minute amount of blood was located inside the vehicle, but

no fingerprints were found inside or outside the vehicle. A Louisiana lottery ticket

purchased at 9:02 p.m. on September 18 was also found in the car.

Captain Webber interviewed Kenzell Isaac on September 26, 2014. It was

established that on September 18, 2014, Mr. Isaac had possession of his mother’s

cell phone. Mr. Isaac said that he knew Defendant as “Larry” Byrd. Mr. Isaac

identified Defendant in court as the man he knew as Larry Byrd. He testified that

he let Defendant use his mother’s phone that evening. Shortly after Defendant used

the phone and left, the victim called and asked for Defendant. The victim told Mr.

Issac that Defendant was supposed to meet him at a nearby convenience store but

was several minutes late. Mr. Isaac, who disclosed at trial that he was bisexual and

was aware of Defendant’s homosexuality and penchant for exchanging sex for

money, stated that he offered the victim his services. The victim was not interested

8

and hung up. Mr. Isaac said he called the victim back repeatedly throughout the

evening, the next morning, and several times over the next few days. He said the

victim answered a few times that evening but otherwise ignored the calls. At some

point, the phone shut off. He did not recall texting the victim. Mr. Isaac stated that

although he listed the victim’s phone number in his phone’s contacts as “lick,” he

never met the victim.

Captain Webber testified that Defendant lived close to the area where the

victim’s vehicle was located. The captain interviewed Defendant on September 29,

2014. He stated that while Defendant refused to sign a waiver of rights form, he did

verbally agree to a recorded interview. The interview was published to the jury.

Defendant also submitted a buccal swab for DNA analysis following the interview.

Summary of Video of Defendant’s Interview

The interview began with the officer reading Defendant his rights and asking

whether he understood. Defendant refused to state whether he understood his rights,

nor would he sign the waiver of rights form. However, he began answering

questions. Initially, when he was shown a picture of the victim, he denied knowing

the victim. However, he later admitted he had seen the victim in a tan truck cruising

Defendant’s neighborhood. Defendant stated that one time, as he stood on the street,

the victim pulled up in a truck, rolled down the window, and called out Defendant’s

name. Defendant said the victim asked where he could get some fun. Except for

speaking with him this one time, Defendant asserted he had no interaction or

relationship with the victim. He stated that he saw the victim several times in the

neighborhood. Defendant denied that he was homosexual or bisexual. He admitted

that his girlfriend, Stephanie Armstead, made him visit a health clinic to be tested

for sexually transmitted diseases because she thought he had sex with men.

9

Defendant explained that he had run away from an officer the day prior to the

interview because he was on probation and had not paid his fees and court costs.

Although Defendant agreed to submit to a buccal swab at the end of the interview,

he still refused to sign the waiver of rights form.

Other Testimony

Doctor Jessica Esparza, a DNA analyst with North Louisiana Criminalistic

Laboratory, testified regarding all the items collected by the police for DNA

analysis.1 The doctor stated that the only DNA she was able to identify was the

victim’s. In the samples that contained a major and a minor contributor, the major

contributor was always the victim. She testified that Defendant and Kenzell Isaac

were excluded as major contributors and the minor contributors were in such low

concentration that a valid profile could not be obtained.

Doctor Christopher Tape, a forensic pathologist, conducted the autopsy on the

victim’s body. He noted the victim was stabbed nine times, in the neck, arm, chest,

stomach, and abdomen area. He stated there were no indications of defensive

wounds on the body. He also noted the toxicology report did not find evidence of

any drugs in the victim’s system. He concluded that the cause of death was eight of

the nine stab wounds and the manner of death was homicide.

Jason Perritt, the victim’s son, moved into his father’s house. On January 20,

2015, late in the evening, there was a knock on the back door. Mr. Perritt answered

the door, and a man asked for his father. Upon being informed that John Perritt was

deceased, the man hurriedly got into his vehicle and left. Mr. Perritt, however, called

1
The Crime Lab Report listed over one hundred items submitted for analysis. The list
included material swatches taken from various locations in the victim’s house, swatches and swabs
from the vehicle, buccal swabs from every suspect and person related to victim, and swabs from
items of both the victim’s and Defendant’s.

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the police and then pursued the man. The police quickly apprehended the man and

identified him as Lester Jennings.

Mr. Jennings testified at trial. At the time of trial, Mr. Jennings was in jail,

charged with failure to register as a sex offender. Mr. Jennings admitted he went to

the victim’s house looking for money. The witness stated he had known the victim

since the latter part of 2013 or the first of 2014. He stated that he met the victim late

one night at a convenience store in Jonesville. He said that the victim was driving

around looking to have a sexual encounter with a black man. Initially, Mr. Jennings

denied having anything to do with the victim. He said the victim advanced him $40

for sexual services, but he took the money, left, and never went back. However, he

stated that after he bought some crack cocaine and consumed it, he encountered the

victim again, went with the victim to the victim’s house, and they had sex. Mr.

Jennings said that it was only a one-time occurrence because he was not comfortable

having sex with a man. During Mr. Jennings’ testimony it came out that he had at

least three more sexual encounters with the victim. He said that the victim wanted

him to move in and take care of him, but after the fourth sexual encounter, he told

the victim he wanted no more dealings with him. Mr. Jennings said that the victim

told him it did not matter because he had met someone in Natchez. Mr. Jennings

explained that after his summertime yardwork business ran out, he decided to visit

the victim and see if he could get some money. He did not know that the victim was

deceased.

Thaddeus Perry, an officer with the Natchez Police Department, testified that

on September 28, 2014, he was on patrol in Natchez. He stated that he had been

alerted to be on the look out for Defendant. The officer encountered Defendant at a

convenience store driving a vehicle with a friend, James Anderson. The vehicle

11

belonged to Stephanie Armstead.2 As the officer approached the vehicle, Defendant

leaped out and fled on foot. The officer pursued him, but Defendant jumped down

a steep bay and escaped. The officer returned to the vehicle where Mr. Anderson

waited. The officer contacted his supervisor to have the vehicle towed.

Stephanie Armstead testified that after her vehicle was impounded by the

police, she learned of the murder of a white man in Monterey. Ms. Armstead said

she gave a statement to Officer Bellings of the Natchez Police Department on

October 3, 2014. She stated that after she got her vehicle back, she had a

conversation with Defendant about his possible involvement in the death of

someone. She said Defendant told her he killed a man in Monterey. He told her that

he, Mr. Anderson, and another man from McComb went to Monterey to burglarize

a house. When they arrived at the chosen house, a neighbor, an old white man, came

out and told them the victim was not there. The neighbor had a gun, and they got

into a tussle. Defendant said he took the gun from the neighbor and shot him.

Defendant told her that he kept the gun, but later his brother threw the gun into the

river. Ms. Armstead testified that on October 6, 2014, she spoke with Captain

Webber. She repeated to Captain Webber the same conversation she had with

Officer Bellings. This time she said that Defendant told her he wrapped the man he

killed in some blankets and left the body by the steps of the house. She also told

Captain Webber that Defendant said they took a flat screen television, an iPad, and

a pistol from the house.

Ms. Armstead testified that after the first conversation with Defendant, he

came back to her house drunk and threatened her not to speak of what he told her

2
Ms. Armstead is also referred to as Ms. Armstead Banks at various times throughout the
trial.

12

about killing the man in Monterey. She said he pointed a knife at her. She testified

that this time, Defendant told her he killed the man because the man owed him

money. Ms. Armstead stated that Defendant had been staying at her house for a

while after Desmond Washington kicked him out of his apartment. She said

Defendant had been staying there for a few weeks, sleeping in her room, but that

they were not having an intimate relationship because he “messed with men” and

that made it uncomfortable for her. However, after Defendant told her about killing

the man and threatening her, she told him to leave her house. She stated that

sometime later, Defendant told her that he had been living with the man he killed,

but the man would not give him any money, so Defendant stabbed him. Defendant

also told her that he, James Anderson, and a third man returned to the victim’s house

and cleaned up. Shortly thereafter, Defendant was jailed in Mississippi for unstated

reasons until May 2015.

Desmond Washington testified that in September 2014 he was living in

Natchez with his girlfriend, Andrea Hauer, and their four children. He stated that

Defendant stayed with them some nights and some nights at Stephanie Armstead’s

house. In September 2014, at approximately 3:00 a.m., Defendant showed up at Mr.

Washington’s apartment. It was raining, and Defendant was soaking wet. Mr.

Washington let Defendant in and gave him some dry clothes. Mr. Washington stated

he put Defendant’s wet clothes in the washing machine. Defendant appeared to be

upset, stating “[B]ro, this some fucked up shit.” Mr. Washington rolled a marijuana

cigarette, and they smoked it. Defendant then told Mr. Washington he had just killed

a man because the man owed him money. Mr. Washington said he did not believe

Defendant, but later that morning when James Anderson came to the apartment,

Defendant said they were going to do some lawn work. Mr. Washington wanted to

13

go with them, but they said no. Mr. Anderson told him it was going to be “some

crazy shit.” Mr. Washington later spoke with Captain Webber. He testified that he

told the captain that Defendant said he stabbed the victim and that he and Mr.

Anderson wrapped the body in blankets and lugged the body outside the house. They

then went back and cleaned up the house. Defendant told Mr. Washington that he

parked the victim’s car at a sawmill, which was close to Mr. Washington’s

apartment. Defendant also told Mr. Washington that they took a television and a

pistol from the house. Defendant said he threw the knife he stabbed the victim with

into the river.

At the time of trial, Mr. Washington was in jail on a charge of intimidation of

a witness. Ms. Armstead had accused him of threatening her if she told the police

about Defendant killing the victim.

Captain Webber also testified that he collected two recently called phone

numbers from the victim’s phone records. Using Facebook, he identified the two

phone numbers as belonging to Laura Swazy and Andrea Hauer. He located and

interviewed both women.

Ms. Swazy testified at trial that she knew Mr. Washington because his brother

was her youngest child’s father and that she lived right down the street from Mr.

Washington and Ms. Hauer. Ms. Swazy said that she overheard Defendant tell Mr.

Washington that he had stabbed a white man and left his body in the grass at the

victim’s house.

Captain Webber testified at the end of the State’s case that he never revealed

to the public the cause of the victim’s death, that the victim’s car was found at the

sawmill several days later, that the victim was found outside his back door wrapped

in a blanket, or that a television, a pistol, and an iPad were taken from the victim’s

14

house. He explained in a case such as this, keeping the details of the crime from the

public was necessary to help find the perpetrator of the murder. He explained that

the statements made to him by Ms. Armstead, Mr. Washington, and Ms. Swazy,

giving details only the perpetrator would know, gave him probable cause to arrest

Defendant for the murder of Mr. Perritt. Furthermore, the captain confirmed that it

was raining the night of September 18 into the morning of September 19, 2014, when

the victim’s vehicle was left at the sawmill, and Defendant showed up at Mr.

Washington’s apartment soaking wet.

Defendant argues in brief that the evidence relied on by the State to prove he

murdered Mr. Perritt—the testimonies of Ms. Armstead, Mr. Washington, and Ms.

Swazy—was not credible. He asserts that each of these witnesses had an agenda, a

reason to blame Defendant for the murder. He claims that Ms. Armstead’s husband,

James Banks, got out of jail just after the murder, and she wanted to get rid of

Defendant and go back with her husband. Ms. Swazy wanted revenge. Ms. Swazy

had testified that Defendant, at some time prior to the victim’s death, had attempted

to rob her sister and grandfather at gun point. When he did not receive whatever he

wanted, he pistol-whipped the sister. As for Mr. Washington, Defendant argues:

Finally, Desmond Washington was in his own trouble and
indicated in his interview in subtext if not outright that he would say
what the police wanted if it would help his case. He continued to ask
if his answers were helping and continued to ask if the detective could
help him out of the charges. Consequently, he had more reason to
implicate Mr. Byrd than anyone else.

The issue is not just credibility of these witnesses. None of these
witnesses were testifying as eyewitnesses to the crime. Their testimony
was to what they perceived Mr. Byrd told them, which is not always
accurate. This is particularly true when if the witnesses are believed,
Mr. Byrd would have had to have lied about how the crime was
committed, as if he also did not know the details of murder.

15

Analysis

In State v. Spears, 05-964, p. 3 (La. 4/4/06), 929 So.2d 1219, 1222-23, the

supreme court stated that:

[C]onstitutional law does not require the reviewing court to determine
whether it believes the witnesses or whether it believes that the
evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Mussall,
523 So.2d 1305, 1309 (La.1988). Rather, the fact finder is given much
discretion in determinations of credibility and evidence, and the
reviewing court will only impinge on this discretion to the extent
necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of
law.

Furthermore, as credibility of the witness is a matter of weight of the evidence

and not sufficiency, determination of the credibility is left to the trier-of-fact’s sound

discretion and will not be re-weighed on appeal. State v. F.B.A., 07-1526 (La.App.

3 Cir. 5/28/08), 983 So.2d 1006, writ denied, 08-1464 (La. 3/27/09), 5 So.3d 138.

Defendant argues that despite Captain Webber’s testimony that the details of

the crime were not made public, the three witnesses could have learned of the facts

by other means. However, as noted by the State in brief to this court, each of the

above witnesses’ agendas were rigorously examined by defense counsel on cross-

examination, and the jury apparently credited the details of the witnesses’

testimonies enough to find Defendant guilty. Ms. Armstead testified that an iPad, a

television, and a pistol were taken from the victim’s home and that Defendant had

gone back and cleaned the crime scene. Ms. Armstead also testified that the body

was wrapped up in blankets and left outside the back door. Ms. Swazy stated that

Defendant said the body was left outside in the grass. Mr. Washington also testified

that the body was wrapped in blankets and left outside and that the crime scene had

been cleaned. He had told Captain Webber that a television and a pistol were taken

from the victim’s house. Mr. Washington also knew that the victim’s vehicle was

16

left at the sawmill on a rainy night. The witnesses’ knowledge of details of the crime

that were not made public supported their credibility.

Defendant further argues there were two reasonable hypotheses of innocence

which were not disproved by the State. He asserts that the actions of Kenzell Isaac

and Lester Jennings strongly suggested that either one of them could have been the

killer. He argues that Mr. Isaac’s repeated phone calls to the victim after the victim

was dead was “exactly how a clever murderer would cover his tracks to throw

suspicion off of himself.” However, as noted by the State, there was no evidence in

the record that linked Mr. Isaac to the victim or his missing vehicle otherwise nor

was there any testimony or evidence that Mr. Isaac told anyone about killing

someone. Defendant argues the Mr. Jennings could have gone back to the victim’s

house to see “what he could take to sell for drugs now that he had destroyed his only

source of cash.” However, it seemed highly unlikely that Mr. Jennings would have

waited from September 18, 2014 to January 20, 2015, to return to the victim’s house

to see what more he could steal.

Circumstantial evidence involves, in addition to the assertion of
witnesses as to what they have observed, a process of reasoning, or
inference by which a conclusion is drawn. Like all other evidence, it
may be strong or weak; it may be so unconvincing as to be quite
worthless, or it may be irresistible and overwhelming. There is still no
man who would not accept dog tracks in the mud against the sworn
testimony of a hundred eye-witnesses that no dog passed by. The gist
of circumstantial evidence, and the key to it, is the inference, or process
of reasoning by which the conclusion is reached. This must be based
on the evidence given, together with a sufficient background of human
experience to justify the conclusion. Prosser, [Law of Torts, p. 212 (4th
ed. 1971)] at 212.

Consequently, before a trier of fact can decide the ultimate
question of whether a reasonable hypothesis of innocence exists in a
criminal case based crucially on circumstantial evidence, a number of
preliminary findings must be made. In addition to assessing the
circumstantial evidence in light of the direct evidence, and vice versa,
the trier of fact must decide what reasonable inferences may be drawn

17

from the circumstantial evidence, the manner in which competing
inferences should be resolved, reconciled or compromised; and the
weight and effect to be given to each permissible inference. From facts
found from direct evidence and inferred from circumstantial evidence,
the trier of fact should proceed, keeping in mind the relative strength
and weakness of each inference and finding, to decide the ultimate
question of whether this body of preliminary facts excludes every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

State v. Chism, 436 So.2d 464, 469 (La.1983)

We find that there was no foundation to Defendant’s two hypotheses of

innocence, which, in both cases, were based solely on speculation. Three witnesses

testified Defendant said he killed someone and revealed facts which only the

perpetrator of the crime would have known. There was evidence that the victim was

seeking the company of Defendant the night of the killing. There was testimony that

Defendant was known for selling sexual acts. Both Ms. Armstead and Mr.

Washington testified that Defendant and Mr. Anderson returned to clean the crime

scene. The detectives in the case strongly suspected that the crime scene was cleaned

up by two persons after the murder because of the two sets of bloody footprints. On

the morning of the murder, Defendant showed up at Mr. Washington’s house

soaking wet because it was raining. When the victim’s vehicle, which was parked

within walking distance to Mr. Washington’s house, was first cranked up, the

windshield wipers were operating. Further, when a police officer attempted to

engage Defendant shortly after the murder, Defendant fled. “Flight may be

considered as evidence of a guilty mind.” State v. Petit, 463 So.2d 749, 751 (La.App.

4 Cir. 1985); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673 (2000).

The hypotheses of innocence suggested by Defendant were not sufficient to

impact the reasonable inference drawn from the circumstantial evidence, and,

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viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence, though

circumstantial, was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the conviction and sentence of Defendant for the second degree

murder of John Perritt.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Uniform
Rules—Courts of Appeal. Rule 2-16.3.

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