State of Louisiana v. Russell Wade Cole

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

18-538

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

RUSSELL WADE COLE

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF VERNON, NO. 89549
HONORABLE SCOTT WESTERCHIL, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

SHANNON J. GREMILLION
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Shannon J. Gremillion, and Phyllis M. Keaty,
Judges.

SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

Paula C. Marx
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 80006
Lafayette, LA 70598-0006
(337) 991-9757
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Russell Wade Cole

Hon. Asa A. Skinner
Thirtieth Judical District Attorney
P. O. Box 1188
Leesville, LA 71496-1188
(337) 239-2008
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

GREMILLION, Judge.

Defendant, Russell Wade Cole, pleaded guilty to a charge of racketeering, a

violation of La.R.S. 15:1353. This plea was accompanied by a recommendation

from the State that Defendant be sentenced to fifteen years; in exchange, Defendant

agreed to testify truthfully against his co-defendants and otherwise cooperate with

the State. The State agreed to not proceed against Defendant civilly and to seek no

asset forfeiture. The State also agreed that Defendant would not be indicted for any

other crimes, other than murder, he admitted to while testifying. The trial court

sentenced Defendant to twenty years at hard labor with credit for time served.

Defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, which was denied without

hearing. Defendant now appeals his sentence, asserting two alleged errors: that his

sentence of twenty years of imprisonment at hard labor is harsh and excessive,

considering his cooperation in bringing down the largest methamphetamine

distribution ring in the history of Vernon Parish and considering the State’s

sentencing recommendation of fifteen years. In his second assignment of error,

Defendant contends that the trial court failed to comply with La.Code Crim.P. art.

894.1, failed to individualize this sentence to this offender and offense, and failed to

adequately consider mitigating factors in this case. For the reasons that follow,

Defendant’s sentence is affirmed.

ANALYSIS

Defendant was indicted on June 2, 2016, under the Louisiana Racketeering

Act for racketeering activity that revolved around his participation in a

methamphetamine distribution enterprise between February 1, 2015, and March 9,

2016, under the auspices of the Sinaloa Mexican drug cartel. This corresponded

with a surge in methamphetamine availability in Vernon Parish that witnessed street

prices plummet from $120.00 per gram to $60.00 per gram. The participants in the

racketeering enterprise were Defendant, Christopher Granado, Nathan Wayne

Robertson, Carey Lynn White, Felisha Hernandez-Quezada, and twenty-two

unindicted co-conspirators. Granado was the head of the organization and the main

source and supplier of the Sinaloa methamphetamine. The racketeering offense was

predicated on the laundering of proceeds collected and channeled through Granado

and the illegal distribution of methamphetamine, violations of La.R.S. 14:230 and

La.R.S. 40:967. Defendant became involved as a lower-level dealer, and, for the

first few months of the enterprise, received methamphetamine from Robertson, who

had been receiving methamphetamine directly from Granado. In November of 2015,

Robertson was arrested for domestic abuse battery and incarcerated, and Defendant

began receiving methamphetamine directly from Granado, taking over the

distribution of the methamphetamine in Vernon Parish.

Following his arrest, as outlined above, Defendant entered into a plea

agreement to actively cooperate with law enforcement authorities in exchange for

testifying truthfully against Granado and Hernandez-Quezada. Defendant’s

cooperation was acknowledged by the State in a memorandum asking that Defendant

be sentenced to fifteen years. Sheriff John S. “Sam” Craft of Vernon Parish wrote a

letter on Defendant’s behalf in which he indicated that Defendant had been

employed at the sheriff’s department’s automotive shop during his incarceration and

behaved “in a very courteous manner.” The warden of the detention facility also

wrote on Defendant’s behalf, along with several other Vernon and Beauregard Parish

residents.1

The trial court noted that Defendant’s participation in methamphetamine

distribution “carried a catastrophic effect on the substance abuse problem in Vernon

1
We note that many of the letters seem to have been penned by the same author, as they
repeat verbatim many of the same phrases and concluding paragraphs.
2

Parish.” Defendant’s participation was initially low-level until Robertson’s arrest,

which Defendant capitalized on to move higher in the distribution chain. Defendant,

the trial court noted, “organized meth selling operations in Vernon and Beauregard

Parishes with plans to expand his operations in Calcasieu Parish in the future.” Only

“the combined efforts of the Vernon Parish Narcotics Task Force, the Louisiana

State Police, the DEA, and other state and federal law enforcement agencies”

brought Defendant to heel. The trial court also noted:

The Court in this matter, in addition to what has been indicated
earlier, will acknowledge that I have read the entire criminal file in this
matter because I wasn’t initially involved in this matter from the
beginning. And I’ve reviewed the many statements that were taken
during the investigation by co-defendants and other persons with
personal knowledge of the inner workings of this organization. Those
statements included statements by Nathan Robertson, Carey White,
Jimmy Morgan, Robert Keen, Jr., David Dowden, Amanda Stewart,
Shelly Clutter, Wilmer Stewart, Justin Williams, and Russel Cole. Of
all the statements in the record, Mr. Cole was the most evasive and least
forthcoming about the organization and his involvement. In fact, he
attempted to portray his involvement in terms of receiving only ounces
of drugs instead of the pounds of meth as described by the others
mentioned giving statements. The record also reflects that it was only
until Mr. Cole realized that there was no other light at the end of the
tunnel and that he had to do something to help himself that his
cooperation became significant and fruitful.

The trial court simply did not accept that Defendant genuinely acknowledged the

seriousness of his crimes and felt that an extended period of probation would present

“an undue risk” of recidivism. Defendant was sentenced to serve twenty years at

hard labor.

Defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence in which he argued that

his sentence was a deviation from the cooperation agreement, was inconsistent with

the sentence given to others similarly situated, was excessive, and was based, at least

partially, on evidence in dispute and about which the defense had no knowledge.

This motion was denied without a hearing. This appeal ensued.

3

Defendant asserts that the trial court committed two errors that render his

sentence illegal. First, he contends that the sentence of twenty years at hard labor is

excessive in light of his cooperation with the State, along with the fact that the State

recommended a sentence of fifteen years and in comparison to the sentences

imposed on his co-defendants. Second, Defendant urges that the trial court failed to

comply with La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1, in that the sentence was not tailored to

Defendant’s case. Specifically, the trial court noted that methamphetamine

consumption represents a serious problem in Vernon Parish and that most crime in

Vernon Parish stems from methamphetamine addiction. This, Defendant argues,

departs from the purpose of La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1, which ensures that the

sentence is individualized to the defendant and the offense.

On appellate review of an excessive-sentence claim, a panel of this court

stated that:

Both the United States and Louisiana constitutions guarantee that
no person shall be subject to cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const.
amend. VIII; La. Const. art. I, § 20. A sentence is excessive when a
reviewing court finds that the penalty is “so grossly disproportionate to
the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the
sentence makes no measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals
and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless imposition of pain and
suffering.” State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir.
1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808
So.2d 331. The trial court has broad sentencing discretion, and a
sentence within statutory limits will not be set aside absent a manifest
abuse of that discretion. State v. Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir.
10/13/99), 746 So.2d 124, writ denied, 00-165 (La.6/30/00), 765 So.2d
1067. However, sentences within the statutory sentencing range can be
reviewed for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Sepulvado, 367
So.2d 762 (La.1979).

In reviewing the defendant’s sentences, the appellate court
should consider the nature of the crime, the nature and background of
the offender, and the sentences imposed for similar crimes. State v.
Lisotta, 98-648 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d 57 (citing State v.
Telsee, 425 So.2d 1251 (La.1983)), writ denied, 99-433 (La.6/25/99),
745 So.2d 1183. In State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir.
2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied, 03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845
So.2d 1061, a panel of this court observed that:
4

While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar
crimes may provide some insight, “it is well settled that
sentences must be individualized to the particular offender
and to the particular offense committed.” State v. Batiste,
594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991). Additionally, it is
within the purview of the trial court to particularize the
sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best
position to assess the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances presented by each case.” State v. Cook, 95-
2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Soileau, 13-772, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1008, 1011,

writ denied, 14-452 (La. 9/26/14), 149 So.3d 261.2

Defendant argues that the trial court ignored many mitigating factors and that

the trial court punished Defendant for its view of the crime rather than

individualizing the sentence to Defendant. Addressing his status within the

distribution ring, Defendant notes that his role was more expansive for only a few

months of the enterprise. Defendant received several letters of support from the

community. He notes that the contents of the letters indicate that he is a hard-

working man, committed to paying his debt to society, has the tools and motivation

to return to the community and to his family, is a talented and skilled pipeline welder,

has been a good provider to his wife and children, attends church, enjoys helping

people, regrets his mistakes, and has demonstrated remorse, honest character, loyalty,

and a strong work ethic. Defendant maintains that, in accordance with the warden’s

letter, he was one of the best trusties at the jail with no disciplinary problems.

Defendant further contends that the trial court improperly fashioned his sentence by

focusing on the its shock at a letter of support coming from the sheriff, and that the

court improperly focused on its personal feelings about the methamphetamine

problem in the parish, rather than what was appropriate for this particular offender

2
The irony that Defendant argues, on the one hand, that his sentence should conform to
the sentences imposed on others, and, on the other, that the sentence was not sufficiently
individualized to his case, is not lost on the court.
5

and offense, rendering his sentence not individualized under La.Code Crim.P. art.

894.1. Further, Defendant has been sober for over a year, has begun rehabilitation,

and is equipped to become a productive member of society now that he is not

debilitated by addiction.

In his motion to reconsider the sentence, Defendant did raise the issue of his

twenty-year sentence being a deviation from the cooperation agreement. His

cooperation and the State’s sentencing recommendation per the cooperation

agreement are considered below. However, Defendant did not raise the other

mitigating factors that he now alleges on appeal in his motion to reconsider the

sentence; as such, the remainder of the mitigating circumstances raised by Defendant

on appeal are not properly before this court. Under La.Code Crim.P. art. 881.1(E),

the failure to make or timely file a motion to reconsider sentence or to include a

specific ground for reconsideration precludes a defendant from raising an objection

to the sentence or urging any ground not raised in the motion on appeal. State v.

Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, writ denied,

01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331; State v. Moore, 98-1423 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/3/99),

734 So.2d 706. See also State v. King, 95-344 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/4/95), 663 So.2d

307, writ denied, 95-2664 (La. 3/15/96), 669 So.2d 433.

As stated earlier, Defendant contends that his sentence was not individualized,

arguing that the trial court did not properly follow the guidelines in La.Code Crim.P.

art. 894.1, and that the sentence was not tailored or individualized to this offender

and this offense. Further, he argues that the trial court’s comments concerning the

seriousness of the methamphetamine problem and the trial court’s statement that

most of the crimes in the parish stemmed from methamphetamine addiction

constituted personal feelings and did not demonstrate compliance with the purpose

of La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1, which is to ensure that the sentence is individualized
6

to the offender and the offense. Thus, he argues, the sentence is unconstitutional.

Defendant did not raise these issues in his motion to reconsider the sentence. The

issue of the trial court’s compliance with the guidelines in La.Code Crim.P. art.

894.1 and the comments made by the trial court judge are not properly before this

court.

Defendant entered his guilty plea to racketeering many months before he was

sentenced. At the hearing, the trial court specifically and pointedly questioned

Defendant whether he understood that the State merely recommended a sentence,

but that the sentencing authority lay with the trial court, which is not bound by the

State’s recommendation. Defendant answered in the affirmative. The trial court is

not bound by a recommendation by the State and “may pronounce any sentence it

sees fit.” State v. Malbroux, 485 So.2d 257, 259 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 489

So.2d 1273 (1986).

Defendant argues that there was no sentencing parity between his sentence of

twenty years and Nathan Robertson’s sentence of twenty-five years with twelve

years suspended, since he faces seven more years’ incarceration than Robertson, in

violation of La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1. Defendant was sentenced to twenty years

less than Granado. On the issue of sentencing parity between co-defendants, the

third circuit has stated that:

There is no requirement that co-defendants receive equal
sentences. See State v. Taylor, 01–1638 (La.1/14/03), 838 So.2d 729,
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1103, 124 S.Ct. 1036, 157 L.Ed.2d 886 (2004);
State v. Rogers, 405 So.2d 829 (La.1981). Notwithstanding, in State v.
Quimby, 419 So.2d 951, 962 (La.1982), our supreme court stated:

This does not mean that disparity in sentences of co-
defendants with similar backgrounds, charged with similar
participation in identical crimes may not be considered as
a factor in determining whether a sentence is excessive and
out of proportion to the severity of a crime. It is only a
factor to be considered along with all other appropriate
considerations when there is no reasonable basis in the
7

record for the disparity. State v. Sims, 410 So.2d 1082
(La.1982).

“In providing a wide range of criminal sanctions for violations
of a statute, the legislature obviously intends that the [trial court] shall
exercise [its] sentencing discretion to impose sentences gradated
according to the individualized circumstances of the offense and of the
offender.” State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 766 (La.1979). Indeed,
the individualization of a sentence cannot be accomplished “without
independently considering the merits of each case.” State v. Day, 414
So.2d 349, 352 (La.1982). Simply stated, “[d]isparities are inherent in
a system where punishment is tailored to fit the defendant and the
crime.” Id.

State v. Prejean, 10-480, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/3/10), 50 So.3d 249,

253(alteration in original). The trial court found that Granado and Robertson were

more forthcoming in their cooperation than Defendant. Additionally, Defendant was

a second-felony offender and has a prior criminal record, including a history of

methamphetamine distribution. Though Granado discussed his status as a first-

felony offender in his 2018 appeal before this court and Robertson was arrested for

domestic abuse in November of 2015, the methamphetamine distribution history of

Robertson is largely unknown. State v. Granado, 18-485 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/18),

__ So.3d __. We conclude that he disparity between the sentences of Defendant,

Robertson, and Granado is not problematic.

Defendant’s sentence is not excessive. The record indicates that Defendant’s

offense stems from racketeering activity, specifically participation in a

methamphetamine distribution enterprise, in violation of La.R.S. 15:1353, which

carries a maximum sentence of fifty years at hard labor, a fine with a maximum

amount of one million dollars, or both. La.R.S. 15:1354(A). Unquestionably, the

Legislature intended to convey the serious nature of the offense by the severity of

the punishment. Defendant’s twenty-year sentence is a mid-range sentence for this

offense. Defendant is a second felony offender, with a criminal history of

methamphetamine distribution. At the time he pleaded guilty to the racketeering
8

charge, Defendant was awaiting sentencing for related methamphetamine

distribution charges. Additionally, the State was seeking ten years for cooperating

street-level dealers and the maximum penalty of fifty years for non-cooperating mid-

level actors. Defendant did cooperate with the State, providing truthful and useful

information, and, before he became a major participant and leader of the enterprise,

he was a lower mid-level/street-level dealer.

Defendant’s sentence is also comparable with other racketeering sentences.

In Granado, __ So.3d __, this court upheld co-defendant Christopher Granado’s

sentence of forty years of imprisonment and a $50,000.00 fine plus court costs for

racketeering. In State v. Nagi, 17-1257 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/9/18) (unpublished

opinion), the first circuit upheld consecutive sentences of thirty years of

imprisonment at hard labor for racketeering and money laundering, violations of

La.R.S. 15:1353 and La.R.S. 14:230, and fifteen years of imprisonment at hard labor

for both distribution of synthetic cannabinoids and possession with intent to

distribute synthetic cannabinoids, totaling ninety years of imprisonment. In State v.

Smith, 16-406 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/30/17), 227 So.3d 337, writ denied, 17-1643, 17-

1660 (La. 9/14/18), 252 So.3d 481,482, the fifth circuit upheld a fifty-year sentence

for the crime of racketeering, which is the maximum sentence for the crime, where

the defendant was convicted of racketeering, conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and

possession with intent to distribute cocaine.

That Defendant was far more than a street-dealer for several months is clearly

demonstrated by the record; contrary to his assertions in his brief, he was the highest-

ranking distributor of methamphetamine in Vernon Parish, working directly with the

Sinaloa Mexican drug cartel between November 2015 and March 2016 and

distributing methamphetamine to consumers and lower-level dealers for distribution

9

throughout Vernon Parish. Defendant received a mid-range sentence of twenty

years, which was imposed without a fine.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when imposing a twenty-year

sentence. Defendant’s two assignments of error are without merit.

DECREE

Defendant’s sentence of twenty years at hard labor for the crime of

racketeering is affirmed.

SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

10