State of Louisiana v. Jamula L. Collins

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

18-969

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

JAMULA L. COLLINS

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LASALLE, NO. 16-1799
HONORABLE J. CHRISTOPHER PETERS, DISTRICT JUDGE

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CANDYCE G. PERRET
JUDGE

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Court composed of Shannon J. Gremillion, Candyce G. Perret, and Jonathan W.
Perry, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Holli Herrle-Castillo
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 2333
Marrero, LA 70073
(504) 345-2801
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Jamula L. Collins

J. Reed Walters
District Attorney
Walter E. Dorroh, Jr.
Assistant District Attorney
Post Office Box 1940
Jena, LA 71342
(318) 992-8282
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

PERRET, Judge.

Defendant, Jamula L. Collins, pleaded guilty to second degree battery, a

violation of La.R.S. 14:34.1, following an altercation with a fellow inmate at the

LaSalle Correctional Center in Urania, Louisiana. He was sentenced to six years at

hard labor with the Department of Corrections, the sentence to run consecutively to

any sentences he was currently serving. Defendant was further ordered to pay the

costs of the court proceedings and a fee of $150.00 for the pre-sentence

investigation (“PSI”) report. Defendant appeals alleging that his sentence was

excessive. On appeal, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

The facts of the offense were stipulated to at the June 22, 2018 guilty plea

hearing as follows:

THE COURT: Can I have a factual basis, please?

MR. DORROH: Yes sir. On or about September 19,
2016, the defendant and Michael Guillory were inmates at the
uh, La Salle Correctional Center in Urania, in La Salle Parish,
Louisiana. On that date uh, the victim, Mr. Guillory, was
talking on the telephone, uh, in one of the dorms. That was in
La Salle Parish. Mr. Collins uh, attacked him from behind.
Knocked him unconscious and proceeded to administer a
beating to him. The victim was unconscious and unable to
defend himself. The beating was so severe that the victim had
to be life, uh, airlifted to the hospital. He was hospitalized for
several days. It was thought that he was going to die at the
time. He still is having problems with uh, memory and brain
damage. He was uh, severely injured and had to be
hospitalized. Was knocked unconscious at the time of the
incident.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Collins, you heard what Mr.
Dorroh said. Is that basically what happened?

A. Yes sir.

THE COURT: Okay. And he didn’t say come hit me.
Did he? He didn’t consent to being hit.

A. No sir.

On November 15, 2016, Defendant was charged by bill of information with

one count of aggravated second degree battery, a violation of La.R.S. 14:34.7,

upon Michael Guillory. Defendant initially pled not guilty, but later withdrew that

plea and entered a plea of guilty on June 22, 2018, to an amended charge of second

degree battery, a violation of La.R.S. 14:34.1, as part of a blind plea deal in which

the State agreed not to file a habitual offender bill. The trial court ordered a PSI to

be conducted and set sentencing for August 7, 2018.

At the sentencing hearing, Defendant was sentenced to six years at hard

labor with the Department of Corrections to run consecutively to any sentences he

was currently serving. Defendant was further ordered to pay the costs of the court

proceedings and a fee of $150.00 for the PSI report.

Defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider Sentence on August 28, 2018,

alleging that his sentence was excessive under the circumstances because the trial

court failed to fully consider the mitigating facts that were presented. Additionally,

Defendant notes that he is not entitled to diminution of sentence. Defendant

requested all exhibits attached to his previously filed sentencing memorandum as

well as those attached to the State’s sentencing memorandum be proffered into the

record for appellate review. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to

reconsider.

Defendant now appeals and assigns one assignment of error, that his

sentence is excessive.

ERRORS PATENT:

All appeals are reviewed for errors patent on the face of the record in

accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920. “An error patent is one ‘that is

discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without

inspection of the evidence.’” State v. Wagnon, 18-446, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir.
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12/6/18), 261 So.3d 60, 63 (quoting La.Code Crim.P. art. 920(2)). After reviewing

the record, we find no errors patent.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

In his sole assignment of error, Defendant alleges that the trial court imposed

an excessive sentence by declining to consider the mitigating factor that Mr.

Guillory’s behavior contributed to the attack against him. We find no merit to

Defendant’s argument.

We must first determine whether Defendant properly preserved the review

of his sentence on appeal, which procedure is set forth in La.Code Crim.P. art.

881.1:

A. (1) In felony cases, within thirty days following the
imposition of sentence or within such longer period as the trial court
may set at sentence, the state or the defendant may make or file a
motion to reconsider sentence.

....

E. Failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence or to
include a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider sentence
may be based, including a claim of excessiveness, shall preclude the
state or the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence or
from urging any ground not raised in the motion on appeal or review.

Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence on August 28, 2018, and

argued:

Mover[] asserts that the court ordered sentence of six years hard
labor is excessive under the circumstances in that the court did not
fully consider the mitigating facts presented to the court. Further the
defendant as [sic] indicated in his sentencing memorandum that he is
not entitled to diminution of sentence and as such will have to serve
day for day on the sentence imposed.

....

Mover further ask [sic] that all exhibits attached to his prior
filed sentencing memorandum and the State sentencing memorandum
be proffered into the record for appellate review.

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At the hearing on the motion to reconsider, Defendant’s sentencing

memorandum was filed into the record. Defendant argued in his memorandum that

the court should consider the mitigating factors under La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1,

namely that Defendant did not contemplate that his actions would cause serious

harm, that he acted under strong provocation, that there were substantial grounds

which could justify Defendant’s actions despite failing to establish a defense, and

that Mr. Guillory’s conduct induced Defendant’s actions. Thus, Defendant has

properly preserved his claim for appellate review.

Excessive punishment is prohibited under the U.S. Const. amend. VIII and

La.Const. art. 1, § 20. Despite a sentence being within the statutory sentencing

range, it may be reviewed for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Sepulvado, 367

So.2d 762 (La.1979).

The supreme court has explained that, “[i]n reviewing a sentence for

excessiveness, we first determine whether there has been compliance with LSA-

C.Cr.P. Art. 894.1 in the imposition of [the] sentence. If so, a second inquiry is

made to determine whether the sentence is too severe given the circumstances of

the case and the defendant’s background.” State v. Lobato, 603 So.2d 739, 751

(La.1992). This court has used the following guidelines:

In State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01),
779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La.2/1/02), 808 So.2d
331, a panel of this court discussed the review of excessive sentence
claims, stating:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law
shall subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.”
To constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing
court must find the penalty so grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to
shock our sense of justice or that the sentence makes
no measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals
and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless
imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell,
404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial court has wide
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discretion in the imposition of [a] sentence within the
statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as
excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d
124, writ denied, 00-0165 (La.6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067.
The relevant question is whether the trial court abused its
broad sentencing discretion, not whether another
sentence might have been more appropriate. State v.
Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied,
519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

Further, in reviewing the defendant’s sentences, the
appellate court should consider the nature of the crime, the
nature and background of the offender, and the sentences
imposed for similar crimes. State v. Lisotta, 98-648 (La.App. 5 Cir.
12/16/98), 726 So.2d 57 (citing State v. Telsee, 425 So.2d 1251
(La.1983)), writ denied, 99-433 (La. 6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183. In
State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786,
789, writ denied, 03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061, a panel of
this court observed that:

While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar
crimes may provide some insight, “it is well settled that
sentences must be individualized to the particular
offender and to the particular offense committed.” State
v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991).
Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to
particularize the sentence because the trial judge
“remains in the best position to assess the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances presented by each case.”
State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Soileau, 13-770, 13-771, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1002,

1005-06, writ denied, 14-452 (La. 9/26/14), 149 So.3d 261 (emphasis added).

Additionally, “[w]hile the trial judge need not articulate every aggravating

and mitigating circumstance outlined in [La.Code Crim.P.] art. 894.1, the record

must reflect that he adequately considered these guidelines in particularizing the

sentence to the defendant.” State v. Smith, 433 So.2d 688, 698 (La.1983) (citing

State v. Ray, 423 So.2d 1116 (La.1982); State v. Keeney, 422 So.2d 1144

(La.1982); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982)).

In this case, Defendant pleaded guilty to second degree battery, a violation

of La.R.S. 14:34.1(A). In 2016, second degree battery was defined as “a battery
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when the offender intentionally inflicts serious bodily injury[.]” La.R.S.

14:34.1(A). The penalty provision at the time stated, “Whoever commits the crime

of second degree battery shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars or

imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than eight years, or both.”

La.R.S. 14:34.1(C). The trial court sentenced Defendant to six years at hard labor,

which was ordered to run consecutively to any sentences he was currently serving,

as well as costs of the court proceedings and a fee of $150.00 for the PSI report.

The trial court considered the guidelines set forth in La.Code Crim.P. art.

894.1 at the sentencing hearing and noted Defendant’s criminal history, which

includes a prior felony conviction for manslaughter, the sentence he was serving at

the time of the offense in question, and prior juvenile arrests for simple burglary,

obstruction of justice, second degree battery, three unnamed misdemeanors, and

contempt of court. The trial court asserted that it seemed Defendant’s “entire adult

life has been spent with a more than comfortable relationship with Louisiana’s

criminal justice system. This is not a record of a person who simply makes a

mistake.” The trial court concluded that Defendant had “difficulty operating in

normal society without resorting to violence or some other form of criminal

activity.”

The trial court also considered Defendant’s sentencing memorandum, which

argued that Defendant’s actions were provoked by sexual advances and bullying

from Mr. Guillory, and that Defendant had no other recourse to resolve the

unwanted advances and bullying. Defendant notes that he was confined in a

dormitory and that there was no place for Defendant to go to get away from Mr.

Guillory. Defendant states that the problems precipitating the present incident

started about three months prior when he, Mr. Guillory, and other inmates in the

dorm were playing poker and Mr. Guillory started to lose money. Mr. Guillory
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started to sneak chips into his pocket then accused Defendant of not giving him

enough chips. This caused an argument between Defendant and Mr. Guillory, and

Mr. Guillory told Defendant he wanted to fight. Defendant gave Mr. Guillory

extra chips to avoid the fight, but he was then perceived as weak. Soon after, Mr.

Guillory began antagonizing Defendant by making sexual advances. Defendant

alleges that he attempted to talk to Mr. Guillory several times to try to end the

advances, but Mr. Guillory did not stop. The last time he tried to talk to Mr.

Guillory was the day of the offense at issue. Mr. Guillory was on the phone and

winked at Defendant. It was then that Defendant left to put on his shoes, came

back, kicked Mr. Guillory, who hit his head against the wall and fell to the ground,

and punched Mr. Guillory repeatedly.

On appeal, Defendant argues that there was evidence supporting his claim

that Mr. Guillory was a bully, not only to Defendant but to other inmates as well.

Defendant points to the statements of four inmates that indicate Mr. Guillory was

known to threaten inmates with a knife. Some stated that they had seen the knife.

One inmate claimed he had stopped Mr. Guillory from using the knife against

another inmate. Another stated he was choked by Mr. Guillory during an

altercation. Additionally, the inmates claimed that Mr. Guillory often made sexual

advances towards other inmates, which included threats and sexual remarks.

Defendant notes that the inmates’ statements also indicate that he,

Defendant, was quiet and stayed to himself. Further, Defendant points out that he

was at this facility for over a year and was only reprimanded once for arguing with

a deputy who refused to let him take a shower.

Defendant refutes the State’s assertion that the witness statements were not

reliable because they were made by inmates. According to Defendant, the State’s

allegation that the inmate witnesses are not credible because of their criminal
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history is hypocritical when the State is also “portraying Guillory, with just as long

a rap sheet, as an angel.” Defendant further argues that the statements all

corroborate each other and set forth substantially similar claims about Mr.

Guillory’s conduct which lends credence to their credibility. The State, on the

other hand, asserts that the statements lack credibility because the witnesses were

not cross-examined, and Mr. Guillory was not available to refute the statements

because of the brain injuries he suffered as a result of the attack.

Defendant further claims that the State is incorrect in its suggestion that the

presence of only one disciplinary infraction on Mr. Guillory’s record at the prison

is evidence that he did not engage in the bullying conduct that the inmates claimed

he perpetrated. Rather, according to Defendant, the inmates’ statements suggest

that they were afraid of retaliation should they report Mr. Guillory. One inmate

stated he did try to bring Mr. Guillory’s behavior to the attention of the prison

authorities, but the issue was never pursued.

In Defendant’s final argument supporting his claim that Mr. Guillory was a

bully, he claims that the failure of fellow inmates to intervene during the attack is

evidence that Mr. Guillory did behave in the manner claimed. The State asserts

that such an argument is speculation, inuendo, and supposition. Aside from

Defendant’s statement, the inmates’ statements suggest that another inmate did try

to stop the attack, but he was advised not to get involved.

Additionally, Defendant claims that the trial court did not consider the

journal articles submitted with his sentencing memorandum that describe the

realities of prison life. These articles discuss bullying in prison and prison culture.

Defendant further explains that prison life does not provide the same outlets as the

real world to diffuse potentially violent situations such as the ability to walk away

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from a confrontation or the ability to report bullying or crimes to authorities

without the threat of violent retaliation.

However, the record shows that the trial court did consider these journal

articles at sentencing. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated:

I thoroughly reviewed the ten page memorandum and each of the
thirteen exhibits. The essence of the memorandum and accompanying
statements, journal articles and other attached documents, seem to
indicate that you were really the victim here because you were making
a preemptive strike upon Mr. Guillory to keep from being bullied. It
certainly was not the man that you beat unmercifully to
unconsciousness, and was subsequently left with brain damage. You
had to attack him to cement your position in the upper echelon of the
prison hierarchy to avoid being perceived as weak, making you an
easy mark for others to pick on. To your lawyers’ credit, he did not
try to indicate that you were not guilty, only that your punishment
should not be as severe because you were incarcerated. On some
level, I understand the argument, and I would not go as far as the
assistant district attorney, in his memorandum stated, as classifying
the analysis as “psychobabble.” However, the argument rings hollow. . . .
Nowhere in the articles does it excuse steps taken as retribution.
These articles simply describe the conditions in prisons and the
environments that allow bullying to prosper, and methods to combat
that activity. The fact that this atmosphere exists is not in and of itself
a mitigating circumstance.

Thus, not only did the trial court consider the journal articles, but it stated that it

understood the argument defense counsel was trying to make and disagreed with

the State’s characterization of the argument as “psychobabble.” The trial court’s

conclusion that the argument rang hollow is not a total disregard of and failure to

consider the journal articles, but rather, it is a valid exercise of the trial court’s

authority to determine whether the evidence presented by Defendant was enough to

support his claim that Mr. Guillory’s behavior should mitigate Defendant’s

sentence.

Given the above, the trial court did properly consider the evidence

Defendant provided to mitigate his sentence. However, the trial court rejected his

argument, finding that no credible evidence demonstrated Defendant was bullied

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by Mr. Guillory, that Defendant’s past showed he had a history of violence, and

that the fact that an atmosphere of bullying exists in prisons is not in and of itself a

mitigating circumstance. According to the trial court, there was no evidence that

Mr. Guillory’s conduct “induced or facilitated this savage attack” and, importantly,

even if Defendant was bullied and such a preemptive attack was necessary for

Defendant to protect himself, the attack was not proportional to the bullying

Defendant allegedly received. It was within the trial court’s authority to find that

this evidence did not constitute mitigating circumstances.

We will now address the excessiveness of Defendant’s sentence. The

factors to consider on appellate review are “the nature of the crime, the nature and

background of the offender, and the sentences imposed for similar crimes.”

Soileau, 153 So.3d at 1005.

Nature of the Crime

Second degree battery requires the intentional infliction of serious bodily

injury. La.R.S. 14:34.1. Further, second degree battery is classified as a crime of

violence under La.R.S. 14:2. At sentencing, the trial court specifically noted that

“the attack [Defendant] perpetrated upon Mr. Guillory was vicious and frankly

disturbing. Not only did [Defendant] attack him from the back, but after knocking

him to the ground, [Defendant] continued to beat upon him until he was a bloody

pulp.” The trial court continued, “the extent to which [Defendant] delivered the

beating was savage and beyond the pale of anything acceptable by the law.” The

trial court noted the following regarding Mr. Guillory’s injuries at the time of the

sentencing hearing:

Mr. Guillory has been diagnosed with Paranoid Schizophrenia due to
his extensive brain damage suffered as a result of this attack. He
further has difficulty walking, but can use a wheel chair for balance
for only a short distance. He will be in need of further treatment for at
least an additional six months.
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After reviewing the video of the attack, the pictures of Mr. Guillory, and the

sentencing memorandums, the trial court concluded that “one cannot realistically

state with a straight face that [Defendant] did not contemplate serious harm to Mr.

Guillory in this attack.”

Background of the Offender

The trial court ordered a PSI and referenced it and Defendant’s background

at length during the sentencing hearing:

The Pre-Sentence Investigative Report provides that you are a thirty-
four year old male and are a second time felony offender. However,
that one previous felony is a serious crime of violence. According to
this report, you were convicted in 2004, when you were twenty years
old, in Rapides Parish, of Manslaughter as part of a plea bargain
arrangement from the original charge of Second Degree Murder. As a
result of that plea, you received a sentence of twenty-five (25) years at
hard labor. It seems as if your criminal record has lasted as long as
you have been an adult. In July of 2001, some six weeks after you
turned seventeen, you were arrested on the charge of Simple Burglary,
for which no disposition is found. Two months later you were
arrested on the charges of Obstruction of Justice and Second Degree
Battery, for which you received a probated sentence for a plea to the
reduced charge of Simple Battery. That probation, by the way, was
revoked. Two months after that, you were arrested for three
misdemeanors, which were either dismissed or nolle prossed. In
March of 2002, you were arrested for Contempt of Court for which no
disposition exists. And the last entry occurred approximately one year
later with your arrest for Second Degree Murder in January of 2003.
Thus, it seems your entire adult life has been spent with a more than
comfortable relationship with Louisiana’s criminal justice system.
This is not a record of a person who simply makes a mistake. Rather,
it is the record of a career criminal and apex predator. As a result, it
appears that you have difficulty operating in normal society without
resorting to violence or some other form of criminal activity.

Sentences Imposed for Similar Crimes

As previously noted, the maximum penalty for second degree battery at the

time of Defendant’s offense was eight years at hard labor and a two thousand

dollar fine. La.R.S. 14:34.1(C). Defendant received six years despite his extensive

criminal history. Defendant was originally facing an aggravated second degree

battery charge, which carried a maximum sentence of fifteen years at the time of
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Defendant’s offense. La.R.S. 14:34.7(C). Defendant benefited from a plea deal, in

which he pleaded to the lesser charge of second degree battery and the State agreed

not to pursue a habitual offender bill.

In State v. Sanders, 17-679 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/18), 238 So.3d 1098, writ

denied, 18-342 (La. 12/17/18), 257 So.3d 1261, this court upheld a five year

sentence for second degree battery, which was the maximum sentence at the time

of the defendant’s offense. The defendant threw the victim down the stairs, held

her against her will, threatened to harm her with a meat skewer, sprayed lighter

fluid on her and threatened to set her on fire, hit her multiple times on the top of

her head with a knife, kicked her, threw her to the ground, seriously injured her

head, and slapped her. As previously set forth, Defendant stipulated at his guilty

plea hearing that he attacked Mr. Guillory so severely that Mr. Guillory had to be

airlifted to the hospital where he spent several days, it was thought that Mr.

Guillory would die from his injuries, and he now suffers memory problems and

brain damage. Thus, his offense is comparable to that committed in Sanders.

In State v. Barnes, 12-667 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/5/12), 103 So.3d 1254, this

court upheld a sentence of four years, where the maximum at the time of the

offense was five years, and the defendant had prior arrests and/or convictions for

simple battery, second degree battery, and domestic abuse battery. The victim in

Barnes sustained a broken jaw in a fight that required screws and plates to correct

the injury. As previously noted, Defendant in the present case has similar arrests

and convictions in his past with the additional fact that he is currently serving time

for a manslaughter conviction. The injury sustained by Mr. Guillory in this case is

also much more severe than in Barnes.

As this court noted in Barling, 779 So.2d 1035, the trial court has great

discretion in shaping sentencing and appellate courts should respect that discretion
12

absent an abuse of discretion. Given the factors set forth herein, we cannot say that

the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Defendant to six years at hard

labor. Accordingly, Defendant’s sentence is affirmed.

DECREE:

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.3.

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