State of Louisiana v. Kenneth Seth Thomas

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

19-097 consolidated with 19-360

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

KENNETH SETH THOMAS

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APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 336,230
HONORABLE HARRY FRED RANDOW, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JONATHAN W. PERRY
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Phyllis M. Keaty, and Jonathan W. Perry,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

George Lewis Higgins, III
2002 Hartsfield Avenue
Post Office Box 7730
Pineville, Louisiana 71360
(318) 473-4250
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Kenneth Seth Thomas

J. Phillip Terrell, Jr.
District Attorney, Ninth Judicial District
Catherine L. Davidson
Assistant District Attorney
Post Office Box 7538
Alexandria, Louisiana 71306-7358
(318) 473-6650
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

PERRY, Judge.

Kenneth Seth Thomas (“Defendant”) appeals his sentence of three years in

the parish jail subject to work release for the crime of abuse of office, a violation of

La.R.S. 14:134.3.1 For the following reasons, we affirm Defendant’s sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

Defendant, a member of the Alexandria City Police Narcotics Division, was arrested

and charged in a bill of information with distribution of marijuana and abuse of

office. The charges filed by the State alleged that Defendant received “sexual

contact or intercourse” by using the authority of his position as a duly commissioned

police officer. Defendant pled guilty to the charge of abuse of office and the drug

charge was dismissed in conjunction with the plea.

On November 26, 2018, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve three years in

the custody of the Louisiana Department of Corrections without hard labor. The

sentencing colloquy is quoted below:

Mr. Thomas, . . . the . . . offense of abuse of office for which you have
entered a plea of guilty is viewed by this Court as both a serious and
troubling offense. And let me explain to you . . . why I say that and I
view it . . . in that regard. At the time of the illegal activities which
formed the basis of . . . the activities of which you . . . entered the plea
of guilty to these amended charges, you engaged in those activities as a
member of the Alexandria Police Department. It is the view of this
Court that your conduct . . . formed a very serious breach of your oath,
a solemn oath . . . that you took at the time . . . that you were sworn in
as an Alexandria police officer. It is also a breach of trust, trust that is
held by the community that you serve and, and people that come to this
community and would have any interactions with a police officer, and

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Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:134.3 provides, in pertinent part:

A. No public officer or public employee shall knowingly and intentionally
use the authority of his office or position, directly or indirectly, to compel or coerce
any person to provide the public officer, public employee or any other person with
anything of apparent present or prospective value when the public officer or
employee is not entitled by the nature of his office to the services sought or the
object of his demand.

B. (1) Whoever violates the provisions of this Section shall be fined up to
five thousand dollars, or be imprisoned with or without hard labor for not less than
one year nor more than five years.

it is also a trust that is held by your fellow police officers. The oath and
trust that is represented by the badge and the uniform that you wore
convey to all, your fellow officers, and this community integrity,
respect for the rights of all, and you made the choice and the decision
to trade . . . your oath and trust to satisfy not only your sexual desires
but also I believe, . . . in furtherance of your view of power and control.

. . . [T]hese serious illegal acts occurred while you were in uniform,
while you had a weapon on you, while . . . you were on duty. I think
it’s apparent to you that this Court . . . is of the opinion that a police
officer holds a high duty and a responsibility . . . to the people of the
community that he serves and also to his fellow law enforcement . . .
officers. To one that much is given, much is expected. And so, your
breach of conduct as a police officer, in my view, has to be held to a
higher standard.

Mr. Thomas, . . . I have considered . . . the provisions under Code
of Criminal Procedure Article 894.1 as to aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. I considered the . . . case . . . report . . . prepared by the
Louisiana State Police in furtherance of their criminal investigation . . .
of . . . the activities, the illegal activities . . . committed by you, and I
have . . . received and read each of the letters . . . that have been written
by family and friends to this Court . . . in your behalf.

Mr. Thomas, one of the most challenging difficult things that a
judge is called to do is to sentence someone. Regardless of what the
nature of the offense, serious or minor, part of the responsibility of the
Court is determining what’s fair, what’s just, what serves . . . the
community and . . . does right by that. [Y]our case is no different. I, I
want to tell you that . . . several of the letters . . . I reread, . . . because
this, the . . . Kenneth Seth Thomas that they spoke about in their letters
I couldn’t find in the case . . . report by the State Police. I didn’t see
someone that they represented to the Court as being this moral,
upstanding, . . . individual. I couldn’t find him in there.

Under Article 894.1, aggravating circumstances that I found:
one, at all times during the commission of the underlying criminal
offenses forming the amended charge, . . . which you entered a plea of
guilty, . . . you acted . . . as a law enforcement officer in his official
capacity. You breached your oath as a law enforcement officer by
engaging in illegal and corrupt practices while on duty and in the
uniform. Your engagement in illegal and, and corrupt practices
resulting the plea of guilty diminishes and undermines the reputation,
the integrity and the credibility of law enforcement in this community.
I truly believe that there is a real risk of that happening . . . as a result
of . . . your . . . behavior. Of your possessing illegal drugs with the
intent to distribute - - your interference with a narcotic investigation in
which you instructed another narcotic officer not to . . . inspect and
inventory the victim’s automobile, . . . during a narcotics . . .
interdiction at one of the local motels. Your destruction of a public
document, . . . being . . . the tearing up of a traffic citation to
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demonstrate to the victim that you had power and control. Your
coercion and intimidation of this female victim for the purpose of
obtaining sex on more than one occasion. That you knew or should
have known that the victim that you coerced and intimidated for sex
was particularly vulnerable due to her illegal activities. The only
mitigating factor that I could identify is the fact that you don’t have a
prior criminal history.

Defendant filed a Motion to Confirm Oral Appeal and Designation of Record on

December 21, 2018, which was granted by the trial court on January 7, 2019.

On December 21, 2018, Defendant also filed a motion to reconsider sentence

alleging (1) the sentence the trial court imposed was illegal in that a sentence in the

custody of the Louisiana Department of Corrections cannot be without hard labor

and (2) the sentence imposed was excessive. After a hearing on February 19, 2019,

the trial court granted the motion and resentenced Defendant to three years in the

parish jail subject to work release. Defendant filed a Motion to Confirm Oral Appeal

and Designation of Record which was granted by the trial court on March 6, 2019.2

Defendant’s appeal presents two assignments of error. He contends the trial

court erred in imposing an excessive sentence and in failing to provide a sufficient

basis and record for appellate review of the sentence for excessiveness.

DISCUSSION

Defendant’s assignments of error are interrelated. Therefore, we will address

them together.

Defendant first contends his three-year sentence is excessive due to his lack

of criminal history. He notes that the court did not order a presentence investigation

(PSI); rather, it based his sentence on allegations contained in a police report as well

as a drug charge which the State dismissed. Defendant also claims the trial court

failed to provide adequate reasons for sentencing in violation of La.Code Crim.P.

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By order of this court dated June 12, 2019, Defendant’s two appeals were consolidated.
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art. 894.1. Finally, Defendant notes the trial court did not impose a probated

sentence as desired by Defendant.

In response, the State contends the three-year sentence is squarely within the

one- to five-year sentencing range and is not excessive. The State further contends

that a probated sentence would be illegal, and although a mandatory minimum

sentence may be waived pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 890.1, the record is devoid

of any indication that such an agreement was entered in this case. We believe

resolution of this legality issue is unnecessary as the issue before this court is simply

whether the three-year sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive.

We note Defendant did not raise his claims that the trial court failed to comply

with La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1 and to order a PSI in his motion to reconsider

sentence filed after his original sentencing nor in his motion to reconsider filed after

his February 19, 2019 resentencing. Therefore, we find these claims are precluded

from review. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 881.1 states in pertinent

part:

A. (1) In felony cases, within thirty days following the imposition
of sentence or within such longer period as the trial court may set at
sentence, the state or the defendant may make or file a motion to
reconsider sentence.

....

E. Failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence or to
include a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider sentence
may be based, including a claim of excessiveness, shall preclude the
state or the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence or from
urging any ground not raised in the motion on appeal or review.

Thus, as previously stated, Defendant’s claims concerning non-compliance with

La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1 and the failure to order a PSI are precluded from review.

He is entitled to a review of his sentence for constitutional excessiveness only. See

State v. Breaux, 18-690 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/7/19), 269 So.3d 938, and State v. Scott,

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50,920 (La.App. 2 Cir. 11/16/16), 209 So.3d 248, writ denied, 17-353

(La. 11/13/17), 229 So.3d 478. In addition, Defendant’s claims are without merit as

the trial court is not required to order a PSI and Defendant did not object to the

absence of a PSI at sentencing. La.Code Crim.P. art. 875; State v. Houston, 50,126,

50,127 (La.App. 2 Cir. 11/18/15), 181 So.3d 188. Furthermore, a review of the

record indicates the trial court provided adequate reasons prior to imposing sentence.

No additional reasons were provided by the court at the hearing on February

19, 2019, on Defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence at which a new, more lenient

sentence was imposed. Thus, we find Defendant’s claim regarding noncompliance

with La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1 has no merit.

As for Defendant’s claim that his three-year parish prison sentence subject to

work release is excessive, we find this claim also has no merit. As articulated by

this court in Breaux, 269 So.3d at 940-41:

Louisiana courts have laid out the following guidelines with
regard to constitutionally excessive sentence review:

Sentences within the statutory sentencing range can
be reviewed for constitutional excessiveness. State v.
Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La.1979). In State v. Barling,
00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779
So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02),
808 So.2d 331, a panel of this court discussed the review
of excessive sentence claims, stating:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that,
“[n]o law shall subject any person to cruel or
unusual punishment.” To constitute an
excessive sentence, the reviewing court must
find the penalty so grossly disproportionate
to the severity of the crime as to shock our
sense of justice or that the sentence makes no
measurable contribution to acceptable penal
goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a
needless imposition of pain and suffering.
State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981).
The trial court has wide discretion in the
imposition of sentence within the statutory
limits and such sentence shall not be set aside

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as excessive absent a manifest abuse of
discretion. State v. Etienne, 99-192 (La.App.
3 Cir. 10/13/99), 746 So.2d 124, writ denied,
00-0165 (La.6/30/00), 765 So.2d 1067. The
relevant question is whether the trial court
abused its broad sentencing discretion, not
whether another sentence might have been
more appropriate. State v. Cook, 95-2784
(La. 5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied,
519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d
539 (1996).

Further, in reviewing the defendant’s sentences, the
appellate court should consider the nature of the crime, the
nature and background of the offender, and the sentences
imposed for similar crimes. State v. Lisotta, 98-648
(La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d 57 (citing State v.
Telsee, 425 So.2d 1251 (La.1983), writ denied, 99-433
(La. 6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183. In State v. Smith, 02-719,
p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ
denied, 03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061, a panel of
this court observed that:

While a comparison of sentences imposed for
similar crimes may provide some insight, “it
is well settled that sentences must be
individualized to the particular offender and
to the particular offense committed.” State v.
Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991).
Additionally, it is within the purview of the
trial court to particularize the sentence
because the trial judge “remains in the best
position to assess the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances presented by each
case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96),
674 So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Soileau, 13-770, 13-771, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir.
2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1002, 1005-06, writ denied, 14-452
(La. 9/26/14), 149 So.3d 261.

Violations of La.R.S. 14:134.3 carry a fine of up to five thousand dollars or

imprisonment with or without hard labor for not less than one year nor more than

five years. Defendant faced a maximum term of imprisonment of five years at hard

labor. He received a three-year sentence in parish jail subject to work release. As

noted by the trial court at the original sentencing proceeding, on more than one

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occasion Defendant used his position of authority to take advantage of a person in a

vulnerable situation. The State Police Criminal Investigation report introduced at

sentencing indicates that agents suspected Defendant also committed the offenses of

injuring public records, possession with intent to distribute a Schedule I drug

(marijuana), possession with intent to distribute a Schedule II drug (Adderall), and

possession with intent to distribute a Schedule IV drug (Alprazolam), although crime

lab reports were still pending at the time of the report. Defendant’s charge of

distribution of marijuana was dismissed in conjunction with the entry of his guilty

plea.

We echo the sentiments expressed by the trial court at Defendant’s original

sentencing hearing. Defendant’s conduct violated the position of trust which he

occupied as an officer responsible for enforcing the law and protecting society. Such

violations can seriously damage the relationship between the police force and the

community it is sworn to protect. Defendant’s sentence is a just consequence of his

breach of this trust. Thus, we find three years without hard labor subject to work

release is not an excessive sentence under the circumstances of this case.

Defendant’s sentence is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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