State of Louisiana v. Terrell Javon Batiste

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

19-632

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

TERRELL JAVON BATISTE

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. CR 158063
HONORABLE EDWARD D. RUBIN, DISTRICT JUDGE
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ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE

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Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Phyllis M. Keaty, and John E. Conery,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Chad M. Ikerd
Louisiana Appellate Project
P.O.Box 2125
Lafayette, LA 70502
(225) 806-2930
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:
Terrell Javon Batiste

Hon. Keith A. Stutes
Lafayette Parish District Attorney - Fifteenth Judicial District Court
Cynthia K. Simon
Assistant District Attorney
P. O. Box 3306
Lafayette, LA 70502-3306
(337) 232-5170
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

PICKETT, Judge.

FACTS

In the early morning hours of June 3, 2016, Drexel George and his fiancé

Sholonda Francis went to their residence in Lafayette where they found the

defendant, Terrell Javon Batiste, with a date, Kirsten Savoy. The defendant was a

cousin of George’s and had permission to stay there if George and Francis were

home, but not when they were away. The house was dark, as the electricity was not

on. According to Savoy, George told the defendant to leave, and the latter moved to

comply. However, the defendant bumped into an air conditioner that had been left

on the floor, making a loud noise. Reportedly, George became irritated, armed

himself with a hammer, and pinned the defendant against a wall. Francis and Savoy

both went outside. Savoy continued to the defendant’s mother’s home, which was

nearby. Francis stayed on the porch and heard a gunshot. The defendant ran out of

the house, then George walked out, bleeding from a gunshot wound. Investigators

later found a hammer on the porch. Medical testimony confirmed that George died

as a result of a gunshot to the body.

On August 16, 2016, a Lafayette Parish grand jury indicted the defendant on

charges of second degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1, and possession of

a firearm by a convicted felon, a violation of La.R.S. 14:95.1. The parties selected a

jury on December 18, 2018. The jury began hearing evidence the next day. At the

conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the murder charge

and guilty on the possession of a firearm charge. On January 31, 2019, the trial

court sentenced the defendant to twelve years at hard labor.

The defendant now appeals his conviction, assigning a single error. We affirm

the judgment of the trial court.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by this

court for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find

no errors patent.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In his sole assignment of error, the defendant argues the evidence was

insufficient to support his conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,

in violation of La.R.S. 14:95.1. As at trial, he does not dispute possessing a gun long

enough to shoot the victim. However, he repeats his trial argument that the shooting

was justified.

The general test for sufficiency is settled:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the
critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct.
2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195,
62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d
559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v.
Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to
weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the
appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations
of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the
Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d
559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order
for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect
that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

The statute that defines possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is La.R.S.

14:95.1(A), which states in pertinent part: “It is unlawful for any person who has

been convicted of . . . any violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances

Law which is a felony . . . to possess a firearm or carry a concealed weapon.”

(footnote omitted). As the defendant acknowledges, he stipulated to a cocaine
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conviction at trial. Also, he concedes that he possessed a firearm at the time of the

shooting. His sole defense was and is justification. A felon charged under La.R.S.

14:95.1 may raise justification. The supreme court has explained:

We hold that when a felon is in imminent peril of great bodily
harm, or reasonably believes himself or others to be in such danger, he
may take possession of a weapon for a period no longer than is
necessary or apparently necessary to use it in self-defense, or in defense
of others. In such situation justification is a defense to the charge of
felon in possession of a firearm.

State v. Blache, 480 So.2d 304, 308 (La.1985).

Justifiable homicide is governed by La.R.S. 14:20. As previously mentioned,

the jury acquitted the defendant of that offense. Since he conceded shooting the

victim and claimed justification, said defense was the sole legal basis upon which

the jury could have acquitted him of the murder. In a homicide case, the state bears

the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant did not act in self-

defense. State v. Griffin, 06-543 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/27/06), 940 So.2d 845, writ denied,

07-02 (La. 9/14/07), 963 So.2d 995. Under this legal standard, the jury could

rationally have decided that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

the defendant did not act in self-defense.

Again, justification is the defendant’s sole defense. There were no

eyewitnesses to the actual shooting. As noted above, Savoy testified that she saw

George holding a hammer while he pinned the defendant against a wall. She also

said she heard the victim exclaim that he would kill the defendant. After the incident,

the defendant stated to Savoy, in a telephone call from jail, that shooting George was

the only way for him to get out of the house. Investigators found a hammer on the

victim’s porch. The question remaining was whether the defendant was justified in

arming himself with a gun. There is sufficient evidence in the record for the jury to

conclude that at some point during the incident, George armed himself with a

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hammer. There is sufficient evidence in the record to support a jury finding the

defendant reasonably believed himself to be in imminent peril of great bodily harm

and was, therefore, legally justified in possessing a gun the necessary amount of time

required to use it in self-defense. Blache, 480 So.2d 304.

The question therefore becomes, in order for there to be sufficient evidence to

convict him of the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation

of 14:95.1, whether he was already in possession of the firearm before it was

necessary to possess it for self-defense, or whether he maintained possession of the

firearm after the danger had passed.

The record indicates the house was dark since it had no electricity. The state

questions how the defendant would have retrieved a gun in someone else’s house

and deployed it in the dark, and how he would have known it was loaded, if it was

not already in his possession. The state also notes that a firearm was never found and

infers that the defendant took it with him when he fled the scene. There is logic to

the state’s first point, but it is purely speculative. There is no evidence regarding

where the gun was before the defendant deployed it. There is no evidence as to who

owned the gun. Neither of the witnesses saw the defendant with a gun. Savoy stated

she did not bring a gun into the house. Though there is circumstantial evidence of

the likelihood that the defendant probably had the gun on him, there is no direct

evidence in the record to support a finding that the defendant possessed a firearm

before the shooting. The circumstantial evidence is insufficient to support a

conviction.

The remaining question is whether the defendant continued to possess the

weapon after the threat of imminent harm had passed. Clearly, there was a weapon

in the defendant’s hand at the time of the shooting. The defendant admitted to

shooting the victim. Law enforcement found no weapon in the residence afterward.
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The defendant fled immediately after shooting George. Savoy had already left the

scene and Francis was outside. Further, there is no evidence that Francis removed

the weapon or would want to do so. The evidence suggested that George walked out

onto the porch carrying a hammer, and there is no indication he was carrying a

firearm. No other people were present. Therefore, the circumstantial evidence

sufficiently establishes the defendant took the gun with him when he ran from the

house. The jury could have reasonably concluded, based on the evidence, that the

defendant continued to possess the firearm after such possession was necessary and

justified.

In reviewing the evidence under the Jackson standard, we find there is

sufficient evidence to uphold the defendant’s conviction of possession of a firearm

by a convicted felon in violation of La.R.S. 14:95.1.

CONCLUSION

The defendant’s conviction is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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