State of Louisiana v. Curtis Cheley

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

20-10

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

CURTIS CHELEY

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF VERNON, NO. 90627
HONORABLE LESTER P. KEES, DISTRICT JUDGE

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PHYLLIS M. KEATY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Billy Howard Ezell, Shannon J. Gremillion, and Phyllis M.
Keaty, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Paula C. Marx
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 82389
Lafayette, Louisiana 70598-2389
(337) 991-9757
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Curtis Cheley

Asa A. Skinner
District Attorney
Terry W. Lambright
Assistant District Attorney
Post Office Box 1188
Leesville, Louisiana 71446-1188
(337) 239-2008
Counsel for Appellee:
State of Louisiana

KEATY, Judge.

On January 18, 2017, a six-person jury found Defendant, Curtis Cheley, guilty

of aggravated second degree battery, a violation of La.R.S. 14:34.7. On February

22, 2017, the trial court adjudicated Defendant a third felony habitual offender, and

on March 14, 2017, Defendant was sentenced to twenty-two-and-one-half years at

hard labor. On January 2, 2018, this court affirmed Defendant’s conviction, but

vacated his sentence and remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing and

imposition of a legal sentence. See State v. Cheley, 17-538, 17-696 (La.App. 3 Cir.

1/4/18), 237 So.3d 58.

On June 20, 2018, the trial court adjudicated Defendant a third felony habitual

offender and sentenced him to fifteen years at hard labor on the aggravated second

degree battery offense and imposed an additional seven-year sentence upon

Defendant as a third felony habitual offender, an aggregate twenty-two-year

sentence. Defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider Sentence, which the trial court

denied on July 2, 2018. Defendant subsequently appealed his sentence, and this

court vacated and remanded for resentencing due to a procedural error. See State v.

Cheley, 18-805 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/1/19), 270 So.3d 870.

On September 25, 2019, an ad hoc trial judge sentenced Defendant to twenty-

two-and-one-half years at hard labor, with credit for time served pursuant to La.R.S.

15:529.1. Defendant filed another Motion to Reconsider Sentence, which the trial

court denied without a hearing. Defendant timely filed a Motion for Appeal and

Designation of Record, which the trial court granted on November 4, 2019.

FACTS

In Cheley, 237 So.3d at 60-61, this court articulated the facts of this case as

follows:

On June 28, 2016, Sergeant Jerol Morrow of the Leesville Police
Department was dispatched by a 9–1–1 operator to an incident
involving Defendant. Sergeant Morrow knew Defendant and where he
was living, so the sergeant proceeded to that location. On arrival,
Sergeant Morrow witnessed Defendant on the ground struggling with a
woman. Defendant was seen striking the woman and yelling at her,
“Where’s my kids? Where’s my kids?” Sergeant Morrow, a trailing
officer, and Deputy Paul Davis of the Vernon Parish Sheriff’s Office,
attempted to restrain Defendant. Sergeant Morrow was forced to
administer pepper spray to effect the arrest of Defendant.

The woman Defendant battered was unresponsive to Sergeant
Morrow’s attempts to speak to her. Her face was very swollen, and her
mouth was bloodied. She was identified as Ms. Mary Pittmon. Ms.
Pittmon had been staying at Defendant’s aunt’s house, where
Defendant also was residing.

Defendant and Ms. Pittmon were alone in the house on the
morning of June 28, 2016. Ms. Pittmon was seated on the couch.
Defendant was talking with someone on his phone, and stated, “I’m
gonna take her out.” Ms. Pittmon had no idea to whom Defendant was
referring until he grabbed a red pipe, tucked it under his arm, and strode
toward her with evident intent to strike her. Defendant struck Ms.
Pittmon twice with the pipe, once on the head and once on her arm. Ms.
Pittmon attempted to stand up, but slipped. Defendant then began to
choke Ms. Pittmon with the pipe. He then lifted Ms. Pittmon and
moved her toward the front door. Outside, Defendant pushed Ms.
Pittmon to the ground on her stomach and began to punch her with his
fists. Defendant was angrily asking Ms. Pittmon why she did not “feed
his kids,” whom Ms. Pittmon had never met. The beating continued
until Sergeant Morrow intervened.

As a result of the beating, Ms. Pittmon sustained a broken tooth,
mouth lacerations, and several bruises. She was transported to Byrd
Memorial Hospital in Leesville, then to LSU Medical Center in
Shreveport. This hospital move was necessitated by tachycardia Ms.
Pittmon was experiencing following the battering.

On September 6, 2016, the State filed a bill of information
charging Defendant with aggravated second degree battery, a violation
of La.R.S. 14:34.7. The parties selected a six-member jury on January
17, 2017. The jury began hearing evidence on the same date.
Proceedings continued on the following day, and the jury found
Defendant guilty as charged.

On January 31, 2017, the State filed a bill of information
charging Defendant as a third habitual offender, pursuant to La.R.S.
15:529.1. The trial court heard the matter on the same date and
adjudicated Defendant as charged. On March 14, the court sentenced
Defendant to twenty-two-and-one-half years at hard labor. In imposing
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this sentence, though, the trial court stated that the sentence was
imposed without regard to habitual offender enhancement. Defendant
now seeks review by this court.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After review, we find no errors patent.

DISCUSSION

In his sole assignment of error, Defendant asserts that the twenty-two-and-

one-half-year sentence is excessive because the trial court failed to individualize his

sentence to his offense. Defendant argues that his criminal history does not support

his sentence after considering the facts and his ability to re-enter society as a

productive member. Defendant further contends that the trial court failed to

individualize his sentence, because the trial court did not duly consider the

mitigating factors. More particularly, Defendant contends that “[t]his crime resulted

in part from [his] belief that Ms. Pit[t]mon had his children and was not feeding

them.”1 He admits, however, that “[w]hile [his] actions resulted in serious injury to

Ms. Pittmon, Mr. Cheley acted under provocation, not in the traditional sense, but

out of parental concern for the well-being of his children.” Defendant cites State v.

Franklin, 48,781 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/15/14), 130 So.3d 980, writ denied, 14-337 (La.

9/19/14), 148 So.3d 950 (twelve-year sentence for aggravated second degree battery)

and State v. Shabazz, 14-431 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/7/14), 167 So.3d 725 (seven-year

sentence for aggravated second degree battery) for the proposition that a lesser

sentence is indicated in this case, noting that the defendants in those cases received

lesser sentences than him despite their having committed the more egregious acts of

stabbing their victims in the neck. Of significance to this court, however, is the fact

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Defendant notes that he “was estranged from his children’s mother, Wanda Washington,
and did not know where his children were.”
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that the appellate courts in Franklin and Shabazz merely upheld the defendants’

sentences as imposed by the trial courts on the grounds that the sentences were not

unconstitutionally excessive.

The State asserts that Defendant’s contention has no merit and that his

sentence should be affirmed because Defendant failed to offer proof that the trial

court abused its wide sentencing discretion or that the trial court did not fully

particularize the sentence to Defendant. According to the State, the trial court fully

considered all relevant factors in Defendant’s case prior to imposing sentence. With

regard to Defendant’s claim that his actions were caused out of concern for his

children’s well-being, the State points out that those contentions were not presented

to the trial court during sentencing and no evidence was introduced to prove them.

Louisiana courts have laid out the following guidelines regarding excessive

sentence review:

Sentences within the statutory sentencing range can be reviewed
for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762
(La.1979). In State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir.
1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02),
808 So.2d 331, a panel of this court discussed the review of excessive
sentence claims, stating:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law
shall subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.”
To constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court
must find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that
the sentence makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than
a needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v.
Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial court has
wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within the
statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as
excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124,
writ denied, 00-0165 (La. 6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The
relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad
sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might
have been more appropriate. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.
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5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117
S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

Further, in reviewing the defendant’s sentences, the appellate
court should consider the nature of the crime, the nature and
background of the offender, and the sentences imposed for similar
crimes. State v. Lisotta, 98-648 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d
57 (citing State v. Telsee, 425 So.2d 1251 (La.1983)), writ denied, 99-
433 (La. 6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183. In State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4
(La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied, 03-562 (La.
5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061, a panel of this court observed that:

While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar
crimes may provide some insight, “it is well settled that
sentences must be individualized to the particular offender
and to the particular offense committed.” State v. Batiste,
594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991). Additionally, it is
within the purview of the trial court to particularize the
sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best
position to assess the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances presented by each case.” State v. Cook, 95-
2784 (La. 5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, 958[, cert. denied, 519
U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615 (1996)].

State v. Soileau, 13-770, 13-771, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1002,

1005-06, writ denied, 14-452 (La. 9/26/14), 149 So.3d 261.

The crime for which Defendant was convicted, aggravated second degree

battery, subject offenders to a fine not more than ten thousand dollars or imprisoned,

with or without hard labor, for not more than fifteen years, or both. See La.R.S.

14:34.7(C). In State v. Kinsey, 19-384 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/29/20) (unpublished

opinion), writ denied, 20-504 (La. 7/2/20), 297 So.3d 769, this court affirmed a

fifteen-year sentence of a defendant who was convicted of aggravated second degree

battery.2 The facts of the defendant’s actions were as follows:

Defendant punched his girlfriend, Angela Olds, in the face to the point
of unconsciousness after a heated argument between them. He then

2
The defendant in Kinsey was also convicted of “domestic abuse battery, first offense, a
violation of La.R.S. 14:35.3(C) and (L); second degree battery, a violation of La.R.S. 14:34.1; and
aggravated battery, a violation of La.R.S. 14:34[,]” for which he was sentenced, as a habitual
offender, to consecutive sentences of two, six, and seven years, respectively. Kinsey, 19-384. All
of his convictions and sentences were affirmed. Id.

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proceeded to strangle her, break the tip of her nose, and beat her with a
PVC pipe on her legs and arm. The following day, he hit her across the
back with a broom stick, hit her on the head with a brass lock, put a lit
cigarette on her stomach and throat, and hit her feet with a wooden
shovel.

Id. Further, in State v. McGill, 52,169 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/15/18), 253 So.3d 872, writ

denied, 18-1552 (La. 3/25/19), 267 So.3d 594, the second circuit affirmed the

defendant’s third-felony habitual offender adjudication and twenty-seven-year

sentence for aggravated second degree battery after the defendant stabbed and

severely beat his girlfriend.

In the instant case, the evidence submitted at trial showed that Defendant beat

the victim with a metal pipe and his fists, causing her to suffer physical injuries that

required hospitalization. He was forty years old at the time of the instant offense.

Defendant worked as a combination welder for twenty years. He is a single father

of three. Defendant’s criminal history reflects prior felony convictions for

aggravated obstruction of a highway and aggravated flight from an officer. After

applying the Lisotta factors, we conclude that Defendant’s sentences are not

disproportionate to the offense nor do they impose a purposeless and needless

infliction of pain and suffering. Lisotta, 726 So.2d 57.

Defendant contends that the trial court failed to individualize his sentence.

We disagree. Our review of the record shows that the trial court individualized the

sentence pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1, as it explicitly took note of the

aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented in this case, including that of

Defendant’s criminal history, the prior sentencing transcripts, and the facts of the

most recent offense. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in imposing an enhanced twenty-two-and-one-half-year sentence.

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DECREE

Defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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