State of Louisiana v. Michael Thibodeaux

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

20-91

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

MICHAEL THIBODEAUX

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APPEAL FROM THE
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF IBERIA, NO. 18-CR-691
HONORABLE LEWIS H. PITMAN, JR., DISTRICT JUDGE

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ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE

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Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Billy Howard Ezell, and D. Kent Savoie,
Judges.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

John S. McLindon
Walters Papillion Thomas Cullens
12345 Perkins Rd, Bldg 2, Ste
Baton Rouge, LA 70810
(225) 236-3636
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:
Michael Thibodeaux

M. Bofill Duhe
District Attorney, Sixteenth Judicial District
Alister Charrier
M. Craig Colwart
W. Claire Howington
Assistant District Attorney
300 Iberia St., Suite 200
New Iberia, LA 70560
(337) 369-4420
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

PICKETT, Judge.

FACTS

The defendant, Michael Thibodeaux, was the duly-elected Clerk of Court for

Iberia Parish. A former employee of the clerk’s office made allegations of the

misuse of funds within the clerk’s office which prompted an investigation by the

legislative auditor. As a result of that investigation, the legislative auditor alleged

the misuse and/or misappropriation of funds maintained by the clerk’s office. This

evidence was presented to an Iberia Parish Grand Jury.

On June 8, 2018, the grand jury returned a fourteen count bill of indictment

charging the defendant with the following offenses:

Count #1: R.S. 15:1351 et. Seq – RACKETEERING, IN THE PARISH
OF IBERIA, defendant MICHAEL THIBODEAUX, beginning on or
about January 1, 1998, and continuing through and including October
12, 2016, was a member of an Enterprise as defined by La. R.S.
15:1352(B), in that it consists of an individual or other legal entity, or
group of individuals associated in fact and includes unlawful as well as
lawful enterprises and governmental as well as other entities, and did
unlawfully and knowingly conspire and engage in the crime of
RACKETEERING, a violation of La.R.S. 15:1353, that is, to
knowingly conduct or participate in, directly or indirectly, in the affairs
of the Enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity as defined in
La.R.S. 15:1352(A), to-wit: multiple acts of Theft, violations of La.R.S.
14:57; multiple acts of Injuring Public Records, violations of La.R.S.
14:132; and/or multiple acts of Filing or Maintaining False Public
Records, violations of La.R.S. 14:133.

Count #2: R.S. 14:67 – THEFT OVER $25,000, IN THE PARISH OF
IBERIA, defendant MICHAEL THIBODEAUX, beginning on or about
January 1, 1998, and continuing through and including October 12,
2016, did unlawfully engage in the crime of THEFT, violation of La.
R.S. 14:67, by the misappropriation or taking with the intent to
permanently deprive monies belonging to others on deposit with the
Iberia Parish Clerk of Court for advance costs, without their consent
and by means of fraudulent conduct, practices, or representations,
where the misappropriation or taking amounts to twenty-five thousand
dollars ($25,000) or more.

Count #3 R.S. 14:133 – FILING OR MAINTAINING FALSE PUBLIC
RECORDS, IN THE PARISH OF IBERIA, defendant MICHAEL
THIBODEAUX, beginning on or about January 1, 2005, and
continuing through and including October 12, 2016, did unlawfully

engage in the crime of FILING OR MAINTAINING FALSE PUBLIC
RECORDS, a violation of La.R.S. 14:133, by filing or depositing in any
public office or with any public official, or maintaining as required by
law, regulation, or rule, with the knowledge of its falsity, and forged or
wrongfully altered document, or document containing a false statement
or representation of material fact. (12,137 counts).

Count #4: R.S. 14:134 – MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE, IN THE
PARISH OF IBERIA, defendant MICHAEL THIBODEAUX,
beginning on or about January 1, 2005, and continuing through and
including October 12, 2016, did unlawfully engage in the crime of
MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE, a violation of La.R.S. 14:134, by
intentionally refusing or failing to perform any duty lawfully required
of him; intentionally performing any lawfully required duty in an
unlawful manner; or knowingly permitting any public officer or
employee under his authority to do the same, to-wit: the duty to refund
monies belonging to others and on deposit with the Iberia Parish Clerk
of Court for advance costs as required by La.R.S. 13:842(B).

Count #5: R.S. 14:134 – MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE, IN THE
PARISH OF IBERIA, defendant MICHAEL THIBODEAUX,
beginning on or about January 1, 2005, and continuing through and
including October 12, 2016, did unlawfully engage in the crime of
MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE, a violation of La.R.S. 14:134, by
intentionally refusing or failing to perform any duty lawfully required
of him; intentionally refusing or failing to perform any duty lawfully
required of him; intentionally performing any lawfully required duty
in an unlawful manner; or knowingly permitting any public officer or
employee under his authority to do the same, to-wit: the duty to remit
unclaimed property to the State Treasury in accordance with the
Louisiana Uniform Unclaimed Property Act, La.R.S. 9:151 et seq.

Count #6: R.S. 14:67 – THEFT OVER $25,000, IN THE
PARISH OF IBERIA, defendant MICHAEL THIBODEAUX, during
the month of April 2012, did unlawfully engage in the crime of
THEFT, a violation of La.R.S. 14:67, by the misappropriation or
taking with the intent to permanently deprive monies belonging to
others which had been deposited with the Iberia Parish Clerk of Court
for advance costs and for which refund checks had been issued but not
negotiated, without their consent and by means of fraudulent conduct,
practices, or representations, where the misappropriation or taking
amounts to twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or more.

Count #7: R.S. 14:133 – FILING OR MAINTAINING FALSE
PUBLIC RECORDS, IN THE PARISH OF IBERIA, defendant
MICHAEL THIBODEAUX, during the month of April 12, 2012, did
unlawfully engage in the crime of FILING OR MAINTAINING
FALSE PUBLIC RECORDS, a violation of La.R.S. 14:133, by filing
or depositing in any public office or with any public official, or
maintaining as required by law, regulation, or rule, with the
knowledge of its falsity, any forged or wrongfully altered document,
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or document containing a false statement or representation of material
fact. (334 counts).

Count #8: R.S. 14:134 - MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE, IN THE
PARISH OF IBERIA, defendant MICHAEL THIBODEAUX,
during the month of April, 2012, did unlawfully engage in the crime
of MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE, a violation of La.R.S. 14:134, by
intentionally refusing or failing to perform any duty lawfully required
of him; intentionally performing any lawfully required duty in an
unlawful manner; or knowingly permitting any public officer or
employee under his authority to do the same, to-wit: the duty to remit
unclaimed property to the State Treasury in accordance with the
Louisiana Uniform Unclaimed Property Act, La.R.S. 9:51 et seq.

Count #9: R.S. 14:67 – THEFT OF $5,000-$25,000, IN THE
PARISH OF IBERIA, defendant MICHAEL THIBODEAUX,
beginning on or about January 1, 1998, and continuing through and
including July 25, 2017, did unlawfully engage in the crime of
THEFT, a violation of La.R.S. 14:67, by the misappropriation or
taking with the intent to permanently deprive monies belonging to the
State of Louisiana, without its consent and by means of fraudulent
conduct, practices, or representations, where the misappropriation or
taking amounts to five thousand dollars ($5,000) or more but less than
twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000).

Count #10: R.S. 14:134 – MICHAEL THIBODEAUX IN OFFICE,
IN THE PARISH OF IBERIA, defendant MICHAEL
THIBODEAUX, beginning on or about January 1, 1998, and
continuing through and including July 25, 2017, did unlawfully
engage in the crime of MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE, a violation of
La.R.S. 14:134, by intentionally refusing or failing to perform any
duty lawfully required of him; intentionally performing any lawfully
required duty in an unlawful manner; or knowingly permitting any
public officer or employee under his authority to do the same, to-wit:
the duty to collect all fees and charges due his office and deposit them
in the Clerk’s Salary Fund, and to keep an accurate set of books in
connection with said Fund, in accordance with La.R.S. 13:781.

Count #11: R.S. 14:134 – MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE, IN THE
PARISH OF IBERIA, defendant MICHAEL THIBODEAUX, on or
about January 1, 2007, and continuing through and including
December 31, 2015, did unlawfully engage in the crime of
MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE, a violation of La.R.S. 14:134, by
intentionally refusing or failing to perform any duty lawfully required
of him; intentionally performing any lawfully required duty in an
unlawful manner; or knowingly permitting any public officer or
employee under his authority to do the same, to-wit: the prohibition
on loan, pledge, or donation of public funds to any person,
association, or corporation, as required by La.Const. Art. 7, §14, and
the obligation not to misappropriate, misapply, convert, misuse, or
otherwise wrongfully take any funds, property, or other thing of value
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belonging to or under the custody of the public entity in which they
hold office or are employed, as required by La.R.S. 42:1461.

Count #12: R.S. 14:123 – PERJURY, IN THE PARISH OF
IBERIA, defendant MICHAEL THIBODEAUX, on or about June 7,
2018, did unlawfully engage in the crime of PURJURY, a violation
of La.R.S. 14:123, by intentionally making a false written or oral
statement which he knew to be false, under oath, in or for use in a
judicial proceeding.

Count #13: R.S. 14:134 – MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE, IN THE
PARISH OF IBERIA, defendant MICHAEL THIBODEAUX, on or
about June 7, 2018, did unlawfully engage in the crime of
MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE, a violation of La.R.S. 14:134, by
intentionally refusing or failing to perform any duty lawfully required
of him; intentionally performing any lawfully required duty in an
unlawful manner, or knowingly permitting any public officer or
employee under his authority to do the same, to-wit: the duty to
testify truthfully under oath in a judicial proceeding, as required by
La.R.S. 14:123.

Count #14: R.S. 14:134 – MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE, IN THE
PARISH OF IBERIA, defendant MICHAEL THIBODEAUX,
beginning on or about January 1, 1998, and continuing through and
including July 25, 2017, did unlawfully engage in the crime of
MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE, a violation of La.R.S. 14:134, by
intentionally refusing or failing to perform any duty lawfully required
of him; intentionally performing any lawfully required duty in an
unlawful manner; or knowingly permitting any public officer or
employee under his authority to do the same, to-wit: the obligation
not to misappropriate, misapply, convert, misuse, or otherwise
wrongfully take any funds, property, or other thing of value
belonging to or under the custody of the public entity in which they
hold office or are employed, or required by La.R.S. 42:1451.

This matter was tried by means of a jury trial, and the defendant was found

guilty of all fourteen counts.

On July 30, 2019, the district court sentenced the defendant as follows:

Count 1: (Racketeering) Five years at hard labor, suspended, with three
years of supervised probation.

Counts 2, 6, & 9: (Felony Theft) As to each count, five years at hard
labor, suspended, with three years supervised probation.

Counts 3 & 7: (Filing or maintaining false public records) As to each
count, three years at hard labor, with three years of supervised
probation.

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Count 12: (Perjury) Three years at hard labor suspended, with three
years of supervised probation.

The above sentences were ordered to run concurrently with each other.

Counts 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 13, & 14: (Malfeasance in office) As to each
count, thirty months at hard labor, to be served concurrently to each
other but consecutive to the other charges.

The defendant has filed this appeal as to the convictions.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The Trial Court committed error when it denied a Batson challenge
made by the defense to the prosecution’s using peremptory strikes on
African American jurors.

2. The charges against Michael Thibodeaux in Count 6 (Theft), Count
7 (Filing or Maintaining False Public Records), and Count 8
(Malfeasance in Office) are prescribed and the trial court committed
error when it denied the defendant’s Motion to Quash these charges.

3. There was insufficient evidence to support a conviction against
Michael Thibodeaux on all of the Counts set forth in the indictment.

4. The Trial Court committed error when it allowed Roger Harris to
testify as an expert witness.

5. The Trial Court committed error when it denied the Motion for
Arrest of Judgement, Motion for New Trial, and Motion to Quash
Indictment - regarding the improprieties of the District Attorney before
the grand jury.

6. Any Counts which were not by a unanimous vote should be reversed.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by this

court for errors patent on the face of the record.

The trial court ordered the defendant to serve thirty months at hard labor for

each of the defendant’s convictions for malfeasance in office (Counts 4, 5, 8, 10, 11,

13, and 14), with each of these sentences to run concurrently. On the remaining

seven charges, the trial court ordered suspended sentences, each with a three-year

period of supervised probation, which would begin when he is released from

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incarceration. For reasons to be discussed, the convictions and sentences for Counts

2, 12, and 13 must be vacated.

As conditions of the supervised probation on the suspended sentences, the trial

court stated that the conditions would be those required by La.Code Crim.P. art.

895(A), with the following special conditions:

report to the Department of Probation and Parole within twenty-four
(24) hours of your release from incarceration; report monthly or as
instructed by your probation officer and pay a monthly supervision fee
of Sixty Dollars ($60.00); pay court costs and a fine of Five Thousand
Dollars ($5,000.00) within the first three (3) months of your release
from incarceration; pay restitution of the Offices of Clerk of Court
Iberia Parish, Louisiana for the cost incurred and paid in retaining an
accounting firm to assist in the refunding of monies belonging to others
on deposit with the Clerk of Court of Iberia Parish, Louisiana for
advanced court costs; should the defendant agree with the probation
officer as to the amount owed in this restitution, restitution is to be paid
within six (6) months of date of that agreement; should defendant not
agree with the probation officer as to the amount owed in restitution a
restitution hearing shall be conducted upon the request of the probation
officer; restitution is then to be paid within six (6) months of the date
of the restitution hearing, in no event shall restitution exceed Fifty
Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00); shall perform two hundred and forty
(240) hours of community service within one (1) year from the date of
your release from incarceration;

At a subsequent hearing, the trial court clarified that the restitution was strictly to

cover the cost of the forensic CPA selected by the Iberia Parish Clerk of Court to

determine what monies needed to be reimbursed or paid in restitution. The court

was not specific as to which count or counts the restitution and fine were imposed

as a part of the sentence. We remand the case with instructions for the trial court to

specify the count or counts upon which restitution and the fine are owed.

Further, the trial court ordered the defendant to pay restitution of not more

than $50,000.00, based on the cost of the audit. The trial court also allowed a process

to invoke a hearing if the defendant disagrees with the amount charged as restitution.

We find this sentence is sufficiently determinate. See State v. Tall, 12-280 (La.App.

3 Cir. 10/24/12), 100 So.3d 388.
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER SIX

The defendant argues that this court should set aside any charge in which the

jury did not reach a unanimous verdict of guilt. The state readily acknowledges that

the verdicts for Count 2 (Felony Theft), Count 12 (malfeasance), and Count 13

(perjury) were non-unanimous and must be reversed. Our review of the polling slips

confirms that the state is correct.

In Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. ___, 140 S.Ct. 1390 (2020), the Supreme

Court ruled that non-unanimous jury verdicts finding a defendant guilty are not

constitutionally permissible. In reaching its conclusion, the majority of the Court

noted that “Louisiana and Oregon may need to retry defendants convicted of felonies

by nonunanimous verdicts whose cases are still pending on direct appeal.” Slip

Opinion of Justice Gorsuch at p. 22. This is one of those cases. While ordinarily

we would review the sufficiency of the evidence under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979), and State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731 (La.1992), we find

it imprudent to comment on the evidence in this case that we know must be set aside

and may be retried because the United States Supreme Court has given us a clear

directive. The convictions and sentences for Counts 2, 12, and 13 are vacated.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE

The defendant alleges there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction

against him on any of the counts set forth in the indictment.

Pursuant to Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, we will address this assignment of error

first, as a finding that the evidence was insufficient on any conviction would

necessitate reversal of said conviction. The analysis of the sufficiency of evidence

is well settled:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the
critical inquiry is whether after viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
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the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L Ed. 2d 560,
rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L. Ed. 126 (1979);
State ex rel. Graffagnino v King, 436 So 2d 559 (La. 1983); State v
Ducan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v Moody, 393 So.2d 1212
(La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective
credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should
not, second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of fact
beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of
review. See State ex rel Graffagnino, 436 So 2d 559 (citing State v.
Richardson, 425 So 2d 1228 (La 1983) In order for this court to affirm
a conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has satisfied
its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367,

1371.

THEFT

The defendant’s first argument is that the state failed to prove the theft charges

set forth in Counts 2, 6, and 9. Theft is defined by La.R.S. 14:67, which states, in

pertinent part:

Theft is the misappropriation or taking of anything of value
which belongs to another, either without the consent of the other to the
misappropriation or taking, or by means of fraudulent conduct,
practices, or representations. An intent to deprive the other
permanently of whatever may be the subject of the misappropriation or
taking is essential.

The defendant was charged with three separate counts of theft, Counts 2, 6, and 9.

Count 2 was discussed above, has been vacated, and will not be discussed herein.

Count 6 alleged that the defendant committed theft of over $25,000.00 by

misappropriating funds from the advance deposit account for which refund checks

had been issued but not negotiated.

Roger Harris, assistant legislative auditor, testified that the Iberia Parish Clerk

of Court’s office maintains an “advanced deposit account” in which attorneys and

litigants deposit money to pay in advance costs associated with the filing of lawsuits.

The account is a fiduciary account, and the funds in that account belong to the
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attorneys and/or litigants. When the clerk performs work in that suit, payments to

the clerk’s office are drawn from the deposit. The auditor identified a number of

lawsuits which, upon being settled or dismissed, had refunds sent to the interested

parties by checks which had not been negotiated after a year. In those instances

when a check had not been cashed within a year, the defendant cut a new check from

a different check-writing software program than used for day-to-day business which

bore the exact check number as the original check but was made payable to the

clerk’s office “Salary Fund.” The Salary Fund is a fund maintained by the clerk’s

office to pay salaries and general office expenses. Therefore, private funds were

removed from the trust account to the clerk’s Salary Fund. The evidence presented

was uncontroverted. The defendant does not contest that the evidence established

this procedure took place. There was no evidence of any attempt to contact the

individuals to whom the unnegotiated checks had been written. Louisiana law

requires any money that cannot be returned to an individual be sent to the state

treasurer. Louisiana Uniform Unclaimed Property Act of 1997, La.R.S. 9:151 –

9:182 This mandate was ignored. The evidence showed that 334 refund checks

were recreated in this manner which resulted in the amount of over $47,000.00 being

transferred from the advance deposit fund to the clerk’s Salary Fund.

Count 9 alleged that the defendant committed the crime of theft by

misappropriating a sum of more than $5,000.00 but less than $25,000.00. These

allegations stemmed from the defendant’s misuse of funds that were generated in

cash at the front counter in the clerk’s office. Through testimony of clerk’s office

employees and the legislative auditor, the evidence established that each day a

designated employee took the cash brought in at the counter the day before and

reconciled it with receipts written for payments made in cash. If there was more

cash than reflected by the receipts, the overage was placed in a cash box held
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separately and the amount that matched the receipts was deposited in the clerk’s

Salary Fund. The testimony established all money brought in at the front counter

for copies, marriage licenses, filing of deeds and mortgages and other matters not

associated with on-going litigation should have been deposited in the clerk’s Salary

Fund, which is public money. The evidence showed the money that was placed in

this cash box was used to fund office parties, to buy pizza for election workers, and

on occasion, the defendant would use funds from the box to pay the cost of marriage

licenses for the friends who came into to clerk’s office to apply for a license. During

the period examined by the legislative auditor’s office, it was established that

$5,200.00 was diverted to this box instead of being deposited in the clerk’s Salary

Fund. It was uncontroverted that all money taken in at the front counter should have

been deposited into to clerk’s Salary Fund. Therefore, it was established that public

money was misappropriated to private use since none of the expenditures listed

above could have been legally paid for with public funds. Again, the defendant does

not contest the evidence and, as in Count 6, it is uncontroverted.

The defendant instead argues that the state failed to establish an essential

element of the crimes alleged, the intent to permanently deprive anyone of their

money. The element of criminal intent must frequently be established by

circumstantial evidence. State v. Schmidt, 99-1412 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/26/00), 771

So.2d 131, writ denied, 00-2950 (La. 9/28/01), 798 So.2d 105. The finder of fact

must consider the testimony and evidence presented as a whole, including all the

surrounding circumstances and the actions taken by the defendant, to determine

whether a defendant had the requisite specific intent to commit the crime charged.

Id. In this case, like all other elements of theft, the state was required to prove an

“intent to deprive the other permanently” of the funds that were established to have

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been misappropriated. This element of the offense had to be proved beyond a

reasonable doubt.

With regard to Count 6, the state established the defendant made no attempt

to contact the parties to whom the money belonged and to whom the checks had

been written, in spite of the fact that many were local attorneys and/or individuals

known to the defendant and who could have been contacted with a minimum of

effort. In addition, although the defendant used a specific system to write all

legitimate checks that were issued by the clerk’s office, a totally separate software

program was used to recreate the checks used to divert the money into the salary

account. This allowed him to recreate the same check number of the original check.

When the check was processed through the bank, it appeared on the face of the

books, should they be examined, that the original check had been processed. This

entire scheme reflects deception, an active attempt to disguise the misappropriation,

and an attempt to permanently deprive the legitimate owners of their money. It also

was a violation of the law which requires any monies they legitimately could not

return to legal owners to be sent to the state treasurer as unclaimed funds. The

evidence presented, when analyzed under the Jackson standard, established an intent

to permanently deprive the legitimate owners of their money. All elements of the

offense of theft were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

With regard to Count 9, the evidence clearly shows that cash which should

have been deposited into the salary fund was diverted into a box from which it was

used improperly to pay for expenses that can only, legally, be paid for with private

funds such as parties and marriage licenses. The very actions of the defendant in his

use of the funds and his attempt to conceal the box when his office came under

investigation reflect an intent to permanently deprive. This element of the offense,

as well as all other elements of theft, was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
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This court, therefore, finds sufficient evidence to establish beyond a

reasonable doubt the defendant is guilty of both Counts 6 and 9 as to the theft

charges.

FILING OR MAINTAINING FALSE PUBLIC RECORDS

In Counts 3 and 7, the defendant was charged with Filing or Maintaining False

Public Records. Filing or maintaining false public records, a violation of La.R.S.

14:133, is defined in relevant part as:

A. Filing false public records is the filing or depositing
for record in any public office or with any public official, or the
maintaining as required by law regulation or rule, with
knowledge of its falsity, of any of the following:

(1) Any forged document.

(2) Any wrongfully altered document.

(3) Any document containing a false statement or false
representation of a material fact.

In regards to Count 3, the state offered testimony, including the defendant’s

own statement, that periodically the staff in the clerk’s office, at the direction of the

defendant, would conduct “suit clean-up.” In this process, funds left in a lawsuit that

had no movement for a period of five years and was considered stale were transferred

from the advance deposit account to the clerk’s Salary Account. Some of the

amounts transferred were quite small and some suits had balances of several

thousand dollars which were transferred. The testimony established that in none of

the 12,137 lawsuits from which transfers were made had the clerk’s office done any

work which would justify the transfer of funds to the clerk’s Salary Fund. Because

these funds could not be transferred for a legitimate reason, the defendant instructed

his staff to make a notation of “cc” or “xc,” the notation which reflects copies of

documents were made, so that it would appear on the face of the document that these

were legitimate charges for which the clerk’s office was due payment. The
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falsification of these records and the purpose for that falsification are not in dispute.

The defendant argues the false ledger entries were not “material” and, therefore, a

necessary element of the offense is missing. The use of the fraudulent “cc” and “xc”

notations were central to these transfers and used to conceal the fact the clerk was

transferring money which had not been earned by the clerk’s office from the advance

fund to the Salary Fund. These notations were material, and all elements of La.R.S.

14:133, when reviewed pursuant to the Jackson standard were proved beyond a

reasonable doubt.

In regards to Count 7, as previously discussed, the defendant’s office, at his

instruction, issued new checks with the same check numbers as the original refund

checks that had not been negotiated and made the clerk’s office the payee. This

process allowed funds to be improperly moved from the advance deposit account,

where it had been deposited by its legitimate owners, to the clerk’s Salary Account.

This use of check numbers that mirrored the numbers of the original checks was used

to conceal the improper transfers by effectively falsifying the clerk’s records which

were subject to audit. The state submitted evidence that established all elements of

La.R.S. 14:133 as to Count 7, which when reviewed under the Jackson standard

prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE

The defendant was charged with malfeasance in office in Counts 4, 5, 8, 10,

11, 13, and 14. Count 13 was discussed above, has been vacated, and will not be

discussed herein.

Malfeasance in office is defined in La. R.S. 14:134, which states in pertinent

part:

A. Malfeasance in office is committed when any public officer
or public employee shall:

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(1) Intentionally refuse or fail to perform any duty lawfully
required of him, as such officer or employee; or

(2) Intentionally perform any such duty in an unlawful
manner; or

(3) Knowingly permit any other public officer or public
employee, under his authority, to intentionally refuse or fail to
perform any duty lawfully required of him, or to perform any
such duty in an unlawful manner.

B. Any duty lawfully required of a public officer or public
employee when delegated by him to a public officer or public employee
shall be deemed to be a lawful duty of such public officer or employee.
The delegation of such lawful duty shall not relieve the public officer
or employee of his lawful duty.

Count 4 pertains to the defendant’s breach of duty to refund money on deposit

in the clerk’s office to those individuals who had deposited it in violation of La.R.S.

13:842(B). Count 5 pertains to the defendant’s failure to fulfill his duty to remit

unclaimed property (i.e., money related to “stale” lawsuits) to the state treasury in

accordance with La.R.S. 9:151 – 9:182. Count Eight pertains to the defendant’s

failure to fulfill his duty to remit unclaimed property (i.e., sums represented by

unnegotiated checks) to the state treasury in accordance with La.R.S. 9:151 – 9:182.

Count 10 pertains to the defendant’s failure to fulfill his duty under La. R.S. 13:781

to collect all fees and charges due his office and deposit them into the Clerk’s Salary

Fund, instead of diverting cash into a box, where little to no accurate accounting of

those funds was kept. Count 11 pertains to the defendant’s misapplication of public

funds and misuse of the public funds in his care to pay for expenses not allowed by

law in violation of La.R.S. 42:1461. Specifically, the defendant used government

funds to pay for an employee’s membership to Sam’s Discount Club and for an

annual membership fee. Count 14 pertains to the defendant’s failure to use

government property for public benefits in violation of La.R.S. 42:1461.

14

Specifically, that he used points accrued for use of a government credit card to pay

for a personal vacation.

The facts for all the underlying allegations for which the state argues the

defendant committed malfeasance in office are discussed above and will not be

repeated here, with the exception of Counts 11 and 14 which we will discussed in

more detail.

The state presented testimony that established an office employee obtained a

Sam’s Club card through the clerk’s office which was for her personal use. On at

least one occasion, the defendant used public funds from the clerk’s office to pay for

the annual fee for that membership. The state further submitted evidence that the

clerk’s office possessed a credit card which was used for legitimate office expenses.

This credit card was the type that collected or accrued “points.” The unrefuted

testimony presented established that the defendant cashed in those points for debit

cards which he used to pay for a personal vacation.

The defendant does not contest the underlying facts. He argues that his actions

on all the above counts amounted to mere negligence, that his actions were not

intentional. The jury, however, found him guilty of the underlying facts in their

consideration of both theft cases and in all counts of filing and maintaining false

records (excluding Count 2 and Count 13, the charges on which there were non-

unanimous verdicts as previously discussed). This reflects the jury’s belief he acted

intentionally in those instances. The record supports those convictions. His

arguments that he relied on advice from his accountant and auditor are contradicted

by the testimony of both. His arguments that he was ignorant of laws pertaining to

management of abandoned property are contradicted by direct testimony from both

a former employee and his previous employer. Further, ignorance of the law is no

defense. La.R.S. 14:17; La.Civ.Code art. 5.
15

Having reviewed the evidence presented under the Jackson standard as to

sufficiency of evidence, we find there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find,

beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the offenses charged in

Counts 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, and 14.

RACKETEERING

Count 1 alleges the defendant committed the offense of racketeering.

Racketeering activity is defined by La.R.S. 15:1352, which states in pertinent part:

A. As used in this Chapter, “racketeering activity” means
committing, attempting to commit, conspiring to commit, or soliciting,
coercing, or intimidating another person to commit any crime that is
punishable under the following provisions of Title 14 of the Louisiana
Revised Statutes of 1950, the Uniform Controlled Dangerous
Substances Law, or the Louisiana Securities Law:

....

(10) R.S. 14:67 (Theft)

....

(38) R.S. 14:133 (Failing or maintaining false public
records)

....

B. “Enterprise” means any individual, sole proprietorship,
partnership, corporation or other legal entity, or any unchartered
association, or group of individuals associated in fact and includes
unlawful as well as lawful enterprises and governmental as well as other
entities.

C. “Pattern of racketeering activity” means engaging in at least
two incidents of racketeering activity that have the same or similar
intents, results, principals, victims, or methods of commission or
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not
isolated incidents, provided at least one of such incidents occurs after
August 21, 1992 and that the last of such incidents occurs within five
years after a prior incident of racketeering activity.

Further, La.R.S. 15:1353 states:

A. It is unlawful for any person who has knowingly received any
proceeds derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering
activity to use or invest, whether directly or indirectly, any part of such
16

proceeds, or the proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof,
in the acquisition of any title to, or any right, interest, or equity in
immovable property or in the establishment or operation of any
enterprise.

B. It is unlawful for any person, through a pattern of racketeering
activity, knowingly to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any
interest in or control of any enterprise or immovable property.

C. It is unlawful for any person employed by, or associated with,
any enterprise knowingly to conduct or participate in, directly or
indirectly, such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.

D. It is unlawful for any person to conspire or attempt to violate
any of the provisions of Subsections A, B, or C of this Section.

The defendant’s argument is that, since the underlying crimes of theft and

filing false records were unproven, the racketeering charge that rested on them is

likewise unproven. Since this court has found the evidence sufficient to find the

underlying charges were proven by the state, this argument fails. However, the

defendant also argues that since he never received any proceeds from the activities

at issue, he has not violated the proscriptions contained in La.R.S. 15:1353. The state

disputes this assertion but provides no details. It takes the position that the issue of

whether the defendant personally profited from the activities at issue is immaterial

to the analysis. This assertion by the state is incorrect, due to the language of La.R.S.

15:1353.

The record includes testimony that the defendant improperly used $400.00

worth of reward points from a clerk’s office credit card for himself. Also, the

defendant took money from the cash box that contained overages from transactions

at the front desk. The record, however, indicates that he primarily used the money

for office activities such as Christmas parties, all of which has been previously

discussed. It is debatable whether the defendant “received any proceeds” within the

meaning of the La.R.S. 15:1353.

17

In vacating judgments of forfeiture pursuant to racketeering allegations, the

supreme court explained:

Section 1353 by its terms prohibits a person, when he has
knowingly received funds derived from drug racketeering activity as
defined in La.R.S. 15:1352(A), only from using or investing the funds
either (1) to acquire title to or an interest in immovable property or (2)
to establish or operate any enterprise. Section 1353 does not purport
to prohibit the mere receipt of funds from drug racketeering activity or
to prohibit any other use or investment of such funds. This section is
clearly intended as an anti-laundering statute to permit the pursuit of
drug-related funds which have been invested in real estate or in business
enterprises by persons who knew the source of the funds.

We therefore reject the district attorney’s contention that the
statute’s making it unlawful “to use or invest . . . any part of such
proceeds . . . in the acquisition of any title to, or any right, interest or
equity in immovable property or in the establishment or operation of
any enterprise” should be construed as prohibiting either (1) any use of
such funds or (2) investment of such funds in real estate or business
enterprises. Such an interpretation is grammatically inconsistent with
the wording of the statute and is also inconsistent with the stated
purpose of Act 727.

Because Act 727 [the enacting legislation] was apparently
patterned after 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act), federal decisions in this area are
persuasive. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) makes it unlawful for a person who
has received income from racketeering activities “to use or invest,
directly or indirectly, any part of such income . . . in acquisition of any
enterprise”. In Hemmings v. Barian, 822 F.2d 688 (7th Cir.1987), the
court held that for a violation of Section 1962 there must be, in addition
to a pattern of racketeering activity, an investment in another enterprise
of the funds received from the racketeering activity. In United States
v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1331 (5th Cir.), cert. denied[,] 465 U.S. 1005,
104 S.Ct. 996, 79 L.Ed.2d 229 (1984), the court held that the
government, in order to establish a Section 1962 violation, must prove
the existence of an enterprise, the defendant’s derivation of funds from
a pattern of racketeering activity, and the use of any part of that income
in acquiring an interest in or operating the enterprise. In United States
v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied[,] 445 U.S. 946, 100
S.Ct. 1345, 63 L.Ed.2d 780 (1980), the court noted that the statute
“seeks to bar the investment of racketeering moneys [and] the
acquisition of property through a pattern of racketeering activity”. Id.
at 568. And in Guerrero v. Katzen, 571 F.Supp. 714 (D.C.D.1983),
affd. 774 F.2d 506 (D.C.Cir.1985), the court held that “the gravamen of
§ 1962(a) is not the receipt of funds or benefits from a pattern of
racketeering activity; rather, it is the investment of such funds to
acquire an interest in, establish, or operate an enterprise”. Id. at 721.
The court further stated:
18

RICO does not forbid engaging in racketeering activity or
even in a pattern of such activity. Section 1962(a) requires
that a person receive income from a pattern of racketeering
activity and that he use the income to establish, operate or
acquire an interest in an interstate enterprise.

Id. at 718. (emphasis in original).

Therefore, the prosecutor in this case could not prove a violation
of La.R.S. 15:1353 by merely showing Johnson had used proceeds of
drug activity. It was necessary to prove use or investment in the
acquisition of immovable property or in the establishment or operation
of any enterprise. Because there is no suggestion of Johnson’s
investment in immovable property, the decision turns on whether a
deposit in a savings account is use or investment in an enterprise.

State v. Nine Savings Accounts, 553 So.2d 823, 825-26 (La.1989)(footnote

omitted)(fourth alteration in original).

The facts proven at trial do not meet the requirements of La.R.S. 15:1353.

Although the record reflects the defendant received a certain amount of proceeds

from his activities, there is no evidence he used them in an enterprise pursuant to

ongoing racketeering activity. Therefore, this court finds insufficient evidence to

support the defendant’s conviction on the charge of racketeering. That conviction is

reversed, and the sentence for that charge is vacated.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

In the first error assigned by the defendant, he argues the district court erred

by ruling against his Batson challenge. The analysis for such challenges has been

explained by the Louisiana Supreme Court:

In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d
69, (1986), the Supreme Court held that it is an equal protection
violation for the state to exercise its peremptory strikes to remove jurors
from the venire panel solely on the basis of the juror’s race. Batson
provides a three-step process to guide courts faced with a claim of racial
discrimination in the voir dire process:

First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a
peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of
race[; s]econd, if that showing has been made, the
19

prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the
juror in question[; and t]hird, in light of the parties’
submissions, the trial court must determine whether the
defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.

Foster v. Chatman, __ U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. 1737, 1747, 195 L.Ed.2d 1
(2016) (quoting Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 476-77, 128 S.Ct.
1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008) ). The burden of persuasion never shifts
from the opponent of the strike. However, after establishing a prima
facie case of racial discrimination, the burden of production shifts to
the proponent of the strike to articulate race-neutral reasons for its
actions. “The neutral explanation must be one which is clear,
reasonable, specific, legitimate and related to the particular case at bar.”
State v. Collier, 553 So.2d 815, 820 (La. 1989) (adopting the holding
of Batson ). If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must
decide whether the defendant has proven purposeful discrimination.
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995)
(per curiam) (citations omitted). A reviewing court owes the district
judge’s evaluations of discriminatory intent great deference and should
not reverse them unless they are clearly erroneous. Hernandez v. New
York, 500 U.S. 352, 364, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991);
Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, n.21, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (“Since the trial judge’s
findings in the context under consideration here largely will turn on
evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those
findings great deference.”).

State v. Turner, 16-1841, pp. 50-51 (La. 12/5/18); 263 So.3d 337, 374, cert. denied,

___ U.S. ___, 140 S.Ct. 555 (2019)(footnote omitted)(alterations in original).

During voir dire, the following colloquy took place:

BY MR. MCLINDON:

Judge, we’re going to be making a Batson challenge
do you want it now or do you want to wait?

BY THE COURT:

Give me a [few] minutes, let me see what I got.
Okay. Let’s hear about your challenge.

BY MR. MCLINDON:

So I found one they used a peremptory to strike --
five or their six strikes were African Americans, so I
think they have to give race-neutral reasons for those.

BY MR. COLWART:

20

Well, you got to look at all of them.

BY THE COURT:

Yeah, not just the panel, I’ve got to look at all their -
-

BY MR. MCLINDON:

I’m sorry?

BY MR. COLWART:

We have African Americans on the jury.

BY MR. MCLINDON:

I know, but of your strikes you’ve used five or six on
Panel A were African Americans.

BY MR. COLWART:

And on Panel B, you add them all together.

BY MR. MCLINDON:

I’m getting there. So Panel B you have stricken
seven total and they are African Americans. I think they
have to give race neutral reasons for those.

BY THE COURT:

Okay. Let me see what I’ve got left here. Panel A,
I’ve got four blacks on Panel A, and I have –

BY MS. LOWE:

There’s five on Panel A that they’ve stricken.

BY MR. COLWART:

We have three African Americans on Panel A and
we have –

BY THE COURT:

We’ve got more than that.

21

BY MS. CHARRIER:

Yeah, we have several African Americans on Panel
A.

BY THE COURT:

Hold on let me look at Panel A.

BY MR. COLWART:

I think it’s how many jurors you have and have all of
the vast majority of the African Americas have been
struck, that’s a pattern. And we’re saying there isn’t a
pattern because we have four – I haven’t looked at all of
them. We have at least four African Americans on the
jury, so how can you say that’s a pattern of cutting all
African Americans?

BY MR. MCLINDON:

Well, I look at it, Judge, as a percentage of your
peremptories -- what percentage of your peremptories
are used to strike African Americans.

BY THE COURT:

I think the result is how many do you have on the
jury. I mean the difficulty we have is the vast majority
of our jurors were black. I mean, I’m counting on Panel
A, I have – Panel A we had – how many we had?

BY MS. LOWE:

Ten and eleven, there were ten black and eleven
white on Panel A.

BY THE COURT:

And now Panel A we now have --

BY MR. COLWART:

Three.

BY THE COURT:

Four, I have four blacks on Panel A out of twelve
jurors. Now how many do we have on Panel B?

22

BY MS. LOWE:

I see one.

BY THE COURT:

We got one on Panel B, so we’ve got five blacks out
of twelve jurors.

BY MR. COLWART:

We’re at eleven now.

BY THE COURT:

We’re at eleven. Okay. We got five blacks out of
eleven, I find that difficult to say that they’re being
excluded.

BY MR. MCLINDON:

All right. Just note my objection for the record.

BY THE COURT:

Yes, sir, I understand, but --

BY MR. MCLINDON:

Yes, Sir.

It is clear that the district court considered the first part of the analysis under Batson,

i.e., whether the defendant made a prima facie case of racial discrimination, and

concluded there was no pattern of racial discrimination established.

The supreme court has discussed at length the considerations for determining

whether the defendant has established a prima facie case discrimination:

In the instant case, the only issue before the Court is whether
defendant met his burden of proof under the first Batson factor and
established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the state’s
exercise of its peremptory challenges. When determining whether the
defendant has made the requisite prima facie showing, the court in
Batson held the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances,
including a pattern of strikes against black jurors and the prosecutor’s
questions and statements during voir dire examination and in exercising
his challenges. 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723; State v. Duncan,
23

99-2615, p. 13 (La.10/16/01); 802 So.2d 533, 544. The Court refused
to provide guidance beyond these two illustrations, choosing instead to
rely upon experienced trial judges to decide whether the circumstances
surrounding the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges creates a
prima facie case of discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at
1723; Duncan, 99-2615 at 13, 802 So.2d at 545. Because the trial
judge’s findings in this context will largely turn on evaluations of
credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great
deference. 476 U.S. at 98, n. 21, 106 S.Ct. at 1724.

This Court, however, has provided additional guidance by
enumerating several other factors Louisiana courts may consider in
determining whether a defendant has made a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination. For example, in State v. Green, this Court
held “the defendant may offer any facts relevant to the question of the
prosecutor’s discriminatory intent to satisfy this burden.” 94-0887, p.
24 (La.5/22/95); 655 So.2d 272, 288. Such facts include, but are not
limited to, a pattern of strikes by the prosecutor against members of a
suspect class, statements or actions by the prosecutor that indicate the
peremptory strikes were motivated by impermissible considerations,
the composition of the venire and of the jury finally empanelled [sic],
and any other disparate impact upon the suspect class which is alleged
to be the victim of purposeful discrimination. Id. (citing State v.
Collier, 553 So.2d 815 (La.1989); State v. Thompson, 516 So.2d 349
(La.1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 180, 102 L.Ed.2d 149
(1988)). This Court has also taken into consideration whether the
nature of the case presented overt racial overtones, the timing of the
defendant’s objection, and whether the trial judge thought the issue of
purposeful discrimination was “very close.” State v. Draughn, 05-1825,
pp. 26-27 (La.1/17/07); 950 So.2d 583, 603-04.

In this case, the defense claims it established a prima facie case
of discrimination numerically because the state used peremptory
challenges to strike five of seven prospective black jurors (71%) and
only six of twenty-seven prospective white jurors (22%), thereby
striking black jurors at a rate of more than three times that of white
jurors. The district court clarified there were eight prospective black
jurors available for jury selection and the state had challenged five, one
was excused by the defense, one was selected for the jury, and one was
available as an alternate. The district court then found the defense had
established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination and ordered
the state to provide race-neutral reasons for striking the jurors. The state
objected to the court’s order and asked the court to articulate its reasons
for finding a prima facie case of discrimination so the state could make
an informed decision regarding whether it would seek appellate review.
Before the court could do so, however, the state argued it only struck
five out of eight black jurors, thereby lowering the percentage of black
jurors struck from 71% to 62.5%. The state further claimed it struck
every juror who rated himself as a “four” on the state’s five-point scale,

24

regardless of race, indicating a preference towards imposing a life
sentence. When the court asked whether this was the state’s race neutral
reason, the state responded, “it is a component of it,” but further
explained, “that is not a race neutral reason, that is a correction of the
factual basis set for the prima facie case.” Throughout its objection, the
state repeatedly emphasized it was not providing its race neutral reasons
for the strikes. After hearing the state’s explanation, the court set aside
its previous order and denied the Batson challenge, finding there was
no systematic pattern of exclusion based upon race.

Upon review, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
ruling. As the state noted, this Court has held bare statistics are
insufficient to support a prima facie case of discrimination. State v.
Duncan, 99-2615, p. 22 (La.10/16/01), 802 So.2d 533, 550 (citing
United States v. Moore, 895 F.2d 484, 485 (8th Cir.1990)). In Duncan,
the defendant argued racial discrimination could be inferred from the
record, which showed that the state had struck 84% of the prospective
black jurors and only 12% of the prospective white jurors, using five of
its eight peremptory challenges to strike black jurors. This Court held,
"there is not a per se rule that a certain number or percentage of the
challenged jurors must be black in order for the court to conclude a
prima facie case has been made out.” 99-2615 at 22, 802 So.2d at 549-
50. However, the Court explained “such number games, stemming from
the reference in Batson to a ‘pattern’ of strikes, are inconsistent with
the inherently fact-intense nature of determining whether the prima
facie requirement has been satisfied.” 99-2615 at 22, 802 So.2d at 550.
This Court further held it is important for the defendant to come
forward with facts, not just numbers alone, when asking the district
court to find a prima facie case. Id. (citing Moore, 895 F.2d at 485).
Consequently, in Duncan this Court held the defendant’s reliance on
bare statistics to support a prima facie case of race discrimination was
misplaced.

Applying Duncan to the instant case, we hold the defendant’s
reliance upon statistics alone does not support a prima facie case of race
discrimination.

State v. Dorsey, 10-216, pp. 12-15 (La. 9/7/11), 74 So.3d 603, 616-17, cert. denied,

566 U.S. 930, 132 S.Ct. 1859 (2012) (footnote omitted). Pursuant to Dorsey, it

seems clear that the defendant’s simple assertion of the number of black jurors

stricken was not sufficient to meet the first step of the Batson analysis. Also, the fact

that the jury ultimately included African Americans is relevant to assessing the

state’s intent on this issue. Turner, 263 So.3d at 375. At the time the objection was

25

made five of the eleven seated jurors were African American. This assignment of

error lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO

In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues that the district court

erred by denying his motions to quash Counts 6, 7, and 8 because they had

prescribed. Both parties agree that the charges are based on actions that took place

in April 2012. The indictment was filed more than six years later in June of 2018,

which is beyond the statutory time limit that the defendant cites. The controlling

article, La.Code Crim.P. art. 572, states in pertinent part:

A. Except as provided in Articles 571 and 571.1, no person shall
be prosecuted, tried, or punished for an offense not punishable by death
or life imprisonment, unless the prosecution is instituted within the
following periods of time after the offense has been committed:

(1) Six years, for a felony necessarily punishable by
imprisonment at hard labor.

(2) Four years, for a felony not necessarily punishable by
imprisonment at hard labor.

The state argues, as it did at the pretrial hearing, that La.Code Crim.P. art. 573

controls. The article states, in pertinent part:

The time limitations established by Article 572 shall not
commence to run as to the following offenses until the relationship or
status involved has ceased to exist when:

(1) The offense charged is based on the misappropriation of any
money or thing of value by one who, by virtue of his office,
employment, or fiduciary relationship, has been entrusted
therewith or has control thereof.

The terms of La.Code Crim. P. art. 573 clearly apply to the present case.

However, as the state observes, the defendant counters by arguing the existence of

“an ‘exception to the exception.’” In essence, the defendant’s argument is that

La.Code Crim.P. art. 573 does not apply because the defendant’s conduct at issue

was well-known within his office. The defendant cites State v. Lester, 49,787
26

(La.App. 2 Cir. 5/20/15), 165 So.3d 1181, for the proposition that the date of

commission of an offense, rather than when it became known, controls. The state

argues that La.Code Crim.P. art. 573 exists for the type of situation at issue. We find

Lester is inapplicable. The opinion itself states that article 573 did not apply to the

scenario that was at issue. However, the article’s language clearly applies to the set

of facts at issue in the present case. The defendant has failed to demonstrate a legal

basis for “an exception to the exception.” This assignment of error lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FOUR

In his fourth assignment, the defendant argues the district court erred by

qualifying assistant legislative auditor Roger Harris as an expert witness. The

relevant colloquy appears in the record:

BY MR. MCLINDON:

I object, Your Honor, he can not give an opinion.

BY THE COURT:

Of course I have to decide whether or not he’s eligibly
[sic] to be classified as an expert.

BY MR. COLWART:

Excuse me?

BY THE COURT:

I have to make the decision if he’s an expert.

BY MR. COLWART:

Right.

BY MR. MCLINDON:

Judge, had I been put on notice that they were calling
an expert witness I might’ve gone and hired my own
expert witness, it’s the first time I ever heard that they’re
going to call an expert witness.

27

BY MR COLWART:

Your Honor, the code article [states] we only have to
give notice if there’s no written report.

BY THE COURT:

I know.

BY MR COLWART:

And he’s been having this legislative audit since day
one.

BY MR. MCLINDON:

Judge, if you want to look at the written report none of
the requirements of Article 719 are in there.

BY THE COURT:

Let me see the report. (Reviewing document.)
Name your witness again?

BY MR. COLWART:

Excuse me?

BY THE COURT:

The name of the witness that you’re wishing to call
first?

BY MR. COLWART:

I’m sorry, I can’t hear you.

BY THE COURT:

The name of the witness you wish to call first?

BY MR. COLWART:

Roger Harris.

BY THE COURT:

Thank you. Okay. Code article reads if the witness
preparing the report will be called as an expert the report
shall contain the witness’ area of expertise, his
qualifications. He’s a member of the legislative auditor’s
28

staff, that indicates his area of expertise. His qualifications
are listed with his name, director of investigative audits
Roger W. Harris, JD, juris doctorate, CCEP, which I think
stands for -- I find that those are sufficient to contain his
areas of expertise and his qualifications, the report does
have a list of materials upon which his conclusion is based
and his opinion or reason thereof are cited in the report.
I’m going to allow the State to introduce him as an expert.

BY MR. MCLINDON:

Just note my objection for the record.

BY THE COURT:

Yes, sir. Thank you. Okay.

The code article at issue, La.Code Crim.P. art. 719, states in pertinent part:

Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall order the
district attorney to permit or authorize the defendant to inspect and
copy, photograph, or otherwise reproduce any results or reports, or
copies thereof, of a physical or mental examination, and of scientific
tests or experiments, made in connection with or material to the
particular case, that are in the possession, custody, control, or
knowledge of the district attorney and intended for use at trial. If the
witness preparing the report will be called as an expert, the report shall
contain the witness’s area of expertise, his qualifications, a list of
materials upon which his conclusion is based, and his opinion and the
reason therefor. If the expert witness has not reduced his results to
writing, or if the expert witness’s written report does not contain the
information required of an expert as provided in this Article, the state
must produce for the defendant a written summary containing any
information required to be produced pursuant to this Article but absent
from a written report, if any, including the name of the expert witness,
his qualifications, a list of materials upon which his conclusion is based,
and his opinion and the reason therefor.

Thus, the district court’s reading of the article was correct. Further, the

defendant did not dispute receiving the report or that it contained the information

recited by the district court. A district court’s ruling regarding the qualification of an

expert will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Middleton, 19-

110 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/19/19), 275 So.3d 440, writ denied, 19-1177 (La. 10/15/19),

280 So.3d 600. The defendant has not established such an abuse of discretion. This

assignment of error lacks merit.
29

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FIVE

In his fifth assignment of error, the defendant argues the district court erred

by denying his Motions for Arrest Judgment, Motion for New Trial, and Motion to

Quash Indictment. The core argument of his assignment is that improprieties took

place during grand jury proceedings. He alleges that the recording of grand jury

proceedings shows that prosecutors talked to the grand jury during deliberations,

while the defendant was out of the room.

The defendant cites La.Code Crim.P. art 442, which states, in pertinent part:

A grand jury shall hear all evidence presented by the district
attorney. It may hear evidence for the defendant, but is under no duty
to do so.

....

A grand jury should receive only legal evidence and such as is
given by witnesses produced, or furnished by documents and other
physical evidence. However, no indictment shall be quashed or
conviction reversed on the ground that the indictment was based, in
whole or in part, on illegal evidence, or on the ground that the grand
jury has violated a provision of this article.

The defendant also cites La.Code Crim.P. art. 433(B): “No person, other than

a grand juror, shall be present while the grand jury is deliberating and voting.”

The state responds that nothing prevents prosecutors from addressing the

grand jurors before deliberations, i.e., before the matter has been submitted to the

jury for its final consideration. The colloquy at issue appears at 6:21:18 on the cd

recording of the grand jury proceedings. The defendant’s counsel asked to step out

with the defendant at 6:21:18; they returned at 6:24:45; and the defendant continued

testifying before the grand jury. Thus, it appears the state is correct in asserting, as

the district court found at the hearing on the defendant’s motions, that the

prosecutors’ comments occurred before, not during, the grand jury’s deliberations.

30

During the colloquy at issue, a prosecutor stated to the grand jury that the

defendant was lying. Acknowledging that La.Code Crim. P. art. 442 states no

indictment shall be quashed nor conviction reversed due to a grand jury’s use of

illegal evidence, the defendant argues that the state’s argument in this case

constituted “more than evidence.” Further, he argues that by making the statements

at issue, the prosecutor rendered himself an “unauthorized person” within the

meaning of the relevant code articles. On these latter two points, the defendant

provides no supporting jurisprudence.

The defendant made these arguments at the hearing on his motions. The state

raised procedural objections. A review of the record supports the conclusion that

the motions lacked an underlying factual basis, as the prosecutors did not participate

in the grand jury’s deliberations.

The state further argues, as it did in district court, that the motions were

procedurally improper. It cites La.Code Crim.P. art. 533, which states in pertinent

part: “A motion to quash an indictment by a grand jury may also be based on one or

more of the following grounds: . . . (3) A person, other than a grand juror, was

present while the grand jurors were deliberating or voting, or an unauthorized person

was present when the grand jury was examining a witness.” It is apparent from the

earlier analysis that this is the type of claim the defendant is making. The state

alleges that by bringing the motion after commencement of trial (in fact, after

conviction) the defendant waived his right to bring the motion.

Regarding the timing of the motion, we note La.Code Crim.P. art. 535:

A. A motion to quash may be filed of right at any time before
commencement of the trial, when based on the ground that:

(1) The offense charged is not punishable under a
valid statute;

31

(2) The indictment does not conform with the
requirements of Chapters 1 and 2 of Title XIII [regarding
the form of the indictment; see La.Code Crim. P. arts. 461
et seq. and 466 et seq.];

(3) Trial for the offense charged would constitute
double jeopardy;

(4) The time limitation for the institution of
prosecution has expired;

(5) The court has no jurisdiction of the offense
charged; or

(6) The information charges an offense for which
prosecution can be instituted only by a grand jury
indictment.

(7) The individual charged with a violation of the
Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law has a
valid prescription for that substance.

These grounds may be urged at a later stage of the proceedings
in accordance with other provisions of this Code.

B. A motion to quash on the ground that the time limitation for
commencement of trial has expired may be filed at any time before
commencement of trial.

C. A motion to quash on grounds other than those stated in
Paragraphs A and B of this Article shall be filed in accordance with
Article 521 [i.e., within fifteen days of arraignment].

D. The grounds for a motion to quash under Paragraphs B and C
are waived unless a motion to quash is filed in conformity with those
provisions.

E. The court may, in order to avoid a continuance, defer a hearing
on a motion to quash until the end of the trial.

Since the ground of the motion to quash at issue appears in a different code

article, La.Code Crim.P. art. 533, and does not appear in Paragraph A or B of article

535, the time limitation of La.Code Crim.P. arts. 535 (C) and 521 applies, i.e., the

motion to quash should have been raised within fifteen days of arraignment.1 The

1
In 2020, after the trial in the case, the legislature changed the time period of filing pre-
trial motions to thirty days after receipt of initial discovery. 2020 La. Acts No. 252 § 1.
32

State cites State v. Johnson, 07-1040 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/10/08), 993 So.2d 326, writ

denied, 08-2649 (La. 6/5/09), 9 So.3d 868, for the proposition that a failure to timely

object can waive the ability to file a motion to quash based upon a defective

indictment. We note that Johnson cited La.Code Crim.P. arts. 535 and 521.

Further, the state argues that the defendant should have been aware of the

colloquy at issue because the relevant material was provided to him in discovery.

The state notified the defendant approximately two and a half weeks before trial that

it would be playing audio at trial and asked him if there was anything that he wanted

excised. Defense counsel did not deny receiving the materials but noted he had

already sat through the grand jury proceedings and did not want to listen to three

hours of audio. Therefore, he relied on the transcript he had, which apparently did

not include the relevant colloquy, and argued he was entitled to do so. Defense

counsel made a decision about how to budget his time in preparing for trial. This

does not form a valid basis for obviating the time limitations in La.Code Crim.P. arts.

535 and 521.

Ultimately the district court denied the motions for both procedural and

substantive reasons. We agree with the trial court’s ruling.

As this discussion shows, there were both substantive and procedural bases

for denying the motion to quash.

Regarding the motion for new trial, La.Code Crim.P. art. 851 states, in

pertinent part:

A. The motion for a new trial is based on the supposition that
injustice has been done the defendant, and, unless such is shown to have
been the case the motion shall be denied, no matter upon what
allegations it is grounded.

B. The court, on motion of the defendant, shall grant a new trial
whenever any of the following occur:
....

33

(4) The defendant has discovered, since the verdict or judgment of
guilty, a prejudicial error or defect in the proceedings that,
notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable diligence by the defendant,
was not discovered before the verdict or judgment.

For the reasons previously discussed in regard to the procedural barriers to the

motion to quash, the defendant failed to establish the exercise of reasonable

diligence, as required by this article. Therefore we find this argument lacks merit.

The defendant also assigns as error about the denial of his motion for arrest of

judgment, although his argument on this point is very brief. The relevant article,

La.Code Crim.P. art. 859, states, in pertinent part:

The court shall arrest the judgment only on one or more of the
following grounds:

(1) The indictment is substantially defective, in that an essential
averment is omitted[.]

For the reasons discussed regarding the substantive issues relating to the

indictment, the defendant has failed to demonstrate that said document is defective.

This assignment of error lacks merit.

CONCLUSION

The defendant’s conviction and sentence for racketeering (Count 1) is

reversed and set aside as the evidence is insufficient to prove an essential element of

the charge, and a judgment of acquittal as to the charge is hereby entered. The

defendant’s convictions and sentences in Count 2 (theft), Count 12 (perjury) and

Count 13 (malfeasance in office) are vacated pursuant to Ramos, as the jury verdict

on those charges was not unanimous. The defendant’s convictions and sentences for

Count 3 (filing or maintaining false public records), Count 4 (malfeasance in office),

Count 5 (malfeasance in office), Count 6 (theft), Count 7 (filing or maintaining false

public records), Count 8 (malfeasance in office), Count 9 (theft), Count 10

(malfeasance in office), Count 11 (malfeasance in office), and Count 14

34

(malfeasance in office) are affirmed. The case is remanded for the trial court to

clarify the count or counts on which the order of restitution or a fine is ordered.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

35