State of Louisiana v. Desmond Young

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

20-94

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

DESMOND YOUNG

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF VERMILION, DOCKET NO. 62740
HONORABLE LAURIE A. HULIN, DISTRICT JUDGE

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SYLVIA R. COOKS
JUDGE
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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, John E. Conery and D. Kent Savoie, Judges.

SENTENCE VACATED; AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

John V. Ghio, Assistant District Attorney
15th JDC District Attorney’s Office
100 N. State Street, Suite 215
Abbeville, LA 70510
(337) 898-4320
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Mary Constance Hanes
Louisiana Appellate Project
P.O. Box 4015
New Orleans, LA 70178-4015
(504) 866-6652
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Desmond Young

COOKS, Judge.

On February 6, 2018, Defendant, Desmond Young, was charged by grand jury

indictment with one count of first degree rape of a child under the age of thirteen, in

violation of La.R.S. 14:42. On July 18, 2019, Defendant withdrew his plea of not

guilty and entered a plea of guilty to the responsive crime of attempted molestation

of a juvenile under the age of thirteen. The State presented the following factual

basis at Defendant’s guilty plea:

Your Honor, this is an amended charge. If this matter would
have gone to trial, the State would have proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that on November 3rd, 2017, Mr. Young was caught in the act of
attempting to molest a seven-year-old individual.

The State also asserted in its Sentencing Memorandum that Defendant was an

eighteen-year-old who lived with his aunt and uncle. The victim was an eight-year

-old boy with severe autism. It was stated that the uncle found Defendant straddling

the boy with his penis lying on top of the boy’s naked buttocks.

On October 31, 2019, the trial court sentenced Defendant to ten years at hard

labor, to run concurrently with any other sentence Defendant was presently serving.

Defendant was also told he must register as a sex offender for life and was subject

to ankle monitoring upon his release from prison. Defendant filed a Motion for

Appeal, wherein he alleges the trial court erred in ordering that he be subject to ankle

monitoring for life upon his release from prison.

ANALYSIS

Specifically, Defendant argues the trial court erroneously interpreted La.R.S.

14:81.2(D)(3) to require electronic monitoring for life of a person convicted of the

attempted offense rather than the completed offense.

The record reveals at the sentencing hearing, defense counsel objected to the

recommendation in the PSI that Defendant be subject to ankle monitoring for the

rest of his life. The relevant portion of La.R.S. 14:81.2(D) provides as follows:

D. (1) Whoever commits the crime of molestation of a juvenile
when the victim is under the age of thirteen years shall be imprisoned
at hard labor for not less than twenty-five years nor more than ninety-
nine years. At least twenty-five years of the sentence imposed shall be
served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

....

(3) Upon completion of the term of imprisonment imposed in
accordance with Paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Subsection, the offender
shall be monitored by the Department of Public Safety and Corrections
through the use of electronic monitoring equipment for the remainder
of his natural life.

We pretermit discussion of Defendant’s assignment of error, as we have

discovered an error patent that requires we vacate Defendant’s sentence and remand

for resentencing. Our review of the trial court’s sentence reveals the imposition of

the electronic monitoring requirement was indeterminate, in violation of La.Code

Crim.P. art. 879. The statutory provision clearly requires the defendant to be

monitored by the Department of Public Safety and Corrections for the remainder

of his natural life. La.R.S. 14:81.2(D)(3) (emphasis added). When the trial court

first addressed defense counsel’s argument as to ankle monitoring, the trial court

stated, “I think, if I am to sentence him today, I’m going to order that he have ankle

monitoring for the remainder of his natural life.” However, when the trial court

actually imposed sentence, it simply stated that Defendant must wear an ankle

monitor once he is released from the custody of the Department of Corrections. We

find the trial court’s failure to state how long Defendant would be subject to the

electronic monitoring at the time it imposed sentence renders the sentence

indeterminate. That requires we vacate Defendant’s sentence and remand the matter

back to the trial court for re-sentencing.1

1
In our errors patent review, we also note Defendant failed to allege below
the constitutionality of the lifetime requirement for ankle monitoring found in
La.R.S. 14:81.2(D)(3). Several states have found such lifetime requirements to be
violative of the Fourth Amendment restriction against unreasonable searches. See
Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306, 135 S.Ct. 1368 (2015) (wherein the United
States Supreme Court specifically held GPS monitoring of a sex offender constitutes
2

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Defendant’s sentence as indeterminate

and remand the case for resentencing.

SENTENCE VACATED; AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; State of North Carolina v.
Grady, 831 S.E.2d 542 (N.C. 2019) and reversed and remanded for further
disposition in a North Carolina court’s lifetime monitoring sentence. The North
Carolina Supreme Court, on remand from the United State Supreme Court,
ultimately concluded lifetime monitoring violated the Fourth Amendment. Again,
in Park v. State, 825 S.E.2d 147 (Ga. 2019), the Georgia Supreme Court, in a
unanimous opinion, struck down as unconstitutional the statutory requirement that
“sexually dangerous predators” who have completed their sentences remain on
electronic monitoring for the remainder of their lives.

3