State of Louisiana v. Desmond Dangelo Dugas

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

21-85

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

DESMOND DANGELO DUGAS

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ACADIA, NO. 87538
HONORABLE DAVID MICHAEL SMITH, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE

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Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Candyce G. Perret, and Jonathan W. Perry,
Judges.

AFFIRMED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Chad M. Ikerd
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 2125
Lafayette, LA 70502
(337) 366-8994
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:
Desmond Dangelo Dugas

Donald D. Landry
District Attorney - Fifteenth Judicial District
Burleigh G. Doga
Assistant District Attorney
P. O. Box 288
Crowley, LA 70526
(337) 788-8831
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

PICKETT, Judge.

FACTS

On July 22, 2017, the defendant, Desmond Dangelo Dugas, was planning to

sell a car for scrap. According to the defendant, he contacted the victim, Blake

Jones, to have Jones use his truck to pull the derelict vehicle to the scrapyard. The

defendant testified at trial that he had agreed to pay Jones twenty dollars for his

help. Jones arrived with another friend, Jonathan Istre, and the trio, along with the

defendant’s uncle Charlie, towed the old car to a scrapyard. The scrap business

paid the defendant approximately one hundred and fifty-six dollars for the car.

The group returned to the defendant’s house. After the defendant was out of

the truck, Istre demanded more money. As tempers rose, the defendant tried to

show Blake and Istre his receipt from the scrapyard. The men inside rolled up the

window and began to pull away. The defendant stated that the passenger-side

mirror hit his shoulder, then the fender struck his hip, and he fell into a nearby

ditch. According to the defendant, when he stood back up, and was out of the ditch,

the truck was to his right, “a couple of feet” away from him. Jones put the truck

into gear and began to drive forward; the defendant pulled a gun from his pocket

and fired. A couple the defendant knew was parked nearby. The defendant

jumped into the car with them, and they left the scene. Police apprehended him

soon thereafter. Medical testimony at trial established that the victim died due to a

gunshot wound to the head.

On September 27, 2017, an Acadia Parish Grand Jury indicted the defendant

for the offense of second degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1, and illegal

possession of a stolen firearm, a violation of La.R.S. 14:69.1. The state later

dismissed the firearm charge. The defendant filed a motion to suppress on October

4, 2018, arguing the state failed to prove the admissibility of his statements to

police or of video surveillance footage obtained by police. At a hearing on

November 12, 2018, the district court denied the motion insofar as it addressed the

video surveillance footage. The defendant did not seek review. In a separate

hearing on February 14, 2019, the district court denied the motion insofar as it

addressed the defendant’s statements to police. He sought review of the latter

ruling, and this court denied relief. State v. Dugas, 19-415 (La.App. 3 Cir.

9/11/19) (unpublished opinion).

On February 11, 2020, the parties began selecting a trial jury. The following

day, the defendant filed a motion to quash the venire due to the lack of black

members. The district court denied the motion. The parties completed jury

selection, and said jury began hearing evidence. On February 14, it found the

defendant guilty as charged in a unanimous verdict.

The court addressed the defendant’s motions for post-verdict judgment of

acquittal and for new trial in a hearing on August 24, 2020, and denied both. The

defendant waived statutory delays for sentencing. After hearing argument, the

court sentenced him to the mandatory term of life imprisonment without benefit of

probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

The defendant now appeals, assigning six errors.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The State failed to sufficiently prove that Desmond Dugas was
guilty of second-degree murder. The evidence showed he was justified
in defending himself, and thus, should have been found not guilty.

2. Alternatively, if the Court finds Desmond Dugas’ actions did not
rise to the level of justifiable homicide, Desmond should have been
found guilty of the lesser included offense of Manslaughter.

3. The trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress videos and
statements made by Desmond Dugas during custodial interrogations.
Officers did not properly Mirandize Desmond and inform him of his
rights. An officer read a form from his iPad quickly to Desmond, who

2

signed it without reading or checking off that he understood his
constitutional rights.

4. The transcripts in the record are demonstratively unreliable. Even
after a second review of the audio recordings, there continues to be
problems with the transcripts. Further, key transcripts of voir dire
could not be verified and clearly show gaps of missing conversations.
Appellate counsel cannot reasonably rely on the record to know
whether other errors exist or were properly preserved. Thus, Desmond
Dugas’ right to appellate review has been compromised and [a] new
trial should be ordered.

5. This Court should remand the case for a hearing on the racial
makeup of the petit jury venire. The defense timely filed a motion to
quash the venire based on the fact that only two African Americans
responded to the summons and were actually eligible for jury duty,
although one was struck for cause and the other was never questioned
because the jury was selected beforehand. The record is incomplete,
and a further evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine the nature
of venire selection and why the jury pool was so unrepresentative of
Acadia Parish.

6. The trial court erred in instructing Desmond Dugas of his rights for
pursuing post-conviction relief. Specifically, the court failed to
properly explain when the timing of his rights begins.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by

this court for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record,

we find there is one error patent regarding the trial court’s advisement of La.Code

Crim.P. art. 930.8’s time period for filing post-conviction relief. Since the error

has been alleged as error in assignment of error number six, we will address it as

such.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBERS ONE AND TWO

The defendant’s first two assignments of error are related. In the first, he

argues that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to prove he was guilty of

second degree murder. He does not contest that he killed the victim. However, he

claims the killing was justified because it was done in self-defense. In his second

assignment of error, he makes an alternative argument that he should have been
3

found guilty of a lesser-included offense, manslaughter. When self-defense is pled

by a defendant, the burden is on the state to prove that the defendant did not act in

self-defense. State v. Patterson, 295 So.2d 792 (La.1974).

Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence as it relates to a self-defense

claim, this court set forth the well-established general analysis for such claims:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised
on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing
denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126
(1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559
(La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982);
State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role
of the fact finder to weigh the respective credibility of the
witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should not
second guess the credibility determinations of the triers
of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the
Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel.
Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson,
425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this Court to
affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect that
the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d
1367, 1371.

Defendant does not deny that he shot and killed the victim, nor
did he deny it at trial. Rather, he argues that the State failed to
disprove that he acted in self-defense. Killing in self-defense is
governed by La.R.S. 14:20(A), which states, in pertinent part, “[a]
homicide is justifiable: (1) When committed in self-defense by one
who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his
life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to
save himself from that danger.” (Emphasis added).

Defendant contends that the killing was justifiable because he
had his back against the wall, and was surrounded by the victim and
the victim’s two friends, Doucet and Jones. Further, he contends that
shooting the victim was the only way he could escape.

The Defendant’s claim that Jones had a firearm was disputed by
both Doucet and Jones at trial. The evidence given by his own mother
4

defeats his claim of justifiable self-defense. The essence of his
defense is that he was justified in responding to an attempted punch
by shooting his opponent in the chest at close range. We recognize
that Dejean had two friends with him. Thus, Defendant may have
genuinely felt endangered; further, some level of fear was objectively
reasonable. However, the level of force he used to defend himself
was far beyond what was necessary under the circumstances.

In the context of self-defense in a manslaughter prosecution,
our court has observed in State v. Griffin, 06-543, pp. 12, 14 (La.App.
3 Cir. 9/27/06), 940 So.2d 845, 851, 854, writ denied, 07-2
(La.9/14/07), 963 So.2d 995, the following:

The State had the burden of proving the defendant
did not stab Marcus Conway in self-defense; therefore,
we must determine whether the defendant reasonably
believed that he was in imminent danger of losing his life
or receiving great bodily harm and that killing Marcus
was necessary to save himself from that danger. The
standard in La.R.S. 14:20 is whether the defendant’s
subjective belief that he was in danger was reasonable.
State v. Brown, 93-1471 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/4/94), 640
So.2d 488.

Factors to consider in determining whether the
defendant had a reasonable belief that the killing was
necessary are the excitement and confusion of the
situation, the possibility of using force or violence short
of killing, and the defendant’s knowledge of the
assailant’s bad character. State v. Hardeman, 467 So.2d
1163 (La.App. 2d Cir.1985). Although there is no
unqualified duty to retreat, the possibility of escape is a
factor to consider in determining whether the defendant
had a reasonable belief that the use of deadly force was
necessary to avoid the danger. State v. Brown, 414 So.2d
726 (La.1982).

State v. Spivey, 38,243, p. 6 (La.App. 2 Cir.
5/12/04), 874 So.2d 352, 357.

State v. Mincey, 08-1315, pp. 2-3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/3/09), 14 So.3d 613, 614-15.

As Mincey demonstrates, even when the defendant has a reasonable fear of

harm from the victim, a self-defense claim will fail if the force employed by said

defendant is excessive in proportion to the threat or harm presented by the victim.

In the present case, surveillance video of the incident showed that any potential

threat to the defendant was dissipating, since the front of the truck had already
5

passed by the defendant when he shot into the vehicle. Also, although he

equivocated on details, the defendant’s own testimony indicated that the front of

the truck had passed him at the time he fired his weapon. As noted above, the

defendant testified that the victim struck him with the truck and knocked him down

shortly before the shooting. However, there was no credible danger to the

defendant at the time he pulled the trigger. Under Mincey, his response to the

situation was clearly disproportionate. Thus, the first assignment of error lacks

merit.

Regarding the second assignment of error, similar reasoning applies.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:31(A)(1) defines manslaughter:

A homicide which would be murder under either Article 30 (first
degree murder) or Article 30.1 (second degree murder), but the
offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately
caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his
self-control and cool reflection. Provocation shall not reduce a
homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender’s blood
had actually cooled, or that an average person’s blood would have
cooled, at the time the offense was committed[.]

The defendant claimed before trial, and during his testimony, that as the

victim backed out of the driveway, he struck the defendant with the side mirror and

knocked the defendant down with the fender of the truck. The video evidence does

not show this part of the event, as the camera was on the side away from where the

defendant assertedly fell. However, even taking his statements on this point as

true, the jury could conclude that the provocation alleged by the defendant was not

sufficient to “deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection[.]”

Id. Again, the undercurrent of this reasoning resembles the principle of Mincey, 14

So.3d 613, as normal anger or fear neither justifies nor mitigates homicide.

For the reasons discussed, the second assignment of error lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE

6

In his third assignment of error, the defendant argues the district court erred

by denying his motion to suppress recorded statements he made to police during

custodial interrogations, as he was not properly Mirandized.1 Similarly, he alleges

that this court erred in affirming the district court’s ruling in an earlier writ. He

argues the state failed to demonstrate that he was properly advised of his

constitutional rights, that he understood said rights, and that he was fully advised

of the reason for his arrest and questioning.

As the defendant acknowledges, he previously brought these arguments to

this court in a pretrial writ, which was filed on June 5, 2019. This court denied his

application on September 11, 2019, finding no error in the district court’s ruling.

State v. Dugas, 19-415 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/11/19) (unpublished writ disposition).

The defendant argues that this court can and should revisit the issue because the

writ denial was equivalent to a decision to decline jurisdiction.

He cites a recent case from this court, State v. Bryant, 21-240 (La.App. 3

Cir. 12/22/21), 333 So.3d 495, in which this court reviewed an assignment of error

despite the fact that the defendant had previously brought the same arguments to

this court in a pretrial writ. Bryant relied on a Louisiana Supreme Court case from

2003:

The court of appeal erred in holding its earlier writ denial
resolved the issue presented on appeal. . . . [O]nce a court of appeal
declines to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction by denying the writ,
the court was without jurisdiction to affirm, reverse or modify the
judgment of the trial court. Thus, any language in the court of
appeal’s earlier writ denial purporting to find no error in the trial
court’s certification ruling is without effect.

1
Before a person may be questioned in a custodial interrogation, he must be advised that
he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in court, that he
has a right to an attorney, and that if he cannot afford to hire an attorney one will be appointed to
represent him. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630 (1966).

7

Davis v. Jazz Casino Co., L.L.C., 03-276, 03-1223, p. 1 (La. 6/6/03), 849 So.2d

497, 498 (per curiam). In view of Davis, the panel in Bryant decided that the law-

of-the-case doctrine did not apply to bar review of issues that had been raised in a

pretrial writ.

We note that Davis did not address the foundations of the “law of the case”

doctrine.

As the fourth circuit has explained:

The State contends that because this Court already considered
these issues and found no error in the trial court’s decision, the law of
the case doctrine should apply to preclude any further consideration of
the defendant’s arguments.

Under the law of the case doctrine, appellate courts have held
they have discretion to not reconsider a previously-decided issue
unless they find the previous decision is based on palpable error or
that manifest injustice would occur. Pitre v. Louisiana Tech
University, 95-1466 (La.5/10/96), 673 So.2d 585, 589; Zatarain v.
WDSU Television, 95-2600 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/24/96), 673 So.2d 1181.

The “law of the case” doctrine applies to all prior rulings or
decisions of an appellate court or the Supreme Court in the same case,
not merely those arising from the full appeal process. See Brumfield
v. Dyson, 418 So.2d 21 (La.App. 1 Cir.1982). This policy applies to
parties who were parties to the case when the former decision was
rendered and who thus had their day in court. The reason[] for the
“law of the case” doctrine is to avoid relitigation of the same issue; to
promote consistency of the result in the same litigation; and to
promote efficiency and fairness to both parties by affording a single
opportunity for the argument and decision of the matter at issue. Day
v. Campbell-Grosjean Roofing and Sheet Metal Corp., 260 La. 325,
256 So.2d 105 (1971).

As noted in State v. Gillet, 99-2474, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir.
5/10/00), 763 So.2d 725, 728-29:

This Court has stated that “an appellate court will
not reverse its pretrial determinations . . . unless the
defendant presents new evidence tending to show that the
decision was patently erroneous and produced an unjust
result.”

State v. Molineux, 11-275, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/19/11), 76 So.3d 617, 619,

writ denied, 11-2556 (La. 3/30/12), 85 So.3d 117. See also Trahan v. State ex rel.
8

Dep’t of Health & Hosp., 04-743 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/10/04), 886 So.2d 1245, 1250.

To the extent that the appellate court in Davis appeared to use the doctrine as a bar

to re-examination of previously presented claims, the supreme court has certainly

ruled against such a bar. However, this court has continued to apply the doctrine

as a discretionary tool of judicial economy, as explained in Molineux. The present

case provides another illustration of the need for the use of the doctrine in some

form. Relying on Bryant and Davis to allow him to reach the merits of the

assignment, the defendant seeks to raise the arguments he has previously put

before this court.

After reviewing the arguments put forth by the defendant, and both the

statements sought to be excluded and the circumstances surrounding the taking of

those statements, we find no palpable error in the previous ruling by the writ panel

and find no manifest injustice will occur by relying on the ruling in the defendant’s

writ.

We therefore decline to revisit that issue. This assignment of error is

without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FOUR

In his fourth assignment of error, the defendant argues that some of the

transcripts are inaccurate, particularly those depicting jury selection and

sentencing. Appellate counsel consulted with trial counsel, who apparently had

possession of preliminary transcripts which did not match portions of the record.

Appellate counsel filed a “Motion for Review and Supplementation of the

Record,” and on March 10, 2021, this court issued an order that the three court

reporters review the audio tapes and either provide affidavits attesting to the

accuracy of the existing transcripts or produce new verbatim transcripts. One of

the reporters, Mary Jane Moreau, responded with an affidavit of accuracy dated
9

March 15, 2021. A new court reporter, Tonya Cormier, responded and requested

multiple extensions during the passing months, as she was replacing one of the

original reporters, who had retired. The various extension requests and a notation

at the beginning of the new transcripts indicated that Cormier had to work with

audio recordings and no notes. A third reporter, Janice Ann Plaisance, submitted a

letter along with new copies of the sentencing transcripts. The letter is not an

affidavit but appears to vouch for the accuracy of the transcripts. However, it is

not immediately clear whether the new copies were in fact new or re-done

transcripts.

We have reviewed the voir dire and sentencing transcripts in reference to

this assignment of error and reviewed the trial transcript in reference to the first

two assignments of error. Although the defendant alleges the sentencing transcript

is incorrect in stating that trial counsel did not object to the sentence, he does not

allege that any prejudice has resulted from this, and none of his assignments of

error address the sentence. He alleges no inaccuracies in the trial transcript and we

encountered none of any significance while assessing the first two assignment of

error.

However, the defendant notes that in the voir dire transcripts there are eight

pages for which Cormier had no audio and thus was unable to verify that section of

the transcript. He argues there is material missing regarding the selection of the

final juror, Lisa Istre. He also asserts that it is impossible to verify whether he

used all of his peremptory challenges. He correctly notes they must be exhausted

in order for him to be able to challenge district court rulings on any of his cause-

based challenges.

Both parties cite State v. Landry, 97-499, pp. 2-3 (La. 6/29/99), 751 So.2d

214, 215-16 (footnote omitted) which stated, in pertinent part:
10

We have reversed convictions when material portions of the
transcript were either incomplete or unavailable. In State v. Ford, 338
So.2d 107, 110 (La.1976), a second-degree murder conviction in
which appellate counsel did not serve as trial counsel and the court
reporter failed to record the testimony of four state witnesses, voir
dire, and the State’s opening statement, we held: “Without a complete
record from which a transcript for appeal may be prepared, a the
defendant’s right of appellate review is rendered meaningless.”
Similarly, in State v. Jones, 351 So.2d 1194 (La.1977), we held that
the omission of a portion of the hearing on a motion for change of
venue was not an “inconsequential omission” and required reversal
because it was impossible to assess the existence of community
prejudice or to ascertain whether the evidence supported the
defendants contention that the motion was improvidently denied.
Again, in State v. Parker, 361 So.2d 226 (La.1978), reversal was
required when the transcript of the closing argument could not be
prepared and the defendant assigned as error the State’s closing
argument. Likewise, in State v. Rooney, 187 La. 256, 174 So. 348
(1937), we reversed the defendant’s conviction and sentence, finding
that the transcript relative to the defendant’s bill of exceptions was so
defective that it made presentation of an appeal impossible.

In the present case, as in Ford, we are faced with an appellate
counsel who did not serve as trial counsel. A criminal defendant has a
right to a complete transcript of the trial proceedings, particularly
where counsel on appeal was not counsel at trial. U.S. v. Atilus, 425
F.2d 816 (5 Cir.1970) citing Hardy v. U.S., 375 U.S. 277, 84 S.Ct.
424, 11 L.Ed.2d 331 (1964). “[W]here the defendant’s attorney is
unable, through no fault of his own, to review a substantial portion of
the trial record for errors so that he may properly perform his duty as
appellate counsel, the interests of justice require that a defendant be
afforded a new, fully recorded trial.” State v. Ford, 338 So.2d at 110.

From the outset, we are faced with assignments of error relative
to voir dire examination that we cannot resolve on the present record.
Although the State asserts there are no defense objections recorded
during jury selection, appellate counsel adroitly points to numerous
defense counsel remarks which were transcribed as, “I
[INAUDIBLE].” Furthermore, the record is replete with
“(INAUDIBLE)” responses during critical portions of voir dire which
make it impossible to ascertain why certain jurors were excluded. To
worsen matters, not only are questions shown as inaudible, but the
record indicates that the inaudible responses were made by
unidentified jurors. . . . When we consider that there were
approximately forty jurors excluded for cause, there is almost nothing
to justify the various exclusions because of the incomplete record.
Clearly, on the deficient record before us, we cannot assure that no
erroneous excuses for cause were made.

11

The supreme court has also stated: “The defendant will not be entitled to relief on

the basis of an incomplete record absent a showing that he was prejudiced by the

missing portions of the record.” State v. Campbell, 06-286, p. 99 (La. 5/21/08),

983 So.2d 810, 873, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1040, 129 S.Ct. 607 (2008).

Although counsel in the present case was not trial counsel, he acknowledges

that he communicated with trial counsel. As noted earlier, this communication led

to the discovery of the problems with the transcripts. Despite having contact with

trial counsel, current counsel makes no specific allegation that any challenge for

cause was improperly denied or that any particular juror should not have been

seated. As noted above, there are problems with some of the transcripts, but the

defendant has not demonstrated that those problems prejudiced him. For this

reason, the assignment of error lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FIVE

In his fifth assignment of error, the defendant argues this court should

remand the case for a hearing on the racial composition of the trial jury venire.

The parties appear to agree on the procedural facts related to this assignment of

error. As both briefs recount, the defendant filed a motion after the first day of

jury selection alleging that out of “50 potential jurors [who] appeared and were

qualified to serve . . . only 2 were black.” The parties appear to agree that the

population of Acadia Parish, where the trial occurred, is approximately eighteen

percent black. The district court reached this figure at the hearing on the motion,

and it noted that out of three hundred members on the venire list, fifty-four were

black. As the court further noted, fifty-four is approximately eighteen percent of

three hundred. After the court had already ruled, the defendant argued that only

two black venire members had actually appeared and that this was “statistically

unlikely.” The court observed that a third potential venire member who was black
12

did not appear because he exercised his age exemption. The court suggested that a

fourth was ill. The court did not go into further detail, probably because it had just

observed that it had ruled and was ready to “move on.”

As the state observes, the selection of a trial jury from a cross-section of the

community is a core component of the constitutional right to a jury trial. Taylor v.

Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692 (1975). We note that pursuant to La.Code

Crim.P. art. 419(A), “A general venire, grand jury venire, or petit jury venire shall

not be set aside for any reason . . . unless persons were systematically excluded

from the venires solely upon the basis of race.” The burden of proof is on the

defendant seeking to set aside the venire. State v. Lee, 559 So.2d 1310 (La.1990),

cert. denied, 499 U.S. 954, 111 S.Ct. 1431 (1991). This structure is congruent with

analysis cited by the state:

In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section
requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be
excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the
representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected
is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in
the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to
systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.

Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 668 (1979).

After trial, the defendant filed a motion for new trial which included a

renewed argument that the jury venire did not properly represent a cross-section of

the community. In support, he offered a statistical report from a mathematics

instructor from Baton Rouge Community College. The instructor was not present.

The state objected, and the court did not allow the defendant to enter the report into

evidence. Instead, the report was entered as a proffer. The parties and the court

discussed the same issue at the core of the earlier hearing on the motion to quash,

i.e., that the black population of Acadia Parish is eighteen percent of the total, and

13

eighteen percent of the venire subpoenaed was also black – but only two black

potential jurors were present for voir dire.

The defendant’s counsel stated, “I do not know how the determination of the

racial makeup of that population was made, but regardless of that by whatever

process this occurred, it was not random chance that Black citizens of Acadia

Parish did not show up.” This is the true heart of the defendant’s argument in the

assignment of error. It falls well short of the requirements of Duren and Lee. The

defendant fails to make any demonstration that Acadia Parish’s system of

summoning venire members systematically excludes black citizens. Accordingly,

we find no merit to this assignment of error.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER SIX

In his sixth and final assignment of error, the defendant argues the district

court gave him an incorrect instruction regarding the time limits for seeking post-

conviction relief. Having concluded sentencing, the district court stated: “Mr.

Dugas, you have two years from the date of this sentence in which you can

respond, to file any post-conviction relief.” Discussing a similar situation as an

error patent, this court explained:

Defendant was incorrectly advised at sentencing that he had two years
from that date to file an application for post-conviction relief.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 930.8 provides that the
defendant has two years after the conviction and sentence become
final to seek post-conviction relief. The trial court is directed to
inform the defendant of the correct provisions of La.Code Crim.P. art.
930.8 by sending appropriate written notice to the defendant within
ten days of the rendition of the opinion and to file written proof in the
record that the defendant received the notice. See State v. Baylor, 08-
141 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/26/08), 998 So.2d 800, writ denied, 09-275
(La. 11/20/09), 25 So.3d 795.

State v. Thomas, 16-578, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/19/17), 217 So.3d 651, 655,

writ denied, 17-1153 (La. 8/31/18), 251 So.3d 411.

14

Similarly, in the present case, the district court is hereby ordered to file

written proof in the record that it issued the appropriate notice to the defendant

regarding the provisions of La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8 and that he received it.

CONCLUSION

The conviction and sentence are affirmed. The district court is directed to

inform the defendant of the correct provisions of La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8 by

sending appropriate written notice to the defendant within ten days of the rendition

of this opinion and to file written proof in the record that the defendant received

said notice.

AFFIRMED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.3.

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