State of Louisiana v. Joseph Michael Elie, III

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

KA 21-118

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

JOSEPH MICHAEL ELIE, III

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APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 344,498
HONORABLE MARY LAUVE DOGGETT, DISTRICT JUDGE

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BILLY H. EZELL
JUDGE

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Court composed of Billy H. Ezell, John E. Conery, and Van H. Kyzar, Judges.

AFFIRMED

J. Phillip Terrell, Jr.
District Attorney
Catherine L. Davidson
Assistant District Attorney
Ninth Judicial District
P.O. Box 7358
Alexandria, LA 71306-7358
(318) 473-6650
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Chad M. Ikerd
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 2125
Lafayette, LA 70502
(337) 366-8994
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Joseph Michael Elie, III

Joseph Michael Elie, III
River Bend Detention Center
9450 Hwy 65 South
Lake Providence, LA 71254

EZELL, Judge.

Defendant, Joseph Michael Elie, III, was charged by bill of information filed

on July 9, 2019, with second degree battery, a violation of La.R.S. 14:34.1. Trial

by jury commenced on January 7, 2020, and Defendant was found guilty as

charged on January 9, 2020. On August 17, 2020, Defendant was sentenced to

serve seven years at hard labor.

A “Notice of Appeal with Designation of Record and Motion to Appoint

Appellate Counsel” was filed on September 18, 2020. The record was lodged with

this court on February 10, 2021. Defendant now asserts, in his counsel-filed claim,

that the State failed to prove he inflicted serious bodily injury upon the victim. He

also asserts, pro se, that the victim’s testimony conflicts with cell phone location

data. These claims lack merit.

FACTS

The Defendant was convicted of committing a second-degree battery upon

Jasmine Duncatel.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find there

are no errors patent.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

In his counsel-filed assignment of error, Defendant contends the State failed

to sufficiently prove that he was guilty of second-degree battery because it failed to

prove he inflicted serious bodily injury. Counsel for Defendant acknowledges that

the victim, Jasmine Duncatel, testified he punched her and slammed her head into

the hood of a car, among other things, and did so without her consent. Thus, the

evidence was sufficient as to identity and the fact that a battery took place.

However, counsel asserts the facts do not support a finding that Duncatel suffered

serious bodily injury.

In his pro se brief, Defendant contends the victim’s testimony that the

altercation took place on Madeline Street conflicts with cell phone location data

and cannot be relied on to establish that an altercation took place on September 9,

2018, on Madeline Street. Defendant argues that location data did not place him

on Madeline Street or other streets near that location, creating a conflict with Ms.

Duncatel’s testimony. Thus, there is a reasonable doubt that he ever made contact

with Ms. Duncatel.

As both assignments of error relate to the sufficiency of the evidence, this

court will address them collectively.

The standard of review in a sufficiency of the evidence claim is
“whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of each of the essential elements of the crime
charged.” State v. Leger, 05-11, p. 91 (La. 7/10/06), 936 So.2d 108,
170, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1221, 127 S.Ct. 1279, 167 L.Ed.2d 100
(2007) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61
L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676 (La.1984) ).
The Jackson standard of review is now legislatively embodied in
La.Code Crim.P. art. 821. It does not allow the appellate court “to
substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact-
finder.” State v. Pigford, 05-477, p. 6 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So.2d 517,
521 (citing State v. Robertson, 96-1048 (La. 10/4/96), 680 So.2d
1165; State v. Lubrano, 563 So.2d 847 (La.1990) ). The appellate
court’s function is not to assess the credibility of witnesses or to
reweigh the evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661
So.2d 442.

The factfinder’s role is to weigh the credibility of witnesses.
State v. Ryan, 07-504 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/7/07), 969 So.2d 1268. Thus,
other than insuring the sufficiency evaluation standard of Jackson,
“the appellate court should not second-guess the credibility
determination of the trier of fact,” but rather, it should defer to the
rational credibility and evidentiary determinations of the jury. Id. at

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1270 (quoting State v. Lambert, 97-64, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir.
9/30/98), 720 So.2d 724, 726-27). Our supreme court has stated:

However, an appellate court may impinge on the
fact finder’s discretion and its role in determining the
credibility of witnesses “only to the extent necessary to
guarantee the fundamental due process of law.” State v.
Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1310 (La.1988). In determining
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction,
an appellate court must preserve “ ‘the factfinder’s role
as weigher of the evidence’ by reviewing ‘all of the
evidence . . . in the light most favorable to the
prosecution.’ ” McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 133–
34, 130 S.Ct. 665, 674, 175 L.Ed.2d 582 [ (2010) ]
(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct.
2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ). When so viewed by
an appellate court, the relevant question is whether, on
the evidence presented at trial, “any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99
S.Ct. at 2789. Applied in cases relying on circumstantial
evidence, . . . this fundamental principle of review means
that when a jury “reasonably rejects the hypothesis of
innocence presented by the defendant[ ], that hypothesis
falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another
hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt.” State v.
Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 680 (La.1984).

State v. Strother, 09-2357, pp. 10-11 (La. 10/22/10), 49 So.3d 372,
378.

State v. Bias, 18-268, 18-665, pp. 2-3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/6/19), 265 So.3d 821, 822-

23 (alterations in original), writ denied, 19-416 (La. 4/22/19), 268 So.3d 300.

Defendant . . . contends the injuries he inflicted . . . do not rise
to the level of serious bodily injury within the definition of La.R.S.
14:34.1. To sustain a conviction for second degree battery under the
statute, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the injury
inflicted “involved unconsciousness, extreme physical pain or
protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or
impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental
faculty, or a substantial risk of death.” Id. The term extreme physical
pain refers to a condition which most people of common intelligence
can understand. State v. Thompson, 399 So.2d 1161, 1168 (La.1981).
It is considered subjective in nature and susceptible to interpretation.
Id.

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State v. Jackson, 02-1250, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/03), 838 So.2d 841, 844,

writ denied, 03-832 (La. 10/17/03), 855 So.2d 759.

Corporal Huy Le responded to the complaint from Ms. Duncatel, who was

eight months pregnant, on September 9, 2018, at 6:48 p.m. Ms. Duncatel told

Corporal Le that at 1:00 a.m. on September 9 she and Defendant had a verbal

argument, and Defendant grabbed her hair and slammed her into the hood of a

vehicle. Defendant then punched and hit her while she was on the ground. Ms.

Duncatel reported that she was unconscious for a few seconds. A second incident

occurred at 6:40 p.m. the same day. At that time, Defendant pulled up to Ms.

Duncatel’s house and threatened to kill her. She then called police.

Ms. Duncatel told Corporal Le she just wanted to make a report. Corporal

Le told her the report would be on file and to go to the police department to press

charges. She did not ask for medical attention, and he did not ask her if she would

like him to call an ambulance. Ms. Duncatel’s injuries were as depicted in the

photos admitted by the State.

Sergeant Wesley Matthews took photos of the complainant, Jasmine

Duncatel, who was noticeably pregnant at the time. Sergeant Matthews described

the pictures and what they depicted: State’s Exhibit 2 - redness to the right cheek,

a small cut on the lip, a red mark under the eye, “purple and swollen and red”

above the eye, and what appeared to be blood in the right eye; State’s Exhibit 3 -

red and swollen ear, and blood and a cut on the ear; State’s Exhibit 4 - swelling

and discoloration to the eye; State’s Exhibit 5 - redness to the front of the face, the

right temple, and toward the bottom of the ear; and State’s Exhibit 6 - a cut and

abrasion at the bottom of the knee and some swelling. On cross-examination,

Sergeant Matthews was questioned about whether Ms. Duncatel had a black eye

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and indicated there was bruising under the left eye. He also testified that her

bottom lip was “busted.”

Corporal Thomas Rodney interviewed Ms. Duncatel on September 10, 2018.

Corporal Rodney then sought a warrant for Defendant’s arrest. The Affidavit for

Arrest Warrant stated, in pertinent part:

On 9/09/2018 at approximately 1850 hours Cpl Le was
dispatched to 2423 Madeline St in reference to a domestic battery.
Victim Jasmine Duncatel reported that her ex-boyfriend Joseph Elie
III slammed her head into the hood of a car before punching her
multiple times in the head. Duncatel reported to Cpl Le that she lost
consciousness or blacked out during the altercation. Duncatel reported
that the incident happened at approximately 0100 hours. Visible
injuries to her face and knew [sic] were observed. Photographs were
taken.

....

On 09/10/2018 I made contact with Jasmine Duncatel . . . .
Duncatel reported that the incident in which she was battered occurred
after Elie confronted her about text messages that he found and didn’t
like. Duncatel said she had been riding around with Elie and that
upon returning home he confronted her. Duncatel stated that they
were parked in front of her house and that he attacked her on the
roadway. Duncatel reported that Elie punched her in the head and
face multiple times and slammed her head into the hood of the
vehicle. When I asked Duncatel about their relationship she reported
that he was her ex-boyfriend, but she is currently pregnant with his
child. . . . When I asked Duncatel about blacking out she stated that
after being thrown to the ground she blacked out and upon waking up
she observed Elie driving away.

(State’s Exhibit 7.) Corporal Rodney testified that Ms. Duncatel did not know how

long she was unconscious. He believed she stated, “possibly seconds, possibly

minutes.” She ultimately said she did not know how long, but Defendant was

leaving when she came to. In her statement, Ms. Duncatel said, “It was probably a

couple of minutes. I don’t know. I just know he wind up stop [sic] hitting me as I

was trying to get up and when I got up saw [sic] that he was driving off or that he

had drove [sic] off.” Ms. Duncatel looked as she did in the photographs admitted

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by the State. Ms. Duncatel told him she wanted to press charges, and she may go

to the hospital.

Corporal Rodney was asked where the incident occurred and responded:

“[T]he incident occurred on Madeline Street in front of her residence but not

directly in front as if, as if it would have been you know just down from her

residence or maybe the next house over, in the street.” Her statement indicated it

occurred “the corner away” from her home. The officer assumed her statement

meant in front of her house.

Jasmine Duncatel testified she was eight and one-half months pregnant on

September 8, 2018, which was the day of her baby shower. Defendant was the

father of her child. She returned home a little after 7:00, and Defendant, who had

returned from Atlanta, Georgia that day, and his mother were in front of her house.

Ms. Duncatel lived on Madeline Street, which was near Chester Street and

Twenty-Fourth Street. She and Defendant talked for a while then left her home

walking, ending up by Rapides Street. They got a ride from her cousin off Garden

Street and went to Hickory Hill, where Defendant got a car from his other pregnant

girlfriend, Rakeishala. The two then went for a ride, during which they argued

about her getting text messages from other men. They probably went down Bolton

Street and in neighborhoods. On 12th Street or near Elliot Street she got out of the

car but ended up getting back in. They got back on the highway and went to

Lecompte. Ms. Duncatel clarified that this was the first time they went to

Lecompte and rode around. They were previously just riding. Defendant later

headed back toward Alexandria on Interstate 49. A block away from her house at

approximately one something in the morning, the conversation got heated.

Therefore, she got out of the car at the corner and decided to walk home.

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Defendant subsequently stopped the car in the middle of the street, where an

altercation took place. Ms. Duncatel tried to push Defendant off her, and he

grabbed her head and hit it on the hood of the car.

Ms. Duncatel explained the events:

A. After my head was slammed on the car, I’m steady trying to fight
him off. As we got off the car, he started hitting me in my face. So my
head is down so he won’t hit me in my mouth so he’s constantly
hitting me in my eyes. At some point he slammed me on the ground
and I think once my face hit the ground, I felt his foot hit my head. So,
I’m on the ground. I think I blacked out. I don’t remember when I
came to, but when I did, I heard the cars, the tires spinning, to let me
know he was gone. So when I looked up, I kind of seen the back of
the car flying up . . . 23rd Street. So I knew he was gone and it was
safe to get up. I got up and ran home.

Q. And you said that you blacked out?

A. Yes.

Q. Tell us about that. I mean, describe that for us the best you can.

A. I say I blacked out like once my head was hitting the ground. I
didn’t remember so much and as I was getting up it was like dark and
I had like black stars spinning around my head so that’s what made
me feel like I blacked out and I didn’t know like - once it stopped, the
last thing I can really recall is him kicking me in my head and that’s
when after a while I heard the tires spinning so that’s how I knew he
was gone.

When she got up, she saw stars, and her head was spinning. She did not know how

long she blacked out. She did not give Defendant permission to hit her. She was

in “a lot of pain” and afraid to go to the doctor. She guessed she never mentioned

Defendant kicking her in the head to police. Ms. Duncatel stated she was probably

confused that night and did not remember everything. When Defendant slammed

her to the ground, her head hit the ground.

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Ms. Duncatel did not know what time the two stopped during their trip

because she left her phone at her home and did not have a watch. Defendant called

Ms. Duncatel to the stand to retrace her steps.

Defendant returned to Duncatel’s house the next day at 8:30 a.m. He also

returned that evening and threatened to kill her, so she called police. Pictures

taken by police did not represent how she normally looked. The injuries depicted

were caused by Defendant.

Ms. Duncatel was questioned regarding whether she called Defendant at

7:38, 11:54, and 11:57 p.m. on September 8.1

Rosalyn Heckard is Ms. Duncatel’s sister. Heckard testified that she

believed Defendant sent her a message on her Facebook Messenger account

regarding the events with Ms. Duncatel. The message was sent on September 22,

2018, at 11:54 a.m. and stated, in pertinent part: “Only after did I beat Jazz ass

[sic] not for cheating but because she didn’t have enough respect for herself and

the child she carrying [sic].” Heckard saw Ms. Duncatel’s face on September 9,

and it was “really swollen, tremendously swollen,” and she was bruised “really

bad.”

Sheena Vaughn was Ms. Duncatel’s friend. She testified that the morning

after Duncatel’s baby shower, Duncatel called her, stating Defendant had “jumped

on her that night” and wanted Ms. Vaughn to pick her up. Ms. Duncatel was afraid

Defendant was going to “pop up.” Ms. Vaughn went to Ms. Duncatel’s residence.

While Ms. Duncatel was explaining to Ms. Vaughn what happened to her,

Defendant walked into Ms. Duncatel’s room. Defendant spoke to Ms. Vaughn.

1
There was no indication if these calls were from AT&T phone records submitted by
Defendant or whether the time represented was Universal Time Coordinated or Central Standard
Time.

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“[H]e basically was saying that what, what was he supposed to do and I told him I

mean you could have hurt her and you could have hurt the baby and he said well, if

I wanted to step on her I could’ve been [sic] stepped on her.” “Meaning if he

wanted to kill her or hurt her or anything, he could have.”

Samuel Allen, a fire investigator, testified that Ms. Duncatel provided two

phone numbers for Defendant. Thereafter, he got a warrant for phone records from

AT&T for 12:00 a.m. on September 5, 2018, until 11:59 p.m. on September 12,

2018. To Allen’s knowledge, Defendant possessed the phone with one of the

numbers on September 9, 2018. According to Allen, the phone records had to be

adjusted from UTC time to the time zone the person resided in.

Mr. Allen was investigating an attempted aggravated arson at Ms.

Duncatel’s residence between September 9 and 10, 2018. He prepared an affidavit

in support of an arrest warrant for Defendant in relation to that offense.

Edward Butler, an investigator for the Public Defender’s Office, reviewed

Ms. Duncatel’s statement to police and phone records from September 8 and 9. He

indicated the longitude and latitude on the records represented the location of the

phone. Mr. Butler testified regarding the time of certain calls on September 8 and

the location of the phone at those times as follows: 7:38 - in or around Chunky,

Mississippi; 8:22 - around Brandon, Mississippi; 8:24 to 8:28 p.m. - Brandon,

Mississippi; 8:29 to 8:30 - between Brandon and Pearl, Mississippi; 11:17 to 11:19

- near Jena, Louisiana; 11:23 - near Deville, Louisiana; 11:52 and 11:57 - near

North McArthur Drive in Alexandria, Louisiana; 11:57 - near Browns Bend Road

in Alexandria; 12:00 a.m. to 12:39 a.m. - Hickory Street; 12:39 - Murray Street;

12:48 and 12:49 - Hickory Street; 1:03 - “(inarticulate) Road”; 1:32 and 1:34 -

Hickory Street; 2:15 - Enterprise Road in Alexandria; 2:21 to 2:24 - Hickory

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Street; 2:30 Magnolia in Alexandria; 3:42 to 3:58 - Enterprise Road; 6:14 a.m. -

“[a]round South 71” between Alexandria and Lecompte; 6:15 to 6:58 - in the area

of Robinson Bridge Road in Lecompte; 7:02 - in the area of 71 South; and 7:26 to

7:49 - Enterprise Road in Alexandria. He testified that from 7:38 on September 8

to 7:49 on September 9, Defendant was not on Madeline Street. Mr. Butler

reviewed the records in the format they were in when given to him. He did not

deal with UTC time on this case and had never dealt with UTC time.

Lieutenant Stephen Phillips testified that AT&T records were typically in

UTC time, and those submitted as Defense Exhibit 2 were in UTC time. He

testified he lived in the central standard time zone, and that September fell in

Daylight Saving Time, resulting in a five-hour difference from UTC time.

According to Lieutenant Phillips, the longitude and latitude found on the phone

records indicated the cell tower location which the electronic device connected to

in order to make a transmission.

Serious Bodily Injury

Defendant contends Ms. Duncatel’s confusion about whether she blacked

out or lost consciousness raises doubt about whether the element of serious bodily

injury was proven. Defendant asserts Ms. Duncatel testified that she in fact lost

consciousness but stated, “‘I think I blacked out.’” Ms. Duncatel further stated

she saw “‘black stars spinning around my head so that’s what made me feel like I

blacked out.’” Defendant avers that when the victim is not sure she lost

consciousness, the jury cannot fill in the gaps and find sufficient evidence. The

Defendant further claims the State could not prove extreme physical pain because

Ms. Duncatel merely testified she was in a lot of pain.

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Ms. Duncatel did testify that she thought she blacked out, and she felt like

she blacked out. However, she was asked:

Q. And you said that you blacked out?

A. Yes.

She also testified that the last thing she could recall was Defendant kicking her in

the head and later hearing spinning tires. She explained that when she tried to get

up it was “like dark,” and she had black stars spinning around her head. The

testimony of both Corporal Le and Corporal Rodney support Ms. Duncatel’s

testimony. On September 9 she told Corporal Le that she was unconscious for a

few seconds and told Corporal Rodney on September 10 that she blacked out.

The jury heard this testimony and weighed the credibility of the witnesses.

Any rational trier of fact could have found the evidence proved beyond a

reasonable doubt that Ms. Duncatel lost consciousness. Thus, the State proved the

Defendant inflicted serious bodily injury upon Ms. Duncatel.

Because the evidence is sufficient to find Ms. Duncatel was unconscious, we

have not addressed Defendant’s claim regarding extreme physical pain.

Cell Data

Defendant contends cell phone data proves he was not on Madeline Street on

the date in question. Although Butler testified the data in the AT&T phone records

placed the phone at specific locations at the time particular calls were made,

Lieutenant Phillips testified the longitude and latitude provided in Defendant’s

Exhibit 2 represented the location of the cell tower the electronic device connected

to in order to make a transmission. Based on Lieutenant Phillips’ testimony, we

find the cell data does not exonerate Defendant. Moreover, Ms. Duncatel placed

Defendant on or near Madeline Street and testified that he beat her. The jury’s

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verdict clearly indicates it believed Defendant committed the offense, and this

court cannot second-guess the jury’s credibility determinations. Thus, we find

Defendant’s pro se assignment of error lacks merit.

For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant’s conviction for second degree

battery is affirmed.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s conviction is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.3.

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