State of Louisiana v. Domenique Nelson Bryant

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

21-240

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

DOMENIQUE NELSON BRYANT

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 11445-19
HONORABLE ROBERT L. WYATT, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

CHARLES G. FITZGERALD
JUDGE

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Court composed of D. Kent Savoie, Candyce G. Perret, and Charles G. Fitzgerald,
Judges.

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED.

Chad M. Ikerd
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 2125
Lafayette, Louisiana 70502
(337) 366-8994
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Domenique Nelson Bryant

Stephen C. Dwight
District Attorney
Karen C. McLellan
Assistant District Attorney
Fourteenth Judicial District
901 Lakeshore Drive, Suite 800
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601
(337) 437-3400
Counsel for Appellee:
State of Louisiana

FITZGERALD, Judge.

Defendant, Domenique Nelson Bryant, appeals his convictions for being a

principal to armed robbery with a firearm and possession of a firearm by a convicted

felon.

SUMMARY OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Just after sunset on June 8, 2018, Gilbert Greene answered his door to find a

young woman who asked to use his phone. She explained that her cellphone had

died and that she needed to call her uncle to pick her up. Greene invited the woman

into his home. Greene then went to the kitchen to retrieve his phone. As he returned,

he noticed that the woman was now accompanied by another person. This person, a

man, stood in front of the woman. Greene asked, “Who are you?” In response, the

man shot Greene two times.

Still alive, Greene watched as a second man entered his home. This man

walked over to Greene, pointed a gun at Greene’s head, and began kicking him.

Greene watched helplessly as the shooter (the first man) robbed him of his money

and other belongings. Greene survived. He was seventy-five years old when this

happened.

Over the next twelve months, all three perpetrators were arrested. Defendant

was originally charged by bill of information with attempted first-degree murder and

armed robbery with a firearm. After two amended bills were filed, Defendant was

ultimately charged with being a principal to armed robbery with a firearm, a

violation of La.R.S. 14:24 and 14:64, and possession of a firearm by a convicted

felon, a violation of La.R.S. 14:95.1. Defendant pled not guilty to the amended

charges, and the matter proceeded to jury trial.

However, after the jury had been selected and sworn (but before opening

statements), Defendant filed a motion for mistrial, alleging prejudicial conduct by

the State during jury selection. The trial court denied the motion. In response,

Defendant filed an emergency supervisory writ application. This court denied the

writ application, finding no error in the trial court’s ruling. See State v. Bryant, 20-

69 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/27/20) (unpublished opinion), writ denied, 20-171 (La.

1/28/20), 291 So.3d 1056.

Trial began in January 2020. At the close of evidence, the jury found

Defendant guilty of both charges. Prior to sentencing, the State filed a habitual

offender bill, and Defendant was adjudicated as a second felony offender. Defendant

was then sentenced as follows: for his conviction of being a principal to armed

robbery with a firearm, Defendant was sentenced to thirty-three years without

benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. But this conviction also

implicated the firearm enhancement statute. 1 Under this statute, Defendant was

sentenced to serve an additional five years to run consecutively with the thirty-three-

year sentence. As to Defendant’s conviction for possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon, he was sentenced to ten years without benefit of parole, probation,

or suspension of sentence; this sentence was ordered to run concurrently with the

thirty-three-year sentence. Defendant appealed.

1
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:64.3(A), known as the firearm enhancement statute,
provides:

When the dangerous weapon used in the commission of the crime of armed robbery
is a firearm, the offender shall be imprisoned at hard labor for an additional period
of five years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The
additional penalty imposed pursuant to this Subsection shall be served
consecutively to the sentence imposed under the provisions of R.S. 14:64 [Armed
robbery].

2

On appeal, Defendant asserts the following assignments of error:

1. The State failed to sufficiently prove that Defendant was guilty of either
criminal offense; and

2. The trial court abused its discretion and committed reversible error
when it denied Defendant’s motion for a mistrial due to prejudicial error
during jury selection.

LAW AND DISCUSSION
I. Errors Patent

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, we review appeals for errors

patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find no errors patent.

II. First Assignment of Error

Defendant asserts that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

he was guilty of either being a principal to armed robbery with a firearm or

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant thus challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence.

A sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge is reviewed on appeal under the

standard set forth by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979). “[T]he

relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319. “This standard, now

legislatively embodied in La.C.Cr.P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court

with a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact-

finder.” State v. Pigford, 05-477, p. 6 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So.2d 517, 521. The

appellate court’s function is not to assess the credibility of witnesses or to reweigh

the evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So.2d 442.

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A reviewing court must afford great deference to a jury’s decision to accept

or reject the testimony. State v. Allen, 36,180 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/18/02), 828 So.2d

622, writs denied, 02-2595 (La. 3/28/03), 840 So.2d 566, and 02-2997 (La. 6/27/03),

847 So.2d 1255, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1185, 124 S.Ct. 1404 (2004). “Where there

is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon

a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of

the evidence, not its sufficiency.” Id. at 626.

A. Summary of the Trial Testimony

Three people were arrested for the criminal offenses at issue in this appeal:

Mildred Godley, Sydney Bland, and Defendant.

At trial, Mildred Godley admitted that she had participated in the robbery of

Greene on June 8, 2018. The plan, according to Mildred, was for the three of them

(Mildred, Sydney, and Defendant) to rob Greene. Mildred recalled that Greene

owed Defendant some money, at least that is what Defendant had told her. In any

event, on the day of the robbery, Defendant met Mildred and Sydney at their home;

Mildred and Sydney lived together with their young daughter. The three participants

piled into Defendant’s vehicle, and Defendant drove them to Greene’s

neighborhood. Once there, Mildred recalled that Defendant drove back and forth in

front of Greene’s house approximately twenty times to determine if he was alone.

Eventually, Defendant parked his vehicle near Greene’s home. Mildred

testified that her role, as she understood it, was to knock on Greene’s door, and then

once inside, she would be able to let Defendant into the home. Mildred performed

her role as planned. Thus, when Greene answered his door, Mildred asked to use

his phone. Mildred explained to Greene that she and her boyfriend had gotten into

a fight, that her cellphone was dead, and that she needed to call her uncle to pick her

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up. During her conversation with Greene, Mildred’s cellphone was actively

connected to Defendant’s cellphone; this active call allowed Defendant to hear

everything that was happening. According to Mildred, she and Greene talked for a

little while before she let Defendant inside Greene’s home. But once Defendant was

inside, Mildred testified that she heard the men (Defendant and Greene) begin

arguing, followed by two gunshots. Mildred clarified that she did not actually see

Defendant shoot Greene.

Mildred testified that she immediately ran out of the home, jumped inside the

vehicle with Sydney, and then told him that he needed to go see what was going on

because Greene had been shot. Sydney did as he was told. Mildred, meanwhile,

climbed into the driver’s seat and waited for Sydney and Defendant to come out.

But only Sydney came out, and he hurried to the car, telling Mildred that she needed

to get Defendant out of the house because he was “tripping and that he shot the man

twice.”

Mildred, in turn, reentered the house and came upon Greene. She told Greene,

who was badly injured and lying on the living-room floor, to give his money to

Defendant if he wanted to live. She then told Defendant to hurry and get out. Next,

Mildred recalled that she and Defendant ran out of the house together; they hurried

into the vehicle, and Sydney sped them away from the scene. After a quick stop,

they ended up at Sydney’s friend’s house, where they split the money and hid from

the police. But a few days later, Mildred turned herself in.

On cross-examination, Mildred acknowledged pleading guilty to second-

degree robbery in exchange for her testimony against Defendant, whom she

identified in open court. Mildred was asked about a prior inconsistent statement that

she had given to police. Mildred explained that she originally lied to the police out

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of fear; she thought that by lying she could protect both herself and Sydney. Mildred

then told the jury that she decided to tell the truth once she received a plea offer.

According to Mildred, the prosecutor simply asked her to tell the truth.

Turning now to Sydney Bland’s testimony. Sydney explained to the jury that

he agreed to testify against Defendant in hopes of obtaining a more lenient sentence.

Sydney had already pleaded guilty to armed robbery with a firearm and possession

of a firearm by a convicted felon, and he was awaiting sentencing. Like Mildred,

Sydney stated that the prosecutor only asked him to testify truthfully. But unlike

Mildred, Sydney had not been offered a plea deal in exchange for his testimony.

As to the robbery, Sydney identified Defendant in open court. Sydney

testified that he and Defendant had discussed the details beforehand: he knew

Defendant intended to rob Greene, and he was happy to help. However, Sydney

clarified that Defendant never said anything about bringing a gun or harming

Greene.

Nevertheless, on the day of the robbery, Sydney explained that once

Defendant parked his vehicle near Greene’s home, both Mildred and Defendant

jumped out while he remained inside the vehicle. Sydney watched Mildred knock

on Greene’s door and then walk inside. Defendant then entered the home. But after

about twenty minutes, Sydney became worried and decided to go into the home to

check on things.

Immediately upon entering the home, Sydney saw Greene lying on the floor

bleeding. Mildred was standing nearby. Sydney explained that Defendant then

walked over and handed him a gun. Sydney, in turn, pointed the gun at Greene’s

head and began kicking him. But this did not last long because he (Sydney) started

panicking and fled to the vehicle, which is where he met up with Mildred and

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Defendant. The three of them then sped away. Sydney testified that he did not recall

seeing Defendant steal anything, nor did he remember splitting up any money later

that evening. He did admit, however, that he was high on methamphetamines at the

time of the incident.

On cross-examination, Sydney admitted that he did not tell the police anything

at first, but after he was arrested, he had an opportunity to look at the reports and the

witness statements. After seeing all the evidence against him, he decided to

cooperate with the prosecutor. Sydney also acknowledged that he originally denied

holding Greene at gunpoint. But when he realized that his story was not going to

work, he decided to tell the truth. Sydney testified that only he and Mildred went to

his friend’s house after the robbery; Defendant was not there.

Many other witnesses testified at trial, including Greene. Greene’s testimony

was consistent with Mildred and Sydney’s testimony, but Greene also testified as to

the money and other items of value that were taken from him; Greene, while lying

on the ground bleeding, watched helplessly as Defendant took these items.

B. Principal to Armed Robbery with a Firearm—Sufficiency of the
Evidence

Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of being

a principal to armed robbery with a firearm. In fact, Defendant argues that he has

been wrongfully accused (and convicted) because he had nothing to do with the

armed robbery of Greene on June 8, 2018.

“Armed robbery” is defined as “the taking of anything of value belonging to

another from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another, by

use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon.” La.R.S.

14:64(A). In addition, “All persons concerned in the commission of a crime,

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whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the

offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure

another to commit the crime, are principals.” La.R.S. 14:24.

The Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Neal, 00-674, p. 12 (La. 6/29/01),

796 So.2d 649, 659, cert. denied, 535 U.S. 940, 122 S.Ct. 1323 (2002) (citation

omitted), explained that “the defendant’s mere presence at the scene is not enough

to ‘concern’ him in the crime. Only those persons who knowingly participate in the

planning or execution of a crime may be said to be ‘concerned’ in its commission,

thus making them liable as principals.”

Thus, for this court to affirm Defendant’s conviction, we must determine

whether, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant

knowingly participated in the armed robbery of Gilbert Greene.

As addressed previously, Mildred identified Defendant at trial. Mildred

testified that she knocked on Greene’s door; that she let Defendant inside Greene’s

home; that she heard Defendant and Greene argue, followed by two gunshots; that

she told Greene to give his money to Defendant if he wanted to live; and that the

stolen money was divided up later that evening. Similarly, Sydney testified that he

and Defendant planned the robbery in advance; that once he entered Greene’s home,

he (Sydney) saw Greene on the ground bleeding; and that Defendant then handed

him a gun. Greene’s testimony was essentially the same, though Greene provided

more detail about the things of value that were taken from him.

As stated by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Higgins, 03-1980, p. 6

(La. 4/1/05), 898 So.2d 1219, 1226, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 883, 126 S.Ct. 182 (2005):

“[I]n the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with the physical

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evidence, one witness’s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to

support a factual conclusion.”

Here, multiple witnesses testified against Defendant. And although Mildred

was also charged in this incident and benefited from a plea bargain made in exchange

for her testimony, the jury was made aware of that fact, and Defense counsel

questioned her about her credibility. This is also true of Sydney’s testimony, even

though he was not testifying pursuant to a plea agreement. But here too, the jury

was made aware of these facts, and Defense counsel examined Sydney about his

credibility. In the end, the jury believed the witness testimony about Defendant’s

involvement in the armed robbery.

As summarized by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Neal, 796 So.2d

at 658-59 (citations omitted):

[T]he jurisprudence in Louisiana generally holds that an accomplice is
qualified to testify against a co-perpetrator even if the prosecution
offers him inducements to testify; such inducements would merely
affect the witness’s credibility. As the United States Fifth Circuit has
found, “a conviction may be based even on uncorroborated testimony
of an accomplice or of someone making a plea bargain with the
government, provided that the testimony is not incredible or otherwise
insubstantial on its face.” United States v. Osum, 943 F.2d 1394, 1405
(5th Cir.1991).

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have

found proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was guilty of the crime of

being a principal to armed robbery. It was the jury’s prerogative to assess the

credibility of the witnesses and to accept or reject their testimony. We will not

second guess the jury’s credibility determinations, nor will we impinge on its role as

factfinder. Accordingly, Defendant’s conviction for being a principal to armed

robbery is affirmed.

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C. Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon—Sufficiency of the
Evidence

Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

To convict a person of being a felon in possession of a firearm under La.R.S.

14:95.1, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that Defendant has been

convicted of a felony enumerated in this statute; (2) that subsequent to that

conviction, Defendant possessed a firearm; (3) that a period of less than ten years

has elapsed since Defendant’s completion of his sentence, parole, or probation for

the prior conviction; and (4) that Defendant had the general intent to commit the

offense. State v. Stewart, 18-757 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/1/19), 270 So.3d 741.

“‘The general intent to commit the offense [of being a felon in possession of

a firearm] may be proved through the actual or constructive possession of the

firearm.’ If the State can prove actual possession, it has satisfied the intent element

of the offense.” Id. at 746 (quoting State v. Drayton, 46,191, p. 8 (La.App. 2 Cir.

4/13/11), 63 So.3d 319, 324, writ denied, 11-2343 (La. 6/1/12), 90 So.3d 430).

Here, Defendant does not dispute that he is a convicted felon under this statute

and that the ten-year statutory period of limitation has not elapsed. Rather,

Defendant argues that there was not sufficient evidence to determine beyond a

reasonable doubt that he was the person who possessed the firearm on June 8, 2018.

Therefore, for this court to affirm Defendant’s conviction, we must determine

whether, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant

was in actual possession of a firearm on June 8, 2018.

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In sum, our previous discussion as to the sufficiency of evidence for the

conviction of being a principal to armed robbery applies to the “possession” element

of this offense. And based on the testimony of Mildred, Sydney, and Greene, a

rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt that

Defendant was in actual possession of a firearm on June 8, 2018. Accordingly,

Defendant’s conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is affirmed.

III. Second Assignment of Error

Defendant next asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his

motion for mistrial due to prejudicial conduct during jury selection. We review this

assignment under the abuse of discretion standard of review. State v. James, 16-522

(La.App. 3 Cir. 4/5/17), 216 So.3d 117.

Defendant specifically argues that the State obtained an unfair advantage

during jury selection by obtaining and using juror information obtained by another

prosecutor in an unrelated case (a murder case) in a different division of the court,

and that this information was unavailable to the defense. The juror information at

issue included the seating order of the potential jurors, the potential jurors who had

been stricken and by whom, the challenges for cause, and the notes taken by the

prosecutor in that case.

Defense counsel learned of the above information sharing before the start of

voir dire. The trial court, after being apprised of the situation, explained as follows

to defense counsel: “Is there an advantage by the State, yeah; but you have every

opportunity in questioning . . . [the potential jurors] to undo that advantage.”

A short time later, defense counsel addressed the State’s “advantage” with the

following argument:

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Judge, Defense would move for at a minimum enough of a break
in the proceedings to allow us to at least do some research on these
jurors. The manifest unfairness to [Defendant] and to us as his counsel
where the State has access to all of the notes and all of the questions
asked in the previous interviews at voir dire panels with these jurors is,
to call it unfair is an understatement.

They have the complete set of notes that [the other prosecutor]
and his staff produced through questioning these witnesses. They get
to avail themselves to not only their questions but their answers.

They get to have a wealth of resource for potential challenges for
cause. If Ms. Stagg[, who is defense counsel in the murder case,] struck
someone for cause, the State already knows that. The State then gets to
preempt Defense’s questioning of these people by preemptive, to repeat
myself, to preemptively rehabilitate.

I know for a fact because I was in there listening to Ms. Stagg
dismiss one of them last night, that one of them was dismissed for
attitude and law enforcement relations.

The State has access to that information and we do not. To call
that anything but unfair is ludicrous.

In reply, the State attempted to clarify the situation by explaining to the trial

court as follows:

I will indicate for the record that we do have notes from Mr.
Johnson as to the State’s strikes and to the Defense strikes of the jurors
whom are to be questioned.

While we do have those, I think to characterize it as we have a
list of the questions and answers, I think is embellishing much because
no one in that courtroom seemed to have taken that great of notes; so
I’ve got a series of circles and “Xs” that indicate who struck who.

Not to say that that isn’t helpful because it is. But no one wrote
down answers and questions it doesn’t appear.

Shortly after this exchange, the trial court offered to take a break so that

defense counsel could meet with Ms. Stagg. In response, Defense counsel stated

that he did not know whether a break would alleviate the need for an objection, but

he was appreciative of any time given. Thereafter, the judge decided to recess for

the day because providing a break would delay voir dire until late that afternoon.

12

Defense counsel objected, arguing that this would create an even greater

disadvantage because the prosecutors from the different cases would have additional

time to speak with each other. Defense counsel also pointed out that there was no

guarantee that Ms. Stagg would share any of the jury venire information. The judge

nevertheless maintained his decision to recess for the day, noting that he was trying

to make things as fair as possible.

The following morning, the trial court again acknowledged that the State had

an advantage, but the court pointed out that the defense had every opportunity during

its questioning of the potential jurors to alleviate this advantage. Defense counsel,

in turn, asked for a continuance. This motion was denied. And instead of moving

to have the jury venire quashed, the defense waited until the entire jury had been

selected and sworn, and then moved for a mistrial. Although the trial court

recognized that it was the proper time to request a mistrial, it denied Defendant’s

motion.

In response, Defendant sought an emergency supervisory writ. As noted

above, this court denied Defendant’s writ application, finding no error in the trial

court’s ruling. See Bryant, 20-69.

Now on appeal, the State contends that our previous ruling on Defendant’s

writ application is the law of this case. We disagree. In fact, it appears that the

State’s argument is squarely at odds with the statement of law given in Davis v. Jazz

Casino Co., L.L.C., 03-276 (La. 6/6/03), 849 So.2d 497. There, the Louisiana

Supreme Court explained that

once a court of appeal declines to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction
by denying the writ, the court was without jurisdiction to affirm, reverse
or modify the judgment of the trial court. Thus, any language in the
court of appeal’s earlier writ denial purporting to find no error in the
trial court’s certification ruling is without effect.

13

Id. at 498. For this reason, the law-of-the-case doctrine is inapplicable to this

situation. We therefore must decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in

denying Defendant’s motion for mistrial.

The essence of Defendant’s argument is that the information sharing between

prosecutors amounted to prejudicial conduct that deprived Defendant of a fair trial

under La.Code Crim.P. art. 775 (“[A] mistrial shall be ordered, and in a jury case the

jury dismissed, when prejudicial conduct in or outside the courtroom makes it

impossible for the defendant to obtain a fair trial[.]”).

However, a mistrial is a drastic remedy. State v. Henry, 15-321 (La.App. 3

Cir. 11/12/15) 178 So.3d 1134, writ granted, 15-2300 (La. 3/24/16), 187 So.3d 984.

“The motion should be granted only where the defendant suffers such substantial

prejudice that he has been deprived of any reasonable expectation of a fair trial.”

State v. Smith, 433 So.2d 688, 696 (La. 1983). And “[f]or an appellate court to

reverse a trial court’s denial of mistrial, the defendant must show actual prejudice

resulting from the underlying error.” State v Hernandez, 17-803, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir.

3/7/18), 241 So.3d 1053, 1058.

In sum, Defendant had to prove substantial prejudice for the trial court to grant

the motion for mistrial. And again, the appropriate standard for our review is abuse

of discretion.

As to prejudice, Defendant likens the information sharing here to the conduct

at issue in State v. Bates, 508 So.2d 1346 (La.1987). The prejudicial conduct in

Bates, however, consisted of ex parte juror contact by the district attorney. By

comparison, the conduct at issue in our appeal consists of information sharing

between prosecutors. In addition, seven jurors in Bates had been selected and sworn

14

before defense counsel learned of the district attorney’s ex parte communication

with the entire jury venire—all 100 potential jurors. In our case, defense counsel

learned of the information sharing between prosecutors before any potential juror

was questioned, meaning Defendant had the opportunity to mitigate the State’s

advantage during voir dire.

On the facts presented in Bates, the supreme court reversed the defendant’s

conviction for forceable rape, pointing out that “unilateral ex parte juror contacts

can only result in a skewing of the otherwise impartial administration of justice.” Id.

at 1350. But those facts are not present in this appeal. Indeed, the record before us

reflects markedly different facts, so much so that Bates has no bearing on the issue

now under review. 2

For a case that does offer some guidance, albeit by analogy, we turn to State

v. Lee, 93-2810 (La. 5/23/94), 637 So.2d 102. The issue in Lee was whether the trial

court abused its discretion in denying defense counsel’s challenges for cause as to

potential jurors who had, the day before, served on a jury in a similar case. The prior

case was prosecuted by the same assistant district attorney, who, in the subsequent

case (the case against Mr. Lee), referenced the voir dire questions and answers from

the previous day. Mr. Lee was not privy to this information. In affirming the trial

court’s ruling, the supreme court explained: “To the extent defense counsel and

defendant were not ‘privy’ to the questions and answers which had occurred in the

previous voir dire, defense counsel was not prohibited from questioning those

panelists about any of the referenced questions and answers.” Id. at 108.

2
In further support, Defendant cites State v. Singleton, 352 So.2d 191 (La.1977). Yet this
opinion is not helpful to Defendant’s position. Quite the opposite, in fact.

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In the appeal before us, the record does not reveal that the trial court’s denial

of Defendant’s motion for new trial was arbitrary or unreasonable. The conduct at

issue consists of information sharing between prosecutors; defense counsel learned

of the information sharing before any potential juror was questioned; and defense

counsel had the opportunity to mitigate the State’s advantage, if any, during voir

dire. There is simply no showing that this information sharing amounted to

prejudicial conduct sufficient to deprive Defendant of a fair trial.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for

mistrial. This assignment is without merit.

DISPOSITION

For the above reasons, Defendant’s convictions are affirmed.

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED.

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