State of Louisiana v. Eddie Ray Jackson, Jr.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

21-521

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

EDDIE RAY JACKSON, JR.

************
APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, DOCKET NO. 334,030
HONORABLE WILLIAM GREGORY BEARD, DISTRICT JUDGE
************
SYLVIA R. COOKS
CHIEF JUDGE
************

Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Chief Judge, John E. Conery and Charles G.
Fitzgerald, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

J. Phillip Terrell, Jr., District Attorney
Catherine L. Davidson, Assistant District Attorney
Ninth Judicial District Court
P.O. Box 7538
Alexandria, LA 71306-7538
(318) 473-6650
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Douglas Lee Harville
Louisiana Appellate Project
P.O. Box 52988
Shreveport, LA 71135-2988
(318) 222-1700
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Eddie Ray Jackson, Jr.

COOKS, Chief Judge

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 23, 2017, James Edward Melton, Sr., was sitting in his vehicle

outside of a convenience store located at the intersection of Lee Street and Evergreen

Street in Alexandria. Mr. Melton was waiting for Beatrice Papayanis. Two men

approached Mr. Melton’s vehicle. One of the individuals then pulled out a gun and

shot Mr. Melton in the head while he was sitting in his vehicle, at which point both

men took off.

On June 28, 2017, Defendant was charged by bill of indictment with one count

of first degree murder, in violation of La.R.S. 14:30, and one count of armed robbery,

in violation of La.R.S. 14:64. Following a pair of amendments in 2019, Defendant

was ultimately charged with one count of second degree murder, in violation of

La.R.S. 14:30.1, and one count of attempted armed robbery with a firearm, in

violation of La.R.S. 14:27, 14:64, and 14:64.3.

On April 17, 2021, a jury trial was held. The State’s first witness was

Detective Chris Fonville of the Alexandria Police Department’s Crime Scene

Division, who was dispatched to process the crime scene. He identified the victim’s

blue truck which was at the scene, a number of photographs which showed blood on

the headrest and top of the driver’s seat in the victim’s truck, and some twenty

photographs taken during and after an autopsy was performed on the victim.

Defense counsel voiced an objection to the gruesome nature of some of the State’s

Exhibits, specifically photographs showing the top of the victim’s skull removed to

show the trajectory of the bullet through the victim’s brain.

Detective Fonville testified he was able to view and download footage of the

shooting from the convenience store’s camera system. The State then introduced

video of the shooting taken by the store’s security system from two different

cameras. State’s Exhibit 6 is a sixteen-minute-long security video which shows most

2

of the front of the convenience store where the shooting took place, as well as the

side of the building where the victim parked his vehicle. The victim arrives and

parks on the side of the store at roughly the 1:30 mark of the video. The victim never

exits his truck. While the victim is sitting in his truck, three young black males can

be seen walking to the convenience store from the neighborhood across the street.

The three men are all wearing shorts and tennis shoes; one is wearing a dark hooded

sweatshirt, one is wearing a plain white t-shirt, and the third is wearing a light-

colored hooded sweatshirt. They walk past the victim and head to the front of the

store where they remain without entering. Shortly after the 9:00 mark of the video,

a young woman approaches the victim’s truck from the same side of the street as the

three men. She speaks to the victim for about ten seconds, during which time the

two men wearing hooded sweatshirts both begin walking towards the victim’s truck

while the third male stands by the edge of the building.

After speaking with the victim, the female walks behind the victim’s truck

and heads into the store, passing the two males in hooded sweatshirts in the process.

As the two men calmly walk towards the victim’s driver-side window, the individual

in the dark sweatshirt jumps towards to the window. After roughly ten seconds of

interaction between the victim and the man in the dark sweatshirt, during which time

the individual in the light sweatshirt has his back to the vehicle, the two men walk

away from the truck. Once the two men reach the road, they take off running back

to the neighborhood across the street from which they initially came. The individual

in the white t-shirt disappears from the camera seconds thereafter. The female exits

the store at roughly the 12:00 minute mark of the video, lights a cigarette while

speaking to someone who came out of the store with her, then walks back to the

victim’s truck and sticks her head in the passenger-side window. She then calmly

walks away from the truck. No one else approaches the victim’s vehicle until law

enforcement arrives approximately four minutes later.

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State’s Exhibit 7 is video of the front side of the convenience store from a

camera above the ice machine by the front door during the same sixteen-minute time

frame. Between the 7:05 and 7:10 marks of the video, the individual in the dark

sweatshirt is almost directly under the camera while facing towards it; a comparison

with Defendant’s mug shot photo confirms that Defendant is the individual wearing

the dark sweatshirt. As noted with the prior video, the three individuals spend

around three minutes just standing around outside the front of the store without

entering. The individuals disappear from view at the 9:15 mark with the individual

in the white t-shirt reappearing at roughly the 9:40 mark. The young woman then

walks past and enters the store at the 9:48 mark. The individual in the white t-shirt

continues to pace in front of the store before walking around the corner on the

opposite side of the store from the victim’s vehicle at the 11:00 mark. The young

woman exits the store at roughly the 12:00 mark and disappears from view shortly

thereafter.

The State then called Detective Torrence Bowens who was assigned as the

lead detective in the murder of James Melton. Detective Bowens testified that when

he arrived there was a uniformed officer and Acadian Ambulance on site, that neither

of the clerks inside the store was aware a shooting had occurred in the parking lot,

and that he reviewed the security camera footage. According to Detective Bowens,

his conversations with witnesses led him to the home of Ms. Geraldine Hampton,

where he was looking for Ms. Beatrice Papayanis. Detective Bowens stated he knew

Ms. Hampton and Ms. Papayanis were related and noted Ms. Hampton’s home was

approximately a block and a half away from the convenience store.

According to Detective Bowens, Ms. Papayanis arrived at Alexandria Police

Department headquarters shortly after Detective Bowens returned from the crime

scene, accompanied by Nicholas West. Ms. Hampton then soon arrived with her

son, Joseph Hampton. While unsure when Defendant arrived at headquarters,

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Detective Bowens noted Defendant was interviewed about two hours after the start

of Ms. Papayanis’s interview. Detective Bowens testified he personally interviewed

Defendant and that Defendant waived his rights prior to the interview.

The State introduced both an audio recording of Defendant’s statement and a

transcript of the conversation which was just over three pages long and consisted of

Defendant saying he was walking with Joseph Hampton when they heard a gunshot,

saw a dead body, and went home. Detective Bowens then commented on the video

of the shooting as depicted in State’s Exhibit 6, noting that when Mr. Melton is shot,

the individual in the light sweatshirt is “[w]alking away with his back turned.”

Detective Bowens stated at that point he arrested Defendant and Mr. West.

On cross-examination, Detective Bowens testified that other individuals were

brought to headquarters but no one else was arrested and that no gunshot residue

tests were done in the instant case. He testified he was unaware of anything being

taken from Mr. Melton. He noted that, at the time of the shooting, Defendant was

seventeen, Mr. West was twenty, Mr. Hampton was eighteen, and Ms. Papayanis

was twenty-five years of age.

The State then called Ms. Sonya Wiley-Gremillion, the custodian of records

for 9-1-1 calls in Rapides Parish. Ms. Wiley-Gremillion identified State’s Exhibit

13 as a disc containing six 9-1-1 calls related to the shooting of Mr. Melton, the first

of which was recorded at 11:46 a.m. on February 23, 2017. She also identified

State’s Exhibit 15, a disc containing a 9-1-1 call received at 12:15 p.m. on February

23, 2017. The call was from Ms. Papayanis, who claimed she ran away from the

scene after she knocked on the victim’s window and he did not respond despite

breathing heavily. She stated she knew the shooter’s identity but did not give the

name over the phone.

The State called Mr. Christopher Winchester, the individual who placed the

initial 9-1-1 call to report the shooting of Mr. Melton. Mr. Winchester testified that

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he was parked at an abandoned building on Evergreen Street, directly across from

the convenience store, eating his lunch in his truck. According to Mr. Winchester,

a young lady who “was kind of short with long hair” walked past the side of his truck

heading towards the convenience store. He noted the young lady approached the

truck parked on the side of the store, spoke to the driver, and “made a hand

transaction” before heading into the store. Mr. Winchester testified the young lady

passed two gentlemen as she walked around the back of the truck, noting the two

men walked up to the driver’s window. According to Mr. Winchester, he looked

down at his phone and heard a “pop.” When he looked up, he saw a dark-skinned

male in a black top with basketball shorts on put a gun in his right pocket before both

men took off running. Mr. Winchester viewed State’s Exhibit 6 and confirmed the

individual wearing the dark hooded sweatshirt was the one he saw put a gun back

into his pocket before running away.

The State then called Mr. Joseph Hampton, III, who testified he is Defendant’s

cousin. Mr. Hampton testified that prior to the shooting, he and Defendant would

spend around two days a week together. According to Mr. Hampton, on the morning

of February 23, 2017, he was at his mother’s home on Felker Street with his cousin

Jasmine, his brother Gerald, Defendant, Nicholas West, Beatrice Papayanis, and one

of Jasmine’s friends. He noted the family refers to Defendant as “Jay.” According

to Mr. Hampton, he, Defendant, and Nicholas West all left the house together to

walk to the store on the corner of Lee and Evergreen. Viewing State’s Exhibit 6,

Mr. Hampton identified himself as the member of the three young males in the white

t-shirt, Defendant as “the one with the black hood on,” and Mr. West as “the one in

the tan jacket.” He testified he did not have a firearm that day and he was unaware

if either of the other two men had a firearm.

Mr. Hampton specifically testified he saw Defendant shoot the man in the

truck before both Mr. West and Defendant took off running. Mr. Hampton testified

6

he waited briefly for Ms. Papayanis, his aunt, to come back outside but ultimately

chose to go home because he was nervous and did not know what to do. He stated

that when he arrived home, his brother Gerald, his cousin Jasmine, one of Jasmine’s

friends and the friend’s little sister, and Defendant were all present; he did not see

Ms. Papayanis or Mr. West at the house. Mr. Hampton testified his Uncle David

brought him and Defendant to meet Mr. Hampton’s mother, who then tried to bring

both young men to the police department. According to Mr. Hampton, Defendant

got out of the car before they got to the police department.

On cross-examination, Mr. Hampton stated he saw the gun fire then saw

Defendant and Mr. West run away. Mr. Hampton also testified he was unaware of

any relationship between Ms. Papayanis and Mr. Melton or that Defendant and Mr.

West were planning to confront Mr. Melton, stating he only knew his aunt was going

to get him some cigarettes at the store.

The State then called Ms. Geraldine Hampton, Joseph Hampton’s mother. In

reference to the home on Felker Street, Ms. Hampton testified she lived there part-

time depending on her work schedule. She testified, however, that her sister Deisha

Austin, her brother, cousin, and her children lived at the house full-time. She noted

that she was at the house on Felker daily; however, she did not sleep at the house on

the morning of February 23, 2017. She testified she went to the house on Felker

Street around 8:00 a.m. and stated the following people were at the home: her

children Miranda, Joseph, and Gerald; her sister Deisha; her cousin David; her

nephew Eddie Ray Jackson; Ms. Papayanis; Mr. West; and a neighbor. Ms.

Hampton testified that her ex-husband was Defendant’s mother’s brother. On

February 23, 2017, Ms. Hampton brought her daughter to work then went to work

herself in Pineville, Louisiana.

According to Ms. Hampton, her son Joseph called her around noon, and she

left work and met her cousin David at an Auto Zone near the house to bring Mr.

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Hampton and Defendant to the police station. She testified she tried calling

Defendant’s mother, Ms. Betty Hampton, to let her know Defendant had been

involved with a shooting. Ms. Geraldine Hampton testified she was bringing Joseph

and Defendant to the Bolton Street Police Department, but Defendant got out of the

car before she got there. Viewing State’s Exhibit 7, Ms. Hampton identified

Defendant as the individual in the dark hooded sweatshirt.

On cross-examination, Ms. Hampton identified her son as the individual in

the white t-shirt in the videos, Mr. West as the individual in the tan sweatshirt, and

Defendant as the individual in the dark sweatshirt. She confirmed that, looking at

the individual in the dark sweatshirt’s face in the video, she was completely

confident it was Defendant. Ms. Hampton noted Mr. West was dating Ms.

Hampton’s sister, Ms. Papayanis, who was six or seven years older than Mr. West.

She also acknowledged knowing Defendant and Ms. Papayanis had previously had

a sexual relationship.

The State’s final witness was Mr. Nicholas West. Mr. West testified that in

the instant case he had received a ten-year sentence for obstruction of justice in

exchange for his truthful testimony. Mr. West testified that he was at Geraldine

Hampton’s house on Felker Street on the morning of February 23, 2017, until he,

Defendant, and Joseph Hampton went to the store around 11:30 a.m. Viewing

State’s Exhibit 7, Mr. West identified himself as wearing a “tan hoodie” in the video.

Mr. West identified Defendant as the individual in the dark sweatshirt and Mr.

Hampton as the other individual. According to Mr. West, while he was standing

with his back to Mr. Melton’s vehicle, Defendant told Mr. Melton to “[g]ive up the

money,” at which point Mr. West heard a gunshot and started to walk away. Mr.

West testified there was very little time between Defendant telling Mr. Melton to

give up his money and the gunshot.

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According to Mr. West, both he and Defendant then ran back to the house on

Felker Street, where Mr. West changed his jacket then left with Ms. Papayanis once

she returned to the home. He testified they left the house and went to the mall.

On cross-examination, Mr. West testified that at the time of the shooting he

and Ms. Papayanis had been dating for two or three months and were living together

at the house on Felker Street. He testified he went to the store to get cigarettes but

did not enter because he was waiting for Ms. Papayanis to come actually buy

cigarettes. Mr. West testified Ms. Papayanis was friends with Mr. Melton and she

was going to get money from him to buy the cigarettes. Mr. West denied planning

an attack on Mr. Melton and testified he took a plea deal for ten years on obstructing

justice because his attorney advised him it was in his best interests. He

acknowledged that he knew Defendant and Ms. Papayanis had previously been in a

relationship. The State rested its case at that point.

The defense called Ms. Beatrice Papayanis. Ms. Papayanis testified she had

met Mr. Melton on a dating website. She testified that she was at Ms. Geraldine

Hampton’s house on the morning of February 23, 2017. Ms. Papayanis testified she

went to the convenience store to meet Mr. Melton but Defendant, Mr. Hampton, and

Mr. West had already left the house when she departed for the store. She testified

she was going to buy cigarettes for Mr. Hampton and Mr. West and that Mr. Melton

was going to bring her to Wal-Mart to get Rotel dip. She stated Mr. Melton helped

her by giving her food and change for her and her son “[w]ith nothing asked for in

return.”

Ms. Papayanis admitted that she had offered to have oral sex with Mr. Melton

in a text message but claimed nothing sexual ever happened between them. She

testified that Mr. West knew about her friendship with Mr. Melton but not that Ms.

Papayanis had offered to give him sexual favors. According to Ms. Papayanis,

Defendant may have been upset when their sexual relationship ended, stating “he

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was kind of abusive.” Ms. Papayanis testified Mr. Melton gave her about five dollars

in change to get something from the store when she arrived, claiming he was going

to cash his check when they went to Wal-Mart to get her some groceries. She

testified she passed Defendant and saw Mr. Hampton and Mr. West when she was

going into the store but that she had no idea what they were doing. Ms. Papayanis

testified she asked Mr. Melton to meet her at the store because she was concerned

there were a lot of people around and she was worried about Mr. Melton’s safety

due to his race.

Ms. Papayanis testified a man was talking to her when she exited the store.

She testified she then walked up to the victim’s passenger side to get into the truck,

but it was locked. Mr. Melton did not respond when she knocked on the window, at

which point she noticed the hole in the back of his head. Ms. Papayanis testified she

was in shock and that she backed away from the vehicle, took out her phone, and

called 9-1-1. Ms. Papayanis claimed she was on the phone with 9-1-1 as she returned

to the house at Felker Street and when she saw Defendant she got scared and left

while still on the phone with law enforcement.1 Ms. Papayanis testified she returned

to the house on Felker because she was worried that Mr. West and Defendant had

gotten into an altercation and had accidentally killed Mr. Melton while shooting at

each other.

The defense then called Defendant’s mother, Ms. Betty Hampton.2 According

to Ms. Betty, she was in bed due to her hypothyroidism when she got a phone call

from Geraldine Hampton on February 23, 2017. She testified Defendant was down

the street from her house getting a haircut, so she picked him up and brought him to

1
We note this part of Ms. Papayanis’s story does not match the actual 9-1-1 call she made
thirty minutes after the shooting, when she was in the Burlington Coat Factory parking lot at the
mall and told law enforcement the shooter was at the same house where she lived without ever
telling them who the shooter was.

2
We will refer to Defendant’s mother as “Ms. Betty” to avoid confusion between Ms. Betty
Hampton and Ms. Geraldine Hampton.
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the police station. She testified that her house was about a ten-minute drive from the

convenience store where the shooting took place. According to Ms. Betty, Ms.

Hampton called her at 1:30 p.m. to tell her about the shooting.

On cross-examination, Ms. Betty admitted she did not see Defendant on the

day of the shooting before Ms. Hampton called her. She subsequently clarified that

the first time she saw Defendant on the day of the shooting was around 2:00 p.m.

The defense then called Mr. Jeremy Williams, Defendant’s barber from 2017.

Mr. Williams testified he cut Defendant’s hair on the day of the shooting but could

not state what time the haircut occurred. In addition to not knowing what time the

haircut took place, Mr. Williams did not know how Defendant had gotten to his

residence to get the haircut and did not recall when Defendant left.

The defense concluded its case by calling Defendant to testify on his own

behalf. Defendant testified that in 2017 he was living with his mother near the

England Air Force Base. Defendant testified that on February 22, 2017, he spent the

night at Ms. Hampton’s residence on Felker Street. Defendant stated when he woke

up, he contacted his mother to get a ride home but she could not get him because his

stepfather had the car. According to Defendant, his friend Tyler Joseph picked him

up from the residence on Felker Street “early that morning” and went to Mr. Jeremy

Williams’s house to get a haircut. Defendant claimed his haircut took between thirty

minutes to an hour, then he tried to contact his mother using a phone he borrowed

from someone else at Mr. Williams’s house.

According to Defendant, he had no involvement in the shooting of James

Melton. He testified that he lied to law enforcement when he gave a statement the

day of the shooting because he was trying to protect his cousin, Joseph Hampton.

On cross-examination, Defendant claimed that everyone, including himself,

was lying on the day of the shooting when they said he was at the convenience store.

He stated he knew Nicholas West but they were not friends. Defendant testified his

11

mother brought him to the Alexandria Police Department on February 23, 2017,

where he gave a statement to Detective Bowens claiming that he was with his cousin

Joseph Hampton walking to the store, heard a gunshot, then they saw a dead body

on the way back.

Following deliberations, the jury found Defendant guilty as charged on both

counts. On May 3, 2021, the trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment

at hard labor with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years for the second

degree murder of James Melton. Furthermore, the trial court sentenced Defendant

to forty-five years at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or

suspension of sentence, for the attempted armed robbery of James Melton as well as

an additional five years at hard labor without benefits pursuant to the firearm

enhancement under La.R.S. 14:64.3. The trial court ordered that the forty-five year

sentence and the five-year sentence run consecutively to each other but concurrently

to Defendant’s life sentence. Prior to sentencing, Defendant filed a motion for new

trial which was addressed in open court and subsequently denied.

Defendant filed a “Motion to Reconsider Sentence with Incorporated

Memorandum” on June 2, 2021, arguing it was excessive to allow Defendant to have

parole eligibility for second degree murder after twenty-five years but

simultaneously sentence him to fifty-years at hard labor without benefits, effectively

denying Defendant parole eligibility until after fifty years. Said motion was denied

without hearing on June 3, 2021.

Defendant now appeals his convictions and sentences, asserting four

assignments of error: (1) the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt; (2) the trial court erred by admitting “irrelevant gruesome autopsy

photographs”; (3) the trial court erred by not admitting text messages between

Beatrice Papayanis and the victim; and (4) Defendant’s sentence is unconstitutional

because he was a minor at the time of the murder but his fifty-year combined

12

sentence for armed robbery with a firearm means he has no possibility of parole until

after serving fifty years at hard labor.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find no errors

patent; however, the court minutes of sentencing require correction.

The sentencing transcript indicates Defendant’s five-year sentence imposed

pursuant to La.R.S. 14:64.3 was without the benefit of parole, probation, or

suspension of sentence; however, this is not reflected in the court minutes. “[W]hen

the minutes and the transcript conflict, the transcript prevails.” State v. Wommack,

00-137, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/00), 770 So.2d 365, 369, writ denied, 00-2051 (La.

9/21/01), 797 So.2d 62. Accordingly, the trial court is ordered to amend the court

minutes of sentencing to reflect that Defendant’s five-year sentence was imposed

without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

In his first assignment of error, Defendant contends the State failed to prove

he was the individual in the dark hooded sweatshirt who attempted to rob and

ultimately murdered Mr. Melton. He argues it makes more sense to conclude Mr.

West killed Mr. Melton out of jealousy over the sexual relationship between Mr.

Melton and Ms. Papayanis and that the testimony of Ms. Papayanis, Mr. West, Mr.

Hampton, and Ms. Geraldine Hampton identifying Defendant as the shooter in the

video was too incredible to be believed. The analysis for insufficient-evidence

claims is well settled:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the
critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct.
2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195,
62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979), State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d

13

559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v.
Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to
weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the
appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations
of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the
Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d
559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order
for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect
that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

As noted by this court in State v. F.B.A., 07-1526, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir.

5/28/08), 983 So.2d 1006, 1009, writ denied, 08-1464 (La. 3/27/09), 5 So.3d 138:

Furthermore, the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to
support a conviction “[i]n the absence of internal contradiction or
irreconcilable conflicts with physical evidence.” State v. Dixon, 04–
1019, p. 12 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/15/05), 900 So.2d 929, 936. The trier of
fact may accept or reject the testimony of any witness, and the
determination of the credibility of that witness, in whole or in part, is
left to its sound discretion and “will not be re-weighed on appeal.” Id. at
936.

In the instant case, Defendant contests only the identification of himself as the

shooter. The jury saw two individuals approach the victim’s vehicle, one wearing a

dark hooded sweatshirt and one wearing a light hooded sweatshirt. Mr. Christopher

Winchester, who was eating his lunch in his vehicle across the street from the

victim’s truck, testified he heard a gunshot, looked up, and saw the individual in the

dark sweatshirt put a gun into his pocket before both men ran away from the truck.

Ms. Papayanis, Mr. West, and Mr. Hampton all identified themselves in the

surveillance video and identified Defendant as the individual wearing the dark

sweatshirt. Furthermore, Mr. Hampton testified that he saw Defendant shoot Mr.

Melton before placing the gun back into his pocket. Finally, Ms. Geraldine

Hampton, Defendant’s ex-aunt by marriage, testified that Defendant was wearing

dark clothes when she saw him on the morning of the shooting and further stated she

was certain of her identification of Defendant based upon portions of the videos

which showed the face of the individual in the dark sweatshirt.

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On the other hand, Defendant testified he was nowhere near the convenience

store at the time of the shooting, and he was lying on the day of the shooting when

he gave a brief statement to law enforcement placing himself at the scene. The only

evidence offered to support his version of events was his mother’s testimony which

only confirmed that the first time she saw Defendant on the day of the shooting was

roughly two hours after the shooting and the testimony of his barber that he gave

Defendant a haircut on the day of the shooting but could not give any indication as

to what time that haircut took place.

As previously noted, this court cannot second guess credibility determinations

of the fact finder on appeal and the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to

establish guilt absent internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical

testimony. While some of Ms. Papayanis’s testimony is contradicted by both the

video of the shooting and her subsequent 9-1-1 call, Defendant fails to articulate any

internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict in the testimony of his cousin Joseph

Hampton, Nicholas West, or Mr. Hampton’s mother, Geraldine Hampton.

Defendant instead argues “[b]ecause the State failed to negate the reasonable

hypothesis that Mr. West is the person that tried to rob and shot Mr. Melton, the

State failed to exclude the reasonable hypothesis that Mr. Jackson did not murder

Mr. Melton and did not try to rob Mr. Melton.”

Defendant’s argument is based upon the wrong analysis for insufficient

evidence claims. Defendant’s argument regarding a failure to negate a reasonable

hypothesis is only relevant in cases based primarily upon circumstantial evidence.

See State v. Sheehan, 558 So.2d 758 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 566 So.2d 394

(La.1990). The case against Defendant was based upon first-hand testimony of

multiple witnesses coupled with a video of the shooting itself. Defendant’s

argument is nothing more than a claim that the jury made the wrong credibility

determination when it decided to accept the testimony of the prosecution’s

15

witnesses. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a

reasonable trier of fact could have found the State carried its burden of proving

Defendant’s identity as the shooter beyond a reasonable doubt. This assignment of

error lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

In his second assignment of error, Defendant contends the trial court

committed reversible error when it allowed the State to introduce three “gratuitous

and gruesome autopsy photographs” of the victim over a defense objection. The

photographs in question are pictures taken after part of the victim’s skull had been

removed leaving his brain completely visible with a green shaft through it to indicate

the trajectory of the bullet recovered from his brain. Defendant contends that

because there was no question that the individual in the dark sweatshirt killed the

victim and his defense was that he was not said individual because he was not on

that side of town, there was no need to introduce the photographs showing the

trajectory of the bullet. Accordingly, Defendant contends any probative value of the

“photographs was substantially outweighed by their potential to prejudice the jury.”

As noted by Defendant in brief, the supreme court reviewed the issue of

gruesome autopsy photographs in State v. Broaden, 99-2124, pp. 22-25 (La.

2/21/01), 780 So.2d 349, 364, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 884, 122 S.Ct. 192 (2001):

Defendant complains of the admission of three gruesome
photographs. Defendant argues that as both victims would have died
from bullets fired by Adams, the probative value of this evidence is
slight and was introduced solely to inflame jurors and incite them to
convict based on the pictures. Objections were raised before trial.

The state is entitled to the moral force of its evidence, and post-
mortem photographs of murder victims are admissible to prove corpus
delicti, to corroborate other evidence establishing cause of death, as
well as location and placement of wounds and to provide positive
identification of the victim. State v. Koon, 96–1208, p. 34 (La.5/20/97),
704 So.2d 756, 776; State v. Martin, 93–0285, p. 14 (La.10/17/94), 645
So.2d 190, 198. Photographic evidence will be admitted unless it is so
gruesome as to overwhelm jurors’ reason and lead them to convict
without sufficient other evidence. Koon, 96–1208 at p. 34, 704 So.2d at

16

776, citing State v. Perry, 502 So.2d 543, 558–59 (La.1986), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 205, 98 L.Ed.2d 156 (1987).

We agree that the photographs are indeed gruesome. This court
regularly sees claims of “gruesome” photographs in capital cases, but
has reversed only once on these grounds in any case. State v.
Morris, 245 La. 175, 157 So.2d 728 (1963) (gratuitous introduction of
“gruesome and ghastly” photographs depicting the progress of an
autopsy in an “increasing grotesque and revolting” manner constituted
reversible error when the defendant admitted that he killed the victim
and contested only his state of mind). Admission of “gruesome
photographs is not reversible error unless it is clear that their probative
value is substantially outweighed by their prejudicial
effect.” Martin, 93–0285 at pp. 14–15, 645 So.2d at 198. Cf., State v.
Wessinger, 98–1234, pp 16–17 (La.5/28/99), 736 So.2d 162,
179 (photographic evidence “will be admitted unless it is so gruesome
as to overwhelm the jurors’ reason and lead them to convict defendant
absent other sufficient evidence.”)

We do not find any reason to treat photographic evidence
differently than any other evidence, which is admissible if relevant and
more probative than prejudicial. La.Code Evid. art. 403. At any rate,
we find that the admission of the disputed photographs in this case was
gratuitous. The pathologist could have given verbatim testimony
illustrated by other, less graphic photos. While the state is certainly
entitled to the moral force of its evidence, that evidence should
enlighten rather than bludgeon the jury. The photographs taken at the
crime scenes were sufficient to demonstrate the cause of death as well
as the location of the gunshot wounds. However, we do not find
reversible error.

In the instant case, while Defendant contends his defense was simply that “he

was not the shooter,” that argument was buttressed with his contention, explicitly

stated in Defendant’s first assignment of error, that it made more sense for Mr. West

to have killed Mr. Melton. The State negated this contention by having multiple

witnesses identify Mr. West as the individual who was standing away from the

vehicle with his back to the truck when the shooting occurred. The photographs

showing the bullet was fired from behind and slightly to the left of the victim helped

establish the shooter could not have been the individual in the light sweatshirt,

identified as Mr. West.

“The trial court has considerable discretion in the admission of photographs,

and its ruling will not be disturbed in the absence of an abuse of that discretion.”

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State v. Critton, 52,058, p. 9 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/22/18), 251 So.3d 1281, 1289, writ

denied, 18-1515 (La. 2/25/19), 266 So.3d 292. As noted, the photographs had

probative value in proving the individual identified as Mr. West could not have been

the shooter, contrary to Defendant’s contention Mr. West was the more logical

shooter. Therefore we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in admitting

the three photographs in question.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3

In his third assignment of error, Defendant contends the trial court abused its

discretion when it excluded text messages between Ms. Papayanis and Mr. Melton

that he sought to introduce to show there was conflict between Ms. Papayanis and

Mr. Melton. The trial court excluded the messages on the grounds they were

irrelevant. Defendant contends the messages would have supported the “reasonable

theory of [Defendant’s] innocence, that Ms. Papayanis, Mr. West, and Mr. Hampton

conspired to rob Mr. Melton and to frame Mr. Jackson for Mr. Melton’s murder

when the robbery went wrong.” Defendant is again confusing the standard of review

in this case based heavily upon direct evidence with the standard of review for a

circumstantial evidence case.

Under La.Code Evid. art. 402, “Evidence which is not relevant is not

admissible.” Furthermore, relevant evidence is defined in La.Code Evid. art. 401 as

“evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than

it would be without the evidence.” As previously noted by the supreme court, “In

determining the relevance of evidence, much discretion is afforded to the trial

judge.” State v. Stowe, 635 So.2d 168, 173 (La.1994). We cannot say the trial court

abused its discretion in finding the evidence irrelevant.

As Defendant states repeatedly in his brief to this court, his defense was that

he was not the person that shot Mr. Melton. The evidence he contends should have

18

been admitted had no bearing on the issue of who was the individual in the dark

sweatshirt.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4

In his final assignment of error, Defendant contends his sentences for

attempted armed robbery and the accompanying firearm enhancement were

excessive and violated La.R.S. 15:574.4(J). In particular, Defendant contends his

sentences for said offenses should be amended to allow for parole eligibility after

twenty-five years. Additionally, he argues that La.R.S. 15:574.4(J) applies to his

sentences for attempted armed robbery and the firearm enhancement and entitle him

to parole eligibility after twenty-five years assuming he meets the additional

requirements listed in the statute.

Under La.Code Crim.P. art. 881.1(E), a defendant may only base a claim of

excessiveness on appeal upon those grounds which were raised in his motion to

reconsider sentence. In the motion to reconsider, Defendant argued that his

sentences for attempted armed robbery and the accompanying firearm enhancement

should have been no more than twenty years plus five years so that he would finish

serving those sentences by the time he was eligible for parole on his life sentence.

In his appellate brief, Defendant does not ask this court to limit his sentences for

attempted armed robbery and the firearm enhancement to twenty-five years

combined. He asks this court to amend the current sentences to include parole

eligibility. Defendant failed to raise the argument presented in his brief in his motion

to reconsider sentence. He cannot now raise this argument regarding the

applicability of La.R.S. 15:574.4(J) on appeal.

In his appellate brief, Defendant asserts even if this court finds La.R.S.

15:574.4(J) does not apply, it should still amend his sentences on the attempted

armed robbery conviction and firearm enhancement to allow for parole eligibility

because the sentences are excessive. As Defendant asserts in his appellate brief and

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in the motion to reconsider that his sentences for attempted armed robbery and the

firearm enhancement are excessive, albeit on different grounds, he is entitled to a

bare claim of excessiveness review. State v. Pyke, 95-919 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/96),

670 So.2d 713.

Louisiana courts have laid out the following guidelines with regard to

excessive sentence review:

Sentences within the statutory sentencing range can be reviewed
for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762
(La.1979). In State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir.
1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02),
808 So.2d 331, a panel of this court discussed the review of excessive
sentence claims, stating:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law
shall subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.”
To constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court
must find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that
the sentence makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than
a needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v.
Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial court has
wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within the
statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as
excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124,
writ denied, 00-0165 (La. 6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The
relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad
sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might
have been more appropriate. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.
5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117
S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

Further, in reviewing the defendant’s sentences, the appellate
court should consider the nature of the crime, the nature and
background of the offender, and the sentences imposed for similar
crimes. State v. Lisotta, 98-648 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d
57 (citing State v. Telsee, 425 So.2d 1251 (La.1983)), writ denied, 99-
433 (La. 6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183. In State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4
(La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied, 03-562 (La.
5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061, a panel of this court observed that:

While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar
crimes may provide some insight, “it is well settled that
sentences must be individualized to the particular offender
and to the particular offense committed.” State v. Batiste,
594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991). Additionally, it is

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within the purview of the trial court to particularize the
sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best
position to assess the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances presented by each case.” State v. Cook, 95-
2784 (La. 5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, 958[, cert. denied, 519
U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615 (1996)].

State v. Soileau, 13-770, 13-771, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1002,

1005-07, writ denied, 14-452 (La. 9/26/14), 149 So.3d 261.

Furthermore, in State v. Baker, 06-1218 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/18/07), 956 So.2d

83, writ denied, 07-320 (La. 11/9/07), 967 So.2d 496, and writ denied, 07-1116 (La.

12/7/07), 969 So.2d 626, this court adopted the fifth circuit’s three factor test from

State v. Lisotta, 98-648 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d 57, writ denied, 99-

433 (La. 6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183, which established that an appellate court should

consider the nature of the crime, the nature and background of the offender, and the

sentences imposed for similar crimes.

Regarding the nature of the crimes, Defendant was convicted of attempted

armed robbery and attempted armed robbery with a firearm, both defined as crimes

of violence in La.R.S. 14:2. Furthermore, the instant case involves an attempted

armed robbery that escalated into a second degree murder in the span of ten seconds.

Defendant’s sentence of forty-five years for attempted armed robbery is close to the

maximum possible sentence of forty-nine and a half years under La.R.S. 14:27 and

14:64. The five-year sentence on the firearm enhancement is mandatory under

La.R.S. 14:64.3(B).

We next consider the nature and background of the offender. At the time of

the offense, Defendant was seventeen years old. He testified he completed tenth

grade in school. The trial court noted the following at sentencing, “While

incarcerated [Defendant] had been charged with several jailhouse incidents of

multiple simple batteries, battery on an officer, an escape, marijuana in a correctional

21

facility.” The only mitigating factors acknowledged by the trial court were

Defendant’s youth and his lack of prior criminal history.

Finally, Defendant references sentences imposed in similar cases. In State v.

Allen, 40,972 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/17/06), 930 So.2d 1122, writ denied, 08-507 (La.

11/26/08), 997 So.2d 543, the second circuit upheld a sentence of thirty-five years

for armed robbery despite the defendant getting a lesser sentence for attempted first

degree murder. Similarly, the fifth circuit in State v. Robicheaux, 03-1063 (La.App.

5 Cir. 12/30/03), 865 So.2d 149, writ denied, 04-381 (La. 6/25/04), 876 So.2d 830,

upheld a maximum sentence for armed robbery for a defendant, running

concurrently to a fifty-year sentence for attempted second degree murder, where the

defendant had used a firearm which was discharged during attempted robbery.

Although the defendant in Robicheaux had a prior history of violent offenses, we

note Defendant herein did not just fire a gun during the incident, he shot Mr. Melton

in the back of the head, brutally killing him.

In light of the above, we find no merit in Defendant’s argument that his

sentence was excessive.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s convictions and sentences are

affirmed. The trial court is ordered to amend the court minutes of sentencing to

reflect that Defendant’s five-year sentence was imposed without the benefit of

parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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