State of Louisiana v. William Ray Weeks, Jr.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

21-605

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

WILLIAM R. WEEKS, JR.

**********
ON APPEAL FROM THE
36TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF BEAUREGARD, NO. CR-2018-719
HONORABLE MARTHA A. O’NEAL, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

JONATHAN W. PERRY
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of D. Kent Savoie, Van H. Kyzar, and Jonathan W. Perry, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Holli Herrle-Castillo
Attorney at Law
Louisiana Appellate Project
P.O. Box 2333
Marrero, Louisiana 70073
(504) 345-2801
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:
William R. Weeks, Jr.

William R. Weeks, Jr.
Pro Se Appellant
#7611102
MPWY/HIC-1
La. State Penitentiary
Angola, Louisiana 70712-9818

James R. Lestage
District Attorney
Parish of Beauregard
D. Wayne Bush
Assistant District Attorney
P.O. Box 99
Deridder, Louisiana 70634
(337) 463-5578
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

PERRY, Judge.

On July 30, 2018, a Beauregard Parish grand jury indicted Defendant, William

Ray Weeks, Jr.,1 with four counts of first degree rape, a violation of La.R.S. 14:42;

as well as two counts of molestation of a juvenile, a violation of La.R.S.

14:81.2(A)(1). The victim in two of the first degree rape charges and both

molestation of a juvenile charges was Defendant’s stepdaughter, S.M.2 The victim

in the remaining two first degree rape charges was D.J., Defendant’s other

stepdaughter. On May 14, 2021, the State filed an amended bill of indictment,

charging Defendant with two counts of first degree rape of D.J., a child under the

age of thirteen, born on February 4, 1998, and two counts of molestation of S.M., a

child born on May 26, 1999.3

On May 20, 2021, after a jury trial of three days, the jury returned verdicts of

guilty as charged on both first degree rape charges, not guilty as to one of the

molestation charges, and guilty as charged on the other molestation charge. After

defense counsel requested polling of the jury, it was discovered that a juror had not

agreed with the verdict on either molestation charge. Accordingly, the trial court

declared a mistrial as to the two counts of molestation and accepted the two guilty

verdicts on the first degree rape charges. After defense counsel objected, contending

the confusion of the jury should have resulted in mistrials on all counts, the trial

court denied Defendant’s request for mistrial on the first degree rape convictions.

On May 26, 2021, Defendant filed a “Motion for New Trial” contending the

State failed to establish that the dates of the first degree rapes matched the dates

1
Defendant was born on August 17, 1975.

2
As required under La.R.S. 46:1844(W), we will refer to the victims by their initials.

3
At the time of trial, S.M. was deceased.

alleged in the indictment and that Defendant was prejudiced by the trial court’s

denial of his motion to dismiss and/or sever the counts involving the victim S.M.

following her death before trial. The same day, the State dismissed the molestation

of a juvenile charges involving S.M. which had resulted in mistrials.

The trial court held a hearing on Defendant’s “Motion for New Trial” on June

2, 2021. Following argument, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion, finding the

State provided sufficient evidence of the victim’s age at the time of the crime and

where they were living for the jury to determine the dates the offenses occurred. On

June 7, 2021, the trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor

on each count of first degree rape. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

Defendant now appeals his convictions and sentences, contending the State

failed to provide sufficient evidence to uphold his convictions,4 and the trial court

4
On January 3, 2022, Defendant filed a motion to file a pro se supplemental appellate
brief. This court granted Defendant’s motion and ordered him to file his pro se supplemental brief
on or before February 14, 2022. On February 7, 2022, this court granted Defendant “an extension
until March 14, 2022, to file his pro se brief; however, no further extensions will be granted.”

Later on February 14, 2022, this court issued the following order:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant-Appellant’s “Motion for
Production or Additional Records and Request for Extension of Time” is denied as
Defendant-Appellant’s counsel, on October 8, 2021, requested supplementation of
the record with voir dire, opening statements, and closing arguments or with a
certification that there were no defense challenges during voir dire that were denied
and no objections lodged during opening statements or closing arguments and as
on November 29, 2021, this Court received a supplemental record containing an
affidavit from the court reporter indicating that there were no defense challenges
during voir dire that were denied and no objections lodged by either side during
opening statements or closing arguments.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that no further extensions of
Defendant’s pro se briefing deadline will be granted.

This court received an additional pro se brief from Defendant on March 10, 2022.
Defendant has supplemented appellate counsel’s contention that the evidence is insufficient to
uphold Defendant’s conviction. We will incorporate Defendant’s pro se argument with appellate
counsel’s.

We further note that on the cover page of Defendant’s pro se brief, he has requested that
(continued . . .)
2

committed reversible error when it denied his pre-trial motion to dismiss or sever

the charges involving S.M. from those involving D.J. following S.M.’s death before

trial.

Because Defendant has raised an assignment of error involving the sufficiency

of the evidence, we will first outline the witness testimony presented to the jury.

TRIAL TESTIMONY

Detective Toree Simmons (“Detective Simmons”) of the Beauregard Parish

Sheriff’s Office testified that she has been a full-time employee of the sheriff’s office

since 2015, acknowledging she left for about six to eight months in 2017. It was

during her absence that the initial reporting of this criminal matter was made on

December 20, 2017. Thus, she explained that Detective Tiffany Maks was the initial

investigator in this case. After Detective Simmons returned to the Sheriff’s Office,

she was assigned the case on February 22, 2018.

Detective Simmons stated that as part of her employment at the Sheriff’s

Office she focused on sex offenses and crimes against children. She stated she has

had extensive training on the investigation of sexual assaults and testified that

delayed reporting was “more common than not” in sex offenses. She further

acknowledged that when she was assigned the case, the initial interviews with the

victims and some family members had already been completed. She also noted that

she was aware of an ongoing investigation of Defendant in Vernon Parish on related

charges. Detective Simmons stated she conducted five or six interviews, noting she

“these claims be set for Oral Motions before this Honorable Court, as the merits of these claims
are deemed reviewable for relief.” Defendant’s request is moot for two reasons. First, the date set
for oral argument to consider Defendant’s appeal was February 22, 2022, and had already passed
when Defendant’s pro se brief was filed. Secondly, appellate counsel had already waived the right
to oral argument.
3

spoke to both victims, their mother Tina “Marcy” Breen (“Mrs. Breen”), and Chase

LeFleur (“Chase”), one of D.J.’s best friends and an ex-boyfriend of S.M.

Detective Simmons testified Defendant, Mrs. Breen, and the victims lived at

a couple of addresses in Beauregard Parish over the years, both of which were

located on Baggett Road. She believed the homes were owned by Mrs. Breen’s

family. After noting that S.M. was deceased at the time of trial, Detective Simmons

testified that S.M. stated that Defendant had sexual contact with her in both

Beauregard and Vernon Parishes. She disclosed that, due to the delayed disclosure

of the offenses,5 there was no forensic evidence, and neither girl was examined by a

Sexual Assault Nurses Examiner (SANE) or a gynecologist. Detective Simmons

testified that at the time of the investigation, D.J. was nineteen years old, married,

and either pregnant or had one child; S.M. was eighteen and engaged with no

children.

Detective Simmons testified that D.J. told her about an episode where her

mother may have seen Defendant sexually assaulting her. On that occasion

Defendant had entered D.J.’s room, got in bed with her, and vaginally penetrated

her. Talking with S.M. and D.J. led Detective Simmons to understand that

Defendant sexually assaulted both girls at numerous times and that no one else had

touched them inappropriately.

Detective Simmons testified S.M. made the initial report of abuse and that

D.J. was reluctant to speak with law enforcement. She also learned from her

interviews with S.M. and D.J. that neither of them discussed the abuse with each

other as children; rather, it was only after the two girls were adults that they spoke

5
D.J. would later testify that she reported the sexual abuse of Defendant in the later part
of December 2017.
4

of their abuse with each other. According to Detective Simmons, S.M. came forward

because she was concerned for an eleven-year-old cousin who was spending a lot of

time with Mrs. Breen and Defendant.

On cross-examination, Detective Simmons stated she has investigated

between two and three hundred cases of sexual abuse. When questioned further by

defense counsel, Detective Simmons stated that she has never had a witness recant

their disclosure or has she had to arrest a person for having falsely reported a case

of sexual abuse.

Detective Simmons explained, too, that she executed a search warrant at 284

Paul Cooley Road after the victims’ grandmother, Judy Moses, told her that S.M.

had disclosed the use of a sex toy that was kept in a lockbox at the property.

Detective Simmons stated a lockbox was found at the property shared by Defendant

and Mrs. Breen at the time but noted no sex toy was recovered.

In response to defense counsel’s questioning, Detective Simmons stated D.J.

told her the first time Defendant abused her was when she was under the age of

thirteen, and they were living in Beauregard Parish at one of the residences on

Baggett Road. On that occasion, when her mom and S.M. were away, she was

watching a Disney movie on the couch and Defendant anally penetrated her. She

stated D.J. told her of two instances where Defendant penetrated D.J. vaginally but

stated it occurred more often anally, including the first time Defendant abused her.

Again, on cross-examination Detective Simmons testified that D.J. told her

about an instance where her mother had come into the room when she was first

vaginally penetrated. According to Detective Simmons, D.J. stated that when her

mother came into the room, she noticed that Defendant was in the bed with D.J., that

D.J. was wearing no clothes, that D.J. was bleeding vaginally, and that her mother
5

placed her in the bathtub. She stated this incident was never reported. In addition,

Detective Simmons stated that D.J. told her that Defendant penetrated her anally on

multiple occasions, and that she had performed oral sex on Defendant, which she

disclosed to her friend Chase in high school.

The State then called Mrs. Breen, the mother of the victims. Mrs. Breen

testified that she married Defendant on August 13, 2003, after knowing him for three

months. She stated at that time she, Defendant, S.M., and D.J. were all living at 166

Baggett Road. She testified they lived at 166 Baggett Road for two or three years

before moving to the double-wide trailer at the end of Baggett Road for about a year

or so before moving briefly to Rosepine6 then returning to the double-wide. Mrs.

Breen noted she was the primary caretaker for her daughters because Defendant

“would not keep a job.” She also stated Defendant would be the only one home most

days when the girls returned from school. According to Mrs. Breen, the girls had

separate bedrooms when they lived at 166 Baggett Road but slept in the same room

because S.M., who was only four years old, did not want to sleep alone. She noted

that in the double-wide, the girls shared a large room that had originally been two

separate rooms before the wall between them was removed to make a single, larger

room.

Mrs. Breen testified that when D.J. was about seven or eight, in approximately

2005 or 2006, she observed Defendant asleep in the bed with D.J. She testified that

she found Defendant, who had been drunk and asleep on the couch when she went

to bed, was in bed with D.J. in the middle of the night. When Mrs. Breen questioned

Defendant, he told her he thought he was in their bedroom. Mrs. Breen further stated

6
In accordance with La.Code Evid. art. 201, we take judicial notice that Rosepine is in
Vernon Parish, Louisiana.
6

that when she went to fix the covers after Defendant left the room, she noticed D.J.,

who normally did not sleep with a shirt, was also not wearing any panties. Mrs.

Breen confirmed D.J. had underwear on when she had tucked her into bed.

According to Mrs. Breen, Defendant was wearing pants and socks and his pants were

buttoned when she found him in bed with D.J. She stated she then brought D.J. to

the bathroom, checked and found no blood or fluids on her, and asked if D.J. was

hurting anywhere, to which D.J. told her “No.” Mrs. Breen stated she told Defendant

he needed to get out of the house because it was inappropriate for him to be in a bed

with her naked daughter.

Mrs. Breen testified Defendant then retrieved a gun, put it to his face, and

stated he would kill himself if she thought he could hurt the girls. She never asked

him why D.J. was naked. She testified that she spoke with the girls on multiple

occasions about it not being okay for a grown-up to touch their private parts and

stated the girls never told her anything about Defendant touching them. According

to Mrs. Breen, D.J. left home at seventeen and went to live with her aunt, Toni

Simmons; as Mrs. Breen testified, D.J. told her she left because she was tired of the

way Defendant treated Mrs. Breen. She stated she did not hear about any type of

molestation or abuse by Defendant until S.M. told her about Defendant’s behavior

on December 19, 2017.

Mrs. Breen testified she and Defendant were separated from February 2015

until approximately March 2017 and that her daughters lived with her during that

time and never told her anything inappropriate had happened with Defendant. Mrs.

Breen noted that although Defendant had mistreated her, he had never done anything

to the girls in front of her. She testified that on the night she found Defendant in bed

7

with D.J., Defendant had been drinking alcohol to the point of passing out on the

couch.

Mrs. Breen stated that when the girls finally disclosed what happened with

Defendant, both she and S.M. called him to speak with them. She stated “what

[S.M.] wanted him to do was admit things that he did and to leave our lives and walk

away.” Although they called Defendant, he never admitted to the molestation. She

again testified that D.J. was seven or eight years old when she found Defendant in

the bed with D.J., and S.M. would have been fifteen months younger.

On re-direct examination, Mrs. Breen noted that they were living in an old

trailer when she found Defendant in bed with D.J. and that the trailer doors were

noisy; accordingly, she testified that Defendant would have heard her walking

around before she entered the room if he had been awake. She acknowledged that

when S.M. was four or five years old, a friend of Defendant’s father was visiting

them. While S.M. was sitting on his lap, this individual touched S.M.’s crotch and

moved her. When that happened S.M. told Mrs. Breen and Defendant’s mother

about that incident. Neither she nor Defendant’s mother made any effort to confront

the individual, instead they told S.M. not to go back outside around the adults. She

testified that D.J. was born on February 4, 1998, and that S.M. was born on May 26,

1999.

The State then called D.J., who confirmed her birthdate was February 4, 1998.

According to D.J., she was about eight years old when she, S.M., their mother, and

Defendant lived at 166 Baggett Road. D.J. testified the family then moved down the

road to 230 Baggett Road, where they lived in a double-wide trailer home. There,

she and S.M. shared a “really big” bedroom; each had a twin-sized bed.

8

D.J. testified Defendant vaginally raped her at the 230 Baggett Road address.

D.J. stated that she was asleep when Defendant, who was drunk, stumbled into the

room. She testified that he got in her bed, took her underwear off, then vaginally

entered her with his penis. She also testified it was not the first time Defendant had

penetrated her. D.J. stated her “mom walked in and at that point my legs were on

his shoulders and when she walked in and turned on the light -- at that point, he got

off of me.” She testified her mother took her to the bathroom, sat her on the toilet,

and then her mother had a discussion with Defendant in their bedroom. D.J. stated

that she was able to see her mother and stepfather talking in their bedroom from

where she sat in the bathroom.

According to D.J., after she took a bath and put her night clothes back on,

Defendant and her mother spoke to her in the living room, telling her not to say

anything to her cousin Katie and claiming D.J.’s mother would also get in trouble if

she told anyone what had happened. D.J. also testified that a few months before the

incident when her mother caught Defendant in the act, Defendant had come home

drunk, took off the leotard D.J. was wearing and vaginally raped her at one end of

the couch while S.M. was sleeping at the other end. D.J. testified that during that

incident, Defendant told her to be quiet so S.M. would not wake up.

According to D.J., Defendant had anally penetrated her prior to the two

instances of vaginal rape, noting it began when they were living at 166 Baggett Road.

She again confirmed she was in the second grade when it began. She noted

Defendant anally raped her both in the living room and in her bedroom. D.J. testified

the rapes occurred when S.M. was either playing in her bedroom or when she was

asleep. Although D.J. could not remember how many times Defendant raped her,

she noted that “it would be weekly.” D.J. also testified that after the two instances
9

of vaginal rape at 230 Baggett Road, Defendant would make her use either her mouth

or hand on his penis, again noting it was when her mother was at work and S.M. was

in another room.

D.J. testified that eventually she told both her husband and S.M. about

Defendant’s abuse but that she did not report the abuse because she feared Defendant

and was scared her mother would get into trouble. D.J. testified S.M. convinced her

to report the abuse out of concern for their cousin Jolee, who was spending time with

Defendant and Mrs. Breen. D.J. testified that even when S.M. went to the police,

she still did not want to go to law enforcement, noting she had mental health issues

stemming from the trauma of the rapes. D.J. testified she had been seeing a therapist

for about two years and that she began seeing this therapist prior to S.M.’s death.

D.J. testified that the last time any sexual contact happened between her and

Defendant was when she was thirteen and they were living in Rosepine. She testified

she came home from school and Defendant anally raped her in his bedroom while

S.M. was in the living room doing homework. D.J. stated she did not tell her mother

because she did not think her mother would believe her. She further testified that

her decision to leave was based on her mother’s failure to leave, despite having been

abused by Defendant on multiple occasions.

On cross-examination, D.J. testified she and S.M. never spoke to each other

about being abused by Defendant, stating “[f]or me personally, I know I didn’t want

to hear about these things that were happening to her, and I feel that she felt the same

way.” D.J. again testified that her mother walked in while Defendant was in the act

of raping her, contesting her mother’s claim Defendant was asleep and she had to

shake him awake. D.J. stated she was wearing a nightgown when her mom came

10

into the room and noted that she was bleeding enough that the blood got on her and

her mother’s nightshirt as she wrapped her legs around her mother’s waist.

D.J. testified she left home the first time when she was seventeen, moving in

with her aunt until her mother and Defendant split up, at which time she moved back

in with her mother and S.M. D.J. stated she did not tell her mother about the abuse

because she feared her mother would not believe her, stating she felt her mother was

in denial about finding Defendant on top of her. She testified that growing up she

had a great relationship with Defendant’s family, stating she loved them and that

“they were amazing.” D.J. testified that her mother should have known what was

happening the night she walked in when Defendant was raping her. D.J. confirmed

that her fear of breaking up her extended family had come true, noting she has not

seen her grandfather since she and S.M. reported Defendant’s abuse.

The State then called Detective Rhonda Jordan (“Detective Jordan”), Chief

Detective of the Vernon Parish Sheriff’s Office.7 Detective Jordan noted that she

assigned herself Defendant’s case in Vernon Parish, stating she investigated most of

the sex offenses in the parish. According to Detective Jordan, she took statements

from S.M. and D.J. separately, noting they told very similar stories that did not

contradict each other. Detective Jordan stated that she listened to a number of jail

calls from Defendant when he was incarcerated in Vernon Parish. She described a

phone call Defendant made to his aunt, Joann Easterling (“Mrs. Easterling”), on

April 4, 2018. Afterwards the State published the transcript of that call to the jury,

which included a statement from Defendant that while he never touched the girls,

7
The State filed a motion in limine regarding the admissibility of “other crimes evidence.”
The minutes of court from March 12, 2020, indicate the State and the defense stipulated that
Detectives Jordan and Toree Jones would be allowed to testify about incidents of abuse in
Beauregard and Vernon Parishes.

11

S.M., who was sixteen years of age at the time, would sleep in the bed with him and

Mrs. Breen, and she (S.M.) would “[stick] her hand in my damn underwear and

started playing with me . . . and it happened several times and what was I supposed

to do[?].”8 Detective Jordan noted Defendant had been in custody since February

28, 2018, so he had been incarcerated for a little over a month at the time of the

phone call.

On cross-examination, Detective Jordan was asked to identify and read Mrs.

Breen’s9 voluntary statement to the Vernon Parish Sheriff's Office. The statement

of December 21, 2017, states, in pertinent part:

I am stating that my daughter [S.M.] told me last night 12-20-17
that my husband molested and raped her from the time she was 4 or 5
until she was 16. I had no knowledge or suspicions of the crimes
committed against her. My husband [sic] name is William Ray Weeks,
Jr. (Billy Ray) DOB 8-17-75. . . . I confronted him on the phone
yesterday evening and he denies that any of this happened. . . . Place
of residence at the time of crimes was Stephens Mobile Home Park, Lot
6 1st St Rosepine LA 706[] There were also occurrances [sic] in
Beauregard Parish. The BPSO has been notified and a complaint has
been filed.

According to Detective Jordan, the only member of Defendant’s family to

ever contact her was his cousin, Jennifer, who asked questions about the process

Defendant was going through. Following Detective Jordan’s testimony, the State

rested its case-in-chief.

Defendant’s first witness was William Weeks, Sr. (“Mr. Weeks”),

Defendant’s father. Mr. Weeks identified photographs and diagrams of Defendant’s

home located in Vernon Parish. Mr. Weeks testified he and his wife would see the

8
The jail call was introduced as an audio file. It was then played, and a transcript of the
audio file was printed, provided to the jurors, and entered into evidence.

9
At the time of the statement, Mrs. Breen was still married to Defendant and signed the
document as Tina M. Weeks. For clarity and conciseness, we have simply referred to her as Mrs.
Breen.
12

girls, Mrs. Breen, and Defendant nearly every weekend and holiday from the time

Defendant married Mrs. Breen until 2017, when S.M. and D.J. made these

allegations against Defendant. He testified the Weeks family loved the girls and that

he does not know of anyone in the family who had ever heard any of these claims

prior to December 2017.

Defendant then called Mr. Brian Lestage (“Mr. Lestage”), the Beauregard

Parish Clerk of Court. Mr. Lestage confirmed via court records that Mrs. Breen filed

a petition for divorce on May 11, 2015, and that Defendant answered the petition on

May 28, 2015. He noted there was no judgment of divorce filed. Mr. Lestage noted

Mrs. Breen filed a second petition for divorce on December 21, 2017, with an answer

from Defendant on February 5, 2018, and ultimately a judgment of divorce was

entered on September 27, 2018.

Next, Defendant called Mrs. Easterling, his aunt. Mrs. Easterling testified that

she knew the girls very well and that she often spent weekends and holidays with

them. Mrs. Easterling testified S.M. and D.J. never mentioned anything about

Defendant abusing them, claiming S.M. “was a daddy’s girl. She loved Billy Ray

[Defendant] dearly, and he loved her dearly.”

Following that testimony, Defendant called his cousin, Jennifer Stolzle (“Mrs.

Stolzle”). According to Mrs. Stolzle, S.M. came to a Thanksgiving gathering in

2017 with her boyfriend. She claimed that S.M. “was extremely excited to see

[Defendant] that day. They hugged, she kept kissing him on the cheek.” She

testified that neither girl had ever disclosed any sort of abuse by Defendant to her

and stated that on Thanksgiving 2017, S.M. and Defendant left together to get

alcohol for S.M. and her boyfriend. Mrs. Stotzle claimed that she had a good

13

relationship with the girls, they never said anything about being abused, and she did

not believe the accusations they made against Defendant.

Mrs. Donna Duvall (“Mrs. Duvall”), the Mayor of Rosepine, another of

Defendant’s cousins was next called as a defense witness. She testified that she had

known the victims since they were five or six and that she never saw or heard

anything that she considered inappropriate between them and Defendant. According

to Mrs. Duvall, Mrs. Breen never disclosed any issues she was having with

Defendant or the girls. Mrs. Duvall confirmed she never lived with the girls, and

she had no personal knowledge of any sexual conduct between Defendant and the

girls.

That testimony was followed by the testimony of Mrs. Tammy Dickens (“Mrs.

Dickens”), Defendant’s maternal aunt. She testified the family got together on

December 17, 2017, and that Defendant, Mrs. Breen, and S.M. were there, along

with Mrs. Dickens’s family, as well as Mr. Weeks, Sr., and his girlfriend. Mrs.

Dickens testified there were twenty or twenty-five people present, and defense

counsel introduced a photograph taken on December 17, 2017. Mrs. Dickens’s

husband would later identify the contents of the photograph.

Defendant then called Mr. Ray Dickens (“Mr. Dickens”), the husband of Mrs.

Tammy Dickens. He stated the photograph introduced during the examination of

his wife depicted Defendant, Mrs. Breen, S.M., and her boyfriend. He testified S.M.

came outside where he, Defendant, and several other people were talking around a

fire, sat in Defendant’s lap with her arm around him, and conversed for about ten or

fifteen minutes. Mr. Dickens testified his daughter Amanda was close to the girls in

age, and they would often spend nights together. He testified neither girl ever

reported anything to him and that nothing ever happened to his daughter.
14

Defendant concluded by calling Carol Hebert and Joey Woodard, who both

testified they knew the girls. They testified that they never heard any complaints

about Defendant from the girls, and the girls always seemed to love being around

Defendant.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we have

discovered no errors patent.10

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In Defendant’s first assignment of error,11 he contends there was insufficient

evidence to find him guilty of the two counts of first degree rape of D.J. Defendant

contends the only evidence presented against him was the testimony of D.J., which

he contends was contradicted by the testimony of his family and Mrs. Breen. The

analysis for insufficient-evidence claims is well settled:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the
critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct.
2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195,
62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979), State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d
559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v.
Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to
weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the
appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations

10
We note that Defendant was charged in counts one and two with first degree rape. At
the time of the commission of the offenses, the name of the offense was aggravated rape. However,
La.R.S. 14:42(E) states in pertinent part, “any reference to the crime of aggravated rape is the same
as a reference to the crime of first degree rape.”
11
Defendant’s pro se assignment of error adds nothing to Defendant’s counseled
assignment of error. Defendant’s pro se argument is that D.J.’s testimony was insufficient to prove
Defendant raped her; the premise for his argument is that the testimonies of D.J. and her mother
presented a different version of events concerning the night her mother allegedly caught Defendant
raping her. Thus, Defendant concludes in his pro se argument that D.J.’s testimony was
impeached.
15

of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the
Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d
559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order
for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect
that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

As noted by this court in State v. F.B.A., 07-1526, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir.

5/28/08), 983 So.2d 1006, 1009, writ denied, 08-1464 (La. 3/27/09), 5 So.3d 138:

Furthermore, the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to
support a conviction “[i]n the absence of internal contradiction or
irreconcilable conflicts with physical evidence.” State v. Dixon,
04-1019, p. 12 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/15/05), 900 So.2d 929, 936. The trier
of fact may accept or reject the testimony of any witness, and the
determination of the credibility of that witness, in whole or in part, is
left to its sound discretion and “will not be re-weighed on appeal.” Id.
at 936.

In the present case, the State relied upon direct evidence from the victim, D.J.

Defendant contends in his brief:

[T]he State was required to prove that the appellant committed vaginal,
anal, or oral sexual intercourse with D.J., that D.J. was under the age of
thirteen, and that one act was committed between August 13, 2003[,]
and August 12, 2004, for count one, and between August 13, 2004[,]
and December 31, 2005, for count two.

We disagree with Defendant’s assertion, noting:

At the outset, it should be noted that the date is not essential to
the crime of aggravated rape; therefore, it need not be alleged in the
indictment. When the date is not essential to an offense, the indictment
shall not be held insufficient if it does not state a proper date. La.Code
Crim.P. art. 468 (1960). The state is not restricted in its evidence to the
date set out in the indictment.

State v. Glover, 304 So.2d 348, 350 (La.1974).

Furthermore, D.J. testified Defendant began raping her both anally and

vaginally when she was eight years old and that it continued weekly while the family

lived in Beauregard Parish, noting the last time Defendant abused her was when she

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was thirteen. That testimony, if believed by the jury, clearly established Defendant

raped D.J. at least twice when she was under the age of thirteen.

The crux of Defendant’s argument is that D.J.’s testimony was uncorroborated

by forensic evidence and was at odds with Mrs. Breen’s testimony regarding the

occasion in which she found Defendant in D.J.’s bed. However, as previously

recognized in F.B.A., 983 So.2d 1006, D.J.’s testimony alone is sufficient to sustain

Defendant’s convictions absent internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflicts

with physical evidence. As Defendant points out, there is no physical evidence;

therefore, there can be no irreconcilable conflict. Additionally, the record shows

there are no internal contradictions in D.J.’s testimony.12 As such, the case becomes

one of witness credibility. As noted in Kennerson, it is not this court’s role to second

guess the credibility determinations made by the jury.

Defendant next contends D.J.’s testimony regarding what happened in

Rosepine was unbelievable because “more likely than not a sexual assault would

have been heard in the next room.” We find this line of testimony related to the

trailer in Rosepine is relevant in only one respect—to attack the credibility of the

victim.

Although Defendant suggests this court should give weight to the “eight

witnesses [who] testified that they saw the family frequently and the girls were

comfortable with the appellant and never seemed to be in any type of distress,” we

observe that those witnesses were all Defendant’s relatives, and all admitted they

12
We note a slight variance between the testimony of D.J. and Mrs. Breen in one small
detail. In her testimony, D.J. stated she was wearing a sleeping gown when Defendant raped her
on one occasion. Mrs. Breen’s testimony was that D.J. was naked in bed with Defendant. Though
these witnesses’ testimonies are slightly different, D.J.’s recollection and description never varied.
Contrary to Defendant’s contention in his pro se argument, although D.J. may have presented
testimony that differed from her mother’s, D.J.’s testimony was not impeached. Thus, this truly
presented itself to the jury as a question of credibility.
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had no knowledge of what happened behind closed doors in the Defendant’s family

home. It is clear to this court that the testimony of the eight defense witnesses, too,

was relevant in only one respect—to attack the credibility of the victim.

In State v. Breaux, 08-1061, p. 13 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/1/09), 6 So.3d 982, 991-

92 (quoting State v. Dixon, 04-1019, p. 12 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/15/05), 900 So.2d 929,

936,) this court stated, “The question of the credibility of the witnesses is within the

sound discretion of the trier of fact, who may accept or reject, in whole or in part,

the testimony of any witness.” In the light most favorable to the prosecution, the

jury could have dismissed the testimony of Defendant’s family and found D.J. to be

more credible than her mother. Accordingly, we cannot say the State failed to meet

its burden of proving Defendant raped D.J. on at least two occasions when she was

under the age of thirteen. Accordingly, we find this assignment of error lacks merit.

SEVERANCE

In his second assignment of error, Defendant contends the trial court should

have severed the charges of molestation of S.M., counts three and four of the

indictment, prior to trial. As noted by Defendant, a trial court’s ruling on a motion

to sever “is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and the court’s ruling

should not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.” State

v. Williams, 418 So.2d 562, 564 (La.1982). Nevertheless, Defendant contends the

molestation charges “could have been used by the jury to infer a criminal

disposition” and contends the evidence presented regarding such abuses of S.M.

were scant and indicative of the State’s inability to prove the charges.

Initially, we observe Defendant’s argument requires this court to take

information unavailable to the trial court pre-trial at the time of the ruling, namely

the evidence available to the State to prove the molestation charges and find the trial
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court abused its discretion based upon such information the trial court could not have

known. Additionally, we observe Defendant’s argument that the charges “could

have been used by the jury to infer a criminal disposition,” lacks any merit

considering La.Code Evid. art. 412.2(A), which states:

When an accused is charged with a crime involving sexually
assaultive behavior, or with acts that constitute a sex offense involving
a victim who was under the age of seventeen at the time of the offense,
evidence of the accused’s commission of another crime, wrong, or act
involving sexually assaultive behavior or acts which indicate a lustful
disposition toward children may be admissible and may be considered
for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant subject to the
balancing test provided in Article 403.

Defendant was accused of repeatedly raping his stepdaughter D.J. when she

was as young as eight years old. Prior to D.J.’s delayed reporting of her abuse, her

sister S.M. had independently provided delayed reporting to law enforcement and

described similar behavior by Defendant, also when she was a young child. As

previously noted, Detective Jordan separately took statements from S.M. and D.J.

As Detective Jordan stated, S.M. and D.J. “told very similar stories that did not

contradict each other.” On this basis, we find that under La.Code Evid. art. 412.2(A),

evidence of Defendant’s alleged behavior against his other stepdaughter would have

been admissible for the specific purpose of indicating “a lustful disposition toward

children.” For the foregoing reasons, we find the trial court did not abuse its

discretion when it denied Defendant’s motion to sever the counts involving S.M.

Accordingly, we conclude this assignment of error lacks merit.

DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s convictions and sentences are

affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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