State of Louisiana v. Darrione Kentrell Bell

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

22-109
Consolidated with 22-110, 22-111, 22-112

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

DARRIONE KENTRELL BELL

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CONCORDIA, NO. 19-3539A
(consolidated with 19-3539B, 19-3539C, 19-3540)
HONORABLE JOHN C. REEVES, JUDGE

**********

CHARLES G. FITZGERALD
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Chief Judge, and John E. Conery and Charles
G. Fitzgerald, Judges.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

Edward K. Bauman
Louisiana Appellate Project
P.O. Box 1641
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70602
(337) 491-0570
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Darrione Kentrell Bell

Bradley R. Burget
District Attorney
Joseph A. Boothe
Assistant District Attorney
4001 Carter Street, Suite 9
Vidalia, Louisiana 71373
(318) 336-5526
Counsel for Appellee:
State of Louisiana

FITZGERALD, Judge.

Defendant, Darrione Kentrell Bell, appeals his conviction and sentence for the

first degree murder of Rosie Hooper.

SUMMARY OF FACTS

Defendant was convicted of murdering three people. First, Rosie Hooper, an

eighty-five-year-old woman, who was beaten and stabbed despite being bedridden.

Second, her sixty-five-year-old son, Ellis Hooper, who was stabbed repeatedly in the

neck while in bed. And third, Rosie’s sixty-seven-year-old son, Johnny Hooper,

who was found beaten and stabbed in the kitchen of their home.

Defendant was also convicted of the aggravated burglary of the home of

Charles Lyles, a seventy-nine-year-old man who lived near the Hooper residence.

Defendant entered Charles’s home armed with a lead pipe. Defendant fled when

Charles brandished a rifle.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In February 2020, a grand jury indicted Defendant under La.R.S. 14:30 for

the first degree murder of Rosie Hooper. The trial court docket number for this

charge is 19-3539A. The grand jury simultaneously charged Defendant with two

more counts of first degree murder for the intentional killing of Rosie’s two sons,

Johnny and Ellis. The trial court docket number for Johnny’s murder is 19-3539B.

And the docket number for Ellis’s murder is 19-3539C. In addition, Defendant was

indicted under La.R.S. 14:60 for aggravated burglary. The trial court docket number

for this charge is 19-3540.

Seven months later, in September 2020, the State filed a motion to consolidate

the three murder charges. That motion was immediately granted. Five weeks after

that, Defendant filed a motion to suppress the blood evidence obtained during his

warrantless arrest. Two days later, the State filed a motion to consolidate the

aggravated burglary charge with the murder charges. And a few days after that, a

contradictory hearing was held on Defendant’s motion to suppress and the State’s

second motion to consolidate. Defendant’s motion was denied; the State’s motion

was granted.

Ultimately, on October 15, 2020, a twelve-person jury unanimously found

Defendant guilty as charged on each count. Two weeks later, on October 28, 2020,

the trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without benefit of

probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for each murder. The trial court also

imposed the maximum sentence of thirty years for the aggravated burglary. The

sentences were ordered to run consecutively.

Thereafter, on December 17, 2020, Defendant filed a motion to reconsider

sentence, which the trial court denied that same day. Defendant now appeals his

conviction and sentence for the first degree murder of Rosie Hooper.1 Defendant

asserts three assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred in denying [Defendant’s] Motion to
Suppress any and all evidence seized as a result of the
warrantless search of his home.

2. The trial court erred in not ordering a mental health evaluation of
[Defendant] given the horrendous nature of the crimes and his
erratic actions that night. At the very least, a Pre-Sentence
Investigation Report should have been ordered, despite there
being mandatary sentences.

3. Defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request a mental
examination of [Defendant], for failing to request that a Pre-

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Defendant has also appealed his convictions and sentences for murdering Rosie’s two
sons, along with the conviction and sentence for aggravated burglary. Those appeals are addressed
in three separate opinions. Specifically, our opinion in appellate docket number 22-110 reviews
Defendant’s conviction and sentence for the first degree murder of Johnny Hooper. Our opinion
in appellate docket number 22-111 reviews Defendant’s conviction and sentence for the first
degree murder of Ellis Hooper. And our opinion in appellate docket number 22-112 reviews
Defendant’s conviction and sentence for aggravated burglary.

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Sentence Investigation Report be prepared addressing any prior
mental health treatment or crimes committed, and in failing to
object to the admission of gruesome crime scene photos.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I. Errors Patent

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, we review appeals for errors

patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find no errors patent.

II. Defendant’s First Assignment of Error

In his first assignment of error, Defendant contends that the trial court erred

in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained following his warrantless arrest.

In denying the motion, the trial court found the existence of exigent circumstances

and probable cause. We now review this ruling under the abuse of discretion

standard of review. State v. Summers, 15-1363 (La. 7/29/15), 170 So.3d 960.

The hearing on Defendant’s motion to suppress was held on October 8, 2020.

The State’s first witness was Sergeant Christopher Goad, who is a patrol division

shift supervisor with the Concordia Parish Sheriff’s Office. According to Sergeant

Goad, he was dispatched to the Hooper residence located at 113 Weaver Road in

Ferriday, Louisiana, in response to a female caller reporting to 911 that her mother

was dead; the caller believed someone had killed her mother. Upon arriving at the

scene, Sergeant Goad recalled seeing two women crying by a ditch. He then found

the three Hooper victims inside their home. All three appeared to have been beaten

to death.

Sergeant Goad was then asked about Defendant’s arrest. In response, he

explained that before he arrived at the scene, he was aware that Defendant was a

suspect in an armed break-in just down the road. But once on scene, he observed a

large crowd of people gathering outside of the Hooper residence. And “[s]ome of

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the family members in the large crowd that had gathered had stated that [Defendant]

lived, supposedly lived right across the street[.]”

According to Sergeant Goad, members of the crowd told the officers at the

scene that if they (law enforcement) did not find Defendant, the crowd would, and

that if they (law enforcement) shot Defendant, the crowd would not have to do it.

Sergeant Goad then testified about Defendant’s arrest, explaining:

I believe Captain Cowan at the time and Deputy Walter Mackel
knocked on the door [of 110 Weaver Road] first. Deputy Mackel
hollered loudly he can see the gentleman in the living room. At that
time, they knocked on the door once more, hollered, “Sheriff’s Office.
Open the door.” The door was never opened. At that time, the door
was forced open. Captain Cowan, Deputy Mackel, another deputy and
myself, I went into there, and Mr. Darrione was in the living room.

....

Due to the crowd outside continuing to holler for us to kill
[Defendant], I had another on duty deputy there pull my unit into
[Defendant’s] driveway. I immediately put him in the backseat of my
car, turned my lights and sirens on and tried to clear the crowd and got
him out of there as quickly as we could.

Sergeant Goad reiterated that he did not feel Defendant was safe until he was

removed from the scene. Sergeant Goad also noted that prior to entering the 110-

Weaver-Road residence to arrest Defendant, he watched a surveillance video

showing a man walking back and forth between the driveways of 113 Weaver Road

(the Hooper residence) and 110 Weaver Road (the location of the arrest).

On cross-examination, Sergeant Goad testified that there were additional

officers present beyond the four who entered 110 Weaver Road for the arrest.

Sergeant Goad acknowledged that no warrant had been obtained prior to

Defendant’s arrest, and that he was unaware of any threats of Defendant fleeing or

destroying evidence. But as to the crowd, Sergeant Goad further noted that members

of the crowd had begun gathering at an opening in the fence that surrounded the 110-

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Weaver-Road property. Deputies, however, were able to push them back. And this

was happening before the arrest.

Sergeant Goad also recalled that there were between 150 and 200 people in

the crowd, that people in the crowd were encouraging law enforcement to shoot

Defendant, and that crowd members were yelling “[y]’all better get him before we

do.” He also noted, however, that law enforcement did not see anyone armed in the

crowd.

The State next called Major John Cowan, also with the Concordia Parish

Sheriff’s Department. Major Cowan testified that prior to Defendant’s arrest, he

(Major Cowan) was aware that Defendant had been identified as the perpetrator of

a home invasion that occurred on Weaver Road around the same time as the murders.

The homeowner was Charles Lyles. According to Major Cowan, Charles’s

daughter, who was also inside the home, ended up chasing Defendant down Weaver

Road. And she stated that Defendant would be “in his old house trailer” located at

110 Weaver Road.

As to the growing crowd of people, Major Cowan testified that there were

around forty people, all adults. He described them as acting very aggressively.

When asked if he believed the crowd was a threat to Defendant’s safety, Major

Cowan answered, “[a]bsolutely.”

Major Cowan acknowledged that law enforcement did not have confirmation

of Defendant’s location until they entered the trailer at 110 Weaver Road.

Defendant’s arrest, as described by Major Cowan, occurred as follows:

Once we got to the trailer, . . . [t]he front door was locked. We
used a hooving tool, which is like a pry bar with a hook on the end of
it. We was going to use it to pry the door and make entry. As we were
prying the door, [Defendant] stands up from behind just some random
items that was in the living area that’s when Mackel hollered at him to

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show his hands. At that moment, we dropped the hooving tool, and as
the door was closing, Mackel was saying that he would run towards the
front of the house. So we surrounded the house. Once we got all areas
surrounded, we breached the door, made entry, and I arrested
[Defendant] in the living area on the floor.

Major Cowan clarified that before prying the door open, deputies announced,

“Sheriff’s Department. If you’re in there, please come out.” He then added that he

did not feel Defendant was safe in the area. He also felt that Defendant might pose

a danger to the community.

Major Cowan was then asked questions about the warrant process. In

response, he testified that he was familiar with the process, noting that he typically

filed for warrants for the sheriff’s office prior to his promotion. He then estimated

that it would have taken between an hour and a half and two hours to obtain an arrest

warrant for Defendant. Major Cowan acknowledged that, to his knowledge, the

crowd members were not armed, that there were no specific threats being made

beyond the warnings that the crowd members would get Defendant if law

enforcement did not, and that he had no specific knowledge that Defendant was

attempting to flee or destroy evidence.

Major Cowan believed that there was probable cause for an immediate arrest

of Defendant. He believed that removing Defendant from 110 Weaver Road was

the most reasonable and prudent course of action. And he also believed that the

crowd posed a danger to Defendant: Defendant was at risk of great bodily harm or

death if he was not quickly removed.

The State then called Officer Phillip Smith, who is an investigator with the

Concordia Parish Sheriff’s Office. Officer Smith recalled that upon arriving at the

scene, he was already aware that Defendant had been identified as the individual

who had broken into Charles Lyles’s home.

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Officer Smith also described the crowd members as aggressive. He testified

that people were hollering at law enforcement to “[k]ill [Defendant].” He believed

that the crowd posed a threat to Defendant’s safety, noting that deputies drove a car

right up to the house to safely remove Defendant from the scene. Officer Smith

explained that removing Defendant was the most prudent course of action, adding

that “[o]nce the crowd was aware that he was there, they became [a] lot more verbal,

a lot more agitated, and frankly, if they had wanted [Defendant], they could have

taken him from us, because there was only about eight of us out there.”

On cross-examination, Officer Smith acknowledged that he was not aware of

anybody in the crowd being armed, that law enforcement had not pursued Defendant

into the trailer at 110 Weaver Road, that there was no arrest warrant, and that there

was nothing indicating that Defendant was actively destroying evidence. According

to Officer Smith, the crowd included at least fifty people. Officer Smith reiterated

that he did not believe that the officers at the scene could have stopped the crowd if

its members had decided to become violent. Thus, in his opinion, exigent

circumstances existed to justify the warrantless arrest of Defendant.

At the close of evidence, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion to

suppress. As the trial court put it: “I believe that the State met its burden here that

exigent circumstances as well as probable cause existed for the fearful nature of what

the crowd could have done to [Defendant] for his safety and everything, that the

arrest had to be [e]ffected immediately.”

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 703 addresses the motion to

suppress. Paragraph D of that article states:

D. On the trial of a motion to suppress filed under the provisions
of this Article, the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove the
ground of his motion, except that the state shall have the burden of

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proving the admissibility of a confession or statement by the defendant
or of any evidence seized without a warrant.

Turning now to our standard of review. As explained by the Louisiana

Supreme Court in Summers, 170 So.3d at 966:

“In reviewing the trial court's ruling on defendant’s motion to suppress,
this Court looks to the totality of the evidence presented at the motion
to suppress hearing. . . .” State v. Burkhalter, 428 So.2d 449, 455
(La.1983). The purpose of this comprehensive review is to ascertain
whether there has been an abuse of discretion. State v. Montejo, 06-
1807, p. 21 (La. 5/11/10), 40 So.3d 952, 967.

Here, the only inconsistency between the testimony of the officers was the

size of the crowd: Major Cowan and Officer Smith described the crowd as roughly

forty to fifty people, while Sergeant Goad estimated the crowd was three to four

times that size. Beyond that, the deputies all agreed that the crowd was significantly

larger than the contingent of law enforcement on scene, and that the crowd was angry

and making threats towards Defendant. And on that basis, the deputies all believed

that Defendant was in danger.

In State v. Fountain, 49,637, p. 8 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/4/15), 162 So.3d 652, 656-

57, the second circuit addressed warrantless arrests with exigent circumstances,

explaining:

Warrantless entries into the home for arrest or seizure are invalid
in the absence of exigent circumstances. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); State v. Washington,
2012–2203 (La.11/16/12), 104 So.3d 401. The United States Supreme
Court has defined exigent circumstances as “a plausible claim of
specially pressing or urgent law enforcement need.” Illinois v.
McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 121 S.Ct. 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001).
Exigent circumstances may arise from the need to prevent the
offender’s escape, to minimize the possibility of a violent confrontation
which could cause injury to the officers and the public, and to preserve
evidence from destruction or concealment.

Defendant argues that law enforcement’s concern about crowd control should

have no bearing on the presence of exigent circumstances. We disagree. The issue

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of whether law enforcement is able to prevent a crowd from attacking a suspect falls

squarely into the category of “minimize[ing] the possibility of a violent

confrontation which could cause injury to the officers and the public.” Id. at 657. In

the instant case, the trial court found that the officers were justified in executing a

warrantless arrest due to exigent circumstances—the possibility of a violent

confrontation between the crowd and Defendant.

Based on the record before us, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. Defendant’s first assignment of error is

thus without merit.

III. Defendant’s Second Assignment of Error

In his second assignment of error, Defendant contends that “[t]he trial court

erred in not ordering a mental health evaluation of [Defendant] or at the very least a

Pre-Sentence Investigation Report so as to provide some insight as to [Defendant]’s

mental and criminal background.”

Under La.Code Crim.P. art. 643, “The court shall order a mental examination

of the defendant when it has reasonable ground to doubt the defendant’s mental

capacity to proceed.” Article 643 was interpreted in State v. Barnett, 18-254, 27-28

(La.App. 5 Cir. 4/3/19), 267 So.3d 209. There, the fifth circuit explained:

The trial judge is required to order a mental examination of the
defendant only when he has a reasonable ground to doubt the
defendant’s mental capacity to proceed. La. C.Cr.P. art. 643; State v.
Pugh, 02-171 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/16/02), 831 So.2d 341, 349.
Reasonable grounds to doubt the defendant’s mental capacity to
proceed refers to information which, objectively considered, should
reasonably raise a doubt about the defendant’s competency and alert
the court to the possibility that the defendant cannot understand the
proceedings, appreciate the significance of the proceedings, or
rationally aid his attorney in his defense. State v. Williams, 02-1016
(La. App. 5 Cir. 2/25/03), 841 So.2d 936, 942, writ denied, 03-2205
(La. 8/20/04), 882 So.2d 571. The ordering of a sanity commission
rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Fish, 99-1280

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(La. App. 5 Cir. 4/12/00), 759 So.2d 937, 939. The trial court’s denial
of a motion for appointment of a sanity commission will be reversed
only for abuse of discretion. State v. Pollard, 12-346 (La. App. 5 Cir.
12/18/12), 106 So.3d 1194, 1199, writ denied, 13-0140 (La. 6/21/13),
118 So.3d 408.

Id. at 229.

In essence, Defendant here argues that two things should have alerted the trial

court that Defendant lacked the mental capacity to proceed. First, Defendant points

to the testimony of Danny White. And second, Defendant seems to assert that the

very nature of the murders should have alerted the trial court as to his lack of mental

capacity. We disagree.

At trial, Danny White testified that on the night of the murders, Defendant

entered his (Danny’s) bar carrying a beer bottle which he held on to all night. Danny

recalled that his nephew and Defendant were shirtless dancing with two women. In

fact, they were the only ones left in the bar. Danny described Defendant as generally

behaving childishly. In our view, this testimony creates the inference that Defendant

was drunk rather than mentally incapable of proceeding with trial.

As to the gruesome nature of the murders, many crimes—particularly murder

and rape—involve inexplicable acts of brutality. But that alone does not mean that

the person who committed the criminal act is unable to aid in his own defense.

In this case, the record does not reflect any reasonable ground to doubt

Defendant’s mental capacity to proceed, especially considering that defense counsel

never moved for a sanity commission or competency hearing and never argued the

defense of insanity. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this respect.

Now to Defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in failing to order a

presentence investigation. A presentence investigation under La.Code Crim.P. art.

875(A)(1) is within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Bell, 12-195 (La.App. 3

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Cir. 6/6/12), 91 So.3d 1279, writ denied, 12-2363 (La. 3/15/13), 109 So.3d 380. And

the trial court’s failure to order a presentence investigation will not be disturbed

absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Hayden, 98–2768 (La.App. 4 Cir.

5/17/00), 767 So.2d 732.

Here, Defendant’s three convictions for first degree murder each carried a

mandatory life sentence. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not

ordering a presentence investigation.

For the above reasons, Defendant’s second assignment of error is without

merit.

IV. Defendant’s Third Assignment of Error

In his final assignment, Defendant asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to request a mental examination and for not objecting to the crime-scene

photographs being admitted into evidence.

At the outset, we note that an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is more

appropriately addressed in an application for post-conviction relief. State in the

Interest of A.B., 09-870 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/9/09), 25 So.3d 1012. This is especially

true when the claim is based on evidence not in the record. State v. Kendrick, 96-

1636 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/25/97), 699 So.2d 424, writ denied, 98-2159 (La. 12/18/98),

731 So.2d 280.

Defendant here continues to bemoan counsel’s failure to seek an examination

of his prior mental health treatment. Yet the record does not contain any information

regarding prior mental health treatment. Without that information, we cannot

properly review whether counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a mental

examination. For this reason, relegation of this issue to post-conviction relief will

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allow the trial court the opportunity to fully develop a record regarding whether

Defendant had prior mental health issues that should have been raised in his defense.

Now to the crime-scene photographs. Because the record contains sufficient

evidence concerning this matter, we will exercise our discretion and review

Defendant’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the

admission of these photographs.

In assessing a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, the defendant must show

two things: (1) that his attorney’s performance was deficient, and (2) that the

deficiency prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984).

Both elements must be shown by Defendant. State v. Serigny, 610 So.2d 857, 860

(La.App. 1 Cir.1992), writ denied, 614 So.2d 1263 (La.1993).

As to the second element, the error is prejudicial if it was “so serious as to

deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Strickland, 104

S.Ct. at 2064. In other words, the defendant must demonstrate that but for counsel’s

deficient conduct, the proceeding would have resulted in a different outcome. State

v. Felder, 00-2887 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/28/01), 809 So.2d 360, writ denied, 01-3027

(La. 10/25/02), 827 So.2d 1173.

The supreme court reviewed the issue of gruesome photographs in State v.

Broaden, 99-2124, pp. 22-24 (La. 2/21/01), 780 So.2d 349, 364, cert. denied, 122

S.Ct. 192 (2001):

Defendant complains of the admission of three gruesome
photographs. Defendant argues that as both victims would have died
from bullets fired by Adams, the probative value of this evidence is
slight and was introduced solely to inflame jurors and incite them to
convict based on the pictures. Objections were raised before trial.

The state is entitled to the moral force of its evidence, and post-
mortem photographs of murder victims are admissible to prove corpus
delicti, to corroborate other evidence establishing cause of death, as

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well as location and placement of wounds and to provide positive
identification of the victim. State v. Koon, 96-1208, p. 34 (La.5/20/97),
704 So.2d 756, 776; State v. Martin, 93–0285, p. 14 (La.10/17/94), 645
So.2d 190, 198. Photographic evidence will be admitted unless it is so
gruesome as to overwhelm jurors’ reason and lead them to convict
without sufficient other evidence. Koon, 96-1208 at p. 34, 704 So.2d at
776, citing State v. Perry, 502 So.2d 543, 558–59 (La.1986), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 205, 98 L.Ed.2d 156 (1987).

We agree that the photographs are indeed gruesome. This court
regularly sees claims of “gruesome” photographs in capital cases, but
has reversed only once on these grounds in any case. State v. Morris, 245 La. 175, 157 So.2d 728 (1963) (gratuitous introduction of
“gruesome and ghastly” photographs depicting the progress of an
autopsy in an “increasing grotesque and revolting” manner constituted
reversible error when the defendant admitted that he killed the victim
and contested only his state of mind). Admission of “gruesome
photographs is not reversible error unless it is clear that their probative
value is substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect.” Martin,
93-0285 at pp. 14-15, 645 So.2d at 198. Cf., State v. Wessinger, 98-
1234, pp 16-17 (La.5/28/99), 736 So.2d 162, 179 (photographic
evidence “will be admitted unless it is so gruesome as to overwhelm
the jurors’ reason and lead them to convict defendant absent other
sufficient evidence.”)

We do not find any reason to treat photographic evidence
differently than any other evidence, which is admissible if relevant and
more probative than prejudicial. La.Code Evid. art. 403. At any rate,
we find that the admission of the disputed photographs in this case was
gratuitous. The pathologist could have given verbatim testimony
illustrated by other, less graphic photos. While the state is certainly
entitled to the moral force of its evidence, that evidence should
enlighten rather than bludgeon the jury. The photographs taken at the
crime scenes were sufficient to demonstrate the cause of death as well
as the location of the gunshot wounds. However, we do not find
reversible error.

Here, Defendant provides no argument to support his contention that the

probative value of the crime-scene photographs was substantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice. La.Code Evid. arts. 401, 403. On the contrary, he merely

puts forth the conclusory statement that “[s]uch gruesome photographs were not

necessary for the State to prove their case and could only inflame the jury, thus they

should have been objected to.” Remember, Defendant was accused of murdering

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three elderly individuals, one of whom was bedridden. And he did so by stabbing

and beating them to death. In this light, it is hard to imagine crime-scene

photographs not being gruesome.

In the end, Defendant failed to show that his trial counsel’s performance was

deficient. But even if Defendant had made that showing, there is nothing in the

record to suggest that the outcome of trial would have been different. In other words,

even without the photographs, the evidence connecting Defendant to the murders

includes the blood of the victims on Defendant’s person and clothing, along with a

videotape of Defendant entering the Hooper residence.

In sum, Defendant failed to show either element of his deficiency-of-counsel

claim. His third assignment of error is thus without merit.

DISPOSITION

For the above reasons, Darrione Kentrell Bell’s conviction and sentence are

affirmed for the first degree murder of Rosie Hooper.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.3

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