State of Louisiana v. Rj Bartie

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

22-401

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

RJ BARTIE

************
APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, DOCKET NO. 8774-19
HONORABLE DAVID A. RITCHIE, DISTRICT JUDGE
************
LEDRICKA J. THIERRY
JUDGE
************

Court composed of Shannon J. Gremillion, Van H. Kyzar, and Ledricka J. Thierry,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Stephen C. Wright, District Attorney
John Eric Turner, Assistant District Attorney
14th Judicial District
901 Lakeshore Drive, Suite 800
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 427-3400
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
The State of Louisiana

Meghan Hartwell Bitoun
Louisiana Appellate Project
P.O. Box 4252
New Orleans, LA 70119
(504) 470-4779
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
RJ Bartie

THIERRY, Judge.

Defendant appeals his convictions and sentences for home invasion, second

degree kidnapping, and attempted second degree kidnapping. For the following

reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 6, 2018, there was an incident between Defendant, RJ Bartie,

and his wife, Adrienana R. Bartie. On that date, Defendant and Adrienana had

been separated for approximately one month. During that time period, Adrienana

had been staying with her parents, John and Paulette Rene, at their home. Due to

the contentious relationship at that time between Defendant and Adrienana, he was

not welcome at the home. On the above date, while Adrienana and her parents

were outside in the backyard patio of the home during the evening, they saw a

vehicle’s headlights coming up an alley which led towards the back of the house.

Defendant got out of the vehicle and began approaching the patio. Adrienana’s

parents walked towards Defendant and asked him to leave, but Defendant refused.

Defendant was carrying a firearm which he pointed at Adrienana’s parents and told

them he was there to “get” his wife.

During the time her parents approached Defendant, Adrienana had fled into

the home. Defendant pursued her in there, and when Paulette followed Defendant

into the home, she saw Defendant “had Adrienana up against the refrigerator and

her feet were dangling and he had the gun to her head.” Defendant then physically

dragged Adrienana out of the house to his vehicle. Paulette then attempted to grab

Defendant as he was dragging her daughter out of the house, and Defendant struck

her and knocked her to the floor. When Defendant reached the vehicle, he placed

Adrienana into the passenger seat and ran to the drivers side to get in. As he was

doing this, John approached him armed with his own firearm and told him to let his

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daughter go or he would shoot. As that confrontation ensued, Paulette opened the

passenger door and told her daughter to run.

Adrienana then ran back inside the house and Defendant pursued her.

Defendant grabbed her from inside again and began, once more, dragging her to

his vehicle. In the process he knocked Paulette and John to the ground. Defendant

reached his vehicle and pushed Adrienana inside. John approached, and again, told

Defendant if he did not let his daughter go, he would shoot. When Defendant

proceeded to go to the driver’s side to get into the vehicle, John shot him in the

back. Private security footage from the Rene’s home recorded the encounter.

Shortly after the shooting, police arrived on the scene. John was initially

placed under arrest and put in a police car. While in transit to the police station,

the officers on the scene watched the surveillance video and then radioed to the

police that John was no longer under arrest and he was returned to his home.

Defendant was transported to the hospital where he received treatment for

his gunshot wound. Detective Ben Randolph questioned Defendant at the hospital

later that night. Detective Randolph later testified, in his experience as being

certified in field sobriety testing, he did not believe Defendant was under the

influence of drugs or alcohol that night.

On April 5, 2019, Defendant was charged by bill of information with one

count of home invasion, in violation of La.R.S. 14:62.8; two counts of attempted

second degree kidnapping, in violation of La.R.S. 14:27 and 14:44.1; and one

count of aggravated assault with a firearm, in violation of La.R.S. 14:37.4. On

January 20, 2021, an amended bill of information was filed which dismissed the

aggravated assault with a firearm charge and changed the attempted second degree

kidnapping charges into second degree kidnapping charges in violation of La.R.S.

14:44.1.

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The matter proceeded to trial on September 9, 2021, was interrupted when

this court issued an emergency stay on September 10, and concluded on September

16, 2021, when Defendant was found guilty of home invasion, guilty as charged on

one count of second degree kidnapping and found guilty of the responsive verdict

of attempted second degree kidnapping on the other count.1

On January 7, 2022, the trial court sentenced Defendant to thirty years at

hard labor for home invasion; thirty years at hard labor without benefit of

probation, parole or suspension of sentence for second degree kidnapping; and

twenty years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of

sentence for attempted second degree kidnapping. The sentences were ordered to

run concurrently, with credit for time served.

Defendant now appeals his convictions and sentences, assigning three errors

related to his convictions and one error related to his sentences:

1. The trial court erred in denying him the right to present a defense
when it ruled he could not present evidence of PTSD without
pleading not guilty by reason of insanity where he was not
arraigned on the bill of information;

2. The trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce part of a
page of Defendant’s journal;

3. The trial court erred in refusing to give the jury a requested special
instruction related to compromise verdicts;

4. The sentences imposed were unconstitutionally excessive.

ANALYSIS

In his first assignment of error, Defendant contends “[t]he trial court erred in

denying Mr. Bartie the right to present his defense pertaining to PTSD under

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The emergency stay was issued when defense counsel sought review of the trial court’s ruling
that held Defendant was prohibited from putting forth evidence of his post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) diagnosis. State v. Bartie, 21-584 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/16/21) (unpublished
opinion). This court found no error in the trial court’s ruling excluding any evidence of PTSD or
other evidence regarding his mental health.
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[La.Code Crim.P.] Article 726 when the trial court failed to arraign him on the

amended bill of information.” Initially, we note Defendant argues the trial court

should have allowed him to present a PTSD defense because he filed a motion

under La.Code Crim.P. art. 726, which states:

A. If a defendant intends to introduce testimony relating to a
mental disease, defect, or other condition bearing upon the issue of
whether he had the mental state required for the offense charged, he
shall not later than ten days prior to trial or such reasonable time as
the court may permit, notify the district attorney in writing of such
intention and file a copy of such notice with the clerk. The court may
for cause shown allow late filing of the notice or grant additional time
to the parties to prepare for trial or make such other orders as may be
appropriate.

B. If there is a failure to give notice as required by Subsection
A of this Article, the court may exclude the testimony of any witness
offered by the defendant on the issue of mental condition.

While the article refers to a “mental disease, defect, or other condition,”

notice given under La.Code Crim.P. art. 726 typically relates to intoxication

defenses. Defendant concedes in brief that the State construed the notice as such

prior to trial. Furthermore, the trial court’s ruling that evidence of Defendant’s

intoxication on the night of the event was admissible indicates the trial court’s

belief that Defendant’s notice was related to intoxication. Defendant’s notice did

nothing to give any different impression as it simply stated he “intend[ed] to

introduce testimony relating to a mental disease, defect, or other condition bearing

upon the issue of whether he had the mental state required for the offense charged,

pursuant to Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 726.” Finally, we note that

in his supplemental brief to this court during the emergency writ application on the

issue of the trial court’s exclusion of PTSD evidence, defense counsel explicitly

stated that, “From the outset, defense counsel gave notice of his intent pursuant to

[La.Code Crim.P.] Art. 726 to raise the defense of intoxication. To support that

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defense, defense counsel desired to have the defendant testify regarding his

struggles with alcohol abuse and depression by way of PTSD.”

The trial court’s ruling that evidence of PTSD was inadmissible where the

Defendant did not plead “not guilty by reason of insanity” was based upon

La.Code Crim.P. art. 651, which states that, “When a defendant is tried upon a plea

of ‘not guilty’, evidence of insanity or mental defect at the time of the offense shall

not be admissible.” This court affirmed that ruling during trial. See State v. Bartie,

21-584 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/16/21) (unpublished opinion). As such, any argument the

trial court erred in disallowing a PTSD defense on these grounds fails.

Realizing that this court has already affirmed the trial court’s denial of a

PTSD defense without pleading not guilty by reason of insanity, Defendant now

contends the trial court’s ruling, and Defendant’s entire trial, should be vacated

because he was never arraigned on the amended bill of information. However,

Defendant acknowledges:

Generally, if a bill of information states the essential facts of the
offense charged, the defendant does not object to any error in the bill
of information, and the defendant does not claim surprise or prejudice,
any error in the bill of information is harmless. State v. Morris, 614
So.2d 180 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1993); State v. Boswell, 96-801 (La.App. 3
Cir. 2/12/1997), 689 So.2d 627, 632.

Instead, Defendant contends the error was not harmless because “the failure

to arraign Mr. Bartie on the amended bill of information deprived him of his right

to present a defense, in that it completely foreclosed his ability to present his

defense regarding his PTSD and its impact on his actions.” We disagree. The

incident in question and the alleged actions of Defendant were not changed by the

filing of the amended bill of information on January 20, 2021; a charge was

removed and his charges of attempted second degree kidnapping were amended to

second degree kidnapping based on the fact that his actions of forcibly moving his

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estranged wife from her parents’ home to a car she did not want to enter satisfied

the second degree kidnapping statute. The essential elements remained the same,

Defendant did not object to the amended bill of information, and he never claimed

surprise or prejudice with regard to the filing of the amended bill. Defendant’s

contention that the State’s failure to arraign him deprived him of the opportunity to

present his defense is inaccurate. Under La.Code Crim.P. art. 561:

The defendant may withdraw a plea of “not guilty” and enter a
plea of “not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity,” within ten
days after arraignment. Thereafter, the court may, for good cause
shown, allow such a change of plea at any time before the
commencement of the trial.

The amended bill of information was filed in January of 2021 and provided

to Defendant via discovery the following day. Given that Defendant’s trial began

on September 10, 2021, Defendant had more than seven months during which he

could have sought to change his plea. Defendant never filed a motion to change

his plea, with counsel going so far as to state in open court that “I’m not changing

my plea.” This assignment of error lacks merit because Defendant was prevented

from presenting a defense not through trial court error, but as a result of

Defendant’s attempt to circumvent the clear mandate of La.Code Crim.P. art. 651.

In his second assignment of error, Defendant contends “[t]he trial court erred

in allowing the State to publish only a portion of the journal to the jury.” The issue

of whether the State could introduce only a portion of a page from Defendant’s

journal was already addressed during the emergency writ application filed by

Defendant during trial. In his supplemental brief on the emergency writ

application, Defendant contended the trial court erred by allowing the State to

introduce his full journal into evidence while publishing only a tiny portion, then

prohibiting defense counsel from addressing the sections of the journal which

directly addressed Defendant’s PTSD.

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In State v. Dickerson, 14-170, pp. 9-10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/4/14), 140 So.3d

904, 909-10, writ denied, 14-1466 (La. 3/13/15), 161 So.3d 638, this court stated

the following regarding the “law of the case” doctrine:

Under the “law of the case” doctrine, prior decisions of the
appellate court are considered binding and may not be reconsidered on
appeal absent clear error. Juneau v. State, 06-1653 (La.App. 3 Cir.
5/2/07), 956 So.2d 728, writ denied, 07-1177 (La. 9/14/07), 963 So.2d
1004; State v. Molineux, 11-275 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/19/11), 76 So.3d
617, writ denied, 11-2556 (La. 3/30/12), 85 So.3d 117. “[T]he [law of
the case] doctrine is discretionary and should not be applied where it
would effectuate an obvious injustice or where the former appellate
decision was clearly erroneous.” Juneau, 956 So.2d at
733 (quoting Trans La. Gas Co. v. La. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 96-1477
(La.App. 1 Cir. 5/9/97), 693 So.2d 893, 896) (alternations in original).

....

As this honorable court has already ruled on the issue of whether
Defendant is entitled to discover the identities of the informants, it
may not be reconsidered on appeal absent clear error by the appellate
court. Defendant has failed to present any new evidence showing that
the denial amounted to clear error or an unjust result. As such, we
shall not reconsider Defendant's right to discover the identity of the
informants on appeal.

Defendant presents no new or original argument for why this court should

change its prior ruling; indeed, Defendant does not mention the emergency writ in

this case at all. Given Defendant’s failure to present anything new beyond the fact

that he proffered testimony into the record, the law of the case doctrine applies and

this court’s prior ruling stands.

In his third assignment of error, Defendant contends “[t]he trial court erred

in failing to instruct the jury as to the Defense Request for Special Jury

Instruction.” Specifically, Defendant is contesting the trial court’s refusal to give

the following instruction to the jury: “You may return any responsive verdict listed

on the verdict form, even though you find that the State has proven beyond a

reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged.” Defendant asserts, as he

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did in the trial court, that the instruction is correct in light of State v. Porter, 93-

1106 (La. 7/5/94), 639 So.2d 1137. We find no merit in this assignment of error.

Under La.Code Crim.P. art. 807:

The state and the defendant shall have the right before argument
to submit to the court special written charges for the jury. Such
charges may be received by the court in its discretion after argument
has begun. The party submitting the charges shall furnish a copy of
the charges to the other party when the charges are submitted to the
court.

A requested special charge shall be given by the court if it does
not require qualification, limitation, or explanation, and if it is wholly
correct and pertinent. It need not be given if it is included in the
general charge or in another special charge to be given.

Defendant contends the trial court should have instructed the jury that even

if the State proved every element of the offenses charged, the jury could simply

choose to convict Defendant of a lesser included offense. We note this exact

argument has been addressed, and denied, by this court. In State v. Kidd, 22-227

(La.App. 3 Cir. 9/14/22), 348 So.3d 243, the defendant argued the trial court erred

in prohibiting him from discussing “compromise verdicts” or jury nullification.

Noting that the trial court allowed discussion of responsive verdicts and correctly

pointed out that Porter was focused on the exclusion of a valid responsive verdict

listed under La.Code Crim.P. art. 814, this court affirmed the trial court’s ruling

that held discussion of responsive verdicts was proper, but a discussion of finding a

responsive verdict when the jury agreed the State had proven its case on the

charged offense was improper.

Furthermore, the court in Kidd noted:

Additionally, in the case of State v. Campbell, 21-437 (La.App.
3 Cir. 7/13/21) (unpublished opinion) (footnote omitted), this court
ruled and stated:

WRIT GRANTED AND MADE PEREMPTORY, IN
PART; WRIT DENIED, IN PART: The defense filed a
writ application with this court seeking supervisory

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review of the trial court’s July 12, 2021, ruling limiting
the scope of voir dire concerning defense counsel’s
discussion of responsive verdicts. To the extent the
district court prohibited Defendant’s discussion both of
lesser included offenses and of compromise verdicts as
set forth under State v. Porter, 639 So.2d 1137
(La.1994), Defendant’s writ application is granted.
Defendant is allowed to discuss with the jury venire the
lesser included offenses in this case as well as the use of
those lesser included offenses to reach a compromise
verdict. Defendant is additionally allowed to ask
questions to ascertain the jury venire’s understanding
thereof.

To the extent defense counsel, in brief, seeks to
extend the scope of voir dire to include questions
regarding the venire’s attitude toward returning a
responsive verdict even though the jurors have found the
charged offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
Defendant’s writ application is denied. See State v.
Holmes, 06-2988 (La.12/2/08), 5 So.3d 42, cert.
denied, 558 U.S. 932, 130 S.Ct. 70 [175 L.Ed.2d 233]
(2009); see also, State v. Tilley, 99-569 (La. 7/6/00), 767
So.2d 6, cert. denied, 532 U.S. 959, 121 S.Ct. 1488 [149
L.Ed.2d 375] (2001).

The case is remanded to the trial court for actions
consistent with this ruling.

348 So.3d at 253.

In State v. Campbell, 21-437 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/13/21) (unpublished

opinion), this court explicitly refused to allow questioning during voir dire

regarding the jury choosing a responsive verdict, despite finding the State had

proven the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. While Defendant tries to

argue that his jury instruction was aimed at “compromise verdicts,” the wording of

the instruction makes clear Defendant sought to instruct the jury it could ignore the

fact that the State proved its case and return any verdict it wished. That is not a

valid statement of law, as evidenced by this court’s rulings in Kidd and Campbell.

As the jury instruction was not a valid statement of law, Defendant was not entitled

to have the instruction given to the jury under La.Code Crim.P. art. 807.

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In his final assignment of error, Defendant contends his sentences “are

excessive in light of the fact that Mr. Bartie is now wheelchair-bound, and in light

of the mitigating circumstances of Mr. Bartie’s PTSD and alcoholism.” Louisiana

Code of Criminal Procedure Article 881.1 provides the mechanism for preserving

the review of a sentence on appeal:

A. (1) In felony cases, within thirty days following the
imposition of sentence or within such longer period as the trial court
may set at sentence, the state or the defendant may make or file a
motion to reconsider sentence.

....

E. Failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence or to
include a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider sentence
may be based, including a claim of excessiveness, shall preclude the
state or the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence or
from urging any ground not raised in the motion on appeal or review.

Defendant failed to file a motion to reconsider sentence; therefore, his

argument regarding the impact of himself being wheelchair-bound and his history

of PTSD and alcoholism are not properly before this court. Uniform Rules—

Courts of Appeal, Rule 1-3. However, this court has often allowed defendants a

right to a bare excessiveness review of their sentence, even when they fail to urge

such a claim in the trial court; therefore, we will review the claim as a general

excessiveness claim. Louisiana courts have laid out the following guidelines

regarding excessive sentence review:

Sentences within the statutory sentencing range can be
reviewed for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Sepulvado, 367
So.2d 762 (La.1979). In State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12
(La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-
838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331, a panel of this court discussed the
review of excessive sentence claims, stating:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law
shall subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.”
To constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court
must find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or

10

that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more
than a needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v.
Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial court has
wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within the
statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as
excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d
124, writ denied, 00-0165 (La. 6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067.
The relevant question is whether the trial court abused its
broad sentencing discretion, not whether another
sentence might have been more appropriate. State v.
Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539
(1996).

Further, in reviewing the defendant’s sentences, the appellate
court should consider the nature of the crime, the nature and
background of the offender, and the sentences imposed for similar
crimes. State v. Lisotta, 98-648 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d
57 (citing State v. Telsee, 425 So.2d 1251 (La.1983)), writ denied, 99-
433 (La. 6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183. In State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4
(La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied, 03-562
(La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061, a panel of this court observed that:

While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar
crimes may provide some insight, “it is well settled that
sentences must be individualized to the particular
offender and to the particular offense committed.” State
v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991).
Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to
particularize the sentence because the trial judge
“remains in the best position to assess the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances presented by each case.”
State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957,
958[, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615 (1996)].

State v. Soileau, 13-770, 13-771, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1002,

1005-06, writ denied, 14-452 (La. 9/26/14), 149 So.3d 261.

Furthermore, in State v. Baker, 06-1218 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/18/07), 956 So.2d

83, writ denied, 07-320 (La. 11/9/07), 967 So.2d 496, and writ denied, 07-1116

(La. 12/7/07), 969 So.2d 626, this court adopted the fifth circuit’s three-factor test

from State v. Lisotta, 98-648 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d 57, writ denied,

99-433 (La. 6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183, which established that an appellate court

11

should consider the nature of the crime, the nature and background of the offender,

and the sentences imposed for similar crimes.

We note Defendant was convicted of home invasion, second degree

kidnapping, and attempted second degree kidnapping, all crimes of violence under

La.R.S. 14:2(B). Additionally, evidence introduced and published at trial indicated

Defendant had been thinking about killing his estranged wife and himself.

Based upon the PSI ordered in this case, Defendant was married to the

victim for fifteen years and that they had three sons whose ages ranged from nine

to twenty-one years old. Defendant also has another son from a prior relationship.

Defendant attended college briefly on an athletic scholarship before being

dismissed due to a fight during practice. Defendant served in the United States

Army for fifteen years prior to being honorably discharged in November of 2017.

At that time, he was considered seventy percent disabled by the military due to

hearing loss, shoulder joint pain, and depression. A diagnosis of PTSD in

November of 2019 caused his disability status to be upgraded to fully disabled. As

a result of the gunshot wound sustained by Defendant during the instant offense, he

is paralyzed from the waist down. Defendant has admitted to heavy marijuana use

prior to joining the military as well as heavy alcohol use dating back to the age of

sixteen, claiming he was drunk every time he abused his wife during their

relationship. Defendant is technically a first-felony offender despite the instant

case involving three felony crimes of violence.

Defendant’s maximum sentencing exposure was a range of one to thirty

years at hard labor for home invasion; a range of five to forty years at hard labor

for second degree kidnapping, at least two years of which must be without benefit

of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence; and a range of two-and-a-half to

twenty years at hard labor for attempted second degree kidnapping, with at least

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one year served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

Accordingly, Defendant received maximum sentences for home invasion and

attempted second degree kidnapping while his thirty-year sentence without benefits

for second degree kidnapping represents seventy-five percent of the maximum.

We note the following from State v. Jackson, 48,552, pp. 33-34 (La.App. 2

Cir. 1/29/14), 132 So.3d 516, 535, writ denied, 14-394 (La. 9/19/14), 148 So.3d

952, and writ denied, 14-412 (La. 9/26/14), 149 So.3d 260:

As a general rule, maximum or near maximum sentences are
reserved for the worst offenders and the worst offenses. State v.
Cozzetto, 2007-2031 (La.2/15/08), 974 So.2d 665; State v.
McKinney, 43,061 (La.App.2d Cir.2/13/08), 976 So.2d 802. However,
the reviewing court does not determine whether another sentence
would have been more appropriate, but whether the trial court abused
its discretion. State v. Esque, 46,515 (La.App.2d Cir.9/21/11), 73
So.3d 1021, writ denied, 2011-2347 (La.3/9/12), 84 So.3d 551.

In Jackson, the second circuit affirmed a maximum sentence of forty years at

hard labor without benefits for second degree kidnapping where the defendant had

struck the victim, his long-term romantic partner, in the head with a gun and

threatened to kill her and their children two months before the victim’s car was

found burning and she was never seen again.

The trial court specifically stated he felt maximum sentences would be

appropriate because he found the “home invasion was committed with the intent to

carry out a murder, a kidnapping, murder, and suicide.” The trial court also stated

that, under La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1, it found Defendant’s conduct constituted

deliberate cruelty to the victim, knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily

harm, used violence during the offenses, there was a significant permanent injury

to the family, and Defendant used a dangerous weapon during the commission of

the offense.

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While Defendant contends he is not the worst offender and therefore should

not be ordered to serve a maximum sentence, we note Defendant is not technically

serving the maximum to which he was exposed. While it is true that Defendant’s

sentences for home invasion and attempted second degree kidnapping are

maximum sentences for those crimes, all of his sentences are to run concurrently,

meaning the only sentence he is actually serving is his sentence for second degree

kidnapping, which is thirty years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole,

or suspension of sentence. As previously noted, the maximum for second degree

kidnapping is forty years at hard labor without benefits. Given the above and the

fact the trial court took notice of Defendant’s admission that he was planning to

murder the victim before committing suicide, we cannot say the trial court abused

its discretion in the sentences imposed on Defendant.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s convictions and sentences are

affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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