State of Louisiana v. Marcel N. Dugar

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

22-461

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

MARCEL N. DUGAR

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, DOCKET NO. 2439-21
HONORABLE CLAYTON A DAVIS, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JONATHAN W. PERRY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Candyce G. Perret, Jonathan W. Perry, and Charles
G. Fitzgerald, Judges.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Megan Harwell Bitoun
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 4252
New Orleans, Louisiana 70119
(504) 470-4779
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Marcel N. Dugar

Steven C. Dwight
District Attorney, Fourteenth Judicial District
David S. Pipes
Assistant District Attorney
901 Lakeshore Drive, Suite 800
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601
(337) 437-3400
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

PERRY, Judge.

Marcel N. Dugar (“Defendant”) appeals his convictions for unauthorized

entry of an inhabited dwelling and aggravated kidnapping of a child and the

sentences imposed in connection therewith. For the following reasons, we reverse

Defendant’s convictions and sentences, and the matter is remanded for further

proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 20, 2021, the State filed a bill of information charging Defendant

with one count of home invasion, a violation of La.R.S. 14:62.8, and one count of

aggravated kidnapping of a child, a violation of La.R.S. 14:44.2. On June 17, 2021,

Defendant appeared via audio-visual transmission while his counsel appeared in

open court. Defendant sought to represent himself, but the trial court denied the

request.

On September 21, 2021, a jury found Defendant guilty of the responsive

verdict of unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling, a violation of La.R.S. 14:62.3

on count one, and guilty of aggravated kidnapping of a child. On December 1, 2021,

Defendant was sentenced to six years at hard labor for the unauthorized entry

conviction and thirty years at hard labor for the aggravated kidnapping of a child

conviction, with the first five years of the aggravated kidnapping sentence to be

served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Further, the

trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrent to one another, but consecutive to

Defendant’s pre-existing parole for an armed robbery in another parish.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Defendant now appeals, assigning three errors, as follows:

1. There was insufficient evidence to convict [Defendant] of
aggravated kidnapping because the State’s evidence did not

establish beyond a reasonable doubt that [Defendant] had the
specific intent to “secret” the child.

2. [Defendant] was denied his constitutional right to
self-representation.

3. The sentence in this case of 30 years is unconstitutionally
excessive.

Because we find merit in Defendant’s second assigned error, requiring reversal of

his convictions and sentences, we will not consider the other errors complained of

by Defendant.1

APPELLANT’S ARGUMENT

In his second assignment of error, Defendant argues the trial court incorrectly

denied his constitutional right to self-representation. On June 17, 2021, Defendant

asked the trial court that he be permitted to represent himself. After the trial court

denied his request, Defendant noted his objection for the record.

APPELLEE’S ARGUMENT

The State’s argument is that Defendant obtained the relief he really wanted,

i.e., the removal of his original counsel. The State further alleges Defendant later

acquiesced to representation by his subsequent counsel.

DISCUSSION

Both briefs cite a Louisiana Supreme Court case that outlined the parameters

of self-representation:

An accused has the right to chose [sic] between the right to
counsel and the right to self-representation. State v. Strain, 585 So.2d
540, 542 (La.1991). An accused, however, will be held to have
forfeited the right to self-representation if he vacillates between self-
representation and representation by counsel. United States v. Bennett,
539 F.2d 45, 51 (10th Cir.1976); United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d
553 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 994, 121 S.Ct. 487, 148 L.Ed.2d
459 (2000). In light of the fundamental significance attached to the
right to counsel, the jurisprudence has engrafted a requirement that the
1
All appeals are reviewed for errors patent on the face of the record in accordance with
La.Code Crim.P. art. 920; however, because we find merit in an error assigned by Defendant which
requires reversal of his convictions and sentences, we will not discuss errors patent in this opinion.

2

assertion of the right to self-representation must be clear and
unequivocal. See 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel & Nancy J.
King, Criminal Procedure § 11.3(a)(2nd ed. 1999)(noting courts
should “ ‘indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver’ ”);
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541, 45
L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); State v. Hegwood, 345 So.2d 1179, 1181-82
(La.1977). Requests which vacillate between self-representation and
representation by counsel are equivocable [sic]. Bennett, supra.

Whether the defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and
unequivocably [sic] asserted the right to self-representation must be
determined based on the facts and circumstances of each case. See State
v. Strain, 585 So.2d 540, 542 (La.1991)(citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)).

State v. Bridgewater, 00-1529, pp. 17-18 (La. 1/15/02), 823 So.2d 877, 894, cert.

denied, 537 U.S. 1227, 123 S.Ct. 1266 (2003).

As the State observes, Defendant filed a pro se motion to have his counsel at

the time removed and to represent himself. The State contends the goal of the

motion was mainly the removal of original counsel, as opposed to a desire to

represent himself. However, the State acknowledges in passing that when the

motion was discussed in open court, original counsel had already been removed.

Our review of the record reveals Defendant clearly maintained a desire to

represent himself. At a short hearing held on June 17, 2021, Defendant was

represented by attorney Andrew Casanave. At that time, Defendant rejected the

State’s plea offer in open court and reiterated his desire to represent himself. The

following colloquy occurred:

MR. CASANAVE [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:
He also indicated to me that he’s interested in representing
himself.

THE COURT:
All right. Well, you can help Mr. Casanave, but you’re not going
to represent yourself.

DEFENDANT:
Well, Your Honor, can I object for the record?

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THE COURT:
You may, yes, sir.

DEFENDANT:
To my self-representation?

THE COURT:
Yes, you may.

DEFENDANT:
I want to state that for the record.

THE COURT:
Yes.

DEFENDANT:
What you forfeit, Your Honor, and you told me I would be able
to discuss it with you on my next court date.

THE COURT:
Yes, sir.

DEFENDANT:
Well, you already denied it, so I just wanted to make the
objection for the record.

THE COURT:
Yes, sir. Thank you.

MR. [BOBBY] HOLMES [ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY]:
Judge, the Court has two upcoming trial dates the September
20th and the October 4th dates, but I see the Court has a conference on
the 4th of October. It says Supreme Court Fall Conference. Are you
going to that?

THE COURT:
No. Hang on. First of all, I have a special date for CAT, SCA,
and domestic violence on July 6th.

MR. HOLMES:
Yes, sir. Then I think you’re trying a murder on the 12th of July.

THE COURT:
And we’re trying a murder on the 12th.

MR. HOLMES:
Yes, sir, Judge.

THE COURT:
So would this fall on - - which category would this fall in?

4

MR. HOLMES:
Your regular division, so it would be your second week. So if
we want to do the September 20th, Judge, we could set it for that date.

THE COURT:
Yes, sir, September 20th.

....

DEFENDANT:
September what, sir?

MR. CASANAVE:
Twenty.

THE COURT:
Twentieth.

DEFENDANT:
September 20th. Your Honor, is there any kind of way that I
could get you to reconsider for my motion because I haven’t received
any paperwork. This was the original, my argument, and nobody is
sending me a copy of anything to aide [sic] in my defense. I’m not able
to do anything.

Now today you done telling me that I’m not even able to
represent myself; and I know real clear that I have a Constitutional right
and I’m adequate and I have enough education to do it. I have the
experience.

I done been through this before; so I’m not seeing why I’m being
denied unjustly and without reason.

MR CASANAVE:
Your Honor, I will arrange to forward all his printed discovery
and if we could arrange for Mr. Dugar to be transported back to
Calcasieu at some reasonably soon date, I’ll be happy to go over any
audio and video.

THE COURT:
Well, you can put that in writing and request it and I will sign it.

Thus, the hearing arguably resulted in a hybrid-representation situation. We find it

is clear that at this point, Defendant had not acquiesced to hybrid representation, as

he had unequivocally asserted his right to self-representation. Further, the trial court

erred by failing to assess Defendant’s request to represent himself:

5

In Faretta, the United States Supreme Court recognized that a
trial court may not force a lawyer upon a defendant when the defendant
insists he wants to conduct his own defense and voluntarily and
intelligently elects to proceed without counsel. However, he must ask
clearly and unequivocally to proceed pro se and he must also make his
request in a timely manner. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541.
Further, a defendant must be made aware of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation so that the record demonstrates
that “ ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with his eyes
open.’ ” Id, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 (quoting Adams v. United
States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 242, 87 L.Ed.
268 (1942)). Faretta made clear that the accused’s “technical legal
knowledge, as such, [is] not relevant to an assessment of his knowing
exercise of the right to defend himself.” Id., 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct.
at 2541. In State v. Santos, this Court held that where a trial judge is
confronted with an accused’s unequivocal request to represent himself,
the judge need determine only whether the accused is competent to
waive counsel and is “voluntarily exercising his informed free will.”
State v. Santos, 99-1897, p. 3 (La.9/15/00), 770 So.2d 319, 321 (quoting
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541).

State v. Brown, 03-897, pp. 28-29 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So.2d 1, 22, cert. denied, 547

U.S. 1022, 126 S.Ct. 1569 (2006).

The trial court’s minutes indicate that when Defendant appeared for

arraignment on February 22, 2021, he was represented by Joshua Monroe. On

March 11, 2021, Defendant filed his written pro se motion to strike counsel. The

lawyer’s name is marked out in the record. Defendant’s oral request to represent

himself, already mentioned, took place on June 17, 2021. Anthony Casanave

represented Defendant at that hearing. In a letter to Defendant dated March 31, 2021,

the court mentioned the motion to strike and stated that Ralph Williams was

Defendant’s counsel. Passages from the voir dire examination indicated that

Williams, Casanave, and Bradley Rasile all represented Defendant. All three are

public defenders in Calcasieu Parish. Thus, when the trial court ordered that he act

as co-counsel with Casanave, it was effectively ordered that he act as co-counsel

with all of his assigned public defenders. Therefore, the State’s implication that

Defendant’s interactions with Williams and Rasile showed acquiescence to their

6

representation of him appears to be incorrect. We observe that when Defendant filed

a pro se motion for a preliminary examination on June 24, 2021, he identified himself

as “named defendant and co-counsel.” We do not find this demonstrates

acquiescence, as Defendant filed it only a week after the court refused to allow him

to represent himself.

It is true that Defendant consulted with trial counsel before electing not to

testify on his own behalf. However, we find such consultation is not inconsistent

with a co-counsel situation and, thus, does not indicate acquiescence.

Our survey of the jurisprudence has revealed no case on point. Other than

Bridgewater, a number of cases Defendant cites simply reiterate the general outlines

of self-representation law. He suggests that State v. Murray, 19-1092 (La.App. 1

Cir. 5/11/20), 303 So.3d 655 is analogous; however, the defendant in Murray

represented himself at trial and complained afterward that he should not have been

allowed to do so. Thus, the defendant in Murray was in an opposite situation from

Defendant herein.

Defendant also cites State v. Batchelor, 35,478 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/10/02), 823

So.2d 367, writ denied, 02-2247 (La. 3/14/03), 839 So.2d 32, as an analogous case.

The original majority opinion does appear to be analogous. However, on rehearing

a majority of the panel denied relief, finding that the defendant had vacillated

regarding the assertion of his right to self-representation and held the trial court

correctly required him to proceed to trial with an attorney. Id.

The State’s brief also fails to provide any analogous cases. Nonetheless, it

acknowledges that an improper denial of a defendant’s right to self-representation is

not subject to a harmless error analysis, citing State v. Santos, 99-1897 (La. 9/15/00),

770 So.2d 319.

7

As stated earlier, the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s assertion of his right

to represent himself was not executed properly. Further, Defendant’s assertion was

clear and unequivocal, and he contemporaneously objected to the court’s ruling

against him. Also, we note Defendant asserted his right to self-representation

months ahead of trial, so it does not appear to have been a mere dilatory tactic.2 The

case now turns on whether Defendant’s subsequent actions indicate that he impliedly

acquiesced to being represented by counsel. We find his actions did not, even though

it appears that Defendant never re-asserted his right after the initial denial, and he

apparently consulted with trial counsel about the issue of whether he should testify

on his own behalf. However, we find this lay defendant could logically have

concluded that any reassertion of his right to self-representation would be fruitless.

In the present case, the trial court’s ruling was clear in that it was not going to

allow Defendant to represent himself. This conclusion suggests the convictions and

sentences should be reversed. Discussing a case in which a trial court and a court of

appeal had incorrectly assessed a defendant’s competence to waive his right to

counsel and represent himself, the supreme court stated:

In the present case, . . . he asserted his right of self-representation
unequivocally and under circumstances which precluded a finding that
he was simply engaged in dilatory tactics. Other alternatives short of
denying relator his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation
remained open to the trial court concerned about maintaining the
fairness of the proceedings. Although relator specifically requested
discharge of his court appointed counsel, the trial court could have
assigned the attorney or another attorney as stand-by counsel to aid
relator, even over relator’s objections, or to resume representation of
relator if circumstances required the court to terminate his right of self-
representation. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834, n. 46, 95 S.Ct. at 2541; see
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 187, 104 S.Ct. 944, 956, 79
L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (stand-by counsel may participate in the trial as
long as he does not “seriously undermin[e the defendant’s] appearance
before the jury in the status of one representing himself.”).

2
Motion for self-representation or for substitution of counsel not made until trial or shortly
before trial are generally viewed by Louisiana court as dilatory tactics. See, e.g., State v. Hegwood,
345 So.2d 1179 (La.1977).

8

The trial court therefore erred in denying relator his Sixth
Amendment right to self-representation and the error is not subject to
harmless-error analysis. Wiggins, 465 U.S. at 177, n. 8, 104 S.Ct. at
950 (“Since the right of self-representation is a right that when
exercised usually increases the likelihood of a trial outcome
unfavorable to the defendant, its denial is not amenable to ‘harmless
error’ analysis. The right is either respected or denied; its deprivation
cannot be harmless.”).

Accordingly, relator’s conviction and sentence are reversed and
this case is remanded to the district court for all proceedings consistent
with the views expressed herein.

Santos, 770 So.2d at 321-22. Although Santos allows for the appointment of standby

counsel, we find the trial court in the present case appointed Defendant as co-counsel

to his appointed attorneys, which is a different magnitude of representation.

In light of Santos, we find the trial court erred by denying Defendant his Sixth

Amendment right to self-representation. Thus, we find Defendant’s convictions and

sentences should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. In addition, this

conclusion renders it unnecessary to consider the other errors assigned by Defendant

or errors patent on the face of the record.

DECREE

Defendant’s convictions and sentences are reversed, and the matter is

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

9