State of Louisiana v. Brandon Chase Gee

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

22-486

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

BRANDON CHASE GEE

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 15610-17
HONORABLE KENDRICK J. GUIDRY, DISTRICT JUDGE

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SHARON DARVILLE WILSON
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Billy Howard Ezell, and Sharon Darville
Wilson, Judges.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

Peggy J. Sullivan
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 1481
Monroe, LA 71201-1481
(318) 855-6038
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Brandon Chase Gee

Hon. Stephen C. Dwight
14th JDC District Attorney
John Eric Turner
Assistant District Attorney
901 Lakeshore Drive, Suite 800
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 437-3400
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

WILSON, Judge.

A jury found Defendant, Brandon Chase Gee, guilty of aggravated

second degree battery, a violation of La.R.S. 14:34.7. Mr. Gee appealed and this

court affirmed his conviction but vacated the sentence. Upon resentencing, Mr. Gee

was sentenced to eight years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or

suspension of sentence. Mr. Gee now appeals. For the reasons expressed below, we

amend the sentence and affirm as amended.

I.

ISSUES

In this appeal we must decide:

(1) whether the denial of parole, probation, or
suspension of sentence in this matter constitutes
error patent requiring this court to correct the
sentence on appeal; and

(2) whether the trial court erred in denying the
motion to reconsider sentence.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following facts were set forth in the opinion rendered by this court

in Mr. Gee’s original appeal:

On June 15, 2017, Cheryl Gee-Finley returned
home from work at around 11:00 p.m. and removed some
items from her truck, including a table leg and some
garbage bags. Later that night, Defendant, who lived with
her, returned home. Sometime after Defendant returned
home, an altercation took place between Ms. Finley and
Defendant which left Ms. Finley severely injured and
serves as the basis for Defendant’s aggravated second
degree battery charge. The circumstances surrounding the
altercation were disputed at trial.

Ms. Finley testified that she and Defendant argued
about the garbage bags she had brought in. Ms. Finley

testified that later in the night she played scratch offs and
had a winning ticket. She testified that she remembered
beginning to leave to cash in the scratch off ticket, but then
she woke up on the ground with severe injuries and the last
thing she remembered was reaching for her keys.

Defendant stated that his mother was suffering from
delusions which were becoming dangerous. Defendant
claims that when he returned home on the night in
question, his mother began banging on the door to his
bedroom demanding to know where her trash bags were.
Defendant then stated that the last thing he can remember
is her coming at him with a knife and “the big stick with
the screw hanging out of it,” asserting he blacked out when
his life was threatened. After being attacked, Defendant
stated his next memory was holding his bleeding arm,
unaware of the location of the guitar that he had previously
been holding. When later questioned and confronted with
pictures of his mother’s injuries, Defendant claimed she
came at him with a knife and he kept her at bay with his
guitar.

The table leg that Ms. Finley had brought home that
night was found in the living room, although Ms. Finley
was adamant that she had brought it to her bedroom that
night. A knife was also found on the floor next to Ms.
Finley, although she stated that she had no idea how it
ended up next to her.

Defendant was found to have three cuts on his arm
after the night in question. Yolanda Charles, a paramedic
who looked at Defendant’s injuries, noted Defendant had
three shallow lacerations to the center of his left forearm
and stated Defendant told her he was cut with a kitchen
knife. Ms. Charles testified the cuts did not appear to be
defensive wounds, noting there were three cuts in a row
with no other marks on his arm.

Dr. Patrick Hayes testified that his interviews and
review of medical records led him to the conclusion that
Defendant understood the difference between right and
wrong on June 16, 2017. He noted there was no evidence
of any “serious persistent mental illness” in the days and
months leading up to the incident. He also noted there was
no evidence that on the night of the incident Defendant
“was disorganized, catatonic, delusional[, or] manic.” Dr.
Hayes testified Defendant had schizotypal personality
disorder, which he characterized as “schizophrenia-like, or
schizophrenia-light.”

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State v. Gee, 20-217 pp. 3-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/10/21) (unpublished opinion).

On April 10, 2019, the jury found Mr. Gee guilty as charged. On June

12, 2019, Mr. Gee filed a motion for new trial and the motion was denied the same

day. The sentencing hearing was held June 17, 2019.

At the outset of the sentencing hearing, Defendant
declared that he had fired trial counsel and that she was no
longer his attorney. The trial court, without any inquiry
into Defendant’s competency to represent himself, his
educational background, or any other relevant
information, released trial counsel and allowed Defendant
to represent himself at sentencing. Defendant proceeded to
accuse trial counsel of intentionally sabotaging his case
and actively helping the prosecution, declared that every
part of the Calcasieu Parish justice system was corrupt,
and stated he had been wrongfully convicted and
conspired against. The trial court, after stating it was
“disappointed and taken aback” by Defendant’s lack of
remorse, sentenced Defendant to eight years at hard labor
and ordered that the first year be served without the benefit
of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence after the
State indicated the statute required the one-year restriction
on benefits.

Id. at p. 2. Mr. Gee appealed his sentence to this court.

In its error patent review, this court found that although the court

minutes and commitment order reflect that the sentence was ordered to be served in

the Department of Corrections, the sentencing transcript did not so indicate. Thus,

the trial court imposed an indeterminate sentence because it failed to specify whether

the eight-year sentence was to be served with or without hard labor. Additionally,

this court found that the trial court erred in allowing Mr. Gee to represent himself at

sentencing without discussing the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se.

Mr. Gee’s conviction was affirmed, and his sentence was vacated and remanded for

resentencing.

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On March 16, 2021, the case was randomly allotted to another division

of the trial court. On January 10, 2022, the trial court appointed the Public

Defender’s Office to represent Mr. Gee. On February 23, 2022, the new trial judge,

Judge Kendrick J. Guidry, sentenced Mr. Gee to eight years at hard labor, without

benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Mr. Gee’s counsel objected

to the sentence, and the trial court noted the objection. On April 1, 2022, defense

counsel filed a motion to reconsider sentence which was denied by the trial court.

Mr. Gee now appeals asserting two assignments of error.

III.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed

for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find there

is one error patent. Since the error patent has been assigned as error, we will address

it as such.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

In his first assignment of error, Mr. Gee asserts that the trial court

erroneously imposed his sentence without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension

of sentence. In his second assignment of error, Mr. Gee asserts that the trial court

erred in denying the motion to reconsider sentence. Since the motion to reconsider

sentence reiterated Mr. Gee’s objection to the imposition of sentence without

benefits, the two assignments of error will be addressed together.

Mr. Gee asks this court to modify the sentence imposed by deleting the

provision of the sentence stating that the sentence must be served without benefits.

The State concedes that under the facts of this case, La.R.S. 14:34.7 does not

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authorize the restriction of parole. The State asserts that because the trial court

properly imposed the sentence without benefit of probation and suspension, this

court should delete the parole restriction only. After reviewing the applicable law

and facts of this case, we agree and find that the parole restriction should be deleted.

At the February 23, 2022 resentencing hearing, the State informed the

trial court that it was not seeking more than the original sentence of eight years. The

trial court stated that it was inclined to correct the deficiency in the sentence and

reimpose a sentence of eight years. After defense counsel argued for a more lenient

sentence, the trial court stated the following:

As I appreciate the assignment from the Court of
Appeal, it was to correct some deficiencies in the
sentencing. We’ve corrected one in appointing Mr.
Richard to represent Mr. Gee in this sentencing; and then
to impose the correct sentence.

Mr. Gee was convicted by a jury [after] presenting
his defense. They apparently did not believe his defense.
The Court will not substitute its judgment just reading
from the sentencing transcript and all of the jury.

The Court also, although I’m to resentence him, I
appreciate Judge Bradberry had a better command of the
facts; was present, obviously for the jury trial; listened to
argument; and imposed the sentence he imposed. So I will
impose the same sentence, eight years Department of
Corrections at hard labor, and to be served without benefit
of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

Defense counsel immediately informed the trial court that the statute

did not allow the sentence to be imposed without benefits. In response to the trial

court’s assertion that at least one year must be without benefit, the State noted:

At least one must be served without benefit if the
offender knew or should have known that the victim as a
member of the armed forces or a disabled Veteran.

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So that would not – I would submit to the Court Ms.
Finley was not a disabled Veteran or an active member of
the armed services.

Despite the arguments of counsel, the trial court maintained the

sentence as eight years without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of

sentence. The trial court explained that it was imposing the sentence without benefit

based on the seriousness of the offense and the cruelty inflicted upon the victim.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:34.7 provides, in pertinent part

(emphasis added):

C. Whoever commits the crime of second degree
battery shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars
or imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more
than eight years, or both. At least eighteen months of the
sentence imposed shall be served without benefit of parole,
probation, or suspension of sentence if the offender knew
or should have known that the victim is an active member
of the United States Armed Forces or is a disabled veteran
and the second degree battery was committed because of
that status.

The victim in the present case was not an active member of the United

States Armed Forces or a disabled veteran. Thus, the above penalty provision did

not prohibit parole, probation, or suspension of sentence in this case. Although the

State concedes that this provision did not apply to Mr. Gee, the State contends that

this court should only strike the denial of parole. In support of this contention, the

State cites this court’s decision in State v. Mayfield, 18-420 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/18),

261 So.3d 101, 103–04, writ denied, 19-0046 (La. 5/28/19), 273 So.3d 316.

In Mayfield, the defendant was sentenced without benefit of probation,

parole, or suspension of sentence for the crime of manslaughter. This court held:

First, the trial court erred in ordering that
Defendant’s manslaughter sentence be served without the
benefit of parole. For manslaughter, Defendant was
sentenced to forty years without the benefit of parole,

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probation, or suspension of sentence. Louisiana Revised
Statutes 14:31 provides:

B. Whoever commits manslaughter shall be
imprisoned at hard labor for not more than forty
years. However, if the victim killed was under the
age of ten years, the offender shall be imprisoned at
hard labor, without benefit of probation or
suspension of sentence, for not less than ten years
nor more than forty years.

Thus, the above penalty provision does not prohibit
parole, probation, or suspension of sentence in this case.
However, at the time the offense was committed, La.Code
Crim.P. art. 893(A) prohibited a suspended sentence for an
offense designated as a crime of violence in La.R.S.
14:2(B), which included the crime of manslaughter.
Therefore, the trial court properly imposed Defendant’s
manslaughter sentence without the benefit of probation or
suspension of sentence. But, because La.Code Crim.P. art.
893 did not authorize the restriction of parole, the trial
court erred in ordering Defendant’s manslaughter sentence
to be served without the benefit of parole. Accordingly,
this court amends Defendant’s manslaughter sentence to
delete the denial of parole eligibility and instructs the
district court to make an entry in the minutes reflecting this
change. State v. Batiste, 09-521 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/9/09),
25 So.3d 981.

Id. at 103-104.

Just as in Mayfield, at the time of the offense in the present case,

La.Code Crim.P. art 893(A) provided, in pertinent part, that “[t]he court shall not

suspend the sentence of a conviction for an offense that is designated in the court

minutes as a crime of violence pursuant to Article 890.3[.]” Louisiana Code of

Criminal Procedure Article 890.3 includes an enumerated lists of crimes that must

be designated as a crime of violence as a matter of law. Aggravated second degree

battery is included in the list as a crime of violence. La.Code Crim.P. art.

890.3(C)(18). Therefore, the trial court properly imposed Mr. Gee’s sentence

without benefit of probation or parole.

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However, as noted in Mayfield, Article 893 does not mention a

restriction on parole eligibility. Thus, the trial court erred in ordering Mr. Gee to

serve his sentence without the benefit of parole. We find that Mr. Gee’s assignments

of error have merit. Accordingly, we amend Mr. Gee’s sentence to delete the denial

of parole eligibility and instruct the trial court to make an entry in the minutes

reflecting this change.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we find the trial court did commit legal error

in imposing Mr. Gee’s sentence without the benefit of parole. The sentence is

amended to delete the denial of parole eligibility, and the trial court is instructed to

make an entry in the minutes reflecting this change. Mr. Gee’s sentence is affirmed

as amended.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

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