State of Louisiana v. Earl James Darby

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

22-617

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

EARL JAMES DARBY

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. CR 164003
HONORABLE MARILYN CARR CASTLE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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SHARON DARVILLE WILSON
JUDGE

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Court composed of Shannon J. Gremillion, Candyce G. Perret, and Sharon Darville
Wilson, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Hon. Donald D. Landry, District Attorney
Kenneth P. Hebert, Assistant District Attorney
15th Judicial District Court
800 S. Buchanan Street
Lafayette, LA 70502
(337) 232-5170
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Peggy J. Sullivan
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 1481
Monroe, LA 71201
(318) 855-6038
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Earl James Darby

WILSON, Judge.

Defendant, Earl James Darby, pled guilty to manslaughter, in violation

of La.R.S. 14:31, and was sentenced to twenty-five years at hard labor and ordered

to pay $150 for the cost of the presentence investigation. He now appeals his

sentence, asserting that it is constitutionally excessive. For the following reasons,

we affirm Mr. Darby’s sentence.

I.

ISSUES

In this appeal we must decide:

(1) whether the sentence imposed is constitutionally
harsh and excessive given the facts of the offense
and Mr. Darby’s personal history; and

(2) whether considering the excessive nature of the
sentence is this case, the trial court erred in
denying the motion to reconsider sentence.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 2, 2017, while Mr. Darby was working the night shift at

Subway, he attempted to get in touch with his live-in girlfriend, Lauren Rentrop, to

see if his sick son needed medicine. After getting no response from Ms. Rentrop,

Mr. Darby left work to check on his son. Upon arriving at his residence, Mr. Darby

walked in and observed Ms. Rentrop on the ground, naked, and a naked man ran

towards the back of the house. Mr. Darby shot and killed Jacobie Boudreaux as Mr.

Boudreaux attempted to jump over the couch. After the shooting, Mr. Darby made

Ms. Rentrop help him clean up and he took the body to the dumpster at Subway

before going back to work.

On November 8, 2017, Mr. Darby was charged by bill of information

with second degree murder, in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1, obstruction of justice,

in violation of La.R.S. 14: 130.1, and intimidating a witness, in violation of La.R.S.

14:1291(a). On April 7, 2022, Mr. Darby pled guilty to manslaughter, in violation

of La.R.S. 14:31. The trial court ordered a presentence investigation. On July 15,

2022, Mr. Darby was sentenced to twenty-five years at hard labor and ordered to pay

$150 for the cost of the presentence investigation. The court informed Mr. Darby

that his sentence was not enhanced nor was he billed as a habitual offender. On July

28, 2022, Mr. Darby filed a motion to reconsider sentence with the trial court. He

asserted his sentence is constitutionally excessive because the trial court did not

adequately weigh and consider the mitigating factors in the case. The trial court

subsequently denied the motion without a hearing, and Mr. Darby filed a motion for

appeal on July 28, 2022, seeking a review of the imposed sentence.

III.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed

for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find that

there are no errors patent.

EXCESSIVE SENTENCE

On appeal, Mr. Darby asserts two assignments of error regarding the

excessiveness of his sentence. We will address both assignments together. Mr.

Darby contends that his sentence is excessive because the trial court did not

adequately weigh and consider the mitigating factors in this case. Specifically, he

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points to the fact that he was a first-felony offender with significant community

support, an excellent work history, and children for whom he was providing.

The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences within

the statutory limits, and a sentence should not be set aside as excessive absent a

manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Williams, 03-3514, p. 14 (La. 12/13/04), 893

So.2d 7, 16. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 894.1 lays out the

sentencing guidelines. The purpose of the guidelines is to provide for the trial court’s

articulation of a factual basis for a sentence, not a rigid or mechanical compliance

with its provisions. State v. Bell, 53,712 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21), 310 So.3d 307.

“While the trial judge need not articulate every aggravating and mitigating

circumstance outlined in art. 894.1, the record must reflect that he adequately

considered these guidelines in particularizing the sentence to the defendant.” State

v. Smith, 433 So.2d 688, 698 (La.1983). However, “[t]here is no requirement that

specific matters be given any particular weight at sentencing.” State v. Brown,

51,352, p. 22 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/2/17), 223 So.3d 88, 103, writ denied, 17-1154 (La.

5/11/18), 241 So.3d 1013.

The trial court allowed Mr. Darby to submit several letters in

mitigation, and the trial court heard testimony from Mr. Darby’s family and former

employers, who testified to his character, upbringing, and work ethic. The victim’s

family was then allowed to present impact statements, and those family members

requested the maximum sentence of forty years. In imposing the twenty-five year

sentence, the trial court specifically referenced the factors of article 894.1. The court

noted that Mr. Darby was gainfully employed, had a good work record, and was

supporting his family prior to the offense. The trial court also acknowledged that

Mr. Darby had a sad upbringing, acted on some provocation, and was remorseful.

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However, the trial court also noted Mr. Darby stood convicted of killing another,

that this was a crime of violence using a firearm, the manner in which the firearm

was used put others at risk, he initially attempted to cover up the crime, and his

actions had a significant impact on the victim’s family and Mr. Darby’s own family.

It is clear that the trial court adequately considered both aggravating and mitigating

circumstances. This consideration is reflected in Mr. Darby’s sentence of twenty-

five years out of a possible forty.

Louisiana courts have laid out the following guidelines regarding

excessive sentence review:

Sentences within the statutory sentencing range can
be reviewed for constitutional excessiveness. State v.
Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La.1979). In State v. Barling,
00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779
So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La.2/1/02), 808
So.2d 331, a panel of this court discussed the review of
excessive sentence claims, stating:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o
law shall subject any person to cruel or
unusual punishment.” To constitute an
excessive sentence, the reviewing court must
find the penalty so grossly disproportionate
to the severity of the crime as to shock our
sense of justice or that the sentence makes no
measurable contribution to acceptable penal
goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a
needless imposition of pain and suffering.
State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981).
The trial court has wide discretion in the
imposition of sentence within the statutory
limits and such sentence shall not be set aside
as excessive absent a manifest abuse of
discretion. State v. Etienne, 99-192 (La.App.
3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124, writ denied,
00-0165 (La.6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The
relevant question is whether the trial court
abused its broad sentencing discretion, not
whether another sentence might have been
more appropriate. State v. Cook, 95-2784

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(La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied,
519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d
539 (1996).

Further, in reviewing the defendant’s sentences, the
appellate court should consider the nature of the crime, the
nature and background of the offender, and the sentences
imposed for similar crimes. State v. Lisotta, 98-648
(La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d 57 (citing State v.
Telsee, 425 So.2d 1251 (La.1983)), writ denied, 99-433
(La.6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183. In State v. Smith, 02-719, p.
4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ
denied, 03-562 (La.5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061, a panel of
this court observed that:

While a comparison of sentences imposed for
similar crimes may provide some insight, “it
is well settled that sentences must be
individualized to the particular offender and
to the particular offense committed.” State v.
Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991).
Additionally, it is within the purview of the
trial court to particularize the sentence
because the trial judge “remains in the best
position to assess the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances presented by each
case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96);
674 So.2d 957, 958[, cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1043, 117 S.Ct. 615 (1996)].
State v. Soileau, 13-770, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1002, 1005-06,

writ denied, 14-0452 (La. 9/26/14), 149 So.3d 261.

Furthermore, this court adopted the fifth circuit’s three-factor test from

Lisotta in State v. Baker, 06-1218 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/18/07), 956 So.2d 83, writ

denied, 07-320 (La. 11/9/07), 967 So.2d 496, and writ denied, 07-1116 (La. 12/7/07),

969 So.2d 626.

Viewing the reasons for sentencing in light of the three factors, we

cannot say Mr. Darby’s sentence was excessive. Looking first to the nature of the

crime, we note that Mr. Darby pled guilty to manslaughter. Under La.R.S. 14:31,

the penalty for manslaughter is imprisonment at hard labor for not more than forty

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years. This was a crime of violence involving the use of a deadly weapon, which

resulted in the killing of Jacobie Boudreaux.

As to the nature and background of the offender, the trial court noted

that it had reviewed the presentence investigation report, and Mr. Darby confirmed

that he did not have any prior felony convictions. Brandi Dennis testified that Mr.

Darby worked for her family for several years, and she has been knowing him for

about fifteen years. Ms. Dennis stated that Mr. Darby had also worked for her

husband in a lawn service business and would fill in as needed in the construction

company. She confirmed that Mr. Darby was a reliable employee, she did not know

him to be a violent person, and she would hire him again if he received a shorter

sentence. Ms. Dennis further stated that she submitted a letter to the court attesting

to Mr. Darby’s work ethic.

Mr. Darby’s older sister, Shantelle Onezime, stated that she and Mr.

Darby grew up in foster homes and that they were separated from the rest of their

siblings. She confirmed that there were problems with Mr. Darby in the foster care

system, and in one instance, he was attacked and left behind. Ms. Onezime also

confirmed that Ms. Darby is a helpful family-oriented man. Another sister of Mr.

Darby, Mendrell Darby, testified that her brother is a loving person who helps out

everywhere he goes. Mr. Darby took to the stand and apologized to the family of

the victim for the pain and suffering he caused, and he asked for forgiveness. He

stated he received counseling, and he asked for a second chance. The trial court

considered these facts as mitigating factors.

The final factor in the Baker analysis is a comparison of the sentences

imposed for similar crimes. In State v. Parker, 54,190 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/9/22), 335

So.3d 519, the second circuit affirmed the defendant’s thirty-six-year sentence for

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manslaughter. In Parker, the second circuit noted that the defendant chose to

become extremely intoxicated and chose to shoot his longtime friend in the head for

no apparent reason. The defendant then failed to call 911 or render any aid to his

dying friend; instead, the defendant attempted to make it look like the victim

committed suicide. The defendant lied about how the shooting occurred and

intentionally tried to avoid responsibility for his actions. The second circuit further

noted that the defendant was originally charged with second degree murder but

received a substantial benefit from his favorable plea agreement. The second circuit

indicated the trial court considered relevant aggravating and mitigating factors

before imposing sentence.

In State v. Osborn, 13-697 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/11/13), 127 So.3d 1087,

the defendant was initially charged with second degree murder, but he pled guilty to

manslaughter and was sentenced to thirty years. The trial court found that although

the defendant was not a participant in a fight between several individuals, the

defendant nonetheless intentionally went to a nearby vehicle to retrieve a gun and

fired it, resulting in the death of the victim. In affirming the sentence, this court

noted that: the trial court heard victim impact statements, the trial court discussed

the nature of the offense, the defendant’s background, and several factors including

provocation and the likelihood that the defendant’s actions would recur.

In State v. Rouser, 14-613 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/7/15), 158 So.3d 860, the

defendant was originally charged with second degree murder and two counts of

attempted second degree murder, but the defendant was found guilty of the

responsive verdicts of manslaughter and two counts of attempted manslaughter. The

defendant was later sentenced to thirty years at hard labor for manslaughter and

fifteen years at hard labor on counts two and three. The sentences were ordered to

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be served concurrently. The fourth circuit noted there was a fatal shooting at a tire

shop as a result of an ongoing disagreement between the defendant’s brother and

another individual. There was a verbal disagreement and multiple physical

altercations before the defendant removed a gun from his vehicle and began

shooting. One person sustained fatal gunshot wounds while two other individuals

sustained non-fatal injuries. In affirming the sentence, the fourth circuit noted the

following: that the defendant was thirty-seven years old with no previous

convictions; that the trial court adequately considered the sentencing guidelines and

articulated a factual basis; three letters on behalf of the defendant and well as a letter

from the decedent’s wife were submitted into the record; and that the trial court noted

the victim had been shot six times.

Mr. Darby’s sentence is in line with and comparable to sentences in

other cases. Additionally, Mr. Darby was originally charged with second degree

murder, obstruction of justice, and intimidating a witness, but through his plea deal,

he received a significant reduction in criminal penalties. In light of the above factors

and the trial court’s wide discretion in imposing a sentence within the statutory

limits, we find that Mr. Darby’s twenty-five year sentence is not so grossly

disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice, nor is

it a needless imposition of pain and suffering. The trial court did not manifestly

abuse its discretion when sentencing Mr. Darby and did not err in denying his motion

to reconsider sentence on the grounds of excessiveness.

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V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we find the twenty-five year sentence for

manslaughter is not excessive. Accordingly, this court affirms the conviction and

sentence of Defendant, Earl James Darby.

AFFIRMED.

THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Rule 2-16.3 Uniform Rules, Court of Appeal.

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