State of Louisiana v. Marvin Watson

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

23-18 consolidated with 23-19

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

MARVIN WATSON

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APPEAL FROM THE
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CONCORDIA, NO. 19-2158 & 19-2159 Div. “B”
HONORABLE JOHN C. REEVES, DISTRICT JUDGE

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SHARON DARVILLE WILSON
JUDGE

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Court composed of Shannon J. Gremillion, Van H. Kyzar, and Sharon Darville
Wilson, Judges.
AFFIRMED.

Hon. Bradley R. Burget, District Attorney
Joseph Anthony Boothe, Assistant District Attorney
Seventh Judicial District Court – Concordia Parish
4001 Carter Street, Suite #9
Vidalia, LA 71373
(318) 336-5526
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Prentice Lang White
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 74385
Baton Rouge, LA 70874
(225) 235-2928
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Marvin Watson

Marvin Watson
Louisiana State Penitentiary
17544 Tunica Trace
Angola, La 70712
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Marvin Watson

WILSON, Judge.

In these consolidated cases, a jury found Defendant, Marvin Watson,

guilty of two counts of first-degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:30. Mr. Watson

filed a pro se Motion for New Trial wherein he alleged there was purposeful

discrimination in the selection of the jury. The motion was heard and denied. Mr.

Watson waived the sentencing delays and was sentenced to two consecutive terms

of life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or

suspension of sentence. Mr. Watson now appeals the judgment of the trial court.

For the following reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentences.

I.

ISSUES

We must decide:

(1) whether the state presented evidence sufficient to
establish that the shootings were not in self-defense;
and

(2) whether the trial court erred in denying Mr.
Watson’s pretrial motion for change of venue.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At 12:33 a.m. on July 30, 2019, officers from the Concordia Parish

Sheriff’s Office were dispatched to 211 Anderson Road in Clayton, Louisiana, to

respond to a 911 call made by DeMarcus McCoy. DeMarcus told the 911 operator

that he had arrived home to find his mother, Megan McCoy Watson, and his twelve-

year-old brother, LaFrederick McCoy, unresponsive. He further advised that Mr.

Watson, Megan’s husband, was not home. Upon their arrival, officers found the

victims lying dead on the kitchen floor. Based on the amount of blood and apparent

gunshot wounds, it appeared the victims had been shot to death. Officers were

informed that at approximately 12:55 a.m., Mr. Watson surrendered himself to the

Adams County Sheriff’s Office in Natchez, Mississippi, where he also surrendered

two firearms: and American Tactical rifle (“AR-15”) and a Ruger .22 pistol (pistol).

Mr. Watson was later charged with one count of first-degree murder of LaFrederick

under trial court docket number 19-2158, and an additional count of first-degree

murder of Megan under trial court docket number 19-2159. On February 12, 2020,

defense counsel filed a Motion to Recuse the district attorney’s office, arguing the

district attorney could not be fair and impartial because an investigator in their office

was related to the victims. The trial court denied the motion on March 10, 2020.

Mr. Watson filed a pro se Motion to Recuse the district attorney’s office on

September 28, 2020, and a pro se Motion to Recuse the trial judge on October 9,

2020. Both motions were denied.

On April 12, 2021, the State consolidated the charges for trial, and jury

selection commenced. Following a four-day trial, the jury unanimously found Mr.

Watson guilty as charged on both counts. On April 19, 2021, Mr. Watson filed a

pro se Motion for New Trial wherein he alleged there was purposeful discrimination

in the selection of the jury in his case. On April 28, 2021, the trial court held a

hearing on the motion. After the trial court denied the motion, Mr. Watson waived

the sentencing delays and was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life

imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension

of sentence. Mr. Watson is now before this court asserting two assignments of error.

III.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

ERRORS PATENT

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In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed

for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find there

are no errors patent, but the minutes of sentencing need correction. Although the

transcript indicates that the trial court ordered the two life sentences to be served

consecutively, the minutes fail to state such. “[I]t is well settled that when the

minutes and the transcript conflict, the transcript prevails.” State v. Wommack, 00-

137, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/00), 770 So.2d 365, 369, writ denied, 00-2051 (La.

9/21/01), 797 So.2d 62. Accordingly, we instruct the trial court to amend the court

minutes to correctly reflect that the trial court ordered the two life sentences to be

served consecutively.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his first assignment of error, Mr. Watson alleges the evidence was

insufficient to support his first-degree murder convictions.

The general analysis for insufficiency of the evidence claims is well-

established:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on
appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444
U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex
rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State
v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393
So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to
weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and
therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the
credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the
sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of
review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559
(citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In
order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the
record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of
proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.

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State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

Moreover, when reviewing cases relying on circumstantial evidence, this

court has stated the following:

When the conviction is based upon circumstantial
evidence, La.R.S. 15:438 provides that the state “must
exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence” in
order to convict. State v. Camp, 446 So.2d 1207, 1209
(La.1984). “Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of
collateral facts and circumstances from which elemental
factors may be inferred according to reason, experience
and common sense.” State v. Burns, 441 So.2d 843, 845
(La.App. 3 Cir.1983). However, La.R.S. 15:438 does not
establish a stricter standard of review on appeal than the
rational juror’s reasonable doubt standard. The statute
serves as a guide for the jury when considering
circumstantial evidence. On appeal, the issue is whether a
rational trier of fact, when viewing the evidence in a light
most favorable to the prosecution, could find that all
reasonable hypotheses of innocence were excluded. State
v. Williams, 13-497 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/6/13), 124 So.3d
1236, writ denied, 13-2774 (La. 5/16/14), 139 So.3d 1024.

State v. Baumberger, 15-1056, pp. 10−11 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/16), 200 So.3d 817,

826-27, writ denied, 16-1251 (La. 5/26/17), 221 So.3d 859, cert. denied, ___ U.S.

___, 138 S.Ct. 392 (2017).

Mr. Watson does not contest that he shot and killed his wife and

stepson; rather, he argues that the State failed to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt

that the homicides were committed in self-defense. Louisiana Revised Statutes

14:30(A)(3) defines first degree murder as “[t]he killing of a human being . . . [w]hen

the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon more

than one person.” “Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when

the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal

consequences to follow his act or failure to act.” La.R.S. 14:10(1). “Specific intent

may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the offense and the conduct of

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the defendant.” State v. Draughn, 05-1825, pp. 7-8 (La. 1/17/07), 950 So.2d 583,

592-93 (citations omitted), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1012, 128 S.Ct. 537 (2007).

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:20 provides, in pertinent part:

A. A homicide is justifiable:

(1) When committed in self-defense by one who
reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing
his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing
is necessary to save himself from that danger.

(2) When committed for the purpose of preventing
a violent or forcible felony involving danger to life or of
great bodily harm by one who reasonably believes that
such an offense is about to be committed and that such
action is necessary for its prevention. The circumstances
must be sufficient to excite the fear of a reasonable person
that there would be serious danger to his own life or person
if he attempted to prevent the felony without the killing.

....

C. A person who is not engaged in unlawful activity
and who is in a place where he or she has a right to be shall
have no duty to retreat before using deadly force as
provided for in this Section, and may stand his or her
ground and meet force with force.

D. No finder of fact shall be permitted to consider
the possibility of retreat as a factor in determining whether
or not the person who used deadly force had a reasonable
belief that deadly force was reasonable and apparently
necessary to prevent a violent or forcible felony involving
life or great bodily harm or to prevent the unlawful entry.

The State has the affirmative burden of proving beyond a reasonable

doubt that the homicide was not perpetrated in self-defense. State v. Lynch, 436

So.2d 567 (La.1983); State v. Paddio, 02-722 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/11/02), 832 So.2d

1120, writ denied, 03-402 (La. 2/13/04), 867 So.2d 682. In discussing the factors to

be considered in examining a self-defense claim, this court has stated:

“In examining a self-defense claim, it is necessary
to consider: (1) whether the defendant reasonably believed
that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily
harm; (2) whether the killing was necessary to prevent that

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death or great bodily harm; and (3) whether the defendant
was the aggressor in the conflict.” State v. Mayes, 14-683,
pp. 2-3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/23/14), 154 So.3d 1257, 1259,
writs denied, 15-178, 15-220 (La.11/16/15), 184 So.3d 24.
Additionally, in determining whether the defendant had a
reasonable belief that the killing was necessary, it is
appropriate to consider “the excitement and confusion of
the situation, the possibility of using force or violence
short of killing, and the defendant’s knowledge of the
assailant’s bad character.” State v. Thomas, 43,100, p. 5
(La.App. 2 Cir. 4/30/08), 981 So.2d 850, 854, writ denied,
08-1276 (La.2/6/09), 999 So.2d 769.
State v. Fox, 15-692, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/3/16), 184 So.3d 886, 890, writ denied,

16-404 (La. 3/13/17), 216 So.3d 800.

In the present case, the jury was presented with two versions of what occurred

on the day of the homicides. Through his own testimony at trial, Mr. Watson’s

version of events indicated that Megan and LaFrederick attacked him after he

confronted Megan and stated his intention of leaving her. Mr. Watson testified that

LaFrederick attempted to shoot him with the AR-15, but he was able to wrestle the

gun away after it misfired. According to Mr. Watson, he was fleeing the house, with

Megan and LaFrederick in pursuit, when he tripped and accidentally fired multiple

times, killing Megan and wounding LaFrederick. Mr. Watson claimed he followed

LaFrederick to the bathroom to retrieve the pistol from him and get him medical

help, but, after hearing a loud noise, he again fell backwards and shot multiple times,

killing LaFrederick. A few minutes later, he opened the bathroom door, saw

LaFrederick dead, and picked up the pistol which he alleged fell in the sink. He then

got in his car and left for Natchez, but his eye was bleeding and he had double vision.

After consulting with a lawyer, he turned himself into the police.

The State’s version, on the other hand, was that Mr. Watson entered the

residence while Megan and LaFrederick were in the kitchen and opened fire. The

State argued that after Megan was killed, LaFrederick sustained the graze wound to

6

his face. LaFrederick then ran to the bathroom to escape, and Mr. Watson chased

after him, punched a hole in the bathroom door, and fired the AR-15 into the

bathroom where LaFrederick was hiding. After considering the physical evidence

and the witnesses’ testimony, the jury concluded the homicides were not committed

in self-defense and found the State’s evidence supported convictions for first degree

murder.

After reviewing the record, we find that the evidence overwhelmingly

shows that Mr. Watson did not kill Megan and LaFrederick in self-defense.

According to Mr. Watson’s trial testimony, Megan and LaFrederick were the

aggressors who beat him and attempted to shoot him in the back. Both Megan and

LaFrederick were taller and heavier than Mr. Watson, and he argues that he was

acting with a motivation to preserve his life when he armed himself and shot. The

only evidence in the record that suggests the killings were done in self-defense is the

self-serving testimony of Mr. Watson. However, Mr. Watson’s testimony was

confusing and full of inconsistencies. Moreover, his version of the facts is

incompatible with the physical evidence presented in the case.

Mr. Watson alleged that a struggle took place. The crime scene did not

show any signs that a violent physical confrontation had occurred. Mr. Watson did

not have any visible signs of recent injury other than the superficial cut above his

eye, and the clothes he was wearing were not torn. Lieutenant Chris Groh testified

that he interviewed Mr. Watson and observed dried blood on his left eyebrow, but

the injury was not severe. Similarly, the autopsies revealed that neither Megan nor

LaFrederick had non-gunshot injuries to their bodies or defensive wounds on their

hands to indicate there was a physical altercation. The testimony of Dr. Tape, who

performed the autopsies on the victims, establishes that the fatal gunshot wounds to

both Megan and LaFrederick were inflicted at a downward angle which does not

7

comport with his allegation that the shots were fired while falling to the ground.

Further, one gunshot wound was inflicted on LaFrederick while he was sitting or

bending over behind the bathroom door.

The physical evidence is particularly compelling in the killing of

LaFrederick. Mr. Watson stated that he was armed with the AR-15 when

LaFrederick ran away from him into the master bathroom. Mr. Watson then claims

he followed LaFrederick because he had a pistol in the bathroom with him and he

wanted to retrieve it. It is inconceivable that Mr. Watson was in fear of his life when

he followed the child into another room and shot him through a closed door. While

Mr. Watson claimed this shooting resulted from him accidentally firing after hearing

a gunshot, the evidence directly contradicts this. No spent casings were found from

the pistol and there were no bullet holes in the door. There was however a hole

punched through the bottom half of the door. The evidence supports the notion that

Mr. Watson punched a hole in the door and stuck the gun through it before

intentionally firing at the boy who was crouching down behind it.

Despite Mr. Watson’s self-serving testimony, there was no evidence

that the either of the victims was armed, and all the shell casings recovered were

from the AR-15 wielded by Mr. Watson. Even if either had a gun, the fact that Mr.

Watson fired the AR-15 six times—one bullet instantly killing Megan and three

bullets striking and killing LaFrederick—contradict the theory of reasonable

necessity. The number of gunshot wounds inflicted, combined with the lack of any

significant wounds to Defendant, further discredits his claim of self-defense and

supports the State’s evidence that Mr. Watson had the requisite specific intent to kill

the victims.

The State also introduced evidence of Mr. Watson’s prior conviction in

which he pled guilty to manslaughter for killing Peter Jones. When the State asked

8

Mr. Watson if he had ever threatened anyone else with a gun, he said he had not.

However, Mr. Watson’s credibility was undermined when DeMarcus testified that

Mr. Watson had pointed a gun at his head and threatened him because DeMarcus put

his feet on a coffee table. Moreover, Mr. Watson’s actions in failing to immediately

report the shootings and leaving the scene after shooting the victims are not

consistent with his claim that he acted in self-defense. Flight following an offense,

as well as concealment, and attempt to avoid apprehension indicate “consciousness

of guilt and, therefore, [are] circumstances from which the jury may infer guilt.”

State v. Davies, 350 So.2d 586, 588 (La.1977). The jury heard testimony from Mr.

Watson indicating that he immediately left Louisiana following the shootings and

the first thing that came to his mind was getting a lawyer, not seeking emergency

assistance. Even though he later turned himself in to the Mississippi police, he

refused extradition back to Louisiana.

The evidence presented, viewed in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, proved beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every

reasonable hypothesis of innocence, all of the elements of first-degree murder. As

a trier of fact, a jury is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of

any witness. State v. Dorsey, 10-216 (La. 9/7/11), 74 So.3d 603. In this case, the

jury clearly chose to believe the evidence and testimony that contradicted Mr.

Watson’s claim of self-defense. Given the evidence discussed above, the jury’s

credibility findings were not clearly contrary to the evidence. Accordingly, the

evidence was sufficient to support Mr. Watson’s first-degree murder convictions.

This assignment of error is without merit.

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CHANGE OF VENUE

In his second assignment of error, Mr. Watson asserts the trial court

erred in denying his pretrial motion for change of venue wherein he argued that he

could not obtain a fair and impartial trial because of prejudice that existed in the

public mind. Every defendant has the right to an impartial jury and a fair trial.

La.Const. art. I, § 16; State v. Bell, 315 So.2d 307 (La.1975). The law provides for

a change of venue should a defendant establish that he will be unable to obtain such

an impartial jury or a fair trial at the place of original venue. State v. Brown, 18-

1999 (La. 9/30/21), 330 So.3d 199, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 142 S.Ct. 1702

(2022).

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 622 provides the grounds for a

change of venue as follows:

A change of venue shall be granted when the applicant proves
that by reason of prejudice existing in the public mind or because of
undue influence, or that for any other reason, a fair and impartial trial
cannot be obtained in the parish where the prosecution is pending.

In deciding whether to grant a change of venue the court shall
consider whether the prejudice, the influence, or the other reasons are
such that they will affect the answers of jurors on the voir dire
examination or the testimony of witnesses at the trial.

Only in rare cases will prejudice against a defendant be presumed. See

State v. David, 425 So.2d 1241, 1246 (La.1983) (“[U]nfairness of a constitutional

magnitude will be presumed in the presence of a trial atmosphere which is utterly

corrupted by press coverage or which is entirely lacking in the solemnity and

sobriety to which a defendant is entitled in a system that subscribes to any notion of

fairness and rejects the verdict of the mob.”). In all other cases, a defendant has the

burden of showing actual prejudice. See State v. Magee, 11-574 (La. 9/28/12), 103

So.3d 285, cert. denied, 571 U.S. 830, 134 S.Ct. 56 (2013).

10

The Louisiana Supreme Court has set forth the criteria that must be met

for a defendant to meet his burden of proving actual prejudice as follows:

To meet this burden, a defendant must prove more
than mere public knowledge or familiarity with the facts
of the case: he must demonstrate the extent of prejudice in
the minds of the community as a result of such knowledge
or exposure to the case. State v. Clark, 02–1463, p. 18
(La.6/27/03), 851 So.2d 1055, 1071; State v. Frank, 99–
0553, p. 14 (La.1/17/01), 803 So.2d 1, 15. A defendant is
not entitled to a jury entirely ignorant of his case and
cannot prevail on a motion for change of venue simply by
showing a general level of public awareness about the
crime; rather, he must show that there exists such
prejudice in the collective mind of the community that a
fair trial is impossible. Clark, 02–1463 at 17, 18, 851
So.2d at 1070, 1071. Whether a defendant has made the
requisite showing of actual prejudice is a question
addressed to the district court’s sound discretion which
will not be disturbed on appeal absent an affirmative
showing of error and abuse of discretion. Sparks, 88–0017
at 16–17, 68 So.3d at 457; Lee, 05–2098 at 33, 976 So.2d
at 133; Clark, 02–1463 at 17, 851 So.2d at 1071.

In Bell, [315 So.2d 307 (La.1975)], this court
enumerated several factors relevant to the district court’s
determination of whether to order a change of venue.
These factors include: (1) the nature of pretrial publicity
and the degree to which it has circulated in the community;
(2) the connection of government officials with the release
of the publicity; (3) the length of time between the
dissemination of the publicity and the trial; (4) the severity
and notoriety of the offense; (5) the area from which the
jury is to be drawn; (6) other events occurring in the
community which either affect or reflect the attitude of the
community or individual jurors toward the defendant; and
(7) any factors likely to affect the candor and veracity of
the prospective jurors on voir dire. Bell, 315 So.2d at 311.
In setting out these factors, this court emphasized that in
deciding whether to change venue, the district court must
extend its focus beyond the prejudices and attitudes of
individual venire persons. The defendant must be allowed
to show that, even if it would be possible to select a jury
whose members were not subject to a challenge for cause,
prejudice or influences exist within the community at large
that would affect the juror’s answers during voir dire or
the witnesses’ testimony, or that for any other reason, a
fair and impartial trial could not be obtained in that venue.
Clark, 02–1463 at 16–17, 851 So.2d at 1070; Bell, 315
So.2d at 313. The district court’s ultimate determination

11

must rest on the community’s attitude toward the
defendant. Clark, 02–1463 at 17, 851 So.2d at 1075.

In reviewing a denial of change in venue, the
primary task of the court is to inquire as to the nature and
scope of publicity to which prospective jurors in a
community have been exposed and examine the lengths to
which a court must go to impanel a jury that appears to be
impartial in order to ascertain whether prejudice existed in
the minds of the public which prevented the defendant
from receiving a fair trial. Clark, 02–1463 at 18, 851 So.2d
at 1071. In performing this review, courts must distinguish
largely factual publicity from that which is invidious or
inflammatory, as the two present real differences in the
potential for prejudice. Id. While, ultimately, there is no
bright line test for ascertaining the degree of prejudice
existing in the collective mind of the community, the
seven Bell factors help facilitate the inquiry. Sparks, 88–
0017 at 18, 68 So.3d at 457; Frank, 99–0553 at 16, 803
So.2d at 16. In addition, courts have examined the number
of jurors excused for cause for having a fixed opinion as
another gauge of whether prejudice exists in the public
mind. Clark, 02–1463 at 18, 851 So.2d at 1071; Frank,
99–0553 at 15, 803 So.2d at 15.
Id. at 298-99.

In an effort to prove actual prejudice, the defense introduced several

articles from Mississippi newspapers which were published in late June and early

July of 2019. One paper reported that the Concordia Parish Sheriff’s Office was

seeking extradition of Mr. Watson, “a man they believe killed two people in Clayton

this weekend.” According to Sheriff Hedrick, Mr. Watson, accompanied by his

attorney, surrendered himself to the Adams County Sheriff’s Office in connection

with the killings. The article quoted Sheriff Hedrick as saying, “We believe we have

the right person.” Another article reported on Mr. Watson’s prior conviction and

sentence. An article published by the Concordia Sentinel related that Mr. Watson

was fighting extradition to Louisiana. According to Lieutenant Groh, Mr. Watson

allegedly shot Megan and her minor son with and AR-15, and Lieutenant Groh noted

that Mr. Watson was out on probation at the time. The defense also introduced

12

several articles pertaining to Mr. Watson’s previous manslaughter conviction which

were published prior to Megan and LaFrederick’s deaths. Additionally, the defense

introduced social media comments which were varied in nature.

On February 26, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on the motion.

Defense counsel noted there would be an “opportunity . . . in Voir Dire . . . to see

just how damaging this information is[,]” but he argued the publicity was “highly

prejudicial.” In contrast, the State agreed that people were upset about the killings

but urged the trial court to consider how much time had passed since the homicides

and to consider the number of recent homicides in Concordia Parish. Regarding the

social media comments, the State argued the defense had not shown the commenters

lived in the jurisdiction and were, thus, representative of Concordia Parish. The

State suggested the issue was not only whether prospective jurors had heard about

the case, but also whether they had formed an opinion as to Mr. Watson’s innocence

or guilt. The State concluded the defense failed to meet its burden of proving Mr.

Watson would not be able to obtain an impartial jury or a fair trial in Concordia

Parish but reasoned the motion could be re-urged during voir dire if it became

evident that an impartial jury could not be impaneled due to prior knowledge of the

case. Following arguments, the trial court denied the motion for the reasons

submitted by the State and found the voir dire process would bring forth any issues.

Defense counsel did not object to the trial court’s ruling, nor did he re-

urge the motion before, during, or after voir dire as suggested by the State and trial

court. Consequently, defense counsel adduced no further evidence in support of his

motion, relying instead on the voir dire process to uncover the existence of any

community prejudice. We will now address the applicability of the Bell factors to

the present case as the supreme court did in Magee.

Nature and Degree of Publicity

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The first factor instructs courts to consider the nature and degree of

publicity. The newspaper articles relied upon by Mr. Watson were factual, rather

than inflammatory. Admittedly, some of the social media comments were

incendiary or inflammatory; however, there is no proof that the people who posted

the comments are representative of the Concordia Parish community, and there is no

proof that those people are residents of Concordia Parish. See State v. Wilhite,

55,023, p. 12 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/17/23), ___ So.3d ___ (2023 WL 3486253).

A review of voir dire reveals that only a handful of the prospective

jurors had heard of either the crime, the victims, or Mr. Watson. Some prospective

jurors stated they recognized Megan from shopping at the local Dollar General

where she worked or knew members of the McCoy family. One prospective juror

had previously worked with Megan. Both the State and defense counsel questioned

the prospective jurors regarding whether they had seen any newspaper articles or

social media posts about the homicides; no prospective juror indicated that they had.

As the State argues to this court, voir dire shows “the vast majority of the panel was

not familiar with the case.”

Connection of Government Officials with Publicity

To the extent the police contributed to the publicity, there was no

allegation of a strategy by government officials to prejudice the public mind against

Mr. Watson with the release of publicity. Moreover, any comments by police in this

case did not equate to the “actual prejudice” that must be proven to require a change

of venue. Mr. Watson did not establish the existence of such prejudice in the

collective mind of the community that a fair trial was impossible. Thus, in the instant

case, if Mr. Watson was prejudiced from the comments of any government officials,

such prejudice diminished by the start of his trial.

Length of Time Between Publicity and the Trial

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As the State points out, the motion for change of venue was filed on

February 12, 2020, over a year before trial commenced in this case. The newspaper

articles and social media comments about Megan and LaFrederick’s deaths were

posted the week after the homicides, and some of the newspaper articles about

Defendant’s prior conviction predated the homicides. Due to the length of time

between the publicity and the trial, Mr. Watson has failed to demonstrate the

publicity affected his right to an impartial jury.

Severity and Notoriety of the Offenses

Defense counsel argues the media coverage of the homicides “in a

small, rural community was destined to . . . prejudice many of the citizens” against

Mr. Watson, especially given that LaFrederick was twelve years old. Although the

severity and notoriety of the offenses was significant, the current murder trial

presents facts that are not dissimilar from other first-degree murders in Concordia

Parish. In State v. Lewis, 22-346 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/14/22), 354 So.3d 213, the

defendant robbed the victim and shot him in the back of the head before dragging

the victim’s body down into a ravine; he was convicted of first-degree murder

following a jury trial. Lewis’ co-defendant was tried separately and convicted of

second-degree murder. State v. Tennessee, 22-668 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/23/23), 358

So.3d 565. In State v. Bell, 22-109 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/19/22) (unpublished opinion)

(2022 WL 10820938), the defendant was convicted of three counts of first-degree

murder after he beat and stabbed an elderly bedridden woman and her two sons to

death. Considering these cases, the severity and notoriety of the present offenses is

not unprecedented in Concordia Parish.

Area from which the Jury is to be Drawn

For this factor, Mr. Watson alleges the city of Clayton has a population

of less than 600 residents and, of the population, many either knew the decedents or

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were related to them. Mr. Watson also alleges the surrounding areas of Ferriday and

Vidalia have a population of less than 3,100 residents respectively. Additionally,

defense counsel points out that one of the district attorney investigators was related

to the decedents. The State argues that the defense’s repeated reference to the small

populations of the “community” of Clayton and the surrounding areas of Ferriday

and Vidalia is misleading as it ignores the population of Concordia Parish as a whole,

which is over 18,000 residents.

When analyzing this factor in Magee, the supreme court considered the

size of the jury pool summoned for the case. Because the jury pool consisted of 500

people, with only 43% of the jurors polled having heard something about the case

and only 11% being removed for having formed an opinion about Magee’s guilt, the

supreme court found that the large jury pool prevented a dearth of qualified

prospective jurors. The record in this case is silent as to the size of the jury pool in

the present case. Therefore, the record is insufficient to review this factor.

Other Community Events that Either Affect or Reflect the Community’s Attitude

Regarding this factor, defense counsel asserts that the victims’ family

took an active role in making discriminatory comments about Mr. Watson’s

involvement in the shooting. However, Mr. Watson fails to point to a single

comment made by the victims’ family in the record. Mr. Watson also notes that the

newspaper articles and social media comments were posted months prior to the

COVID-19 pandemic “which forced the entire country to retreat into the safety of

their homes and to resort to online and social media sources for information.” While

that may be true, Mr. Watson has not proven this prevented him from obtaining a

fair and impartial jury.

Any Factors Likely to Affect the Candor and Veracity of the Prospective Jurors

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Mr. Watson implies that excused jurors discussed their knowledge of

the victims’ deaths with other panel members during breaks. He further alleges that

the guilty verdicts—which were rendered less than twenty minutes after the jury

retired to deliberate—were “the result of the jury’s eagerness to punish the man

whom the decedents’ family have accused, condemned, and berated in print and

social media” rather than overwhelming evidence against Mr. Watson. This,

however, is merely speculation. There is nothing in the record to prove any improper

conversations took place which could have tainted the jury.

After considering all the factors in the present case, Mr. Watson has

failed to demonstrate the existence of an overriding prejudice in the community that

affected his right to an impartial jury. Furthermore, the media’s discussion of Mr.

Watson’s manslaughter conviction does not warrant a different result in this case.

As the United States Supreme Court stated in Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799,

95 S.Ct. 2031, 2036 (1975), “juror exposure to information about a state defendant’s

prior convictions or to news accounts of the crime with which he is charged alone”

do not presumptively deprive the defendant of due process. Rather, the “totality of

circumstances” must be examined to determine whether the defendant received a

fair trial. Id. Similarly in State v. Connolly, 96-1680 (La. 7/1/97), 700 So.2d 810,

the supreme court did not presume prejudice simply because a newspaper article

mentioned that Connolly was involved in an unrelated murder. See also State v.

Comeaux, 514 So.2d 84 (La.1987), and State v. Lee, 05-2098 (La. 1/16/08), 976

So.2d 109, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 824, 129 S.Ct. 143 (2008).

Accordingly, we find that Mr. Watson has failed to show that the trial

court abused its discretion in denying the motion to change venue in the present case.

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IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Watson’s conviction and sentence are

affirmed. The trial court is instructed to amend the court minutes to correctly reflect

that the trial court ordered the two life sentences to be served consecutively, and

defendant be provided with notice of said amendment to the minutes within thirty

(30) days.

AFFIRMED.

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