State of Louisiana v. Leslie D. Bruner

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

23-35

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

LESLIE D. BRUNER

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LASALLE, NO. 19-1540
HONORABLE J. CHRISTOPHER PETERS, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

CHARLES G. FITZGERALD
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Candyce G. Perret, Charles G. Fitzgerald, and Guy E. Bradberry,
Judges.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.

Michael A. Brewer
2030 Jackson Street, Unit D
Alexandria, Louisiana 71309
(318) 443-4006
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Leslie D. Bruner

Reed Walters
District Attorney,
Twenty-Eighth Judicial District
W. Evans Dorroh, III
Assistant District Attorney
P.O. Box 1940
Jena, Louisiana 71342
(318) 992-8282
Counsel for Appellee:
State of Louisiana

FITZGERALD, Judge.

Defendant, Leslie D. Bruner, appeals her convictions and sentences for two

counts of distribution of methamphetamine.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In early January 2019, Prentice May contacted Detective Todd Roark, of the

LaSalle Parish Sheriff’s Office, about assisting with a controlled buy of

methamphetamine from Defendant. Detective Roark agreed to the assistance, and a

plan for the controlled buy was put into motion.

On the day of the buy, January 11, 2019, Mr. May used Detective Roark’s

vehicle because it was equipped with a video camera. The detective also provided

Mr. May with money for the drug purchase. Mr. May, in turn, drove to a Tractor

Supply store where he met Defendant and paid for the drugs. Thereafter, Mr. May

drove to a second location, a Wal-Mart, where Defendant provided Mr. May with a

substance that was later confirmed to be methamphetamine.

A few days later, Mr. May contacted Defendant about purchasing more

methamphetamine. This second transaction occurred on January 23, 2019. Once

again, Mr. May gave the money to Defendant at one location, and Defendant

provided him with the drugs at a second location.

Defendant was subsequently charged by bill of information with two counts

of distribution of methamphetamine in violation of La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1). A three-

day jury trial was held in July 2022. And at the close of evidence, Defendant was

convicted as charged. Four months later, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve

five years at hard labor on each count with the sentences running consecutively.

On appeal, Defendant assigns two errors. First, that the trial court erred by

not granting a mistrial. And second, that the trial court erred by imposing an

unconstitutionally excessive sentence.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I. ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim P. art. 920, we initially review this appeal

for errors patent on the face of the record. Here, there is one patent error.

The error patent involves the bill of information. Specifically, the bill of

information charges Defendant with two counts of distribution of methamphetamine,

both violations of La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1). But while the penalty for distribution of

methamphetamine is determined by the weight of the substance, the bill of

information fails to specify the weight of the methamphetamine that was distributed

by Defendant.

In relevant part, La.R.S. 40:967(B) provides the following penalties for

distribution of methamphetamine:

B. Violations of Subsection A. Any person who violates
Subsection A of this Section with respect to:

(1) Except as otherwise provided in Paragraphs (2), (3), and (4)
of this Subsection, a substance classified in Schedule II for an amount
of:

(a) An aggregate weight of less than twenty-eight grams, shall be
imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not less than one year nor
more than ten years and may, in addition, be fined not more than fifty
thousand dollars.

(b) An aggregate weight of twenty-eight grams or more, shall be
imprisoned at hard labor for not less than one year nor more than twenty
years and may, in addition, be fined not more than fifty thousand
dollars.

In addition, La.Code Crim P. art. 470 states that “[v]alue, price, or amount of

damage need not be alleged in the indictment, unless such allegation is essential to

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charge or determine the grade of the offense.” And here, since the penalty is

dependent on the weight of the methamphetamine distributed, it is apparent that the

weight should have been charged in the bill.

But even still, we consider this omission to be harmless. Louisiana Code of

Criminal Procedure Article 487 provides in part:

A. An indictment that charges an offense in accordance with the
provisions of this Title shall not be invalid or insufficient because of
any defect or imperfection in, or omission of, any matter of form only,
or because of any miswriting, misspelling, or improper English, or
because of the use of any sign, symbol, figure, or abbreviation, or
because any similar defect, imperfection, omission, or uncertainty
exists therein. The court may at any time cause the indictment to be
amended in respect to any such formal defect, imperfection, omission,
or uncertainty.

Before the trial begins the court may order an indictment
amended with respect to a defect of substance. After the trial begins a
mistrial shall be ordered on the ground of a defect of substance.

In State v. Carr, 52,273 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/26/18), 256 So.3d 470, writ denied,

18-1815 (La. 4/8/19), 267 So.3d 611, the defendant asserted on appeal that his bill

of information was defective because it did not allege the amount of cocaine he

possessed. After noting that the defendant did not complain of the alleged error

before his conviction, the second circuit explained that he failed to demonstrate

“how the omission misled him to his prejudice as required by La.C.Cr.P. art. 464.”

Carr, 256 So.3d at 477.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 464 states:

The indictment shall be a plain, concise, and definite written
statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. It shall
state for each count the official or customary citation of the statute
which the defendant is alleged to have violated. Error in the citation or
its omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment or for
reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not mislead the
defendant to his prejudice.

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Unlike Carr, Defendant here fails to allege any error in the bill of information

and fails to allege that he was prejudiced by the failure of the bill of information to

state the weight of the methamphetamine distributed. Defendant also did not raise

any objection or lack of notice in the trial court.

In addition, because Defendant was tried by a six-person jury, all parties had

to have understood that Defendant was being charged under the lower-weight

penalty provision (less than twenty-eight grams). After all, the lower-weight penalty

provision is punishable by imprisonment with or without hard labor, while the

higher-weight penalty provision (twenty-eight grams or more) is punishable by

imprisonment with mandatory hard labor. La.R.S. 40:967(B)(1). And as stated in

La.Code Crim.P. art. 782, an offense that is punishable with mandatory hard labor

shall be tried by a twelve-person jury, whereas an offense that is punishable with or

without hard labor shall be tried by a six-person jury.

In summary, even though the bill of information failed to state the weight of

the methamphetamine distributed by Defendant, the error in our view was harmless.

II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 1

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial when

exculpatory and impeachment evidence was withheld, thereby hampering her

entrapment defense. Defendant specifically argues that screenshots of her electronic

messages with Mr. May were withheld until after the start of trial.

During the State’s case-in-chief, Mr. May testified as to his communications

with Defendant. Mr. May explained that Defendant initially contacted him through

Facebook Messenger, and she informed him of her desire to sell excess

methamphetamine. According to Mr. May, he initially declined Defendant’s offer

because he needed time to contact Detective Roark. But after speaking with

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Detective Roark, Mr. May contacted Defendant and arranged for the purchase of an

eight ball of crystal methamphetamine. During cross-examination, Mr. May was

asked about his electronic communications with Defendant. Mr. May explained that

he no longer had access to these messages because he lost access to his Facebook

account. But even still, Mr. May pointed out that he previously sent Detective Roark

a copy of every message that he received from Defendant.

After Mr. May finished testifying, defense counsel raised an objection that he

had not been given a copy of the electronic messages during discovery. The court

allowed time for defense counsel to explore whether material evidence was withheld.

After a brief recess, and out of the presence of the jury, the prosecutor confirmed

that Detective Roark was in possession of screenshots of some messages relating to

the January 23, 2019 incident. The prosecutor admitted that the State failed to

produce the evidence, explaining the items had not been placed in the sheriff’s office

case file or provided to the State prior to trial. Indeed, the State only became aware

of these items during the cross-examination of Mr. May.

The following morning, again out of the presence of the jury, the prosecutor

explained that Detective Roark searched his old electronic messages the prior

evening and copies of all messages between Mr. May and Defendant were given to

defense counsel. The prosecutor explained these messages related only to the

January 23, 2019 incident and did not contain exculpatory evidence. Even defense

counsel agreed that the messages were inculpatory.

But to further explore whether a mistrial was necessary, the court called

Detective Roark back to the stand and allowed defense counsel free reign in the

examination of this witness. When asked about the screenshots, Detective Roark

testified that he printed each one out and then marked it as “Text from Lesley Bruner

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1/23/19.” And the information contained in the screenshot messages was consistent

with the drug sale from January 23, 2019. Yet there were still no messages about the

January 11, 2019 transaction, creating an inconsistency with Mr. May’s testimony.

When asked about this, Detective Roark explained that he had produced every

message that Mr. May had given to him.

Defendant then took the stand and denied ever contacting Mr. May about

selling methamphetamine. She testified that she was heavily medicated during the

exchanges with Mr. May and her memory was spotty. And while she admitted being

the person in the videos with Mr. May, she denied having any knowledge of drugs.

After the parties rested their cases, defense counsel “formally” moved for a

mistrial due to the late disclosure of what he characterized as material and relevant

impeachment evidence. The trial court noted that defense counsel had already

agreed that none of the information provided was exculpatory in nature. The trial

court asked defense counsel to explain how he was prejudiced beyond his inability

to question Mr. May. In response, defense expressed his belief that Detective Roark

had more evidence. The State, in turn, pointed out that its office provided everything

as soon as it was received, noting that it had been prejudiced in that it could not use

the messages during its examination of Mr. May or Defendant.

The court denied the motion for mistrial, ruling:

Okay. I’ve listened to the argument in this matter. I’ll be quite
honest with you, and I’m looking at the chief criminal deputy, I am
really concerned that this information was not provided out of a file that
was apparently kept completely different from the criminal records file,
that wasn’t provided there and wasn’t provided to the DA’s office, and
in turn, could not be provided to the defense. This should have been
provided prior to last night. That’s inexcusable in that regard.
However, I agree that the late turning over of the messages, or the
screenshots, while it was late, and by all account in agreement of Mr.
Lemke, they’re inculpatory rather than exculpatory. But in no fashion,
form or what have you, are they Brady material. I think the real
argument that we’re talking about is, isn’t necessarily what was turned

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over but what wasn’t turned over. Other than the testimony of Mr. May,
yeah, I gave them something three and a half years ago, there’s nothing
to say that the sheriff’s office has it. Under direct and cross, the
detective said, I never got anything, and at least as far as I’m concerned,
even if says, I don’t remember, it was pursued. But did you get it? Or
is it possible? It was kind of left hanging at that point. I have nothing
before me to say that any of that information actually exists. And as a
result, if it existed, whether or not it’s exculpatory or whether or not it
should have been given. So, I have nothing, on the record, before me,
I have nothing to grant a mistrial on. So, the Motion for Mistrial is
denied.

On appeal, counsel contends that the late disclosure as well as the

disappearance of other messages put the defense in an untenable position in light of

its use of the entrapment defense. 1 Defense counsel contends that the bulk of the

messages show that Mr. May initiated the discussions with Defendant, and counsel

submits that the missing messages would have shown the same. Defense counsel

also contends that the missing messages would have provided fertile ground for

impeachment as well as supporting the defense of entrapment in that they would

have shown the extent of Mr. May’s efforts and persistence to set up the transactions.

Essentially, Defendant contends this evidence was clearly exculpatory and

impeachment material in a defense based on entrapment.

In response, the State correctly points out that defense counsel acknowledged

to the trial court that nothing in the material provided was exculpatory. The State

notes that the messages were initially mentioned on the second day of the three-day

trial, and that the messages were not previously known to the State as they were not

in the sheriff’s office case file. Next, upon discovering during Mr. May’s testimony

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The court instructed the jury that to prove the special defense of entrapment by a
preponderance of the evidence, Defendant had to prove she was, “instigated or induced by a law
enforcement officer of someone acting for a law enforcement officer into the commission of a
crime which they otherwise had no intention of committing.” The court further explained, “It is
not entrapment, however, if the defendant already had the requisite criminal intent and the officer
or someone acting for the officer merely furnished the defendant with the opportunity to commit
the offense.”

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that these messages may exist, the State met twice with Detective Roark—first, at a

recess on day two of trial; and second, later that evening—to determine the status

and contents of the messages. And after obtaining the messages, the State emailed

the messages to defense counsel that evening, following up with hard copies the next

morning.

The motion for mistrial is addressed in La.Code Crim.P. 775, which states:

A mistrial may be ordered, and in a jury case the jury dismissed,
when:

(1) The defendant consents thereto;

(2) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict;

(3) There is a legal defect in the proceedings which would make
any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of
law;

(4) The court finds that the defendant does not have the mental capacity
to proceed;

(5) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity
with law; or

(6) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial.

Upon motion of a defendant, a mistrial shall be ordered, and in a
jury case the jury dismissed, when prejudicial conduct in or outside the
courtroom makes it impossible for the defendant to obtain a fair trial,
or when authorized by Article 770 or 771.

A mistrial shall be ordered, and in a jury case the jury dismissed,
when the state and the defendant jointly move for a mistrial.

In State v. Verret, 06-1337 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/23/07), 960 So.2d 208, writ

denied, 07-830 (La. 11/16/07), 967 So.2d 520, the defendant contended the trial

court erred in failing to grant a mistrial due to the prosecution’s failure to disclose

exculpatory or impeachment evidence until after the defense had rested its case. The

victim (M.T.) testified that her father raped her on different occasions and in

different locations within their home. But on cross-examination, the victim testified

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that men named Mario and Roberto lived with her mother before the victim lived

with her father. At issue in that case was the late discovery by the prosecution of the

sheriff’s department’s interview of the victim. Once the information was furnished

to the defense, the parties reached an “agreement” regarding the interview. Pursuant

to the agreement, the court instructed the jury that the victim had given a statement

which was recently discovered. And in the statement, the victim indicated that

Roberto, her mother’s boyfriend, had touched her “in her private and then put his

private in her butt.” Id. at 223. Additional information in the police report was not

revealed to the jury due to the absence of an agreement by the parties. The first

circuit concluded that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court, explaining

as follows:

The suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith
or bad faith of the prosecution. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83
S.Ct. 1194, 1196–97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Favorable evidence
includes both exculpatory evidence and evidence impeaching the
testimony of a witness when the reliability or credibility of that witness
may be determinative of defendant’s guilt or innocence, or when it may
have a direct bearing on the sentencing determination of the jury.
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481
(1985); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d
104 (1972). Regardless of request, favorable evidence is material, and
constitutional error results from its suppression by the government, “if
there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed
to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433–34, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1565, 131
L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383).
Bagley’s touchstone of materiality is a “reasonable probability” of a
different result, and the adjective is important. The question is not
whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a
different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he
received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy
of confidence. A “reasonable probability” of a different result is
accordingly shown when the government’s evidentiary suppression
“undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at
434, 115 S.Ct. at 1566; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 105 S.Ct. at 3381.

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As is pertinent here, LSA–C.Cr.P. art. 775 provides that a
mistrial shall be ordered when prejudicial conduct in or outside the
courtroom makes it impossible for the defendant to obtain a fair trial.
However, a mistrial is a drastic remedy which should be granted only
when the defendant suffers such substantial prejudice that he has been
deprived of any reasonable expectation of a fair trial. Determination of
whether a mistrial should be granted is within the sound discretion of
the trial court, and the denial of a motion for a mistrial will not be
disturbed on appeal without abuse of that discretion. State v. Berry, 95–
1610, p. 7 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/8/96), 684 So.2d 439, 449, writ denied,
97–0278 (La.10/10/97), 703 So.2d 603.

....

Defense counsel indicated he believed the police report was
obvious Brady material, and “. . . I have no reason to disbelieve it was
just received by the District Attorney’s office and supplied to us once
received, even thought [sic] it’s at a late time, the defense would move
for a mistrial at this point based on this issue right here alone.” The
trial court denied the motion for mistrial and permitted the State to
respond to the motion.

The State set forth that during her testimony, Stacy Verret
indicated M.T. had been taken to the Lafourche Parish Sheriff’s Office
where she gave a statement and Verret then described the contents of
that statement. Following Verret’s testimony, the State contacted the
Lafourche Parish Sheriff’s Office to determine whether, in fact, the
referenced report was made, and if the report was made, to request that
a copy of the report be faxed to the State immediately. The report was
received by the State shortly before the defense rested, and the State did
not finish reviewing the report until the recess after the defense rested.
Upon learning that the report contained possible Brady material, the
State disclosed the report to the court and to the defense.

In the instant case, there was no abuse of discretion in the denial
of the motion for mistrial. Defendant did not suffer such substantial
prejudice that he was deprived of any reasonable probability of a fair
trial. The State did not suppress evidence favorable to defendant.
Pursuant to the “agreement” between the State and the defense, the trial
court instructed the jury that on August 8, 2000, M.T. reported being
anally raped by “Roberto.”

Id. at 222-25.

Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion

for mistrial. The evidence produced, albeit late, was admittedly inculpatory

evidence. Further, these messages substantiated Mr. May’s testimony. Defendant

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has simply not shown that the timely production of these messages would have made

a difference in the outcome of trial. Thus, this assignment is without merit.

III. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 2

Defendant contends that her consecutive five-year sentences are excessive and

that several mitigating factors dictate the imposition of a lesser sentence.

Specifically, she argues that she was fifty-one years old at the time of the offenses

with no prior felony convictions. She further asserts that, although the jury rejected

her entrapment defense, Mr. May heavily contributed to the occurrence of the

offenses. Defendant notes that she was suffering from substance abuse addiction at

the time of the offenses. And finally, she claims that she engaged in the transactions

to satisfy her own addiction; this was not about making money.

The State, on the other hand, asserts that neither Defendant’s motion to

reconsider sentence nor the arguments raised at the hearing on the motion urge any

specific grounds, relegating this to a bare claim of excessiveness on appeal. State v.

Mims, 619 So.2d 1059 (La.1993). We agree.

In State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12, (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779

So.2d. 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331, this court

reviewed a bare excessive-sentence claim, explaining:

La. Const. art. I, §20 guarantees that, “no law shall subject any
person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an excessive
sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of
justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless
imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d. 1205
(La. 1981). The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of
sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set
aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99), 746 So.2d. 124, writ denied,
00-0165 (La.6/30/00), 765 So.2d. 1067. The relevant question is
whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not
whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v.

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Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So.2d. 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

An appellate court may consider numerous factors when determining if a

sentence is shocking or lacking in acceptable penal goals. These factors include “the

nature of the offense, the circumstances of the offender, the legislative purpose

behind the punishment and the comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes.”

State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d. 786, 789, writ

denied, 03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d. 1061.

The trial court here provided a solid foundation for the sentence imposed on

Defendant. As the trial court put it:

You [Defendant] further indicated that you do not use illegal
narcotics or alcohol. I am confused, I listened to the testimony in your
trial, I listened to the police officers, I listened to the tech that talked
about what the drugs were, I saw film of you being involved in the drug
trade, I saw film if I am remembering correctly and I could be wrong in
this because this happened in July so this was four (4) months ago but
I think I saw film of you taking a part off of the sell for your own
personal use. I remember when you testified on your own behalf
because in this matter you took the stand to testify in your own defense.
You didn’t remember anything about having drug sells or anything, you
didn’t remember any of this, that none of this really happened in spite
of seeing your face on the video and what have you. Then I get your
letter, your letter talks about a mistake that you made and that you
understand this and that you are sad about because of your activities
that you have embarrassed your family and that you know that this is a
mistake and how it has impacted. You can’t have it both says, I don’t
remember and I didn’t do it to now I made a bunch of mistakes and I
have embarrassed my family and I am really sorry. It doesn’t work that
way. In here you state that basically how my mistakes have impacted
my life as well as my families [sic] life . . . My lapse in judgment, lapse
in judgment is something that you did not something that you now
realize that you did as oppose [sic] to taking any remorse or anything
about basically lying on the stand saying you didn’t do it. So it has now
changed and I understand you may have had more memories now or it
may have refreshed your memory from what happened but you know
to be honest with you it sounds like more excuses. . . . In any event I
have heard it said that drug cases are victimless crimes. I have even
heard it said that punishing drug dealers should be lower on the
punishment scale because those guys dealing drugs are “just supporting
their family” or “they are just selling stuff.” You know what I couldn’t
disagree more. The crime which you have been convicted of is one of

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the more reprehensible crimes in my mind in our society. The stuff you
are dealing ruins lives, not only for the people that are using your
product, but for the people who care for your clients and apparently you
have now realized that it has ruined your families [sic] life too. Further,
you don’t even know if the product you were selling was going to be
used by Prentiss May, or whether or not he was going to turn around
and sell it to some kid or somebody else for a profit. But you did not
care because you had your money. Basically, you are selling poisons
that allow you to make a profit on other people’s misery. One thing that
I find disturbing is that you say that you do not use your product but
you are certainly willing to sell it. If you say now that dope is bad for
you, why do you sell it to others? Again I have in my notes for this
sentencing that I am not sure that I believe that you do not use it, as I
remember from the video that you took a portion of the product for
yourself when you were transferring the drugs. In any event, taking
you at your word at what you are telling me then, this position shows
me that you do not care for others and are callous by your nature. Again
that is unacceptable in our society. Because of the nature of your
offense, and the multiple occurrences of selling methamphetamines in
this particular matter, I find that your actions have become a pattern of
conduct that must be broken, and if you were given a suspended
sentence or placed on probation, there is an undue risk to society that
you would continue to commit drug-related offenses. Further, given
the serious nature of the offenses of which you are now convicted of, I
believe that you are in need of correctional treatment that can be
provided most effectively by the commitment to an institution.
Distribution of Methamphetamines is a serious offense, and it should
not be treated lightly. This is a charge that prey[s] on the weaknesses
of others and allows you to make a profit on the sale of poisons. This
is not even a situation where treatment can help you. There are no
allegations of use of or addiction to illegal substances. The only
addiction that I see that you have is to making money through the
selling of drugs. Therefore, I believe that a lesser sentence would
deprecate the seriousness of the offense charged.

In addition, the aggregate weight of the methamphetamine at issue was less

than twenty-eight grams, resulting in a potential sentence on each count of up to ten

years with or without hard labor, as well as a possible fine of not more than

$50,000.00. La.R.S. 40:967(B)(1)(a).

In State v. Patterson, 11-892 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/1/12), 83 So.3d. 1209, writ

denied, 12-526 (La. 6/1/12), 90 So.3d. 435, a first-time felony offender was found

guilty on five counts of distribution of methamphetamine. He was sentenced to five

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years at hard labor on each count with the sentences running consecutively. The

sentences were affirmed on appeal.

In the end, Defendant here was found guilty of two counts of distribution of

methamphetamine. She was sentenced to consecutive five-year sentences at hard

labor. This is a mid-range sentence for which the trial court provided substantial

support. We therefore do not find that the trial court abused its broad sentencing

discretion. This assignment is without merit.

DISPOSITION

For the above reasons, Defendant’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.

THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.3.

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