State of Louisiana v. Vernell Arconze Chatman, Jr.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

23-187

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

VERNELL ARCONZE CHATMAN, JR.

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 25192-19
HONORABLE G. MICHAEL CANADAY, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE

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Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Shannon J. Gremillion, and Guy E.
Bradberry, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Annette Fuller Roach
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 6547
Lake Charles, LA 70606-6547
(337) 436-2900
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:
Vernell Arconze Chatman, Jr.

Hon. Stephen C. Dwight
District Attorney, Fourteenth Judicial District
Karen C. McLellan
Assistant District Attorney
901 Lakeshore Drive, Suite 800
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 437-3400
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

PICKETT, Judge.

On December 19, 2019, Vernell Arconze Chatman, Jr., was charged with

second degree murder for the death of Kayla Mackenzie Jones, in violation of

La.R.S. 14:30, and the first degree feticide of Ms. Jones’s unborn child, in

violation of La.R.S. 14:32.6. He was convicted by a unanimous jury of the

responsive verdict of manslaughter of Ms. Jones, a violation of La.R.S. 14:31, and

of the responsive verdict second degree feticide of her unborn child, a violation of

La.R.S. 14:32.7. He subsequently filed a motion for a new trial contending that the

verdict was contrary to the law and evidence. Following a hearing, the trial court

denied the motion.

The trial court sentenced the defendant to serve thirty-two years at hard

labor for the manslaughter conviction and eight years at hard labor for the second

degree feticide conviction. The trial court determined that the feticide represented

‘a separate life . . . lost” and ordered that the sentences be run consecutively for a

total sentence of forty years at hard labor. The defendant filed a “Motion to

Reconsider Sentence,” in which he asserted that his sentences were excessive

“under the circumstances.” The trial court denied the motion without a hearing.

The defendant appeals his convictions and sentences, raising four

assignments of error: (l) the state’s evidence was insufficient to find him guilty of

manslaughter, (2) the state’s evidence was insufficient to find him guilty of second

degree feticide, (3) his conviction for second degree feticide was a violation of

double jeopardy, and (4) his sentences are both excessive individually and should

be run concurrently rather than consecutively.

FACTS

On the morning of November 16, 2019, Ms. Jones’s dead body was found in

a park in Lake Charles. The Lake Charles Police Department investigated her death.

Charles Hunter, Jr., 1 the chief investigator for the Calcasieu Parish Coroner’s

Office, testified that based on the “tremendous amount” of dirt and leaves in Ms.

Jones’s hair that did not match the surrounding area where her body was found, it

was apparent to him that Ms. Jones did not die where her body was lying and

opined that she “may have been dropped off at that location.” Mr. Hunter also

noted that Ms. Jones was lying stretched out with her legs straight and her hands

above her head.

Mr. Hunter related that the clothes Ms. Jones was wearing were insufficient

for the cold temperature, which was in the low thirties. He testified that the pajama

pants she was wearing were on backwards and not pulled all the way to her waist.

He further testified that her body was very dirty and had “numerous scrapes and

abrasions and bruises across most of the surfaces of her body.” Despite the dirt on

her skin and shirt, Mr. Hunter noted that the pajama pants Ms. Jones was wearing

were rather clean. He explained that white foam or froth coming from her mouth

and nose as depicted in crime scene photographs can be caused by an overdose,

suffocation, or death from asphyxiation. Based upon cuts and scrapes to her arms,

legs, and face, Mr. Hunter concluded that Ms. Jones was in an altercation. He did

acknowledge, however, that the injuries could have been caused by other means,

including if she were hallucinating and thrashing around on the ground.

Sergeant Willie Fontenot, a violent crimes detective with the Lake Charles

Police Department, testified that on November 16, 2019, he was dispatched to the

corner of Holmes Street and Kline Street at 7:45 a.m. After observing the victim

and speaking with officers on-site, Sergeant Fontenot was informed that Mr.

Brandon Mentor, who lived near the park, had reported Ms. Jones’s location.

1
Based on his work as a death investigator beginning in 2006 and being involved in over 15,000
death investigations, the trial court accepted Mr. Hunter as an expert in the field of death
investigation.
2

According to Sergeant Fontenot, he and Sergeant William Loving went to Mr.

Mentor’s apartment and learned that he lived with his cousin, Bryan Love (Bryan),

Bryan’s wife, Lucia, and their children. During the visit, Sergeant Fontenot learned

that Noah Love, a nine-year-old, was a witness.

At that time, Sergeant Fontenot interviewed Mr. Mentor, Bryan, Lucia Love,

Larry Chatman, Jarred Chatman, Jasmine Jack, and the defendant. He noted that,

after the interviews, both the defendant and Larry Chatman were arrested.2

The state played the defendant’s videotaped statement for the jury.

According to the defendant, he lived with his brother Jarred and Jarred’s girlfriend,

Jasmine Jack. He noted his other brother, Larry, would come over but lived with

his “baby mama.” The defendant stated he had seen Ms. Jones the day before,

between 4 and 6 p.m., at Abraham’s Tent, an organization in Lake Charles that

provides meals for the homeless. The defendant stated he spoke with Ms. Jones at

Abraham’s Tent before she left with someone else. According to the defendant, he

met up with Ms. Jones again after dark at the convenience store near Abraham’s

Tent. He claimed that Ms. Jones told him she was going somewhere else and left

the store with someone he did not know.

The defendant stated that after Ms. Jones left the store, he went to “Sunlight

Manor” to speak with a lady named “Ms. Maddy.” Despite claiming that he last

saw Ms. Jones at the convenience store, the defendant admitted he was at his house

alone with Ms. Jones when pressed by Sergeant Fontenot. He acknowledged

smoking “mojo” (synthetic marijuana) with Ms. Jones. At some point, Ms. Jack

came home and argued with Ms. Jones. When asked if Ms. Jones “wigged out”

after smoking, the defendant denied that she had any troubles and said she left

2
Larry Chatman served two years in jail before pleading guilty to obstruction of justice and
being released.

3

peacefully. He could not say where she went. After being told that everyone else

claimed she was “flipping out,” the defendant maintained that Ms. Jones was

verbal about leaving but was not having any physical issues and that he did not

have to physically remove her from the apartment.

Once law enforcement informed the defendant that witnesses told them he

carried Ms. Jones from his porch to the park, the defendant countered that she was

holding onto his arm and that he helped her walk across the street. When asked

why Ms. Jones had to be removed from the home, it took nearly three minutes

before the defendant finally answered, saying she had gone a little crazy. The

defendant repeatedly denied hitting Ms. Jones in any way. He stated that when Ms.

Jones came to the house, she was dressed but not in winter clothes, and he

acknowledged putting pants on her after helping her from the house. When asked if

his brother Larry helped him bring Ms. Jones across the street, the defendant

denied that Larry helped and claimed he alone brought Ms. Jones to the back

corner of the park. According to the defendant, he realized Ms. Jones was missing

her shoes while helping her to the park. He explained he found the shoes near the

steps to his apartment, brought them to her, put them on her feet, then left her on

the grass at the back of the park.

According to the defendant, at some point in the early morning hours, he and

his brothers went outside looking for a dog that had gotten loose. The defendant

denied knowing Ms. Jones was still in the park at that time. He also denied ever

saying “Die” to the victim or laying his hands on her. He repeatedly stated, “I

never hurt Kayla!” The defendant subsequently acknowledged that it was a mistake

to simply leave Ms. Jones out in the cold.

Eventually, the defendant stated that he attempted to hold Ms. Jones “to

control or constrict, not to hurt or harm.” He indicated that she was on the ground
4

while he was trying to hold her down to prevent her from injuring herself. The

defendant acknowledged that his actions may have looked like he was choking her.

He adamantly denied ever kicking Ms. Jones. The defendant subsequently stated

that he sometimes hallucinated when he smoked “mojo” and that he smoked some

with Ms. Jones that day. He then stated that he had numerous mental health

problems and that he was off his medication.

On cross-examination, Sergeant Fontenot acknowledged that although he

initially arrested the defendant’s brother, Larry, as a principal due to a witness

saying Larry was at the park with the defendant and Ms. Jones, the investigation

subsequently confirmed that information was false. Sergeant Fontenot also

acknowledged that the same witnesses told him the defendant had suffocated Ms.

Jones in front of the house, despite stating that she was alive when she was brought

to the park later. He admitted that the witness statements were confusing.

During the investigation, Noah Love was brought to the Children’s

Advocacy Center to be interviewed. Mr. David Duplechain of the Family & Youth

Counseling Agency in Lake Charles interviewed Noah. Mr. Duplechain testified

that he was a vice president within the agency and that his work involved, among

other things, doing “forensic interviews of children who are alleged to have been

sexually abused, physically abused, or are witnesses to violent crime.” Mr.

Duplechain interviewed Noah on November 16, 2019. The recording of Noah’s

interview was played for the jury.

When Noah testified at trial, he was twelve years old. According to Noah, on

the night Ms. Jones died, his father told him to go outside and see what was

happening because he heard a woman screaming. Noah stated that, at that time, he,

his dad, and his two brothers were in their apartment and that he was watching

cartoons in bed. He testified that he heard the scream at 9:30 p.m., went outside,
5

and by the light of the porch light saw “[a] man beating on a woman, kicking her in

the side and slapping her in the face.” Noah testified that the man was “Pernell,”

his neighbor, and identified the defendant as the person he referred to as “Pernell.”

Noah stated that “Pernell” lived with “JD, Jaz, and LC,” but he did not know the

real names of those three individuals. According to Noah, the woman was on the

ground close to the apartment, and the defendant was slightly further from the

apartment, standing over her. Noah testified that he went back inside, and about

two minutes later, the woman stopped screaming for help. He told his father what

he saw, then they locked the door and turned off the porch light.

On cross-examination, Noah then testified no one was in his apartment

except himself, his dad, and his two brothers, and he specifically denied that Larry

Chatman or any women were there. While he acknowledged that his dad “used to

do [drugs],” he denied that his father was doing drugs that night. Noah testified he

heard the defendant say “Get away from her. She’s pregnant,” after he stopped

hitting and kicking Ms. Jones. Noah then clarified that he heard the defendant say

this after he (Noah) had gone back inside and closed the door. He also stated that

he could not see the defendant when he heard that statement.

Sergeant William Loving testified that on November 16, 2019, he was

dispatched in relation to a deceased female on the side of the road. A pair of shoes

was found roughly fifteen feet from the woman. Sergeant Loving testified that he

and Sergeant Fontenot knocked on doors at the small apartment complex located

across the street from the park where Ms. Jones was found. He further testified that

Ms. Jones was at the entrance to the park very close to the front of the driveway to

the apartments. He recalled speaking with the occupants of Apartment 8: Larry,

Jarred, and Vernell Chatman. Sergeant Loving testified that, despite officers not

mentioning the park and simply asking about a white female, the Chatman brothers
6

“kept looking towards the park” while he was speaking with them. Sergeant

Loving was not wearing a body camera during the interaction, but another officer

who was with him had his body camera turned on. The video from the body

camera was introduced into evidence and played for the jury.

Dr. Terry Welke, the Coroner and Forensic Pathologist for Calcasieu Parish,

was accepted without objection by the trial court as an expert in the field of

forensic pathology. Dr. Welke testified that he listed Ms. Jones’s cause of death as

“blunt force injuries-asphyxia-hypothermia” and identified her death as a homicide.

He did not believe, however, that the blunt force injuries alone would have been

sufficient to kill Ms. Jones. After acknowledging there are numerous ways

asphyxia can occur, Dr. Welke testified that in the instant case, he believed Ms.

Jones suffered a “smothering type of asphyxia.”

Dr. Welke explained that his conclusion was based upon a superficial scrape

on Ms. Jones’s nose and a bruised area on the inner portion of her lower lip, which

indicated to him that someone had cupped their hand over her mouth. He did not

observe petechiae, a common sign of suffocation, in Ms. Jones’s eyes but noted he

had also seen hangings where petechia were not present. He stated that he was

unconcerned about the foam near Ms. Jones’s nose and mouth, noting this can

happen with drug overdoses or drowning but can also occur any time there is an

irregularity of the heart, such as asphyxiation.

Dr. Welke testified that Ms. Jones’s blood contained traces of cocaine,

benzolecgonine (a cocaine byproduct), methamphetamine, amphetamine, and

marijuana. Nonetheless, he felt that the levels of the drugs in Ms. Jones’s system

would not have been sufficient to result in an overdose death. Regarding

hypothermia, Dr. Welke noted that when the body’s internal temperature gets to

around eighty-six degrees, atrial fibrillation occurs, and a person’s heart becomes
7

inefficient. He further explained that at around eighty-two degrees, ventricular

fibrillation occurs, and the heart stops functioning. Dr. Welke noted that because

Ms. Jones was woefully underdressed for the low temperature, he would have

expected her body to be curled up in the fetal position in an attempt to stay warm if

she had died purely of hypothermia. Because she was not in the fetal position, he

believed Ms. Jones’s arms were outstretched because she was positioned that way

after her death. He testified Ms. Jones’s injuries were consistent with someone

sitting or lying on her chest and cupping their hand over her mouth and nose.

Dr. Welke noted that if Ms. Jones had not died from being smothered, she

likely would have had brain damage that would have prevented her from moving

her body while she subsequently died of hypothermia. He testified Ms. Jones’s

knuckles were skinned and noted that could be the result of someone fighting with

her or from her “flailing around and causing those injuries to herself.” Regarding

the bruises on her body, he noted that based on their coloration, they were not old,

but he could not say if they were half an hour old or three days old.

Dr. Welke did not do an autopsy on Ms. Jones’s unborn child, but he

testified that the child was a male that appeared to be approximately eight months

and a week developed with “no evidence of significant natural disease.” The child

was sixteen and one-quarter inches long and weighed a little over eight pounds.

Despite not doing an autopsy, Dr. Welke testified that he believed the child would

have been viable if born prior to Ms. Jones’s death and that he “felt the baby died

as a result of the mother’s death.” After explaining that it is impossible to get an

exact time of death unless someone dies in the hospital, Dr. Welke estimated that

Ms. Jones died around 4:00 a.m. on November 16, 2019. He then stated, however,

it was possible that she may have died at 10:30 p.m. the prior night.

8

On cross-examination, Dr. Welke reiterated that he believed Ms. Jones’s

flailing around on the ground, whether because someone was on top of her or she

was simply flailing, could have caused the injuries to her legs and back. He also

reiterated that he believed the injury to her nose was from either a hand or pillow

being compressed around her nose and mouth. He could not recall examining

anyone who overdosed on “mojo” or synthetic marijuana. Additionally, while he

stated the level of drugs in Ms. Jones’s system was too low for an overdose, he

acknowledged that no tests were done which would have shown the level of

synthetic marijuana in her system. Dr. Welke opined that Ms. Jones was already

dead when she was placed in the park. He clarified that, even if she was not dead

when she was brought to the park, he felt the asphyxia that occurred before she

was brought there would have rendered her unable to protect herself from

hypothermia and would have ultimately resulted in her death.

The state’s final witness was Ms. Jasmine Jack, who acknowledged having a

felony conviction for possession of a firearm with obliterated numbers,

misdemeanor convictions for criminal trespass, resisting an officer, and drug

paraphernalia. According to Ms. Jack, in November of 2019, she was dating the

defendant’s brother, Jarred Chatman, and living with Jarred, the defendant, and

their other brother, Larry Chatman. Ms. Jack testified that she knew Ms. Jones

because Ms. Jones would come to the apartment to get high. Ms. Jack

acknowledged telling Sergeant Fontenot that her initial interview was a lie and that

she did not see anything because she “was told if I take this stand today I’m dead.

Let the record reflect.”

As to the night Ms. Jones died, Ms. Jack testified she saw Ms. Jones outside

the apartment “on the ground hollering and screaming in pain, and Vernell was

right there with her.” She further testified the defendant was leaning over Ms.
9

Jones and it looked like he was trying to calm Ms. Jones down, but she then heard

the defendant yell “Die, bitch, die.” She explained she heard this statement while

she was inside the apartment and returned outside where she saw the defendant

holding down Ms. Jones’s elbows “so she can’t swing at him.”

On cross-examination, Ms. Jack testified that she had not done drugs in

about seven and a half months at the time of trial, noting she had been smoking

mojo but quit. She testified that she initially lied to law enforcement because she

felt “the homicide detectives was [sic] threatening.” She then claimed the

defendant’s mother called her before she was interviewed by law enforcement and

threatened her. Although she acknowledged lying to law enforcement during her

initial interview, Ms. Jack claimed she did not remember what she said to law

enforcement because she was under the influence.

Ms. Jones testified Ms. Jones was still near the apartment when Jarred

Chatman returned home from work, typically around 11 p.m. She then stated

she was positive that, at 11:00 p.m., Ms. Jones was on the ground “with her t-shirt

and panties on hollering.” She stated that neither she nor Jarred wanted Ms. Jones

in the apartment because “when she gets high she flashes out, and she was

pregnant.” She testified that when she returned to the apartment after being told Ms.

Jones was there, both Larry Chatman and the defendant were present, and Ms.

Jones was sitting next to the defendant.

Ms. Jack stated she never told the defendant to get Ms. Jones out of the

house and claimed she never laid a finger on Ms. Jones. According to Ms. Jack,

she and her friend, Shameka Smiley, were both at Bryan’s apartment getting high,

and Ms. Smiley went back to Ms. Jack’s apartment and smoked with the defendant

and Ms. Jones before waking her (Ms. Jack) up to tell her Ms. Jones was at the

apartment. Ms. Jack stated that she was passed out at Bryan’s apartment before Ms.
10

Smiley woke her up. Ms. Jack contested the notion that she and Ms. Jones had a

fight because Ms. Jones would not leave. According to Ms. Jack, she told the

defendant that it was on him because Jarred did not want Ms. Jones getting high at

the apartment when she was pregnant. Ms. Jack then returned to Bryan’s, rolled

another blunt and passed out again.

Ms. Jack explained that she did not want Ms. Jones at the apartment because

she did not approve of a pregnant woman getting high and that Jarred did not want

her there “because he was a registered sex offender.” She testified that when Larry

and the defendant said Ms. Jones did not have to leave, she returned next door and

smoked more mojo. After stating that she smoked “a lot” of mojo that day, Ms.

Jack testified she was also on PCP, claiming everyone except the defendant was

also doing PCP.

According to Ms. Jack, Ms. Jones smoked some crack, in addition to the

mojo she had smoked, and then started “flashing out.” She defined “flashing out”

as “[l]aying on the floor flipping like a little fish, hollering and screaming.” She

testified this would happen with Ms. Jones kicking and tearing up the apartment,

until she came back around when the drugs wore off. Despite previously saying

that Ms. Jones was still behaving when she left the apartment, Ms. Jack then

testified that Ms. Jones had begun flashing out before she left and went back to

Bryan’s.

Ms. Jack later heard Ms. Jones screaming in pain while lying on the ground,

which Ms. Jack attributed to her pregnancy and being held down on the ground.

She testified that she saw the defendant had Ms. Jones’s elbows pinned down

trying to calm her down, noting that Ms. Jones had kicked off her pants while

thrashing around on the ground. She further testified that the defendant put other

pants on her afterwards.
11

Ms. Jack again testified it sounded like the defendant was trying to calm Ms.

Jones down, yet she also stated that was not what she saw. She explained that the

two of them were about ten to fifteen feet away from her on the ground and that

Ms. Jones did not lose her clothing until she was outside the apartment. When

pressed that it makes no sense for someone to scream “die, bitch, die” at a person

they are actively trying to calm down and keep from hurting themselves, all she

could say was “[m]aybe that person wasn’t in their right state of mind.” According

to Ms. Jack, Ms. Jones was outside hollering and screaming for about an hour and

a half before Jarred Chatman got home and that the defendant was next to Ms.

Jones the entire time. Ms. Jack concluded her testimony by stating that she was

positive she heard the defendant tell Ms. Jones to die, immediately after stating “at

the end of the day everybody was full of drugs whether it was PCP, mojo, meth or

crack.”

After allowing the jury to review the physical evidence previously admitted,

the state rested.

The defendant’s first witness was Mr. Larry Chatman, his older brother.

Larry testified that at the time of Ms. Jones’s death, he was living with the

defendant, Jarred, and Jasmine. He had four prior convictions for distribution of

drugs as well as an obstruction of justice conviction. Larry noted that because

people initially told law enforcement that he helped the defendant carry Ms. Jones

to the park, he spent roughly two years in jail charged with second degree murder

for Ms. Jones’s death before he pled guilty to a reduced charge of obstruction of

justice.

Larry testified that he had known Kayla Jones at least eight to ten years prior

to her death and they were good friends. He related that, at some point, his brother

Jarred had been “messing around” with Ms. Jones. Larry was not sure whether Ms.
12

Jones was homeless or not, stating that the only time he ever saw her sleeping

outside was when she “was high on some bubble.” He did not explain what

“bubble” meant. Larry stated that people often used the park across from his old

apartment to get high, including at all hours of the night. Larry acknowledged

previously smoking in the park and testified that people used the park because it

was located on a dead-end road and it just seemed like no one was going to

investigate drug use there.

Larry testified he knew Ms. Smiley from her being around there a lot. He

admitted that he frequently got high with her but testified that he did not recall if

they smoked together the day Ms. Jones died, explaining that his memory was poor

when he was high. Larry stated he often went to Bryan’s apartment to get high,

even when the Love children were home.

On the night Ms. Jones died, Larry testified that he arrived home between

8:00 and 9:00 p.m. At that time, the defendant was lying on the couch with his eyes

closed; Larry was unsure if the defendant was high, asleep, both, or just lying on

the couch. He went to Bryan’s home to get high because Ms. Smiley and Ms. Jack

were in the apartment. Ms. Jack joined him at Bryan’s apartment, and the three of

them got high while Bryan’s kids were there. Larry stated Ms. Smiley then came to

Bryan’s and told them Ms. Jones was at Larry’s apartment, so he told Ms. Jack to

“go see what's going on.” Larry testified that he then went home and that Ms. Jack

and Ms. Jones had had an altercation that morning over the relationship between

Ms. Jones and Jarred.

Larry testified that when he returned to his apartment, Ms. Jones was on the

ground “spinnin on her back" and kicking all over the place. He went back to

Bryan’s because Ms. Jack and Ms. Smiley were about to change Ms. Jones’s

clothes. After talking to Bryan about how Ms. Jones was behaving, Larry testified
13

that he went back outside, and Ms. Jones was lying on the ground by the steps and

that he placed a blanket on her due to the cold temperature. He further testified that

there were already a couple blankets outside with Ms. Jones, but she had become

uncovered. He stated that he argued with the defendant and Ms. Jack about Ms.

Jones being outside.

Larry was in Bryan’s apartment when Noah heard Ms. Jones and looked

outside. According to Larry, the apartments are all basically one large room and a

bathroom; therefore, he and Bryan were getting high in the same room where Noah

and his brothers were. Acknowledging that he and Bryan were smoking mojo,

Larry claimed that he never saw Noah open the door to the apartment or go outside,

but he testified that he heard Bryan tell Noah to “close the door.” Larry further

testified that Bryan asked Noah, “who is that” and Noah answered “Vernell.” Yet,

he denied hearing Noah say anything about the defendant hitting or kicking Ms.

Jones.

On cross-examination, Larry testified that he was waking up, after getting

high and falling asleep, when he heard Noah tell his father it was the defendant

who was outside. Although he admitted it was possible that Bryan may have heard

screaming outside, Larry testified that he did not hear anything and Bryan never

mentioned anything to him about hearing screaming. According to Larry, when he

went outside to go home, the defendant was outside trying to wake Ms. Jones up.

He stated Ms. Jones was still lying on her back, slightly to the side, and the

defendant was next to her. Although he claimed he never heard anyone screaming,

Larry acknowledged it was possible that he simply did not hear it because he was

in and out of sleep while high. Larry claimed that he never saw Ms. Jones at the

park across from his home and was unaware the defendant had had a previous

sexual relationship with Ms. Jones.
14

Ms. Smiley testified that in November of 2019, she was living with Ms. Jack,

Larry, and the defendant. She explained she had been homeless and was spending

some nights at their apartment and some nights in a tent. Ms. Smiley testified she

was good friends with Ms. Jones, had known her for over ten years, and believed

Ms. Jones was also homeless in November of 2019. Ms. Smiley described the

defendant as her “protector” because he would step in any time a man was being

loud or violent with a woman around him. Specifically, she testified that on

multiple occasions, the defendant prevented her ex-boyfriend from hitting her.

Ms. Smiley testified that Bryan was a drug dealer and they all obtained their

synthetic marijuana from him. She smoked dope at Bryan’s house at least 10 times.

According to Ms. Smiley, she and Larry were at Bryan’s apartment smoking

synthetic marijuana the day Ms. Jones died. She stated the defendant was at his

apartment passed out. She also testified that at one point, everyone in Bryan’s

home could hear screaming, which she described as two female voices “arguing

back and forth.” She then testified that Noah stuck his head out the door before

saying “Daddy, Kayla’s laying on the ground.” According to Ms. Smiley, Bryan

told Noah to close the door. She was adamant that Noah did not say anything else.

She further stated that Noah’s testimony that neither she nor Larry were present

and that his dad only smoked on the porch and never in front of the kids were lies.

Ms. Smiley testified that she initially smoked a blunt with the defendant and

Larry, but then she and Larry went to Bryan’s apartment when the defendant

passed out. According to Ms. Smiley, she returned to the defendant’s apartment

about an hour later, and they smoked another blunt, at which point he passed out

again. Ms. Smiley heard a knock at the door; it was Ms. Jones. She told Ms. Jones

she could not come in because Ms. Jack did not want her there, but Ms. Jones

15

pushed her way into the apartment. Ms. Smiley went to Bryan Love’s apartment to

get Ms. Jack.

According to Ms. Smiley, when she and Ms. Jack returned to the defendant’s

apartment, Ms. Jack and Ms. Jones started screaming at each other and got into a

physical altercation which left Ms. Jones on the floor. Ms. Smiley testified that Ms.

Jack either punched or pushed Ms. Jones, who ended up on the floor next to the

mattress. Ms. Smiley further testified that she left while the altercation was

ongoing and stated that the defendant was still passed out at that time. She also

testified that Ms. Jones “wigged out” that night and that, when she saw Ms. Jones

outside later, her pants were gone and her panties were wet. Ms. Smiley explained

that Ms. Jones sometimes flashed out and got “butt naked.”

Ms. Smiley returned to Bryan’s house and smoked another blunt while Ms.

Jones was wigging out at the defendant’s apartment. She stated Ms. Jones was on

the ground outside when she returned to her tent. According to Ms. Smiley, Ms.

Jones was passed out, snoring, in just her t-shirt and panties, so she took a

comforter and put it on Ms. Jones before leaving. Ms. Smiley stated that, when she

saw Ms. Jones’s panties were wet, she believed her water had broken and told

Bryan to call 9-1-1, but he refused because he had drugs in his apartment. When

she could not get anyone to call 9-1-1, Ms. Smiley went back to her tent and fell

asleep until someone woke her the next day and asked if she knew Ms. Jones was

killed.

On cross-examination, Ms. Smiley testified that when she left Bryan’s

apartment and saw Ms. Jones on the ground, the defendant was still asleep in his

apartment, and she got a comforter and put it on Ms. Jones. Ms. Smiley testified

she never told law enforcement she saw the defendant near Ms. Jones outside and

never saw the defendant be aggressive or hostile towards a female, claiming he
16

“deserves wings and a halo.” Ms. Smiley was adamant that she did not discuss

anyone’s trial testimony during the case, including with the defendant.

On rebuttal, the state recalled Sergeant Fontenot, who testified Ms. Smiley

told them during her initial interview that after Noah came back into the Love’s

apartment, Ms. Smiley left and saw the defendant standing over Ms. Jones outside.

The state also published to the jury a portion of the state’s recorded interview

between Sergeant Fontenot and Ms. Smiley.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS NUMBERS 1 & 2:

In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues the state failed to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed manslaughter of Kayla Jones, as

required by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979). Specifically,

he contends “the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

Vernell Chatman killed Kayla Jones or that he committed a simple battery upon

Kayla Jones that ultimately led to her death.”

In his second assignment of error, the defendant contends there was

insufficient evidence to support his conviction for second degree feticide, asserting:

When viewed under the Jackson [Id.] standard, the evidence
was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Vernell
Chatman killed Kayla Jones’ unborn child. The [s]tate also failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the cause of the unborn child’s death
which was necessary to establish that the unborn child was killed.
Alternatively, the [s]tate failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Vernell Chatman committed a battery upon Kayla Jones, and that
this battery was a proximate cause of the unborn child’s death. Thus,
the [s]tate failed to prove that Vernell Chatman committed second
degree feticide of Kayla Jones’ unborn child.

We address these assignments simultaneously. The analysis for insufficient-

evidence claims is well settled:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the
critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
17

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100
S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979), State ex rel. Grafagnino v. King,
436 So.2d 559 (La.1983), State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982),
State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La. 1981). It is the role of the fact
finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and
therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the credibility
determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations
under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino,
436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.
1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the
record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

The defendant was charged with second degree murder but convicted of

manslaughter, in violation of La.R.S. 14:31. Under La.R.S. 14:31:

A. Manslaughter is:

(l) A homicide which would be murder under either Article 30
(first degree murder) or Article 30.1 (second degree murder), but the
offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately
caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his
self-control and cool reflection. Provocation shall not reduce a
homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender's blood
had actually cooled, or that an average person’s blood would have
cooled, at the time the offense was committed; or

(2) A homicide committed, without any intent to cause death
or great bodily harm.

(a) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of any felony not enumerated in Article 30 or
30.l, or of any intentional misdemeanor directly affecting the person;
or
....

(3) When the offender commits or attempts to commit any
crime of violence as defined by R.S. 14:2(B), which is part of a
continuous sequence of events resulting in the death of a human being
where it was foreseeable that the offender’s conduct during the
commission of the crime could result in death or great bodily harm to
a human being, even if the offender has no intent to kill or to inflict
great bodily harm. For purposes of this Paragraph, it shall be
immaterial whether or not the person who performed the direct act
resulting in the death was acting in concert with the offender.

18

As noted by the state, the defendant’s argument addresses only a single

theory of manslaughter, i.e., the defendant killed Ms. Jones without intent to cause

death or great bodily harm but while committing the intentional misdemeanor of

simple battery. The state contends the defendant addresses only one theory of

misdemeanor manslaughter, when the jury could have found him guilty of

manslaughter and second degree feticide based on more than one theory, e.g., a

specific intent killing committed in sudden passion, a killing committed while

engaged in a simple battery, or a killing without specific intent as a result of the

defendant’s intoxication.

With regard to intoxication, the defendant filed a “Notice of Defense of

Voluntary Intoxication” in which he invoked La.R.S. 14:15(2), which provides that

the offender’s intoxicated or drugged condition is immaterial except “[w]here the

circumstances indicate that an intoxicated or drugged condition has precluded the

presence of a specific criminal intent or of special knowledge required in a

particular crime, this fact constitutes a defense to a prosecution for that crime.” As

discussed above, the testimony from multiple witnesses indicates the defendant

was so high that he passed out multiple times during the late night/early morning

hours that Ms. Jones died, as does his statement to law enforcement.

The defendant first argues that the state failed to establish how Ms. Jones

died. Dr. Welke testified, however, that in his expert opinion, Ms. Jones died from

a combination of asphyxia and hypothermia, which he opined was the result of

someone sitting or pressing down on her chest while cupping their hand over her

nose and mouth, which prevented her from breathing. Dr. Welke explained that the

unique injury around Ms. Jones’s nose was unlikely the result of a strike or punch

and that his belief was strengthened by the bruising on the inside of her mouth.

According to Dr. Welke, Ms. Jones either died from the asphyxia, or the asphyxia
19

caused enough damage that her brain could not tell her body to protect itself once

hypothermia set in during the freezing temperatures while she was woefully

underdressed.

In addition to Dr. Welke’s testimony as to the cause of Ms. Jones’s death,

the evidence tying the defendant to her death comes from eye-witness testimony.

The evidence establishes that every witness who claimed to be present during the

time prior to Ms. Jones’s death, except Noah, admitted to copious drug use on that

day. Consequently, it is unsurprising that the testimony of the adults and Noah was

inconsistent in many regards. However, as the trier of fact, “[a] jury may ‘accept or

reject, in whole or in part,’ any witness’s testimony.” State v. Hypolite, 04-1658, p.

5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/05), 903 So.2d 1275, 1279, writ denied, 06-618 (La. 9/22/06),

937 So.2d 381 (quoting State v. Silman, 95-154, p. 12 (La.11/27/95), 663 So.2d 27,

28).

Ms. Jack testified she heard the defendant tell the victim “Die, bitch, die!”

Noah Love testified he saw the defendant physically attacking the victim. The jury

also heard the defendant tell law enforcement that he was high on mojo and that

when he was high on mojo, he sometimes hallucinated. Ms. Jack, Ms. Smiley, and

Larry Chatman all testified that the day Ms. Jones died, the defendant spent most

of the time high and getting high.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a

rational juror could have found the defendant suffocated Ms. Jones before leaving

her in extremely cold weather with very little clothing, resulting in her death.

Furthermore, a rational juror could have found the defendant lacked any intent to

cause death or great bodily harm because he was highly intoxicated. Accordingly,

there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find the defendant guilty of

manslaughter, and the defendant’s first assignment of error lacks merit.
20

As to the defendant’s conviction of second degree feticide for the death of

Ms. Jones’s unborn child, Dr. Welke testified the child had a gestational age of a

little over eight months, weighed a little over eight pounds, and in his opinion, was

viable. Furthermore, Dr. Welke testified that he believed the child died “as a result

of the mother’s death.” Under La.R.S. ,

Feticide is the killing of an unborn child by the act,
procurement, or culpable omission of a person other than the mother
of the unborn child. The offense of feticide shall not include acts
which cause the death of an unborn child if those acts were committed
during any abortion to which the pregnant woman or her legal
guardian has consented or which was performed in an emergency as
defined in RSS. 40:1061.23. Nor shall the offense of feticide include
acts which are committed pursuant to usual and customary standards
of medical practice during diagnostic testing or therapeutic treatment.

Second degree feticide is prohibited by La.R.S. 14:32.7, which states in

pertinent part:

A. Second degree feticide is:

....

(2) A feticide committed without any intent to cause death or
great bodily harm:

(a) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of any felony not enumerated in Article 32.6
(first degree feticide), or of any intentional misdemeanor directly
affecting the person[.]

In order to convict the defendant of second degree feticide in the instant case,

the state had to prove that an unborn child died as a result of some act or omission

of the defendant not related to a legal abortion, and that it occurred when the

defendant was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any

intentional misdemeanor directly affecting the person. Here, based on the trial

court’s jury instruction, that misdemeanor would be simple battery. A battery is

relevantly defined in La.R.S. 14:33 as “the intentional use of force or violence

upon the person of another,” while La.R.S. 14:35(A) defines a simple battery as “a
21

battery committed without the consent of the victim.” Based on the evidence herein,

the jury could have found that the defendant committed a simple battery either by

kicking and hitting Ms. Jones as described by Noah Love or by covering her nose

and mouth while sitting on her chest as described by Dr. Welke. Therefore, when

viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, Dr. Welke’s testimony that

the child died because Ms. Jones died supports a rational juror’s finding the

defendant guilty of second degree feticide.

The defendant contends the state failed to prove how the child died, much

less that it was the result of any act or omission by him. He further argues that Dr.

Welke’s “feeling” the child died because his mother died is insufficient to satisfy

the state’s burden of proof. Although Dr. Welke acknowledged he did not perform

any autopsy on the child and simply testified he felt the death of Ms. Jones caused

the death of the child, he was accepted, without objection, as an expert in the field

of forensic pathology. Accordingly, we find his opinion as to the child’s cause of

death is sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction of second degree

feticide.

Finally, the defendant contends that under the literal language of La.R.S.

14:32.7(A)(2)(a), the intentional misdemeanor at issue had to be directed at the

unborn child, not Ms. Jones. To support this claim, he relies on language in State v.

Smith, 95-61 (La. 7/2/96), 676 So.2d 1068. A review of Smith shows his argument

lacks merit. In Smith, as here, the evidence established that the death of the mother,

who died by strangulation, caused the death of her four-month-old unborn child.

The court determined:

As an element of manslaughter (La.R.S. 14:31), the legislature
explicitly states that a homicide or killing of an individual must take
place. As an element of second degree feticide or any other grade, the
legislature states that the killing of an unborn child must take place.
Therefore, it is abundantly clear that the legislature intended that the
22

two instant crimes are separate and distinct, and are not lesser or
included offenses of each other.

Applying the principle of “common sense” enunciated in State
v. [v. Smith, 94-0621, 647 So.2d 1321 (La.App. 4th Cir.1994) on
remand for resentencing], had the legislature not intended that a
perpetrator be penalized separately for killing an unborn child where
the mother is also killed, it would not have made feticide a crime. The
two statutes were aimed at different evils which proves that the court
of appeal erred when the conviction for second degree feticide was set
aside based on the “same evidence” test. Killing the mother was an
element of manslaughter, not second degree feticide, whereas killing
of the unborn child was an element of second degree feticide and not
manslaughter. These two crimes involve different elements and
require different proof. Hence, the jury did not violate the defendant’s
right against double jeopardy when it imposed separate punishments.

Smith, 676 So.2d at 1071-72 (footnotes omitted).

In Smith, as here, the defendant’s conviction of feticide was predicated on

the fact that the unborn child died as a result of the mother being strangled to death.

There was no evidence that any misdemeanor was aimed at the fetus. Nonetheless,

the supreme court reinstated the defendant’s conviction for second degree feticide.

Consequently, the defendant’s reliance on Smith is misplaced. Accordingly, the

defendant’s second assignment of error lacks merit, and both of his convictions are

affirmed.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3:

In his third assignment of error, the defendant asserts that his conviction for

second degree feticide violated the double jeopardy clauses of the U.S. and

Louisiana constitutions, U.S. Const. Amend. V; La. Const. art. I, § 15, because

proof of the killing of Ms. Jones, was the only possible cause of death offered in

evidence for the death of her unborn child died. He argues there was “no proof of a

fact the state had to prove for the misdemeanor manslaughter, even though second

degree feticide required the additional proof of the death of the unborn child,” and

concludes the “same evidence” was used to prove violations of both La.R.S. 14:31

23

and La.R.S. 14:32.7. As the defendant notes, the “same evidence” test is no longer

used. State v. Frank, 16-1160 (La. 10/18/17), 234 So.3d 27.

Again, the defendant assumes the jury convicted him of misdemeanor

manslaughter, not one of the other theories set forth in La.R.S. 14:31(A)(2)-(3),

and contends that because his act or omission that resulted in the death of the

unborn child caused the death of the mother, his conviction for the lesser offense

cannot stand. He asserts the trial court failed to apply the test for double jeopardy

announced in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182

(1932), which provides, “where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation

of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether

there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a

fact which the other does not.”

The outcome here is no different under the standard set forth in Blockburger.

As discussed in Smith, second degree feticide requires proof of the killing of an

unborn child whereas manslaughter requires proof of the killing of an individual.

Accordingly, the defendant’s convictions of second degree feticide and

manslaughter do not violate the constitution prohibitions against double jeopardy,

and both convictions are affirmed.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4:

Lastly, the defendant contends that his consecutive sentences of thirty-two

years and eight years at hard labor are unconstitutionally excessive. He filed a

“Motion to Reconsider Sentence,” asserting that his sentence is excessive “for the

facts of this case” and “under the circumstances.” Louisiana Code of Criminal

Procedure Article 881.1(E) requires that the motion “include a specific ground

upon which a motion to reconsider sentence may be based.” His failure to satisfy

this requirement precludes him “from urging any ground not raised in the motion
24

on appeal or review.” La.Code Crim.P. art. 881.1(E). Nonetheless, this court has

reviewed claims of sentences being excessive where no objection was made and no

motion to reconsider sentence was filed. See State v. Johnlouis, 09-235 (La.App. 3

Cir. 11/4/09), 22 So.3d 1150, writ denied, 10-97 (La. 6/25/10), 38 So.3d 336, cert.

denied, 562 U.S. 1150, 131 S.Ct. 932 (2011). In the interest of justice, and given

our discretion to do so, we will review the defendant’s claim as a bare claim of

unconstitutional excessiveness. Id.

Louisiana courts have laid out the following guidelines for excessive

sentence review:

Sentences within the statutory sentencing range can be
reviewed for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Sepulvado, 367
So.2d 762 (La.1979). In State v. Barling, 00–1241, 00–1591, p. 12
(La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042–43, writ denied, 01–
838 (La.2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331, a panel of this court discussed the
review of excessive sentence claims, stating:

La. Const. art. I, 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall
subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To
constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court
must find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or
that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more
than a needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v.
Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial court has
wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within the
statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as
excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d
124, writ denied, 00-0165 (La. 6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067.
The relevant question is whether the trial court abused its
broad sentencing discretion, not whether another
sentence might have been more appropriate. State v.
Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied,
519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

Further, in reviewing the defendant’s sentences, the appellate
court should consider the nature of the crime, the nature and
background of the offender, and the sentences imposed for similar
crimes. State v. Lisotta, 98-648 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d
57 (citing State v. Telsee, 425 So.2d 1251 (La. 1983)), writ denied,
99-433 (La. 6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183. In State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4
25

(La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied, 03-562 (La.
5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061, a panel of this court observed that:

While a comparison of sentences imposed for
similar crimes may provide some insight, “it is well
settled that sentences must be individualized to the
particular offender and to the particular offense
committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d I (La.App. I Cir.
1991). Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial
court to particularize the sentence because the trial judge
“remains in the best position to assess the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances presented by each case.”
State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957,
958[, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615 (1996)].

State v. Soileau, 13-770, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1002, 1005-

06, writ denied, 14-452 (La. 9/26/14), 149 So.3d 261.

In State v. Baker, 06-1218 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/18/07), 956 So.2d 83, writs

denied, 07-320 (La. 11/9/07), 967 So.2d 496 and 07-1116 (La. 12/7/07), 969 So.2d

626, this court adopted the fifth circuit’s three factor test from State v. Lisotta, 726

So.2d 57. Under Baker, 956 So.2d 83, the first consideration is the nature of the

crimes. The defendant was convicted of manslaughter and second degree feticide;

both offenses necessarily involve the death of either an individual or an unborn

child. While the defendant contends the jury “concluded a simple battery

ultimately led to the deaths of Kayla Jones and her unborn child,” the jury could

have found the defendant guilty under other theories, such as the defendant being

so intoxicated that he lacked intent when he suffocated Ms. Jones to death or to the

point of brain damage before leaving her to die of hypothermia.

The defendant’s argument against his sentencing exposure primarily falls

into the second Baker factor, the nature and background of the offender. The

defendant contends that his history shows possible mental health issues and a

definite substance abuse problem, claiming “[m]ost of his arrests, which stretched

decades, were drug-related.” The defendant was a week shy of his thirty-sixth

26

birthday when he was sentenced and stated during trial that he completed the

eleventh grade and did not have a GED. At sentencing, the trial court

acknowledged that the defendant did not have a significant criminal history and

that his criminal history consisted primarily of “drug-related [charges] and

noncompliance with court appearances.” The trial court further acknowledged that

he appeared to have some “significant addiction issues” and that he potentially had

some mental health issues that “need to be addressed.”

The final Baker factor is sentences imposed for similar crimes. The

defendant received a thirty-two year sentence for manslaughter and an eight year

sentence for second degree feticide, with the sentences ordered to run

consecutively. He faced maximum sentences of forty years and ten years,

respectively. Therefore, his sentences both represent eighty percent of the possible

maximums. The trial court ordered that the sentences run consecutively, so his

sentences combine for forty years total.

There is very little case law on second degree feticide. However, in Smith,

676 So.2d 1068, the defendant was sentenced to thirty years for manslaughter and

ten years, the maximum, for second degree feticide. The sentences were not

ordered to run consecutively, but the maximum ten-year sentence for second

degree feticide, when the evidence was that the child died because the mother died,

is particularly telling. Additionally, our courts have previously upheld maximum

sentences for manslaughter convictions, even for first offenders. See State v.

Herbert, 12-228 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/13/12), 94 So.3d 916, writ denied, 12-1641 (La.

2/8/13), 108 So.3d 78; State v. Johnson, 38,415 (La.App. 2 Cir. 7/14/04), 878

So.2d 869, writ denied, 05-589 (La. 1/13/06), 920 So.2d 222.

In addition to his claim that his sentences are excessive individually, the

defendant also argues his sentences are excessive because the trial court ran them
27

consecutively rather than concurrently. In La.Code Crim.P. art. 883, the legislature

set forth the following regarding sentencing:

If the defendant is convicted of two or more offenses based on
the same act or transaction, or constituting parts of a common scheme
or plan, the terms of imprisonment shall be served concurrently unless
the court expressly directs that some or all be served consecutively.
Other sentences of imprisonment shall be served consecutively unless
the court expressly directs that some or all of them be served
concurrently. In the case of the concurrent sentence, the judge shall
specify, and the court minutes shall reflect, the date from which the
sentences are to run concurrently.

In State v. Bethley, 12-853, pp. 11-12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/6/13), 107 So.3d 841,

850, this court noted:

The imposition of consecutive sentences, however, requires particular
justification beyond the standard sentencing guidelines, justification
which must be articulated by the trial court at sentencing. State v.
Compton, 11-68 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/11), 66 So.3d 619, writ denied,
11-1362 (La. 12/2/11), 76 So.3d 1177. “The factors to consider when
imposing consecutive sentences include defendant's criminal record,
the severity or violent nature of the offenses, or the danger the
defendant poses to the public.” State v. Wallace, 11-1258, p. 14
(La.App. 3 Cir. 5/30/12), 92 So.3d 592, 602.

In addition to its normal discussion of the factors considered in crafting the

defendant’s sentence, the trial court noted the following:

I do find this to be a tragic case with families losing on both
sides. The Court is constantly involved with the plague of drugs and
their after-effects and consequences in which people have placed
themselves in such a situation these losses occur; but the cruelty and
disregard that the Court saw in this trial, disturbs that, and hopefully
that will haunt you, Mr. Chatman[,] for some time.

This court has previously noted that “an order directing that sentences

arising from a single course of conduct be served consecutively requires particular

justification from the evidence or record, and the trial court shall state the factors

considered and its reasons for the consecutive terms.” State v. Urena, 13-1286, p.

21 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/14), 161 So.3d 701, 715, writ denied, 14-1603 (La. 4/10/15),

164 So.3d 829.

28

When imposing consecutive sentences, the trial court observed this is a

tragic case that resulted from the defendant’s voluntary use and abuse of drugs to

the extent that use affected not only himself but other individuals and their families

as well. The court also noted the defendant’s cruelty and disregard for Ms. Jones

and her unborn child, who was sufficiently developed to survive on his own with

appropriate care. Thus, the defendant caused the death of two individuals, Ms.

Jones and her unborn child.

For these reasons, the defendant’s sentences of thirty-two years at hard labor

for his manslaughter conviction and eight years at hard labor for his second degree

feticide conviction are affirmed. The trial court’s order that his sentences be served

consecutively sentences is also affirmed.

DISPOSITION

As discussed above, the defendant’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

29