State of Louisiana v. Stacy Lynn Tharpe

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

KA 23-222

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

STACY LYNN THARPE

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF VERNON, NO. 95815
HONORABLE SCOTT WESTERCHIL, DISTRICT JUDGE

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GUY E. BRADBERRY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Jonathan W. Perry, Sharon Darville Wilson, and Guy E.
Bradberry, Judges.

AFFIRMED; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Terry W. Lambright
District Attorney
William R. Thornton
Assistant District Attorney
Thirtieth Judicial District Court
P.O. Box 1188
Leesville, LA 71496
(337) 239-2008
COUNSEL FOR:
State of Louisiana

Chad M. Ikerd
Louisiana Appellate Project
600 Jefferson Street, Suite #903
Lafayette, LA 70501
(337) 366-8944
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Stacy Lynn Tharpe

BRADBERRY, Judge.

On September 17, 2020, the State charged Defendant, Stacy Lynn Tharpe, by

bill of information with three counts of principal to second degree cruelty to a

juvenile, all in violation of La.R.S. 14:93.2.3(A)(1) and La.R.S. 14:24. She was

charged along with her two co-defendants, Dakota Wayne Singletary and Allen

Clayton Fulks. On February 2, 2021, Defendant pled guilty to count three of the bill

of information. Consequently, the State dismissed counts one and two.

Since Defendant agreed to testify truthfully at trial against any co-defendant,

her sentencing was deferred until all her co-defendants’ cases had been resolved.

Per the plea deal, the State made no sentence recommendation to the trial court.

Defendant acknowledged that the possible maximum sentence she could be given

was forty years at hard labor. On December 20, 2022, the court sentenced Defendant

to ten years at hard labor with credit for time served. During the sentencing hearing,

the court did not state the facts of the case but instead indicated that the facts were

the same as the Fulks matter, and it therefore utilized those facts to sentence

Defendant.

Defendant’s counsel objected to the sentence. A motion for reconsideration

of sentence was filed on January 11, 2023, and was denied, without written reasons,

on January 20, 2023. On January 26, 2023, Defendant filed a motion for appeal and

designation of record. It was granted by the trial court on January 27, 2023. The

instant appeal was filed on April 18, 2023. It contains one assignment of error: The

trial court abused its discretion by sentencing Defendant to a ten-year sentence based

on the facts of this case and her role as a principal to second degree cruelty to a

juvenile.

For the following reasons, we affirm Defendant’s sentence.

FACTS

The facts from which Defendant’s sentence was tailored were taken from the

record of sentencing of her co-defendant, Allen Fulks. The trial court recited the

facts for the record in Fulks’ case:

The facts of this case came to light following an automobile
accident on July the 6th, 2020, involving this defendant, Mr. Fulks, and
Dakota Wayne Singletary.

Sometime in mid-February 2020, Allen Fulks and his girlfriend,
Stacy Tharpe, took in a 7-year-old female child at the request of the
child’s mother as she had fallen on hard times and needed to get on her
feet and to secure a residence for herself and the minor child. . . . After
taking the child into the home, Ms. Tharpe and Mr. Fulks spoke with
Officer [Robert] Green of the Rosepine Police Department and advised
him that they’d be working with the child’s mother and they were
making arrangements to get the child into Rosepine Elementary School.
Officer Green was familiar with Ms. Tharpe as she had worked at the
Dollar General Store in Rosepine. Officer Green and his chief visited
the couple’s home and spoke with the couple and the minor child. They
advised that they needed school supplies, clothing and other things for
the child. In turn, Officer Green, community members and local
churches came together to raise items for the family which included
money, items for their family and it also included one of the churches
who bought this family a vehicle.

From time to time, Officer Green and other members of the
police department would stop by the residence to check on the child and
to see how things were going. This entire community was interested
and concerned about the welfare of this seven-year-old child.

On June 20th of 2020, a report of possible abuse of the child was
made to Officer Dylan Bergeron of Rosepine Police Department and
the informant was provided -- was provided the contact information for
the Department of Children and Family Services. This information was
conveyed to Officer Green.

On July the 6th of 2020, at 7:49 p.m., Officer Green drove to the
residence to make contact with the minor child. He was met outside on
the porch by Allen Fulks and Dakota Singletary. Dakota Singletary was
a friend of Allen Fulks and Stacy Tharpe and would stay at their home
on occasion for unspecified periods of time. Allen Fulks told Officer
Green that the minor child was with his mother and father on vacation.
Officer Green explained that he would like to see her upon her return
from vacation.

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Officer Green soon learned of an automobile accident involving
Allen Fulks and Dakota Singletary and he went to assist at 9:20 p.m.
Vernon Parish Sheriff Deputy Jacob Durrett was also at the scene and
both Officer Green and Deputy Durrett assisted Louisiana State Police
Trooper Peter Smith. Both Allen Fulks and Dakota Singletary were
transported to Beauregard Hospital by ambulance. Stacy Tharpe was
noticed at the scene in another vehicle. While working on the scene,
law enforcement officers were discussing the fact that the vehicle had
a child seat in it and how they were glad that there wasn’t a child in the
vehicle. The conversation then evolved into the fact that there is a child
staying at the home who hasn’t been seen in a while, which was the
minor child who is the victim in this case.

While waiting on the wrecker, Allen Fulks’ parents arrived at the
scene. Officer Green asked the parents how the minor child was doing
and told them that Allen Fulks had told him she was on vacation with
them. The parents looked puzzled and advised that the minor child was
not with them. The parents left the scene.

Officer Green subsequently left the scene of the accident and
made contact with the individual who reported the possible abuse
allegations and another party regarding the whereabouts of the minor
child. They both advised that they were told that the child was with a
Tristen Maricle.

Shortly thereafter, Stacy Tharpe arrived back at the scene to
attempt to retrieve items from the wrecked vehicle. She was informed
that only the registered owner of the vehicle would be able to retrieve
items. It was noticed that she did not have a minor child matching the
child’s age in the vehicle. After Stacy Tharpe left the scene, Louisiana
State Police Trooper Peter Smith contacted Officer Green and informed
him of this.

Officer Green initiated a traffic stop out of concern as to the
whereabouts of the minor child. Stacy Tharpe informed Officer Green
that the child was with Allen Fulks’ parents. Officer Green informed
her that he knew they did not have her. At that time, Stacy Tharpe began
to cry and ultimately took Officer Green to the child.

The minor child was located hiding in a bedroom of the home
and was in severe pain and had been severely physically abused. An
ambulance transported the child to Byrd Emergency Room for medical
attention.

The parties, Stacy Tharpe, Allen Fulks and Dakota Singletary, all
voluntarily answered questions during several interviews with
Detective David Vance at the Vernon Parish Sheriff’s Office.

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Through several interviews with Stacy Tharpe, Allen Fulks and
Dakota Singletary conducted by David Vance of the Vernon Parish
Sheriff’s Office and an interview with the minor child conducted by
Brittany Evans of the Children’s Advocacy Center, it was learned that
between May the 1st of 2020, and July the 6th, 2020, two months . . .
the child suffered ongoing abuse wherein Stacy Tharpe, Allen Fulks
and Dakota Singletary each participated in different ways, but were all
principals to each other’s acts. Often times they would watch one
another physically abuse the child and high five one another in
celebration -- high five one another in celebration.

The seven-year-old child was repeatedly struck with open and
closed fists in the back of the head and mouth, thrown up into the air
and onto the ground, kicked in the stomach, lashed with a belt as her
head was pressed into a pillow, slapped, popped in the mouth, held
by her shoulders, burned with cigarettes, punched and kneed in the
vagina, choked until she fell unconscious and choked with a belt. She
was forced to drink hot sauce concoctions. Her head was pushed into a
sheetrock wall. She was denied food and drink, and on some occasions,
denied food for three days. She was forced to take ice baths with her
hands and feet zip tied behind her back. Her hair was cut off. She was
lifted up by her hair and held in the air until her roots separated from
her scalp causing a bald spot on the top of the head. While being choked
with a belt, as the belt was being pulled above her head, she was told
“you’re going to die.” She was repeatedly forced to hide under a bunk
bed, inside an air vent for long periods of time to prevent the public or
any company from seeing the severe bruises on her body. When made
to hide in the air vent, she was made to wear a diaper and was left there
so long she urinated and defecated on herself. She was forced to hide
underneath the bed during the birthday party for Ms. Tharpe’s four-
year-old child. She was left alone, under the bed, while the family went
out to eat Mexican food.

These parties were placed under arrest. These parties neglected
the child and failed to seek medical treatment. As a result of the ongoing
abuse, the minor child suffered protraction [sic], disfigurement,
extreme bruising, unconsciousness, severe bodily injury, pain and
repeated injuries.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by this

court for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find

there are no errors patent, but find the court minutes of sentencing require correction.

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The court minutes state, “The Court ordered the defendant to received [sic]

drug treatment while incarcerated.” The sentencing transcript reflects that the judge

stated, “I’m gonna [sic] recommend to the Department of Corrections that she

receive any drug treatment that may be available or substance abuse treatment that

may be available, as well as any mental health treatment that may be available

through the Department of Corrections.” “[W]hen the minutes and the transcript

conflict, the transcript prevails.” State v. Wommack, 00-137, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir.

6/7/00), 770 So.2d 365, 369, writ denied, 00-2051 (La. 9/21/01), 797 So.2d 62.

Accordingly, this court orders the trial court to correct the sentencing minutes to

accurately reflect the trial court’s statement regarding a recommendation for

available drug, substance abuse, and mental health treatment.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Defendant’s sole assignment of error asserts that, based on the facts of this

case and her role as a principal to second degree cruelty to a juvenile, the trial court

abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence of ten years at hard labor.

Louisiana courts have laid out the following guidelines regarding excessive

sentence review:

Sentences within the statutory sentencing range can be reviewed
for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762
(La.1979). In State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir.
1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02),
808 So.2d 331, a panel of this court discussed the review of excessive
sentence claims, stating:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law
shall subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.”
To constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court
must find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that
the sentence makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than
a needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v.

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Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial court has
wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within the
statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as
excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124,
writ denied, 00-0165 (La. 6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The
relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad
sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might
have been more appropriate. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.
5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117
S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

Further, in reviewing the defendant’s sentences, the appellate
court should consider the nature of the crime, the nature and
background of the offender, and the sentences imposed for similar
crimes. State v. Lisotta, 98-648 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d
57 (citing State v. Telsee, 425 So.2d 1251 (La.1983)), writ denied, 99-
433 (La. 6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183. In State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4
(La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied, 03-562 (La.
5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061, a panel of this court observed that:

While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar
crimes may provide some insight, “it is well settled that
sentences must be individualized to the particular offender
and to the particular offense committed.” State v. Batiste,
594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991). Additionally, it is
within the purview of the trial court to particularize the
sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best
position to assess the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances presented by each case.” State v. Cook, 95-
2784 (La. 5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Soileau, 13-770, 13-771, pp. 4–5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1002,

1005–06 (alteration in original), writ denied, 14-452 (La. 9/26/14), 149 So.3d 261.

Here, the penalty for Defendant’s offense is imprisonment at hard labor for

not more than forty years. La.R.S. 14:93.2.3(C). Defendant’s ten-year sentence

therefore lies at the lower end.

Since the question is whether the trial court abused its discretion and not

whether another sentence would be more appropriate, we find, after considering the

nature of the crime, the nature and background of Defendant, and the sentences

imposed in similar cases, that Defendant’s sentence of ten years at hard labor is not

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constitutionally excessive. The trial imposed this sentence because Defendant had

accepted responsibility for her actions and had shown remorse for the victim.

Defendant also testified truthfully against Allen Fulks. Nevertheless, “this defendant

is just as responsible for the injuries and torture of this seven-year-old-child,” said

the trial court. “She also took advantage of the Rosepine community by using

donations to further her drug habit. . . . A lesser sentence would deprecate the

seriousness of this defendant’s offense.”

Nature of the Crime

While under the care of Defendant and her two co-defendants, the seven-year-

old victim, over a two-month period, endured beatings, torture, and neglect, and

suffered severe bodily injury, repeated injuries, and lasting mental trauma.

However, the evidence shows that she did not inflict any of the injuries upon the

child. The child, in fact, was pleading to the police that Defendant had nothing to

do with harming her.

Nature and Background of the Defendant

Defendant was a first-felony offender. She was thirty-two years old,

unmarried, with two children; she was in good health but suffered from depression,

anxiety, asthma, and high blood pressure; she had a history of medical procedures

and of drug and alcohol abuse, including the use of methamphetamines. To finance

her drug habit, she took advantage of the Rosepine community by using the

donations it had given her, meaning to benefit the victim. She had not had any

alcohol or drug treatment. She claimed to have earned a GED, and she was working

as a clerk at Dollar General at the time of her arrest. Defendant had accepted

responsibility for her actions and had shown remorse for the victim. Lastly,

Defendant testified truthfully against Allen Fulks.

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Sentences Imposed in Similar Cases

Defendant’s brief cites State v. Day, 15-564 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/23/15), 182

So.3d 1128. The defendant in Day first received thirty years for directly abusing her

stepson through emotional cruelty and criminal physical neglect. The nine-year-old

victim was found by his aunt. She found him shivering on the floor of a room

furnished with only a thin mattress and a Bible. He was starving. He weighed only

thirty-eight pounds. In the middle of his back was a large circular burn with a

diameter of seven to eight inches. He had ligature marks on the fronts of both ankles,

cuts on his head and inside his mouth and ear, bruises on his eye, lips, stomach, arms,

and legs, and he had “lunago,” indicating starvation. Id. at 1131. The abuse had

occurred over many months. Id. This court, however, vacated the thirty-year

sentence and remanded the matter for resentencing, noting the defendant was a first

felony offender without any prior history of violence and demonstrated a capacity

for rehabilitation. On remand, a ten-year sentence was imposed. The defendant

again appealed; however, the sentence was affirmed.

A fifteen-year sentence was imposed in State v. Conway, 50,596 (La.App. 2

Cir. 5/18/16), 196 So.3d 635, on a twenty-five-year-old first offender for her

mistreatment of her two-year-old daughter. The child suffered second and third

degree burns to both legs, a cut over the left eye, and other injuries to the liver, face,

and head. It must be noted, however, for pleading guilty to second degree cruelty to

juveniles, a sentencing cap of twenty years at hard labor was agreed upon, and the

defendant’s remaining charge of second degree battery was dismissed. Still, the trial

court chose not to impose the twenty years within its discretion but only fifteen years.

Despite her plea bargain, the defendant appealed her fifteen-year sentence, and the

second circuit agreed to review the matter because she had not been specifically

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informed that by pleading she was waiving her right to appeal her sentence as

excessive. Nevertheless, after considering the facts of the case and the benefit she

had received from the plea bargain, the second circuit affirmed the sentence. Id.

In State v. J.S., 10-391 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/3/10) (unpublished opinion), a

first-offender, female defendant mistreated a child under the age of seventeen,

resulting in a fracture of the child’s cranium. She pled guilty to two counts of second

degree cruelty to a juvenile, and three counts of the same offense were dismissed.

The defendant was sentenced to serve thirty years at hard labor on each count, with

eighteen years of each sentence suspended. The sentences were ordered to run

concurrently. Additionally, she was placed on five-year probation for each count,

to run consecutively at the end of her incarceration. This court affirmed the

sentences, noting that the defendant was a first offender and had benefitted from a

plea bargain.

Summary of the Arguments from Defendant and the State

Defendant argues her ten-year sentence is excessive because the court erred

in finding her just as responsible for the injuries and torture of E.J.1 as her two co-

defendants, Fulks and Singletary. Additionally, the court erred in finding she did

not act under strong provocation by the victim or others. In support, Defendant

addresses several mitigating factors she believes the court did not adequately

consider.

Firstly, Defendant asserts she did not act as E.J.’s torturer and in fact tried to

shield the victim from harm. Defendant notes E.J.’s response when asked during

her forensic examination if Defendant had hurt her. “No,” said E.J., “She tried to

1
Pursuant to La.R.S. 46:1844(W), the victim’s initials are used to protect her identity.

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help me.” E.J. also stated that once when Fulks was forcing her into an ice bath,

Defendant tried to save her but was pushed back into the bedroom. When E.J. was

asked if Defendant had done anything to her that she did not want, she answered no.

Also, Defendant would sometimes get between the victim and Fulks and would tell

him to calm down.

Defendant’s indirect role in the abuse of E.J., however, was acknowledged by

the trial court. “Further, the evidence shows that she did not inflict any of the injuries

upon the child,” said the court. “In fact, upon the rescue of the child, the child was

pleading with the police that this defendant had nothing to do with harming the child.”

Secondly, Defendant asserts she was repeatedly threatened by Singletary and

Fulks. Her relationship with Fulks was abusive and could have potentially

threatened the safety of her own two children. For example, once while Fulks and

Singletary were abusing E.J., Defendant came into the room; when asked if he had

made a statement to Defendant upon seeing her, Fulks said he was not sure, but if he

did, he probably said, “Carry your ass or you are next.”

Of her claim that she did not seek outside help because she feared her two co-

defendants would have violently retaliated against her or her children, the State

responds in its brief that there is no evidence that her two co-defendants threatened

her or her children in any manner. The State argues that Defendant was instrumental

to the repeated abuse of the child. When left alone, she never removed the child

from the abusive setting, either to seek help from the police or to seek medical

attention, and she repeatedly failed to assist law enforcement, including lying about

the whereabouts of the victim.

“It should be noted also,” said the court, “that there were two or three dogs in

this home and it’s sad to say that these dogs were treated better than this seven-year-

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old child.” The trial court, therefore, was aware of the harm E.J. could have avoided

if Defendant had removed her from the residence, and her failure to do so contributed

to its assessment of her culpability.

Lastly, Defendant argues that despite pleading guilty to count three of the bill

of information and expressing remorse for her role in the abuse of the victim, she

still received ten years, while Allen Fulks–who did not plead guilty nor express

remorse and who directly tortured E.J. – received a fifteen year sentence for count

three, the same count to which Defendant pled. The State responds that even though

Defendant was convicted as a principal, her ten-year sentence is still appropriate and

not excessive. By pleading guilty, Defendant was facing a possible sentence of forty

years. If she had not pled and instead had gone to trial, she would have faced three

counts of second degree cruelty to a juvenile and would have faced a sentence of up

to one-hundred and twenty years. This court agrees with the State’s argument.

As noted above, the trial court found that a lesser sentence would have

deprecated the seriousness of Defendant’s offense. Furthermore, it is true Allen

Fulks received fifteen years for count three, but he also received fifteen years for

count one and fifteen years for count two, and his three sentences (totaling forty-five

years) were set to run consecutively. Given the context, the apparent similarity of

Allen Fulks’s fifteen-year sentence and Defendant’s ten-year sentence disappears.

CONCLUSION

After reviewing the facts of the instant appeal and the sentences imposed in

similar cases, we find Defendant’s sentence is not constitutionally excessive. The

trial court adequately considered the facts and circumstances of the case before it

found Defendant equally responsible for the torture of the victim. The actions and

inactions of Defendant indissolubly interlinked her to the suffering of the victim who

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endured many weeks of torture and neglect by Defendant’s two co-defendants,

Dakota Singletary and Allen Fulks. Because of her decision to plead guilty and to

testify against Allen Fulks, Defendant received a far more lenient sentence than the

one she likely would have received if she had gone to trial, and there is little to

suggest her diminished sentence exhibits an abuse of discretion by the trial court.

This court affirms Defendant’s sentence. Additionally, this court orders the

trial court to correct the court minutes of sentencing to accurately reflect the trial

court’s statement at sentencing regarding its recommendation for available drug,

substance abuse, and mental health treatment.

AFFIRMED; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2–16.3.

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