State of Louisiana v. Jermarcus Leon McLendon

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

23-298

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

JERMARCUS LEON MCLENDON

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 16-K-4963-C
HONORABLE HERMAN C. CLAUSE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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SHANNON J. GREMILLION
JUDGE

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Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Shannon J. Gremillion, and Guy E.
Bradberry, Judges.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED;
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Peggy J. Sullivan
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 1481
Monroe, LA 71210
(318) 855-6038
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Jermarcus Leon Mclendon

Chad Patrick Pitre
Twenty-Seventh Judicial District Attorney
Alisa Ardoin Gothreaux
Assistant District Attorney
P.O. Box 1968
Opelousas, LA 70571
(337) 948-3041
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

GREMILLION, Judge.

Defendant, Jemarcus Leon McLendon, was convicted of the first degree

murders (violations of La.R.S. 14:30) of Nakia Ramer, Jr., and Shawn Parish. He

was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences. He appeals his convictions and the

consecutive imposition of the sentences. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the

convictions and sentences. We remand the matter to the trial court, though, and

order the trial court to inform Defendant of the provisions of La.Code Crim.P. art.

930.8 by sending appropriate written notice to Defendant within ten days of the

rendition of this opinion and to file written proof in the record that Defendant

received the notice.

FACTS

At 4:39 a.m. on Saturday, September 24, 2016, Mr. Wayne Soileau called the

St. Landry Parish Communications District, which handles 9-1-1 calls, informing

them that a car was located in the ditch of Cosay Road in which two men appeared

to have been shot. Mr. Soileau had stopped his car when he noticed the vehicle in

the ditch with its headlights on. When he realized the two occupants of the car were

deceased, Mr. Soileau panicked and left the scene. He drove to his home, which is

about two miles from the scene, then turned around and went to the house nearest

the scene and called 9-1-1. He did not give any statements to the authorities.

Deputy Andrew Lorah of the St. Landy Parish Sheriff’s Office arrived on the

scene at about 4:54 a.m. He observed the two men, later identified as Mr. Ramer

and Mr. Parish, at least a dozen cartridge cases in the road about 150 feet from the

car, a plastic baggie on the floorboard containing a white powder, and a pistol stuck

between the two front seats.

Detective Mark Fontenot was assigned as the crime scene investigator for the

case. He arrived on the scene at 6:13 a.m. Detective Fontenot identified the blue

Dodge Charger in which Mr. Ramer and Mr. Parish’s bodies were located as having

been rented by Lisa Oakley. He observed no evidence that the vehicle had crashed.

Detective Fontenot secured a Ziploc baggie containing “green vegetable matter”

from the car. He also located seventeen recently fired 7.62 x 39mm (henceforth

simply “7.62”) cartridge casings between 138 and 158 feet from the car. Detective

Fontenot also located a ZTE flip phone and an iPhone 6 Plus in the car. A discarded

job application bearing the name of Noah Briley was also found in the ditch, but its

weathered appearance led investigators to conclude that it was not related to the

crime.

The driver of the car was identified by his driver’s license as Nakia Ramer, Jr.

The passenger’s driver’s license identified him as Shawn Parish.

Detective Fontenot located a “writer’s palm” smudge, indicating the outer

area of the hand, on the vehicle, which he swabbed for DNA and lifted for a print.

Another palm print was found on the car, which he also swabbed and lifted. The

window and handle of the passenger rear door were also swabbed, as that door was

ajar when the vehicle was found.

At 10:41 a.m., an anonymous caller phoned 9-1-1 and stated that Joseph Reed,

Jr., had a gun and was bragging about shooting “Mooney.” The same caller phoned

again at 10:55 a.m. to ask when police were going to pick Reed up.

On Monday, September 26, Deputy Brandon Dugas was dispatched to 538

Marks Road to assist Deputy Keith Dupre at a disturbance involving a firearm.

Deputy Dugas detained three subjects, one of whom was Logan Vidrine. All three

were placed in the deputies’ squad cars as the others were questioned. Logan was

visibly nervous and sweating. Deputy Dugas found some 7.62 casings on the front

porch of the house and asked Logan about them. Logan told the deputy that he

owned a 7.62 rifle that he had reported as stolen but recently found the rifle under a
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trailer near his home. The rifle was actually located two houses down in the attic of

a house, where Logan had stashed it that morning.

Deputy Dugas retrieved the rifle and noticed what he thought was dried blood

on the foregrip. Detective Ronald Papillion photographed the rifle in Deputy

Dugas’s presence. Logan told Deputy Dugas he hid the rifle because “it might’ve

had a body on it,” which is slang indicating it may have been involved in a homicide.

According to Logan, the rifle had been stolen from his house one evening

about a month before the murders. David Miller, Defendant, and Tyler Marks,

Logan’s cousin, came to his home and beat him up. They took the rifle. Logan

claimed, despite Deputy Dugas’s information to the contrary, that he reported the

theft to the police. His claim was confirmed by his mother, Vickie Sandoval.

On the Friday before the murders, Logan claims that Defendant told him that

he knew where his rifle was and that for $200, he could get it back. Logan agreed.

The next morning, after the murders had occurred, Defendant arrived at Logan’s

house with the rifle wrapped in a blanket or towel. Defendant was paid $200. Logan

later testified that Defendant told him to tell others that Hunter Lanclos, one of

Logan’s acquaintances, had returned the gun. Logan was also told by Defendant

that the rifle might have been used in Lafayette and that he should be careful.

Defendant’s warning notwithstanding, Logan almost immediately began

posting videos to social media with him holding the rifle, starting around 4:14 a.m.

That morning, Logan learned of the murders.

Logan thought his mother was supposed to work that Saturday. At about 6:30

a.m., he woke her up while carrying the rifle slung over his back. As it turned out,

that Saturday was her only Saturday off for the month.

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On Monday, Logan and several friends were smoking and shooting his rifle

at a stop sign outside his house. Logan and Desi Bourgeois became embroiled in an

argument, and Logan’s mother called the sheriff’s office.

Deputy Dugas took possession of the rifle, removed the magazine, and cleared

the weapon chamber. He then delivered it to Detective Fontenot. Detective Fontenot

swabbed the foregrip and front sight with a test kit that returned a positive result for

blood. He swabbed them again for DNA, as well as the grip, trigger, and other areas.

Detective Fontenot obtained a DNA swab from Deputy Dugas and sent the swab kits

to the Acadiana Criminalistics Laboratory. Detective Marcus Bergeron collected a

DNA swab from Logan, which was also sent to the crime lab. Several projectiles

were recovered from the car and the bodies of Mr. Ramer and Mr. Parish, which

were also sent to the crime lab.

Logan was detained and questioned. He claimed at trial that he was not sober

during his first questioning but sobered as the day wore on. He admitted lying about

finding the rifle under a trailer in the neighborhood. Ultimately, he told the deputies

he got it from Defendant. Logan had been robbed a few weeks before the murders

as he arrived at a Days Inn hotel to sell some marijuana to an unknown purchaser.

He denied that the robbers were Mr. Parish and Mr. Ramer.

When he was questioned again on September 28, Logan turned over his cell

phone to the sheriff’s office and gave consent for it to be searched. Over 1,000 text

messages were retrieved from the phone. A number of text messages from

September 24 were exchanged between Logan and Defendant in which Defendant

repeatedly denied having sold the rifle back to Logan. These messages were

exchanged after Logan began posting videos to social media with the gun.

Stephanie Miller was involved in an intimate relationship with Defendant at

the time of the murders. She lived with her mother, Peggy Guidry. Stephanie abused
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crystal methamphetamine and formaldehyde in 2016; however, on the night of the

murders, she had only consumed two half-pints of vodka.

According to Stephanie, Defendant was at her mother’s house and took her

camouflage gloves and beanie. He left in the “wee hours” and returned two or three

hours later. The next morning, Defendant asked Stephanie to bleach her mother’s

truck. Stephanie thought this request was “stupid,” and wiped down the driver’s seat

and dash before abandoning the task.

Stephanie testified that she had seen Defendant with a rifle she thought was

an AK-47, though she was not certain. Defendant told her the gun belonged to Logan

Vidrine.

A few weeks before the murders, Stephanie overheard a phone conversation

between Defendant and the victims. Defendant was going to “cook some dope” for

them. Defendant told her that he held one or both of them responsible for the death

of his nephew.

After the murders, Defendant described to Stephanie walking up to the back

door of the car, opening it, and shooting the victims. He fired one shot at Mr. Parish

and several at Mr. Ramer. Defendant told Stephanie “there was matter on the

dashboard - - flesh.” Defendant blamed Mr. Ramer for the death of his son or

nephew, in memory of whom Defendant had gotten a tattoo. Although Stephanie

was interviewed several times by law enforcement, she never related this story to

any interviewer until her brother, David Miller, was arrested. Defendant told

Stephanie that he should have thrown the rifle into the pond behind Ms. Guidry’s

house.

Kullyn Briley, one of Stephanie’s sons, lived with his mother in his

grandmother’s house. After the murders, he was told by Defendant that one of the

two victims had been shot seventeen times and the other once. The one who had
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been shot seventeen times was because of the death of “Dee Dee,” Defendant’s

nephew. The other victim was shot “because he was there.”

Brisen Ryder was a friend of Logan. One evening after the murders, he was

at the home of his girlfriend, Nikki Dardeau, in Broussard, Louisiana, when

Defendant and Stephanie arrived. Brisen claimed that Defendant urged him to call

Deputy Dupre and tell him that Logan had shot Mr. Ramer and Mr. Parish. Deputy

Dupre drove to Broussard and took Brisen’s statement. Brisen later called Deputy

Dupre and recanted this statement.

David Miller testified for the State. He asserted that he received a call from

Defendant at about 4:10 a.m. on the morning of the murders. Before the call, he and

Destiny Jones were asleep in the same bed at Lance Briley’s home on Cosay Road.

Defendant told him that a car was in the ditch that belonged to one of his friend’s

fathers. David got up and dressed and grabbed a couple of beers. He then drove his

truck to the scene with Destiny. A surveillance camera at the Mohorn Church

recorded David’s truck passing by at 4:10 a.m. When David saw that the car did not

belong to his friend’s father, he drove on. David then called Defendant and told him

he had misidentified the car. Defendant then asked him whether the occupants were

breathing. Defendant asked David to give him a ride to Opelousas to pick up some

clothes because he was going on a trip. David picked Defendant up, and they went

to a couple of different locations. David dropped Defendant off at Ms. Guidry’s

house so Defendant could get picked up for his trip to Houston.

In November, Defendant and David were returning from a trip to Texas.

Defendant said to David, “[Y]ou knew where I was when I called you that morning.”

He further stated that he was “by the curb” and that “it was messy.”

David was arrested in connection with the murders. His testimony about

Defendant discussing the phone call from the scene of the murders was the first time
6

he told someone about this call. When questioned about that discrepancy, David

testified, “Yes. I didn’t recall all that.” The State granted David use immunity, but

he denied that this influenced his testimony. After he was granted immunity, David

remembered the conversation.

Lance Briley, who lives on Cosay Road, testified that when he went to bed on

September 23, around 10:30 or 11:00 p.m., David and Destiny were at his house.

He woke up at 5:00 a.m. to find them gone. He called David, who was at his

mother’s house picking Defendant up. David, Destiny, and Defendant drove Lance

to work. During that drive, none of them said anything about the car in the ditch.

Lance got off work around 10:30 or 11:00 a.m., and that is when he first heard

of the murders. He denied knowing either Mr. Ramer or Mr. Parish.

On Sunday, the day after the murders, several people were at Lance’s house.

At that time, Defendant asked if there were any cameras “down that road.”

Destiny Jones also testified under a grant of use immunity from the State. She,

too, had been indicted in part because of posts to social media that could be

interpreted as self-incriminating. Destiny had previously been in a relationship with

Defendant. At the time of the murders, though, she was involved in “back and forth”

relationships with David and his nephew, Kullyn Briley. She was eighteen years old

and involved in prostitution, drug dealing, and robbery.

On September 23, she was at Lance’s house with several people, including

David. Around 11:00 p.m., David got a call from Defendant about some white boys

with guns at Guidry’s house. David left and took Destiny’s phone. David returned

around 2:20 a.m. Destiny and David ate then eventually went a room “to have sex,

lay down, then we got high.” They snorted some meth, and Destiny took a “jigga,”

which was an “x pill.” She was not sure if David took “x.” Destiny said the drugs

she took made her alert, and her memories of the events were clear.
7

Defendant called two times. David answered the second call, and Defendant

told him that he needed to see about his people in the ditch because Defendant

thought they wrecked. Destiny and David went to check. It was around “four

something ish, late 3ish, like around four something.” Destiny had her phone with

her, and David had his. They saw the car, and it was not the right color. The back

door of the car was slightly open, and the interior lights were on. Destiny testified

that David stopped and got out, and returned, saying, , “[O]h fuck no.” He then got

back into his vehicle. He did not let Destiny get out of his truck.

David and Defendant subsequently spoke. David told Defendant the car did

not belong to his friend’s father, and Defendant cut him off and said he needed a

shower. Defendant also told David to meet him at Peggy’s house.

When they pulled up, Defendant came out in a white outfit. Defendant asked

David, “[W]ere them niggas breathing[?]” David indicated he did not know. Then

they talked about drugs. David then went in his own house to get drugs. Defendant

then looked at Destiny and asked, “[W]ere them niggas dead, D[?]”

Thereafter, Lance called David, wondering if David was still giving him a ride

to work. Trevor Briley came out of the house, and Defendant gave him drugs and a

“trap phone” or flip phone. They were going to do a line of meth before Trevor

came out.

Defendant, David, and Destiny left, with David driving. After they picked

Lance up, Defendant drove. Destiny did not think they used the same route going

back to Lance’s because they did not pass the car again. It was before 6:00 a.m.

when they left to take Lance to work. Defendant drove Lance to work and did not

drive the “easiest route.” Defendant then wanted to go to his mom’s house. While

there, they shot dice in the truck and eventually left. Defendant was dropped at

Guidry’s house, and Destiny and David went back to Lance’s house.
8

Destiny was questioned by the police. She lied to them about Defendant

having possession of the rifle and about the call Defendant made to David on the

morning of the murders. Destiny testified that at some point after the murders, she

and Defendant were at Peggy’s house, and Defendant told her that “he had to get

them before they got him.” Destiny also claimed that Defendant threatened her more

than once over what she said about the murders.

Destiny gave a statement to Deputy Dupre in which she implicated Logan,

Keenan Garrett, and Holden Vidrine in the murders, which were in retaliation for

the Days Inn robbery.

Defendant was interviewed by the police on three occasions. In the first,

Defendant denied having been in the area of the murders that morning. He also

denied Logan’s account of retrieving his rifle from Defendant.

In the second interview, taken four days after the first, he again denied

returning the rifle to Logan. He denied being in the area that day. He admitted

knowing Mr. Parish and Mr. Ramer, whom he called friends, although he

characterized them as robbers and murderers. Defendant pointed at a tattoo on his

arm and said he found out the day before that Ramer killed “him.”1 Defendant

further stated that Mr. Ramer and Mr. Parish had weed they had just murdered

someone for in New Orleans. A week before they died, they offered to sell him

several pounds of weed. Defendant said he declined the offer because he cooked

dope.

He admitted calling Mr. Parish at about 3:00 a.m. to wish him a happy

birthday. Mr. Parish called him back to ask for some dope, but Defendant told him

he did not have any and would not get any because he was traveling to Houston.

1
Several witnesses, including the artist, testified that shortly before the murders, Defendant
had himself tattooed with angel’s wings in honor of his nephew, “Dee Dee,” who had recently
been killed.
9

Defendant was interviewed a third time in November 2016. He was

questioned about a Springfield Armory 9mm pistol found in Stephanie’s purse. He

admitted that this pistol was taken from Logan and tossed under the house while

Logan was not looking. At that point, Defendant was informed that he was being

charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

Dr. Yen Van Vo testified as an expert in forensic pathology. He determined

that Mr. Parish had been shot nine times from behind. Any of five shots of the nine

would have been fatal. Mr. Ramer was shot fourteen times, at least nine from behind.

Dr. Vo could not determine the range from which the shots were fired.

Carolyn Booker of the Acadiana Crime Lab was accepted as an expert in

serology and DNA analysis. The swabs taken from the rifle were not blood. Swabs

taken from the rifle, magazine and unspent cartridges, spent cartridge cases, and the

exterior of the victims’ car were inconclusive for DNA matches from anyone from

whom a sample had been obtained, including Defendant.

Phillip Stout was accepted as an expert in forensic science with a specialty in

firearms examination. In 2016, he was employed at the Acadiana Crime Lab. Stout

testified that nineteen cartridge cases submitted by police were examined, and it was

determined that they had been cycled through the action of the weapon,” the rifle

taken from Logan. He could not determine if they had been fired by the weapon.

However, projectiles from Mr. Ramer’s body and from the driver’s seat were fired

from that rifle. Stout also determined that a jacketed bullet he examined was fired

from that gun. One bullet jacket fragment he studied exhibited the same type rifling,

but there were insufficient individual markings to say it was fired from the rifle.

Shane Garrard, an employee of the St. Landry Parish Sheriff’s Office, was

accepted as an expert in call detail and mapping analysis. Garrard gave a list of

phone numbers associated with several people involved in this case: Verizon–Logan
10

Vidrine 337-336-3214; AT&T–Shawn Parish 337-418-6702 and 337-945-5778;

Defendant 337-308-6080 and 337-692-0771; David Miller 337-351-8163; Destiny

Jones 337-418-6888; and Keenan Garrett 337-678-8314. Garrard testified regarding

cell towers used during the pertinent time period by the phone numbers provided.

He explained that cell towers are divided into three sectors, splitting a circle

into three parts. By using the sectors, the “direction that the device that was using

that tower was located.” The State asked Garrard if he recognized maps he made at

its request and published those maps to the jury.

According to Garrard, Logan’s activations at 4:42 and 4:45 were indicative

that he was between two towers “in the little balloon where that house is.” Logan’s

device did not move “outside of that little area at all on this map.” Logan did not

cross the “plane of that east tower and go east of that.” By contrast, both Defendant’s

phone and Mr. Parish’s phone activated to the east of the tower and activated on the

same tower during the time frame of the murder. As for David’s device, no data was

returned from 3:00 to 5:00.

There were 174 contacts between Logan and Defendant on Logan’s phone

that were not found on Defendant’s. Garrard indicated the information had been

deleted or Defendant used a different phone. Additionally, communications between

Destiny and Defendant had been deleted. Indeed, all communications from

September 24 were absent from Defendant’s phone.

Garrard gathered information for a phone number associated with Garrett.

That device did not leave the Opelousas area from 11:00 p.m. through 6:00 a.m., and

the phone was not deactivated for any length of time.

Garrard testified about Mr. Parish’s phone records. The State asked, “[T]hat’s

going to be 3:43 in the morning. . . . So, 4:43 in the morning is that a reception?”

11

Garrard indicated it was “probably” an answered call. Garrard was further

questioned:

Q. So, this is going to be 3:43 in the morning last call answered ten
seconds . . . . The one right before that that . . . coming in from 6080
[Defendant’s phone] again, that’s at 3:37 in the morning. How long did
that call last?

A. One minute nineteen seconds.

Q. So, that was definitely a received call.

A. Yes.

Defendant called Mr. Parish at 3:04 and 3:20 a.m., and Mr. Parish called Defendant

at 3:25, 3:27, 3:34, and 3:35 a.m. Defendant texted Mr. Parish on September 24,

2016, at 8:55 a.m.: “See how y’all played me. Had me wait for nothing. I told you

the B daddy was tripping. I had to walk and get in my car. Don’t ask for a ride and

I still love you. Call me when you get up.” Mr. Parish was dead at that time, as the

9-1-1 call was placed at 4:39.

David received a text on September 27, 2016, at 2:48 p.m. that was deleted:

“Logan is going to - - Bobby Guidroz - -. She’s going to tell him she know [sic]

about the murder scene and show the videos about Logan to him, and I figured Lance

and Rachel will show him - - from out of nowhere, who is - - Bobby - - already show

him the same thing. It will be under control.” This text originated from Defendant.

Other content was either deleted from David’s phone or put in the trash bin. This

included David texting back and forth with Defendant between 8:17 and 8:20 a.m.

However, Defendant’s messages were present for September 25. Garrard had

no knowledge of when any information was deleted from phones.

Garrard was asked if the telephone number associated with Defendant was

operating in the general vicinity of the crime scene at a suspicious time. Garrard

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replied: “We never say that. The telephone number associated with 6880 was

operating on those towers that does service the scene of the crime.”

On cross-examination, Garrard was asked about NELOS (Network Event

Location Services) data provided by AT&T, which stated, “The results provided are

AT&T’s best estimate of the location of the target number. Please exercise caution

in using these records for investigative purposes, as location data is sourced from

various databases, which may cause location results to be less than exact.” Each

data entry provided a statement regarding location accuracy, for example,

“[L]ocation accuracy likely better than 5,000 meters.” This was the equivalent of

three miles. Other entries were accurate within six miles. However, when creating

the maps, Garrard filtered out data less likely than 500 meters.

Crystal Leblanc was employed by the Opelousas Police Department from

2013 to 2016. She investigated the death of Donnie Sam, who may have been known

as Dee Dee. However, she never heard anyone call him that. Traylon Batiste was

convicted in relation to his death, and there were no other suspects. Jaylon Levier,

Keenan Garrett’s little brother, died in August 2013. It was determined that Mr.

Parish was responsible for Levier’s death, but the charge against him was dismissed

because the death was deemed accidental.

Deputy Dupre was called by Defendant. He testified about a statement he

obtained from Destiny that implicated Logan, Keenan Garrett, and Holden Vidrine.

After the close of evidence and summations, the jury retired and returned a

unanimous verdict finding Defendant guilty of the two murders. Defendant now

appeals, and asserts that the following were errors:

I. The evidence adduced at trial was not sufficient to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt Mr. McLendon was culpable in the murders
of Nakia Ramer, Jr., and Shawn Parish. There were no
eyewitnesses to the killings; the gun used to commit the offense
did not belong to Mr. McLendon; and, the evidence of his
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involvement was in the form of witnesses whose credibility was,
to say the least, suspect.

II. The trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence
of other crimes or acts, which did nothing more than paint Mr.
McLendon in a bad light and which had little to no probative
value.

III. The trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences,
particularly in light of the failure to provide any basis for the
consecutive, as opposed to concurrent, sentences in a case where
the offenses arose out of one course of action or transaction.

ANALYSIS

Errors Patent:

Under La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, we are mandated to review all matters for

errors patent on the face of the record. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article

930.8 provides that no applications for post-conviction relief, including applications

for out-of-time appeals, may be considered if filed more than two years after the

judgment of conviction and finality of sentence. Trial courts are required to advise

defendants of this provision at the time of sentencing. La.Code Crim.P. art.

930.8(C). That did not occur at Defendant’s sentencing; therefore the trial court is

directed to inform the Defendant of the provisions of La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8 by

sending appropriate written notice to the Defendant within ten days of the rendition

of the opinion and to file written proof in the record that the Defendant received the

notice.

Assignment of Error Number One:

Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.

[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a criminal conviction must be not simply to determine whether
the jury was properly instructed, but to determine whether the record
evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. . . . [T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt.
14

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2788–89 (1979)(emphasis

in original).

Defendant notes that the evidence turned on the testimony of witnesses who

admitted lying and drug use. Most of the witnesses were related to or in relationships

with other witnesses or interested parties. There were no eyewitnesses, there was no

DNA linking Defendant to the crimes, phone records never pinpointed him at a

location on Cosay Road, and no one admitted being involved with or at the scene

with Defendant.

The credibility of almost every lay witness was at issue in this case. There

was testimony, however, that the jury could rely on to connect Defendant to the

offenses. Defendant made several incriminating statements. Defendant admitted

the killings to Stephanie, there was matter on the dashboard, and that he walked up

to the car and opened the back door. Defendant also told Stephanie to bleach her

mother’s truck. David testified that Defendant called him about the car, and later

that night, Defendant asked David if the victims were breathing. At a later date,

Defendant told David he was by the “curb” when he called David at 4:00 a.m., and

it was messy. The crime was committed in an “S curve” on Cosay Road.

Destiny confirmed David’s testimony regarding Defendant asking whether

the victims were breathing. Destiny further testified that Defendant asked her if the

car’s occupants were dead. Additionally, Defendant told Destiny he had to get the

victims before they got him. Kullyn testified Defendant said one of the victims was

shot so many times because of Dee Dee, and Trevor said Defendant told him he did

it because they killed his nephew.

Several witnesses connected Defendant to the murder weapon and confirmed

that it had been taken from Logan. Then, shortly after the murders, Defendant

15

returned the rifle to Logan, who almost immediately began posting images to social

media posing with the rifle.

The jury heard all of the evidence presented and made credibility

determinations in this case. “It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective

credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should not second

guess the credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency

evaluations under the Jackson standard of review.” State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p.

5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we cannot say

the evidence did not sufficiently establish Defendant’s guilt.

Assignment of Error Number Two:

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce

evidence of other crimes or acts which did nothing more than paint him in a bad light

and had little to no probative value.

At the time of trial, La.Code Evid. art. 404(B) provided:

Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. (1) Except as provided in Article
412, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by
the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable
notice in advance of trial, of the nature of any such evidence it intends
to introduce at trial for such purposes, or when it relates to conduct that
constitutes an integral part of the act or transaction that is the subject of
the present proceeding.

The State filed a notice of intent to introduce evidence of other acts/crimes on

January 6, 2023, seeking to introduce evidence that Logan Vidrine was beaten and

of Defendant’s involvement in the drug trade. The evidence was to be presented

through statements Defendant made to law enforcement and the testimony of

Stephanie, Peggy Guidry, Logan, Colby Soileau, Destiny, and David. A hearing on
16

the motion was held on January 13, 2023. The court found the State’s notice was

timely and adequately provided the defense with notice of its intent to introduce

other acts/crimes evidence.2

On January 13, 2023, Defendant filed a “Motion and Incorporated

Memorandum to Exclude Evidence or Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts,” addressing

the beating of Logan and Defendant’s involvement with drugs. He asked the court

to instruct witnesses, including law enforcement, Stephanie, Peggy Guidry, Logan,

Colby Soileau, Destiny, and David, not to refer to this evidence during their

testimony. On January 19, 2023, the State filed a “Memorandum in Response to

Defendant’s Objection to State’s Motion Regarding 404(B) Evidence and Notice.

Minutes of court for January 23, 2023, state:

The Court, on Friday, January 13, 2023 the Court heard the following:
(1) State’s Motion to Introduce Other Acts/Crimes Evidence
Admissible Under LA Code of Evidence Article 404(B) and Request
for Notice of Hearing; (2) State’s Motion to Determine Free and
Voluntary Nature of Defendant’s Statements. The Court rules as
follows, In reference to Motion (1), the Court finds that the as to the
Defendant’s interviews, the statements present therein were free and
voluntary under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court will
determine admissibility when the appropriate time presents itself.

....

The Defense filed a Reverse 404B Notice and/or Motion in Limine. The
motion was taken up and argued. There was no ruling required by the
Court at this time.

2
Defendant filed a writ application with this court seeking review of the trial court’s ruling
that the State’s notice of intent was adequate and arguing that the trial court erred in failing to
determine the admissibility of evidence before trial. This court found the trial court’s ruling on
the State’s notice was correct. As to a hearing, this court found that Defendant did not clearly
request a hearing. Nevertheless, information provided to the court indicated Defendant filed a
Motion to Exclude Evidence of Other Crimes requesting a ruling on the admissibility of the other
crimes evidence at issue, and the hearing was set for Monday, January 23, 2023, rendering the
claim premature. State v. McLendon, 23-33 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/20/23) (unpublished opinion).
17

The January 24, 2023 minutes of court provide, in part, “Out of the presence

of the jury, a discussion was held regarding 404 Other Crimes Evidence. There was

no ruling required by the Court.”

On January 27, 2023, the State sought to introduce evidence that Defendant

called Destiny a “ratting ass bitch.” During argument on the admissibility of this

evidence, defense counsel stated, “But most important, and I’ll say this, Judge, if she

wants to say that he called her a rat bitch, I think that would be fine, but to show a

video of their interaction . . . crosses over from more prejudicial than probative all

things considered.” The trial court also addressed La.Code Evid. art. 404(B) and

stated, “I will allow the introduction of the jail video[.]” Thereafter, defense counsel

suggested that the court address other anticipated issues relating to La.Code Evid.

art. 404(B). The court stated it had previously ruled on the free and voluntary nature

of Defendant’s statements to investigating officers. The trial court then concluded

it had ruled on Defendant’s “motion to exclude.”

Defendant subsequently addressed statements about the battery of Logan. The

court found it was up to the jury to decide if the allegations were true, and the entirety

of Defendant’s statements were admissible. Defendant next addressed allegations

that he cooked dope, and the court denied Defendant’s motion.

Minutes from January 27, 2023, provide, “The Court will allow introduction

of video with the witness’s testimony. The Court ruled that 404B evidence will be

admissible (from previous hearing on February 13, 2023 [sic]). The Court further

ruled that the defense’s previously filed 404B motion is DENIED.”

In brief to this court, Defendant addresses the admissibility of evidence that

he cooked dope. He alleges the State failed to provide evidence to suggest the

offenses involved a drug deal inasmuch as the victims had a small amount of

marijuana and some cash on them when they were found, and there was no testimony
18

that the murders occurred as the result of a drug deal gone bad. Defendant points

out Stephanie Miller’s testimony that he was cooking dope for the victims and the

trial court’s refusal to require redaction of his statements to remove references to

cooking dope. Defendant suggests there was no evidence to support Stephanie’s

statements or that Defendant ever sold drugs to the victims or engaged in a drug deal

with the victims on September 24, 2016.

Defendant also addressed testimony that Logan was beaten. He suggests that

event had no bearing on the case, inasmuch as Logan was not a victim, Logan did

not testify that the rifle was taken when he was beaten, and there was no testimony

the decedents were involved in the incident. Additionally, the incident did not prove

motive, opportunity, or intent. Thus, testimony regarding the beating was prejudicial

to Defendant.

Defendant further complains about the admissibility of Destiny’s testimony

that Defendant called her a “ratting ass bitch.” Defendant alleges his actions did not

support the offense of intimidation of or impeding a witness, as set out in La.R.S.

14:129.1(A)(1).3

Defendant’s brief does not comply with Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal,

Rule 2–12.4. Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2–12.4 states:

A. The brief of the appellant shall contain, under appropriate
headings and in the order indicated:

....

(3) a jurisdictional statement setting forth the constitutional and
statutory basis for the court to exercise appellate jurisdiction, with

3
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:129.1 provides, in pertinent part:

A. No person shall intentionally:

(1) Intimidate or impede, by threat of force or force, or attempt to intimidate
or impede, by threat of force or force, a witness or a member of his immediate
family with intent to influence his testimony, his reporting of criminal conduct, or
his appearance at a judicial proceeding[.]
19

citations to applicable provisions. The jurisdictional statement shall
also include the dates of the judgment appealed and of the motion and
order for appeal to establish the timeliness of the appeal and the
following, as applicable:

....

(9) the argument, which shall contain:

(a) appellant’s contentions, with reference to the specific
page numbers of the record and citations to the authorities on
which the appellant relies;

(b) for each assignment of error and issue for review, a
concise statement of the applicable standard of review, which
may appear in the discussion or under a separate heading placed
before the discussion; and

(c) for each assignment of error and issue for review which
required an objection or proffer to preserve, a statement that the
objection or proffer was made, with reference to the specific page
numbers of the record; and

....

B. (1) A copy of the judgment, order, or ruling complained of,
and a copy of either the trial court’s written reasons for judgment,
transcribed oral reasons for judgment, or minute entry of the reasons, if
given, shall be appended to the brief of the appellant. If reasons for
judgment were not given, the brief shall so declare.

....

(3) The court may not consider the argument on an assignment
of error or issue for review if suitable reference to the specific page
numbers of the record is not made.

(4) All assignments of error and issues for review shall be
briefed. The court may deem as abandoned any assignment of error or
issue for review which has not been briefed.

In support of his argument, Defendant cites record page 868, which contained

Stephanie’s testimony that Defendant cooked dope for the victims. He also cites

pages 1296 and 1297 from January 27, 2023. Pages 1296 and 1297 contain a portion

of defense counsel’s argument regarding the admissibility of evidence that

Defendant cooked dope and the trial court’s statement that the defense’s motion was

20

denied. Defendant does address what occurred during proceedings held on January

13, January 23, and January 24. Defendant made three statements to police, and he

fails to identify which of the three statements contains remarks regarding cooking

dope and the specific wording of the objectional statements. Moreover, there was

no indication the trial court made any ruling regarding the admissibility of testimony

about Defendant’s involvement in cooking dope prior to January 27. However,

Stephanie testified on January 24, and defense counsel did not move for a ruling on

the admissibility of her testimony at that time, and Defendant does not point to any

objection to her testimony. Furthermore, the discussion had on January 27 did not

reference Stephanie’s testimony. Defendant’s arguments regarding references to

him cooking dope appear more like a complaint as to the sufficiency of the evidence

and not a La.Code Evid. art. 404(B) analysis.

Defendant also fails to address the proceedings held on January 13, January

23, and January 24 in his attack on the admissibility of testimony about beating

Logan. In that discussion Defendant merely cites record page 1105, which is

testimony by Logan as to the date he bought two guns and when the AK-47 was

stolen. The witnesses who testified about the beating included Brisen, Logan, David,

and Destiny. Brisen testified on January 25, and Logan and David testified on

January 26. Defendant points to no ruling regarding the admissibility of testimony

about the beating made prior to January 27, and Defendant does not point to any

objection to the witnesses’ testimony. Furthermore, the discussion had on January

27 merely referenced the testimony of Logan. Thus, Defendant’s brief fails to

comply with Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2–12.4.

When the parties addressed the admissibility of Destiny’s testimony, they

discussed the elements of La.R.S. 14: 129.1(A)(1). However, the trial court’s ruling

was limited to the video of Defendant’s exchange with Destiny. Defendant does not
21

address the content of the video in brief to this court or argue the video was

inadmissible. Because, as defense counsel said, “[I]f she wants to say that he called

me a rat ass bitch, I think that would be fine,” and Defendant does not point to an

objection made during Destiny’s testimony, the issue before the court was not

preserved for review. La.Code Crim.P. art. 841.

For these reasons, Defendant’s second assignment of error lacks merit.

Assignment of Error Number Three:

In his third assignment of error, Defendant contends the trial court erred in

imposing consecutive sentences, particularly in light of the failure to provide any

basis for the consecutive sentences in a case where the offenses arose out of one

course of action or transaction. Defendant suggests the trial court made no findings

and stated no reasons for imposition of consecutive sentences. Additionally, the

sentences imposed do not further the ends of justice. Thus, the trial court should

have ordered the sentences to be served concurrently.

The penalty for second degree murder is a mandatory term of life

imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

La.R.S. 14:30.1. Defendant did not move for a downward departure pursuant to

State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276 (La.1993). Thus, the only discretion the trial judge

could exercise was whether to order the sentences for the two murders to run

concurrently or consecutively. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 883

provides, “If the defendant is convicted of two or more offenses based on the same

act or transaction, or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, the terms of

imprisonment shall be served concurrently unless the court expressly directs that

some or all be served consecutively.” The failure of the trial court to articulate the

reasoning behind imposing consecutive sentences does not require that the matter be

22

remanded if the record adequately supports consecutive sentences. State v. McKeel,

13-855 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1029.

Defendant did not object to the consecutive nature of the sentences when they

were imposed and did not file a motion to reconsider his sentence. In similar

instances, this court has held that review of the sentences is precluded; however, in

the interest of justice, this court has reviewed sentences for constitutional

excessiveness, including the consecutive nature of the sentences imposed. State v.

Pardue, 22-565 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/15/22), 359 So.3d 158; State v. Wood, 08-1511

(La.App. 3 Cir. 6/3/09), 11 So.3d 701. Defendant’s criminal history, the

dangerousness and viciousness of the crimes, the harm to the victims, whether the

defendant poses an unusual risk of harm to the public, the defendant’s potential for

rehabilitation, and whether the defendant benefited from a plea agreement are

relevant to whether imposing consecutive sentences is appropriate. State v. Henson,

19-881 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/3/20), 298 So.3d 844, writ denied, 20-785 (La. 11/18/20),

304 So.3d 422.

The majority of shots from the rifle hit the victims in the back, indicating an

ambush-style attack. Each of the victims was hit by several rounds: Mr. Ramer was

hit fourteen times and Mr. Parish nine. The killings were brutal. Further, it appears

the killings were in retaliation for the earlier killing of Donnie Sam, for whose

murder Traylon Batiste was convicted. Given the circumstances of the murders, we

cannot say the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences.

In State v. Dunbar, 94-1492, p. 10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/31/95), 657 So.2d 429,

434 (alteration in original), this court addressed the defendant’s claim that the trial

court erred in imposing consecutive sentences as punishment for offenses which

arose out of the same course of conduct:

23

Even if the trial judge committed error in imposing consecutive
sentences, the error was harmless. For defendant’s aggravated rape
conviction, the trial judge sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment
at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of
sentence. In State v. Mosley, 466 So.2d 733 (La.App. 4 Cir.), writ
denied, 468 So.2d 1202 (La.1985), the fourth circuit, with whom we
agree, found remand unnecessary in a life-imprisonment case where the
imposition of consecutive sentences was improper. The court in Mosley
sentenced the defendant to consecutive sentences of ninety-nine (99)
years each on three counts of armed robbery, a total of 297 years, to be
served without benefits. The fourth circuit stated, “Whether [the
defendant’s] sentence is 99 years or 297 years he will be in jail for the
rest of his life unless he is pardoned. Remanding for resentencing under
these circumstances is an academic exercise which has no practical
benefit to anyone.” Mosley, 466 So.2d at 736, see also State v.
Franklin, 519 So.2d 292, 295 (La.App. 5 Cir.1988). In State v.
Dennard, 482 So.2d 1067, 1068 (La.App. 3 Cir.1986), this court stated
in dicta that since the defendant “has but one life to serve, it is difficult
to see that a consecutive sentence would penalize him excessively.”
Thus, even if the trial court erred in imposing a consecutive sentence in
the present case, the error was harmless.

Based on Dunbar and the factors indicating that consecutive sentences are

appropriate, this assignment of error lacks merit.

DECREE

The trial court is ordered to inform Defendant of the provisions of La.Code

Crim.P. art. 930.8 by sending appropriate written notice to Defendant within ten days

of the rendition of the opinion and to file written proof in the record that Defendant

received the notice. Defendant’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED; REMANDED WITH
INSTRUCTIONS.

24