State of Louisiana v. Luke L. Boudine, Jr.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

23-373

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

LUKE L. BOUDINE, JR.

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL TRIAL COURT
PARISH OF VERMILION, NO. 67555
HONORABLE THOMAS JAMES FREDERICK, TRIAL JUDGE

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GARY J. ORTEGO
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sharon Darville Wilson, Gary J. Ortego, and Wilbur L. Stiles,
Judges.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

Donald Dale Landry
District Attorney
Fifteenth Judicial District, Lafayette Parish
P.O. Box 3306
Lafayette, LA 70502
(337) 232-5170
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Christopher Albert Aberle
Louisiana Appellate Project
P.O. Box 8583
Mandeville, LA 70470
(985) 871-4084
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Luke L. Boudine, Jr.

Aaron M. Meche
Assistant District Attorney
Fifteenth Judicial District, Vermilion Parish
100 North State Street, Suite 215
Abbeville, LA 70510
(337) 898-4320
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

ORTEGO, Judge.

Defendant, Luke L. Boudine, Jr., a/k/a Luke Boudine, a/k/a/ Luke Boudine,

Jr., a/k/a Luke Landell Boudine, a/k/a Luke Landell Boudine, Jr., a/k/a Luke

Lyndell Boudine, Jr., appeals his plea/conviction of manslaughter, in violation of

La.R.S. 14:31. Defendant argues that a remand for a hearing on the voluntariness

of his plea of manslaughter is required because (1) the trial court failed to

accurately advise Defendant of the nature of the charges, and (2) his plea lacks a

factual basis. Defendant further argues that a remand is necessitated by the lack of

a factual basis specifically as it relates to his sentencing. For the following reasons,

we affirm Defendant’s conviction and sentence.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 23, 2021, a Vermilion Parish grand jury indicted Defendant with

one count of second-degree murder, in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. Thereafter, on

December 8, 2021, Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State. As

part of the plea agreement, the State amended Defendant’s charge down to

manslaughter, in violation of La.R.S. 14:31, and Defendant pled no contest to the

amended charge.

On March 17, 2023, Defendant appeared for sentencing. At the conclusion

of the hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant to serve thirty years at hard labor,

credited Defendant for all time served, and designated Defendant’s penalty to run

concurrently with any other sentence Defendant was serving. Defendant did not

file a request for reconsideration as to sentence.

Defendant now appeals. On September 11, 2023, the State filed a response

brief, and on September 21, 2023 Defendant filed a reply to that response.

FACTS

As Defendant entered a plea agreement and pled no-contest, the record lacks

a factual basis established at trial. However, the information in the presentence

investigation report shows that Defendant was a friend or friendly with the victim,

Jadan Ben. On the evening of June 28, 2021, Defendant picked up Mr. Ben in a

car belonging to Defendant’s aunt, and they rode around together. The joint ride

ended when Defendant shot Mr. Ben eleven times and either pushed him out of the

vehicle or left him in the roadway. Before he died, Mr. Ben identified Defendant

as the person who shot him. Defendant abandoned the car and the two guns used

in the shooting. Defendant then enlisted the assistance of additional relatives so he

could go into hiding at a nearby Days Inn.

On December 8, 2022, Defendant entered a no contest plea to manslaughter,

in violation of La.R.S. 14:31. The text of the plea, as contained on the plea form,

is as follows:

“I, Luke Boudine Jr., on my plea of GUILTY/NO CONTEST, to the
charge of Manslaughter, have been informed and understand the
charge to which I am pleading guilty, as well as the following
[Boykin] rights . . . .”

In signing the form, Defendant further acknowledged, “I further state

that my plea in this matter is free and voluntary.”

At the plea hearing, and prior to accepting Defendant’s plea, the trial court

questioned Defendant, “Do you understand that the sentence which can be imposed

upon you for the crime of manslaughter is imprisonment at hard labor for not more

than forty years?” Defendant replied, “Yes, sir.” After that, Defendant affirmed

that he had read his plea agreement, understood it, and signed it freely and

voluntarily. The trial court then found Defendant to be competent, to have a clear

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understanding of the charges against him, to have a clear understanding of the

possible penalties, to have had the benefit of consulting with an attorney, and to

have freely and voluntarily signed the plea form.

After questioning Defendant regarding his understanding of his individual

Boykin rights and the waiver thereof, the trial court found Defendant had

knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights. The trial court then advised

Defendant that by pleading no contest, he was “not admitting nor disputing any of

the facts alleged” but was agreeing that, if they “went to trial [,] these facts would

be proven.” The trial court queried whether Defendant understood that a no

contest plea had the same effect as a guilty plea, and Defendant said he understood.

The trial court then asked Defendant to listen carefully to the factual basis of

Defendant’s charge, stating:

[T]he State hereby amends the indictment to allege the crime of
manslaughter in lieu of second degree murder and would offer
evidence in support that[,] on or about June 28, 2021, Luke Boudine
committed a homicide on one Jaylan Ben under circumstances by
provocation which would cause the inhabitant [sic] person to lose self
control of a proven plan [sic].

The trial court inquired whether Defendant disputed or challenged the facts,

and Defendant said he did not. When the trial court asked Defendant how he pled

to the charge of manslaughter, Defendant responded, “No contest.” The trial court

further asked if Defendant was pleading no contest because he felt it was in his

best interest, and Defendant agreed, “Yes, sir.” Shortly thereafter, the trial court

found a factual basis for and accepted Defendant’s plea.

The record shows that Defendant did not object or file a motion to withdraw

his plea.

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ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find there are

no errors patent.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal, Defendant argues that:

1. Remand for a hearing on the voluntariness of the plea is required because (1)
the district court failed to accurately advise Boudine of the nature of the
charges, and (2) the plea lacks a factual basis, which is necessitated by
Boudine’s post-plea, innocence-related protestations.

2. Remand for further findings at sentencing is necessitated by the lack of a
factual basis in support of sentencing.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

Defendant challenges the voluntariness of his no contest plea and submits

“Remand for a hearing on the voluntariness of the plea is required because (1) the

district court failed to accurately advise Boudine of the nature of the charges, and

(2) the plea lacks a factual basis, which is necessitated by Boudine’s post-plea,

innocence-related protestations.”

Defendant argues the trial court’s advisement that a manslaughter was a

homicide committed under provocation was an insufficient advisement of the

nature of the offense. Defendant alleges this is especially true in light of

Defendant’s post-plea comments suggesting he had no specific intent to kill and

acted in self-defense. Defendant asserts the State’s advisement about the nature of

the charge was insufficient because it used the term “homicide,” which

encompasses more types of human death than first or second degree murder;

“homicide” is a broader term than defined by La.R.S. 14:31. The defense argues

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that this court should find that the instruction on the nature of the offense must

have included the terms “murder” and “specific intent to kill.”

Defendant further contends that there was no factual basis for Defendant’s

conviction given at the plea hearing and that the record is entirely devoid of a

factual basis for the conviction. Again, the defense points to Defendant’s post-plea

comments suggesting Defendant had no specific intent to kill and acted in self-

defense as a reason to remand for a hearing to determine whether Defendant

understood the nature of the offense and whether the plea was supported by a

significant factual basis.

In its response brief, the State argues it provided a factual basis for the

charge to which Defendant was pleading, Defendant made no indication at the plea

hearing that he did not understand the nature of the charge, and Defendant did not

protest or dispute the factual basis provided by the State. As such, the State asserts

Defendant cannot now make a valid claim that he did not understand the nature of

the charge at the time of the plea. The State further denies Defendant’s claims that

he was not accurately advised of the nature of the charges and that both

Defendant’s plea and sentence lack a factual basis.

Both the State and the defense cite to State v. Clause, 22-545 (La.App. 3 Cir.

1/25/23), 354 So.3d 1269, in their briefs. In Clause, this court relied upon State v.

McGarr, 52,641, 52,642 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/10/19), 268 So.3d 1189, for the purpose

of establishing the standard of reviewing pleas on appeal:

When the record establishes that an accused was informed of and
waived his right to a trial by jury, to confront his accusers, and against
self-incrimination, the burden shifts to the accused to prove that
despite this record, his guilty plea was involuntary. Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); State
v. Cooper, 52,408 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/08/18), 261 So.3d 975; State v.
Martin, [48-45 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/15/13), 115 So.30 750].

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An express and knowing waiver of those rights must appear on
the record, and an unequivocal showing of a free and voluntary waiver
cannot be presumed. Boykin, supra; State v. Johnson, 51,430 (La.App.
2 Cir. 07/05/17), 224 So.3d 505; State v. Kennedy, 42,850 (La. App. 2
Cir. 01/09/08), 974 So.2d 203. A plea of guilty normally waives all
non jurisdictional defects in the proceedings prior to the plea,
including insufficiency of the evidence. State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d
584 (La. 1976); State v. Johnson, supra; State v. Stephan, 38,612 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 08/18/04), 880 So.2d 201. A validly entered guilty plea,
or plea of nolo contendere, waives any right a defendant might have
had to question the merits of the state’s case and the factual basis
underlying the conviction. State v. Bourgeois, 406 So.2d 550 (La.
1981); State v. Cooper, supra; State v. Hardy, 39,233 (La. App. 2 Cir.
01/26/05), 892 So.2d 710.

Clause, 354 So.3d at 1275 (quoting McGarr, 268 So.3d at 1196–97).

In addition to advising defendants of the Boykin constitutional rights they

waive as a result of a plea, the trial court has statutory duties in relation to guilty

and nolo contendere pleas:

A. In a felony case, the court shall not accept a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant personally in
open court and informing him of, and determining that he
understands, all of the following:

(1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the
mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the
maximum possible penalty provided by law.

(2) If the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that he
has the right to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the
proceeding against him and, if financially unable to employ counsel,
one will be appointed to represent him.

(3) That he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that
plea if it has already been made, and that he has the right to be tried
by a jury and at that trial has the right to the assistance of counsel, the
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, and the
right not to be compelled to incriminate himself.

(4) That if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere there will not be
a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo
contendere he waives the right to a trial.

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(5) That if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere, he may be
subject to additional consequences or waivers of constitutional rights
in the following areas as a result of his plea to be informed as follows:

....

(d) It shall be sufficient to utilize a form which conveys this
information [about the additional consequences of the plea] to the
client and the form shall constitute prima facie evidence that the
content was conveyed and understood.

B. In a felony case, the court shall not accept a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant personally in
open court and determining that the plea is voluntary and not the
result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement.

C. (1) The court shall also inquire as to whether the defendant’s
willingness to plead guilty or nolo contendere results from prior
discussions between the trial attorney and the defendant or his
attorney. . . .

....

E. Any variance from the procedures required by this Article
which does not affect substantial rights of the accused shall not
invalidate the plea.

La.Code Crim.P. art. 556.1. “[E]rrors concerning Article 556.1(A)(1) are subject

to the harmless error analysis.” State v. Wilson, 13-1164, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir.

5/7/14), 157 So.3d 83, 86.

[V]iolations of Article 556.1 that do not rise to the level of Boykin
violations are subject to a harmless error analysis. To determine
whether a violation of Article 556.1 is harmless, the proper inquiry is
whether the defendant’s knowledge and comprehension of the full and
correct information would have likely affected his willingness to
plead guilty.

The test for the validity of a guilty plea does not depend on
whether the trial court specifically informed defendant of every
element of the offense. Rather, the defendant must establish that he
lacked awareness of the essential nature of the offense to which he
was pleading. Further, this Court has found that “[w]hen a defendant
is represented by counsel, the trial court accepting his guilty plea may
presume that counsel has explained the nature of the charge in
sufficient detail that the defendant has notice of what his plea asks

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him to admit.” State v. Dadney, 14-511 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/16/14),
167 So.3d 55, 60, writ denied, 15-90 (La. 10/30/15), 179 So.3d 614.

State v. Blunt, 20-171, p. 9 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/18/20), 307 So.3d 384, 392–93

(citations omitted); State v. Minniefield, 43,300, (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/4/08), 986 So.2d

227.

Also in Clause, this court quoted from State v. Johnson, 04-1266 (La.App. 3

Cir. 2/2/05), 893 So.2d 945, for the principles that no contest/nolo contendere pleas

are not the same as pleas wherein the defendants maintain their innocence and,

therefore, no contest/nolo contendere pleas do not require a factual basis:

Generally, a defendant waives the right to question the merits of
the State’s case or the underlying factual basis by entering a plea of
guilt, or plea of nolo contendere. State v. Brooks, 38,963 (La.App. 2
Cir. 9/22/04), 882 So.2d 724. “When a guilty plea is otherwise
voluntary, there is no necessity to ascertain a factual basis for that plea
unless the accused protests his innocence or for some other reason the
trial court is put on notice that there is a need for such an inquiry. In
that event, due process requires a judicial finding of a significant
factual basis for the defendant’s plea.” State v. Linear, 600 So.2d
113, 115 (La.App. 2 Cir.1992); See North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). However, this court
has held that a plea of nolo contendre [sic] alone, unlike a guilty plea
accompanied by a claim of innocence, does not put the trial court on
notice that a significant factual basis must be obtained. State v.
Villarreal, 99-827 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/16/00), 759 So.2d 126, writ
denied, 00-1175 (La. 3/16/01), 786 So.2d 745; State v. Guffey, 94-797
(La.App. 3 Cir. 2/1/95), 649 So.2d 1169, writ denied, 95-973 (La.
9/22/95), 660 So.2d 469.

Clause, 354 So.3d at 1279–80 (quoting Johnson, 893 So.2d at 950).

Instead, a plea of no contest/nolo contendere is the equivalent of an

admission of guilt and is treated as a guilty plea. State v. Gordon, 04-633,

(La.App. 1 Cir. 10/29/04), 896 So.2d 1053, writ denied, 04-3144 (La. 4/1/05), 897

So.2d 600. “A guilty plea relieves the state of the burden of proving guilt and

waives the defendant’s right to question the merits of the state’s case and the

factual basis underlying the conviction, as well as appellate review of the state’s

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case against the defendant.” State v. Dungan, 54,031, pp. 24-25 (La.App. 2 Cir.

9/22/21), 327 So.3d 634, 647-48 (citing State v. Hardy, 39,233 (La.App. 2 Cir.

1/26/05), 892 So.2d 710), writ denied, 21-1679 (La. 1/26/22), 332 So.3d 82.

This court has found that including the handwritten term “Alford plea” in the

plea of guilty/nolo contendere form along with the defendant’s assertion that she

intended to enter an Alford plea was sufficient to require a remand for the purpose

of determining whether the plea was a no contest or an Alford plea and for the

entry of a factual basis for the plea if it was entered in accordance with Alford.

State v. Anderson, 16-588, (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/1/17), 214 So.3d 979, writ denied, 17-

864 (La. 1/29/18), 233 So.3d 609.

However, in State v. Whiddon, 99-1, (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/2/99), 741 So.2d 797,

this court held harmless the trial court’s failure to read the elements of an offense

in satisfaction of La.Code Crim.P. art. 556.1(A)(1)’s statutory requirement to

inform the defendant of the nature of the charges where the defendant did not

allege any misunderstanding as to the nature of the charges and where there was no

indication that the defendant’s plea was involuntary. This court then went on to

explain that the statutory requirement to advise a defendant of the nature of the

plea was not a mandate to obtain a factual basis in support of the plea.

In State v. Ford, 02-1394, (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/16/03), 846 So.2d 98, writ

denied, 03-1401 (La. 11/26/03), 860 So.2d 1132, the fourth circuit found the

defense failed to support its claim that the record contained no evidence to indicate

the defendant understood the nature of the charges against him where 1) the trial

court informed the defendant he was pleading guilty to armed robbery, 2) the trial

court informed the defendant of the mandatory minimum and maximum sentences

for the offense, 3) the trial court personally questioned the defendant regarding his

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waiver of his Boykin rights, 4) the defendant was represented by counsel at the

time of his plea, and 5) the defendant failed to complain that he did not understand

the charges against him. The fifth circuit, in State v. Forrest, 04-43, (La.App. 5

Cir. 5/26/04), 876 So.2d 187, reached the same conclusion in a case involving the

same claim and similar facts.

Additionally, in the instant case, the Defendant raises no question regarding

whether the district court advised Defendant of his constitutional rights or whether

Defendant understood and validly waived those rights.

Thus, we find this argument by Defendant is without merit.

Next, Defendant argues that his plea required a substantial factual basis to be

read into the record at the time of the plea. We find this argument is misguided.

Our review of the record clearly shows Defendant voluntarily intended to

enter a no contest plea. The plea form indicates Defendant intended to plead nolo

contendere, and at the plea hearing, Defendant agreed that he had read the form,

understood it, and signed it freely and voluntarily. There is no mention of Alford

on Defendant’s plea form. At the plea hearing, the trial court told Defendant a plea

of no contest meant Defendant agreed that, if the case went to trial, the State would

prove these facts. Further, Defendant indicated his understanding that his no

contest plea had the same effect as a guilty plea.

Additionally, when the State announced at the plea hearing that if the matter

went to trial the evidence would prove, “on or about June 28, 2021, Luke Boudine

committed a homicide on one Jaylan Ben under circumstances by provocation

which would cause the inhabitant [sic] person to lose self control of a proven plan

[sic][,]” Defendant specifically declined to dispute or challenge the state’s

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statement of facts on the record. Finally, when the trial court asked Defendant how

he pled to the charge of manslaughter, Defendant answered, “No contest.”

Defendant made no indication on the plea form or at the plea colloquy that

he intended to maintain his innocence; and Defendant did not request or file a

motion to withdraw his no contest plea.

In summary, the record clearly shows Defendant intended to plead no

contest, and he pled no contest to these charges; thus, the trial court was not

required to give a factual basis for Defendant’s plea.

As to Defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in failing to inform

Defendant of the nature of the charge against him, the record shows the trial court

did not read the elements of the offense of manslaughter to Defendant during the

plea colloquy. As such, the trial court failed to inform Defendant of the nature of

the charge, which is a violation of La.Code Crim.P. art. 556.1(A)(1). However, in

order to be entitled to the relief requested, Defendant must prove that had the trial

court informed Defendant of the elements of the offense, Defendant would not

have pled no contest.

Here, and as previously stated, Defendant read and understood his plea form;

Defendant agreed to plead no contest to manslaughter; and Defendant specifically

declined to challenge or dispute the State’s allegation that the evidence would

show he “committed a homicide on one Jaylan Ben under circumstances by

provocation which would cause the inhabitant [sic] person to lose self control of a

proven plan [sic].” Additionally, the trial court informed Defendant of the penalty

range for manslaughter, and Defendant failed to raise any complaint that he did not

understand the charges against him.

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Thus, we find that Defendant failed to meet his burden of proving that he

would have maintained his not guilty plea had the trial court specifically read the

elements of the offense of manslaughter into the record at the time of his plea.

Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 2:

In this assignment of error, Defendant challenges the validity of his sentence

based upon the factual basis provided by the sentencing court, and submits

“Remand for further findings at sentencing is necessitated by the lack of a factual

basis in support of sentencing.” Defendant argues the trial court should have given

greater weight to Defendant’s young age; his status as a first offender;1

Defendant’s claim he did not intend to kill his friend; and Defendant’s assertion

that he acted in self-defense. Defendant asks this court to remand Defendant’s

case for the trial court to provide a factual basis in support of its reasons for

sentencing.

A review of the record shows that at the beginning of the sentencing hearing,

the trial court commenced the proceeding by making its findings of facts based

upon Defendant’s presentence investigation, as follows:

Mr. Boudine, you were here before this Court on December 8
of last year, 2022, and on that date you entered a plea of no contest to
the crime of manslaughter. At that ti[m]e[,] I ordered a pre-sentence
investigation and deferred sentencing until today’s date. I have
received the pre-sentence report and have studied it for the purpose of
determining an appropriate sentencing in this case. I’ve shared that
report with the Assistant District Attorney and with your attorney
Mrs. Johnson. The possible sentence which can be imposed upon you
for the offense of manslaughter . . . is imprisonment at hard labor for
not more tha[n] forty years. The pre-sentence report does not reflect
any prior convictions or pending charges. Thus[,] the defendant is

The record shows Defendant had spent time in a juvenile detention center, so this was
1

Defendant’s first adult offense.

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technically or officially classified as a first offender. Although the
Court does take notice that the defendant admitted to the existence of
a juvenile record and, in fact, that is where he met the victim when
they were both in [a] juvenile detention center. When offered the
opportunity to make a statement for the purposes of this report[,] the
defendant deferred until the time of sentencing. The Court has
received several letters or statements from the defendant[’]s family
and friends, 21 to be exact. The Court has read each of these letters
and will make them a part of the record. Finally, the Court is in
receipt of and has read letters or statements submitted by the
victim[’]s family regarding the loss they suffered and asking simply
that justice be served. These statements are made a part of the pre-
sentencing report which is now made a part of the record and will be
placed under seal, as well as the statements on behalf of the defendant.

In concluding the sentencing hearing, the trial court gave additional reasons

for its ruling:

The Court has carefully studied the pre-sentence report,
including the lack of record or prior offenses. Factors in mitigation
presented by the defendant and the letters submitted by both the
defendant’s family and the victim’s family. The Court has considered
these matters, as well as the nature of the offense. In light of the
provisions of Article 894.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the
Court makes the following findings regarding the sentence.

As I mentioned earlier, in preparing for today’s sentencing, I
read the statements submitted on behalf of the defendant. The general
theme of these statements is that the defendant is not a bad person.
And, but for his admission to committing this act, I may believe it.
Emphasis was placed on the fact that the defendant was raised in a
single parent home without a father figure. But being raised in a
single parent home is no excuse for committing a criminal or bad act.
The defendant’s actions alon[e] caused the damage, which was done,
the taking of another person’s life. Thus, he must bear the ultimate
responsibility. Many offered to assist the defendant to find
employment and stay out of trouble once his sentence is complete.
Well, the Court has a question for these people. Where were you
when this defendant needed you most? After he committed the act, it
is not the time to offer help, but rather before it was committed. There
is one simple model to live by it is easier to stay out of trouble th[a]n
to get out of trouble. You have plead no contest to a very serious
crime. A crime which included the use of a dangerous weapon, a
firearm, and inflicted death or great bodily harm upon the victim.
There has been no evidence of provocation or anything that would
justify - - that would suggest justification for your conduct. In fact, all
indications that the defendant and the victim were friends or
acquaintances. And that the defendant picked up the victim in North

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Lafayette, drove him to [a] remote location South of Abbeville where
he shot a defenseless victim. The Court finds that the fact that the
victim was shot multiple times, suffering eleven gunshot wounds,
without any suggestion of provocation or justification highlights the
brutality of this offense. The letters requested leniency on behalf of
the defendant. Leniency was given when the charge was reduced,
when he plead to the amended charge, and avoided life imprisonment
without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension. Under the law[,]
you may be entitled to a probated sentence, but this Court finds that a
lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of that crime. For
that reason[,] imprisonment for a period of time is warranted.
Therefore[,] the sentence which I impose upon you is as follows:

I remand you to the custody of [the] Department of Corrections
for a period of thirty years. You are also given credit for any time you
have served on this charge. Your sentence has not been enhanced
pursuant to the provisions of Revised Statu[t]e 15 Section 529.1 or
Criminal Procedure Article 893.3, or any other provision of law. . . .

The requirement that the sentencing court “state for the record the

considerations taken into account and the factual basis therefore in imposing

sentence” is part of the sentencing guidelines. La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1(C).

However, the failure to state a factual basis for the sentence imposed or to

otherwise comply with the sentencing guidelines is among those claims waived by

the failure to file a motion to reconsider sentence arguing the issue. State v.

Meaux, 21-522, (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/23/22), 335 So.3d 309; State v. Francis, 99-208,

(La.App. 3 Cir. 10/6/99) 748 So.2d 484, writ denied, 00-544 (La. 11/13/00), 773

So.2d 156.

Additionally, Defendant did not make or file a motion to reconsider the

sentence. Under La.Code Crim.P. art. 881.1(E), the “[f]ailure to make or file a

motion to reconsider sentence or to include a specific ground upon which a motion

to reconsider sentence may be based . . . shall preclude the . . . defendant from

raising an objection to the sentence or from urging any ground not raised in the

motion on appeal or review.”

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Therefore, this assignment of error is precluded from review on appeal.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, Luke L. Boudine, Jr.’s conviction and sentence

are affirmed.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

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